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ARISTOTLE'S
ETHICS AND POLITICS.

VOL. I.

**Strahan and Preston,
Printers-Street, London.**

ARISTOTLE'S
ETHICS AND POLITICS,

COMPRISING HIS
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK :

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;
THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;
AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY

JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F. R. S. AND S. A. LONDON; F. R. S. EDINBURGH; AND
HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele.

CICERO FRAGMENT. PHILOSOPH.

THE THIRD EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

**PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES,
IN THE STRAND.**

1813.

Ga 1/2.510.3

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P R E F A C E.

ARISTOTLE is the most voluminous, and generally deemed the most obscure, of all the Greek writers of classic antiquity. His imperfect yet copious remains, which are now rather admired than read^a, and which were formerly much read and little understood, still naturally arrange themselves in the minds of those capable of digesting them, under their original form of an encyclopedy of science; in many parts of which, the author's labours are, doubtless, excelled by those of modern philosophers; while in other parts, and those of the most important nature, his intellectual exertions remain hitherto unrivalled. It seemed high time, therefore, to draw the line between those writings of the Stagirite which still merit the most serious attention of the modern reader, and those of

^a I except the small but incomparable Treatise on Poetry, excellently translated and commented in two recent publications in English; the books on Rhetoric and the History of Animals, to which Mr. Cassandre and Mr. Camus have respectively done justice in French; and the Organum, or Logic, still studied in some Universities.

which the perusal is superseded by more accurate and more complete information. This line I have presumed to draw in the present work, by endeavouring to the best of my abilities to translate the former perspicuously and impressively, while I contented myself with giving a distinct and comprehensive analysis of the latter.

The "Ethics to Nicomachus and the Politics" ought never to have been disjoined, since they are considered by Aristotle himself as forming essential parts of one and the same work^b; which, as it was the last^c and principal object of his studies, is of all his performances the longest, the best connected, and incomparably the most interesting. The two treatises combined, constitute what he calls his *practical* philosophy^d; an epithet to which, in comparison with other works of the same kind, they will be found peculiarly entitled. In the Ethics, the reader will see a full and satisfactory delineation of the moral nature of man, and of the discipline and exercise best adapted to its improvement. The Philosopher speaks with commanding authority

^b See vol. i. p. 241. and p. 534 & seq.

^c Compare vol. i. p. 534 & seqq and vol. ii. pp. 393. 430. The *Magna Moralia* and *Ethics to Eudemus* are chiefly to be considered as the first imperfect sketch of this great work.

^d See vol. i. p. 270. He elsewhere calls it "His Philosophy concerning Human Affairs." Ibid. p. 533.

to the heart and affections, through the resistless conviction of the understanding. His morality is neither on the one hand too indulgent, nor on the other impracticable. His lessons are not cramped by the narrow spirit of system, nor perverted by its wildness; they are clear inductions, flowing naturally and spontaneously from a copious and pure source of well-digested experience.

According to the Stagirite, men are and always have been not only moral and social, but also *political* animals; in a great measure dependent for their happiness and perfection on the public institutions of their respective countries. The grand inquiry, therefore, is, what are the different arrangements that have been found under given circumstances, practically most conducive to these main and ultimate purposes? This question the Author endeavoured to answer in his "Politics," by a careful examination of two hundred systems of legislation, many of which are not any where else described; and by proving how uniformly, even in political matters, the results of observation and experiment conspire with and confirm the deductions of an accurate and full theory. In this incomparable work, the reader will perceive "the genuine spirit of laws" deduced from the specific and unalterable distinctions of governments;

and with a small effort of attention, may discern not only those discoveries in science, unjustly claimed by the vanity of modern writers^e; but many of those improvements in practice^f, erroneously ascribed to the fortunate events of time and chance in these latter and more enlightened ages. The same invaluable treatise discloses the pure and perennial spring of all legitimate authority; for in Aristotle's "Politics," and *his only*, government is placed on such a natural and solid foundation, as leaves neither its origin incomprehensible, nor its stability precarious: and his conclusions, had they been well weighed, must have surmounted or suppressed those erroneous and absurd doctrines which long upheld despotism on the one hand, and those equally erroneous and still wilder suppositions of conventions and compacts, which have more recently armed popular fury on the other.

^e Compare, for example, the works of the modern æconomists, not excepting those of Hume and Smith, with the Fifth Book of the Ethics, p. 375., and the First Book of the Politics, p. 42. & seq. Compare Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws with Books iii. vi. and viii. of the Politics throughout; and judge whether the admirable French work be, as the Author's motto boasts, "*Proles sine matre creata*." Compare likewise Machiavel's "Prince," with the last chapters of Book vii. of the Politics, p. 436. & seq. from which the Italian treatise is entirely copied. Yet none of all these Authors acknowledge their obligations to Aristotle.

^f For the doctrine of representative government, (with which the ancients are said to have been totally unacquainted,) see the following translation, vol. ii. pp. 74. & seqq. 353. & seqq. and 475. & seqq. For that of governments of reciprocal controul, see p. 339. & seqq.

But

But our Author's principles and doctrines will speak convincingly for themselves. The intention of this Preface is merely to explain the plan and object of the present performance; which, besides giving a translation of Aristotle's practical philosophy, contains a new analysis of his speculative works. This addition appeared the more necessary, because the Stagirite's intellectual system is so compactly built, and so solidly united, that its separate parts cannot be completely understood, unless the whole be clearly comprehended. The writings here translated, stand indeed more detached and more independent than almost any other; yet, without the aid of the prefixed "Analysis," even the Ethics and Politics would require frequent, almost perpetual elucidation. The reader, I feared, would be soon tired with the unconnected prolixity of notes^s; he will, I hope, be entertained by the Analysis even of those treatises to which, independently of any substantial utility, his attention may be still allured by a liberal and commendable curiosity.

^s I have also avoided to swell my work with historical notes; a thing as easy as it is useless. Aristotle relates with the utmost precision, the particulars necessary for justifying his conclusions; and to introduce other events and circumstances, altogether unconnected with the subject, appears to me to be better calculated for displaying an author's erudition, than for informing the mind of his reader.

In

In my work throughout, I am ambitious of exhibiting fully, yet within a narrow compass, the discoveries and attainments of a man deemed the wisest of antiquity; and to whom, even in modern times, it will be easier to name many superiors in particular branches of knowledge, than to find any one rival in universal science. Considered under this general aspect, my "English Aristotle" is the natural companion and fit counterpart to my "History of Ancient Greece;" since the learning of that country properly terminates in the Stagirite, by whom it was finally embodied into one great work; a work rather impaired than improved by the labours of succeeding ages. My time, I acknowledge, was miserably mispent in examining his numerous commentators^b; Greek, Arabic, and Latin; but the attention with which I have many times perused the whole of his invaluable remains, with a view of rendering him a perpetual commentary on himself, and thereby expressing his genuine sense clearly and forcibly, will not, I hope, prove useless to those who study Greek literature on an enlarged and liberal plan; not merely as grammarians and philologists, but

^b I am dispensed from the necessity of speaking of former translations of the Ethics and Politics, because I have not borrowed a single sentence, nor derived the smallest assistance, from any of them.

as philosophers, moralists, and statesmen. To this class of readers, many pages of the present work are peculiarly addressed; but the far greater part of it, bearing an immediate reference to the people at large, will not, it is hoped, by the public, be either unregarded or unapplied; especially in an age when, through the ardent activity of the press, salutary information, whatever be its *original* form, speedily circulates to all classes of the community in *new* and fit channels.

J. G.

Upper Seymour Street.
18 May, 1797.

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CHAP. I.
LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

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IT is my design in the present work to give a CHAP.
more distinct, and, I flatter myself, a juster I.
view, than has yet been exhibited, of the learn- Introduction.
ing of an age, the most illustrious in history for
great events and extraordinary revolutions, yet
still more pre-eminent in speculation than it is
VOL. I. B renowned

C H A P. renowned in action. A century before the reign
 { ^{I.} of Alexander the Great, there sprang up and
 flourished in Greece a species of learning, or
 science, totally unlike to any thing before known
 in the world. This science was carried to its
 highest perfection by Aristotle: it decayed with
 the loss of his writings, and revived with their
 recovery. But the imperfect and corrupt state
 of these writings rendered them peculiarly liable
 to be misinterpreted by ignorance, and misrep-
 resented by envy; his philosophy, therefore, has
 been less frequently inculcated or explained,
 than disguised, perverted, and calumniated. It
 has not certainly, since his own time, received
 any material improvement. To the philosophical
 works of Cicero, though that illustrious Roman
 professes to follow other guides, the world at large
 is more indebted for a familiar acquaintance with
 several of Aristotle's most important doctrines,
 than to the labours of all his commentators* col-
 lectively.

* All these commentators lived many centuries after Aristotle.
 They are Greek, Arabic, and Latin. The first began in the
 age of the Antonines, in Alexander Aphrodisiensis at Rome, and
 Ammonius Sacchus in Alexandria; they continued to flourish through
 the whole succession of Roman emperors, under the once revered
 names of Aspasius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, the second Ammo-
 nius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Aristotle was ardently studied, or
 rather superstitiously adored, by the Saracens, during upwards of four
 centuries of their proud domination, till the taking of Bagdat by the
 Tartars in 1258. The names of the Arabian commentators, Alfara-
 bius, Avicenna, and Averroes, long resounded even in the schools of
 Europe. But the Aristotelian philosophy, or rather logic, had early
 assumed a Latin dress in the translation of Boethius Severinus, the
 last illustrious consul of Rome, in the beginning of the sixth century.
 After a long interval of more than six hundred years, Latin transla-
 tions and commentaries began to abound, through the industry of
 Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the succeeding scholastics;
 and

lectively. But how loose and feeble (and often how erroneous!) is the Roman transcript, when compared with the energetic precision of the Greek original! Yet the works of Cicero circulate through and nourish the whole literary world, while those of Aristotle (with the exception of a few short and popular treatises) are allowed to moulder away in the dust of our libraries, and condemned to a treatment little less ignominious than that which befel them soon after their composition, when they were immured in a dungeon, and remained for nearly two centuries a prey to dampness and to worms. It is time once more to release them from their *second* unmerited captivity; to revive, and, if possible, to brighten, the well-earned fame of an author, sometimes as preposterously admired, as at others unaccountably neglected; and whose fate with posterity is most singular in this, not that his authority should have been most respected in the ages least qualified to appreciate his merit, but that

C H A P.

I.

and multiplied to such a pitch, that, towards the close of the sixteenth century, Patricius reckons twelve thousand commentators on different works of the Stagirite. (Discuss. Peripatet.) This vast and cold mass of Gothic and Saracenic dulness is now consigned to just oblivion. But even to the best of Aristotle's commentators there are two unanswerable objections: first, they universally confound his solid sense with the fanciful visions of Plato, thus endeavouring to reconcile things totally incongruous: secondly, they ascribe to their great master innumerable opinions which he did not hold, by making him continually dogmatise, where he only means to discuss. To the same objections those more modern writers are liable, who have drawn their knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy from any other than the original fountain.

C H A P. I. philosophers should have despised his name almost exactly in proportion as they adopted his opinions. The multiplied proofs of this assertion, which I shall have occasion to produce in examining his works, will not, it is presumed, appear uninteresting to men of letters. Those who know something of Aristotle, must naturally be desirous of knowing all that can be told; and of seeing, comprised within a narrow compass, the life and writings of a man, whose intellectual magnitude ought to have preserved and shewn him in his proper shape to the impartial eye of history, but whose picture, beyond that of all other great characters, has been most miserably mangled.

**Aristotle's
birth-place,
Stagira.**

Aristotle, who flourished in Athens when Athens was the ornament of Greece, and Greece, under Alexander, the first country on earth, was born at Stagira towards the beginning of the ninety-ninth olympiad, eighty-five years after the birth of Socrates^b, and three hundred and eighty-four before the birth of Christ. The

^b Socrates drank the hemlock, according to most authors, the first year of the ninety-fifth olympiad; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, the first year of the ninety-seventh. Socrates therefore died at least eight years before Aristotle was born. The latter was one year older than Philip, and three years older than Demosthenes. Vid. Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammæum. This chronology is clearly ascertained by various critics. See Bayle's Dictionary, article "Aristotle." I know not therefore why Lord Monboddo and the late Mr. Harris (two modern writers who have paid great attention to Aristotle's works) should say, and frequently repeat, on no better authority than that of the Life of Aristotle ascribed to Ammonius, or Johannes Philoponus, that the Stagirite was three years a scholar of Socrates.

city

city of Stagira^c stood on the coast of Thrace, in a district called the Chalcidic region, and near to the innermost recess of the Strymonic gulf^d. It was originally built by the Andrians^e, afterwards enlarged by a colony from Eubœan Chalcis^f, and long numbered among the Greek cities of Thrace, until the conquests of Philip of Macedon extended the name of his country far beyond the river Strymon, to the confines of mount Rhodopé^g. Stagira, as well as the neighbouring Greek cities, enjoyed the precarious dignity of independent government: it was the ally of Athens in the Peloponnesian war, and, like other nominal allies, experienced the stern dominion of that tyrannical republic. It afterwards became subject to the city and commonwealth of Olynthus; which, having subdued Stagira and the whole region of Chalcidicé, was itself besieged by Philip of Macedon; and, with all its dependencies, reduced by the arms or arts of that politic prince, in the first year of the 108th olympiad, and 348 years before the Christian æra^h. That the resistance of Stagira was obstinate, may be inferred from the severity of its

^c Strabo Excerpt. ex lib. vii. p. 331. He calls the place Stageirus.

^d Ptolemei Geograph. According to his division, Stagira was in the Amphaxetide district of Macedon.

^e Herodot. l. vii. c. 115.; & Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311.

^f Justin. l. viii. c. 13.

^g Thence the frivolous dispute among modern biographers, whether Aristotle, who was really a Greek, ought to be deemed a Macedonian or a Thracian. See Stanley and Brucker's Lives of Aristotle.

^h History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxv.

C H A P. ^L punishment; the conqueror raised it to the ground¹. Aristotle, who was then in his thirty-seventh year, had been removed from Stagira almost in his childhood; and he appears not, in that long interval, to have ever resided in, and even rarely to have visited, it². But the misfortunes which fell on that city gave him an opportunity of shewing such ardent affection for his birth-place, as may be deemed the indubitable proof of a feeling heart. Through his influence with Alexander the Great, Stagira was rebuilt³: both its useful defences and its ornamental edifices were restored; its wandering citizens were collected, and reinstated in their possessions; Aristotle himself regulated their government by wise laws; and the Stagirites instituted a festival, to commemorate the generosity of Alexander, their admired sovereign, and the patriotism of Aristotle, their illustrious townsman^m.

connected
with that
of Aristotle
and his family.

The city of Stagira indeed owes its celebrity wholly to Aristotle and his family; and, if its name is still familiar to modern ears, this proceeds merely from its having communicated to

¹ Plutarch, *adversus Colot.* p. 1126.; & *de Exil.* p. 603.

² Dionys. Halicarn. *Epist. ad Ammæum.* Ammonius & Diogen. Laert. in *Aristot.*

³ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* l. vii. c. 29.; & Valer. Maxim. l. v. c. 6. Plutarch prefers to all the pleasures of the Epicurean, the delights which Aristotle must have felt when he rebuilt his native city, and placed in their hereditary seats his expatriated countrymen. Plutarch *advers. Epicur.* p. 1097. He ascribes the rebuilding of Stagira to Aristotle's influence with Philip.

^m Plutarch. *advers. Colot.* p. 1126.; & Ammonius in *Vit. Aristot.*

our philosopher the appellation of Stagiriteⁿ. C H A P. I.
 His father Nichomachus, who was the physician and friend^o of Amyntas, king of Macedon, derived his descent, through a long line of medical ancestors, from Æsculapius, the companion of the Argonauts, whose skill in the healing art had raised him to a seat among the gods^p. Nichomachus improved a branch of knowledge, which was the inheritance of his family, by writing six books on natural philosophy and medicine^q. To the same illustrious origin which distinguished Nichomachus, the testimony of one ancient biographer^r (but his only) traces up the blood of Pheftis, Aristotle's mother; who, whatever was her parentage, certainly acknowledged for her country^s the middle district of Eubœa, which lies within twelve miles of the Attic coast. Aristotle was deprived of his parents in early youth^t; yet it is an agreeable, and not altogether an unwarranted, conjecture, that by his father Nichomachus he was inspired with that ardent love for the study of Nature, which made him long be regarded as her best and chosen interpreter^u; while, from his mother Pheftis, he first imbibed that pure and sweet Atticism which every where pervades his writings.

ⁿ Strabo, Excerpt. ex lib. vii. p. 331.

^o He was held by Amyntas, « φίλος χρεός. Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

^p Lucian, Jupiter Tragedus; & Suidas in Nicomach.

^q Idem ibid. ^r Ammon. Vit. Aristot.

^s Dionys. Halic. Epist. ad Ammœum.

^t Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

^u Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς φύσεως γραμματικὸς πρ. Anonym. apud Suid. in Aristot. Literally, « Nature's secretary.”

C H A P.

I.

Aristotle's
education
at Atar-
neus,

and at
Athens.

His literary
industry.

Aristotle also inherited from his parents a large fortune: and their early loss was supplied and compensated by the kind attentions of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus in Mysia, who received the young Stagirite into his family, and skilfully directed his education^x. These important obligations our philosopher, in whose character gratitude appears to have been a prominent feature, amply repaid to Nicanor the son of Proxenus, whom he adopted, educated, and enriched^y. At the age of seventeen^z, the young Stagirite was attracted by the love of learning to Athens, and particularly by the desire of becoming a hearer in Plato's Academy, the best school of science as well as of morals then existing in the world; and where the most assiduous student might find competitors worthy of exciting his emulation and sharpening his diligence. Plato early observed of him, that he required the rein rather than the spur^a. His industry in perusing and copying manuscripts was prodigious; he was named, by way of excellence, "the student or reader^b." Plato often called him the "soul of his school^c;" and, when Aristotle happened to be absent from his prelections, often complained that he spoke to a *deaf audience*^d. As the student advanced in years, his acuteness was as extraordinary in can-

^x Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. ^y Idem ibid.

^z Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

^a Idem ibid.

^b Diogen. Laert. ibid.

^c Or rather the mind or intellect, *νῆς τῆς διατριβῆς*. Idem ibid.

^d Philoponus de Eternit. Mund. advers. Proclum, vi. 27.

vassing

vassing opinions, as his industry had been unex-
 amples in collecting them^c; his capacious mind
 embraced the whole circle of science; and, not-
 withstanding his pertinacity in rejecting every
 principle or tenet which he could not on reflec-
 tion approve, his very singular merit failed not to
 recommend him to the discerning admiration of
 Plato, with whom he continued to reside twenty
 years, even to his master's death; alike careless
 of the honours of a court, to which the rank and
 connections of his family might have opened to
 him the road in Macedon; and indifferent to the
 glory of a name, which his great abilities might
 early have attained, by establishing a separate
 school, and founding a new sect in philosophy^f.

C H A P.

I.

At the same time that Aristotle applied so as-
 siduously to the embellishment of his mind, he
 was not neglectful, we are told, of whatever
 might adorn his person. His figure was not ad-
 vantageous; he was of a short stature, his eyes
 were remarkably small, his limbs were dispropor-
 tionably slender, and he lisped or stammered in
 his speech^g. For his ungracious person Aristotle
 is said to have been anxious to compensate by the
 finery and elegance of his dress: his mantle was
 splendid; he wore rings of great value; and he
 was soppish enough (such is the language of an-
 tiquity) to shave both his head and his face,
 while the other scholars of Plato kept their long

His person
 and sup-
 posed
 foibles.

^c Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

^f ἐπεὶ σχολῇ ἡγεμενός, ἐπεὶ ἰδίαν πεποιμένος αἰρεσιν. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.

^g Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.—Plutarch. de Discrim. Adulat. & Amic. p. 53. says, "that many imitated Aristotle's stuttering, as they did Alexander's wry neck."

hair

CHAP. hair and beards. To some learned men, the
 I. omission of such particulars might appear un-
 Reflections pardonable; yet in a life of Aristotle, such par-
 thereon. ticulars are totally unworthy of being told, since
 his love for ostentatious finery (probably much
 exaggerated by his enemies) was in him merely
 an accessory, which nowise affected his character,
 nor weakened that ardent passion for knowledge
 which reigned sole mistress of his soul. In men
 born for great intellectual achievements, this
 passion must, at some period of their lives, sup-
 press and stifle every other; and, while it con-
 tinues to do so, their real happiness is probably
 at its highest pitch. The pursuit of science in-
 deed, not having any natural limitations, might
 be supposed to invigorate with manhood, to con-
 firm itself through custom, and to operate through
 life with unceasing or increasing energy. But
 this delightful progress is liable to be interrupted
 by other causes than the decline of health and
 the decay of curiosity; for great exertions are
 not more certainly rewarded by celebrity, than
 celebrity is punished with envy, which will some-
 times rankle in secret malice, and sometimes
 vent itself in open reproach: wrongs will pro-
 voke resentment; injuries will be offered and
 retorted; and, a state of hostility commencing,
 the philosopher, in defending his opinions and
 his fame, becomes a prey to the wretched anxie-
 ties incident to the vulgar scrambles of sordid
 interest and senseless ambition. Of this melan-
 choly remark, both the life and the death of
 Aristotle will afford, as we shall see hereafter,
 very forcible illustrations.

Plato

Plato died in the first year of the 108th olympiad, and 338 years before the Christian æra. C H A P.
I.
He was succeeded in the academy by Speusippus, Aristotle's
gratitude
to Plato. the son of his sister Potona; a man far inferior to the Stagirite in abilities; and however well he might be acquainted with the theory, not strongly confirmed in the practice, of moral virtue, since he was too often and too easily vanquished both by anger and by pleasure^b. Aristotle appears not to have taken offence that, in the succession to his admired master, the strong claim of merit should have been sacrificed to the partialities of blood. In some of the latest of his writings, he speaks of Plato with a degree of respect approaching to reverence. Soon after that philosopher's decease, Aristotle wrote verses in his praise, and erected altars to his honourⁱ: and the connections which he himself had already formed with some of the most illustrious as well as the most extraordinary personages of his own or any age, might naturally inspire him with the design of leaving Athens, after he had lost the philosopher and friend whose fame had first drawn him thither, and whose instructive society had so long retained him in that celebrated city.

One of the memorable characters with whom Aristotle maintained a close and uninterrupted correspondence was Hermeias, styled, in the language of those days, tyrant of Assus and Atarneus; a man whose life forcibly illustrates the strange vicissitudes of fortune. His residence with
Hermeias. The singular history of that prince. Hermeias is

^b Diogen. Laert. in Speusipp.

ⁱ Idem; & Ammonius in Aristot.

called

C H A P. ^{I.} called a slave and an eunuch^{*}; but he was a slave whose spirit was not to be broken, and an eunuch whose mind was not to be emasculated. Through the bounty of a wealthy patron, he had been enabled early to gratify his natural taste for philosophy; and, having become a fellow-student with Aristotle at Athens, soon united with him in the bands of affectionate esteem, which finally cemented into firm and unalterable friendship. Aristotle through life pursued the calm and secure paths of science, but Hermeias ventured to climb the dangerous heights of ambition. His enterprising spirit, seconded by good fortune, raised him to the sovereignty of Assus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Mysia, the former situate in the district of Troas, the latter in that of Æolis, and both of them, like most Grecian colonies on the Asiatic coast, but loosely dependent on the Persian empire. Hermeias availed himself of the weakness or distance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the resources with which his own ambition was supplied by a wealthy banker, to gain possession of those strong-holds, with all their dependencies; and endeavoured to justify this bold usurpation of the sceptre, by the manly firmness with which he held it¹. Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Aristotle, almost immediately after Plato's death, revisited Atarneus^m, the same city in which he

^{*} Ευνυχός ὡς καὶ δούλος ἦρχεν. Ερμείας. His master's name was Eubulus, a prince and philosopher of Bithynia. Suidas.

¹ Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 122.

^m Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.

had

had spent the happy years of his youth under the kind protection of Proxenus; and might we indulge the conjecture that this worthy Atarnean still lived, our philosopher's voyage to Æolis must have been strongly recommended by his desire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a second father, and of thus propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian.

Aristotle found at Atarneus the wish of Plato realised; he beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philosophy seated on a throne. In that city he resided nearly three years, enjoying the inexpressible happiness of seeing his enlightened political maxims illustrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-student and sovereign. But, to render his condition enviable, an essential requisite was wanting, namely, that of security. Artaxerxes, whose success against the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his most sanguine hopes, could no longer brook the dismemberment of the fair coast of Mysia, through the usurpation of an eunuch and a slave. Mentor, a Greek, and kinsman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general so famous in the Persian annals, had signalized his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of those craftyⁿ and unprincipled

Destroyed
by Mentor
the Rhodian.

ⁿ Aristotle himself brands with infamy this successful villain by contrasting his profligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. *Αλλά δεινός μιν καὶ ὁ Φαῦλος λεγεται, &c.* "A knave may be clever; for example, Mentor, who seemed to be very clever, but surely was not prudent; for it belongs to prudence to desire and prefer only the best ends, and to carry such only into execution: but cleverness implies barely that fertility in resource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purposes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and speedily accomplished." *Magn. Moral.* l. i. c. 25. p. 171.

Greeks,

C H A P. Greeks, whom the ambitious hopes of raising a splendid fortune often drew to a standard naturally hostile to their country; and his recent merit with Artaxerxes recommended him as the fittest instrument to be employed in chastising the Myfian usurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commissioned to destroy, had formerly been numbered among his friends°. Mentor marched with a powerful army to the western coast. He might have effected his purpose by open force; but to accomplish it by stratagem, was both more easy in itself, and more suitable to his character. He had been connected with Hermeias by the sacred ties of hospitality; the sanctity of this connection was revered by the greatest profligates of antiquity; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his master's will. He employed his former intimacy with Hermeias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an interview: Mentor seized his person, and sent him privately to Upper Asia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor^p. The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this tragedy. Having possessed himself of the ring which the unfortunate Hermeias usually employed as his signet, he sealed with it his own dispatches, and immediately sent them to the cities that acknowledged the sovereignty of a man, whose mild exercise of power tended, in the minds of his subjects, to justify

His singular and cruel artifices.

° Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 122.

^p Diodor. ubi supra. Helladius apud Phot. Biblioth. p. 866. Polyæn. Stratag. vi. 48.

the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In these dispatches Mentor signified that, through his own intercession, Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magistrates of the revolted cities easily gave credit to intelligence most agreeable to their wishes: they opened their gates without suspicion to Mentor's soldiers, who instantly made themselves masters both of those Mysian strongholds, which might have made a long and vigorous resistance to the Persian arms, and of the powerful garrisons by which they were defended^a. One farther deception crowned the successful perfidy of Mentor. He affected to treat the conquered places with unexampled moderation. He was particularly careful to keep in their offices the same collectors of revenues and intendants who had been employed by Hermeias. Those officers, when they were first apprised of the danger which threatened their master, concealed their treasures under ground, or deposited them with their friends; but when they found themselves treated with so much unexpected generosity by the invader, they resumed their wonted confidence, and conveyed back into their own coffers their long accumulated wealth; of which circumstance Mentor was no sooner informed by his emissaries, than he seized both the effects and the persons of these too credulous collectors'.

^a Diodor. ubi supra.

^r We learn this particular, which is necessary to explain what follows in the text, from Aristotle himself, in his curious treatise *De Cura Rei familiaris*, p. 308.

The

C H A P.

I.

Aristotle
escapes to
Lesbos.

His mar-
riage with
Pythias.

Is invited
to Mace-
don.

The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had assumed in his first transactions at Atarneus, enabled Aristotle to avoid the punishment which too naturally fell on the ambition of his friend. By a seasonable flight he escaped to Mitylené in the isle of Lesbos, in company with Pythias, the kinswoman and adopted heiress of the King of Assus and Atarneus, but now miserably fallen from the lofty expectations in which her youth had been educated. But this sad reverse of fortune only endeared her the more to Aristotle, who married the fair companion of his flight in his thirty-seventh year^s; which is precisely that age pointed out by himself as the fittest, on the male side, for entering into wedlock^t. Pythias died shortly afterwards, leaving an infant daughter named after a wife tenderly beloved by Aristotle, and who repaid his affection with the most tender sensibility. It was her last request that, when her husband left life (which might the Fates long avert!) her own bones should be disinterred, and carefully deposited within the inclosure of his revered tomb^u.

The Stagirite passed but a short time in the soft island of Lesbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melancholy. During his residence in Athens, he had strengthened his hereditary friendship with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himself, who, having lived from the age of fifteen to that of

^s Comp. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammœum; et Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

^t Politic. l. vii. c. 16.

^u Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbouring cities, ascended the throne of his ancestors in the twenty-third year of his age. The busy scenes of war and negotiation in which Philip was immediately after his accession engaged through necessity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, seem never to have interrupted his correspondence with the friends of his youth; with those who either possessed his affection, or who merited his admiration^x. In the fifth year of his reign his son Alexander was born; an event which he notified to Aristotle in terms implying much previous communication between them: "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but especially for bestowing it at the time when Aristotle lives; assuring ourselves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and worthy of inheriting our kingdom^y." If this letter was written at the æra of Alexander's birth, it must have found Aristotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, still a diligent student in the school of Plato. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not assume the office of preceptor to the son of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening character of this young prince seemed as highly to deserve, as peculiarly to require, the assistance of so able an instructor^z.

Philip's letter to him.

In

^x History of ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

^y Aulus Gellius, l. ix. c. 3.

^z The chronology is clearly ascertained by Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammæus; yet the accurate Quintilian, because it served to enforce his argument, says, "An Philippus, Macedonum rex," &c. "Would Philip, king of the Macedonians, have thought

CHAP. In the second year of the 109th olympiad,
{^L Aristotle, probably in consequence of a new invitation from Philip, sailed from the isle of Lesbos, in which he had resided nearly two years, escaped the dangers of the Athenian fleet, which then carried on war against Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella^a, to undertake one of the few employments not unworthy of an author qualified to instruct and benefit the latest ages of the world.

His merit
and success
in the edu-
cation of
Alexander.

In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite spent eight years; during which long period, in an office of much delicacy, he enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the highest satisfaction to his employers, while he excited the warmest gratitude in his pupil^b. The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affection, loved and esteemed many; but Aristotle is the only one of his friends whose superior genius he appears unceasingly to have viewed with undiminished veneration, and whom he seems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable respect. By Philip and his proud Queen Olympias, our philosopher was honoured with every mark of distinction which greatness can bestow on illustrious merit. Philip placed

Honours
bestowed
on him by
Philip.

fit that Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of the age, should have been employed in teaching his son Alexander the first rudiments of learning, or would Aristotle himself have accepted of such an office, had he not believed it of the utmost importance to the success of our future studies, that their first foundation should be laid by a teacher of consummate skill?" *QUINTIL. Instit. l. i. c. i.*

^a Dionys. Halicarn. ubi supra.

^b Plutarch. in *Alexand.* tom. i. p. 668. & advers. Colot. t. ii. p. 1126.

his

his statue near to his own: he was admitted to the councils of his sovereign, where his advice was often useful, always honourable; and where his kind intercession benefited many individuals, and many communities^c. On one occasion the Athenians rewarded his good services, by erecting his statue in the citadel^d: and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, attested his unremitting exertions in the cause of his friends and of the public, as well as his manly freedom in admonishing kings of their duty^e. But the ruling passions of Philip and Alexander, the interested policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too strong and too ungovernable to be restrained by the power of reason, speaking through the voice of their admired philosopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root; and the peculiarities of his character had displayed themselves, in a very public and very important transaction, which happened several months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's Illyrian expedition, Macedon was honoured with an embassy from the Great King. In the absence of his father, Alexander, scarcely fourteen years old, received the ambassadors; and his conversation with those illustrious strangers, at a period in history when the public conferences of great personages consisted not merely in words of ceremony, afforded a just subject of praise and wonder.

CHAP.
I.

Peculiarities of Alexander's character.

^c Ammonius, Vit. Arist.

^d Pausanias Eliac.

^e Ammonius, *ibid.* See also the fragments still remaining in De Valle's edition, p. 1102. et seq.

C H A P. Instead of dwelling on their external appearance, or confining himself to such superficial questions as corresponded with the unripeness of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Persian government; the character of Ochus, who then reigned; the strength and composition of his armies; the distance of his place of residence from the western coast; the state of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Susa and Babylon^f. To his premature love of aggrandizement, Alexander already added singular dexterity and unexampled boldness in his exercises, particularly in horsemanship; the most fervid affections, invincible courage, and unbending dignity^g.

The plan followed by Aristotle in his education.

In training such a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cultivate; but he could only hope to give a new direction to passions, which it was too late to eradicate or subdue. In his treatise on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of education best adapted to persons of the highest rank in society; and, in performing the task assigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be skillfully modified, by adjusting it to the peculiar circumstances and extraordinary character of his pupil. Alexander's loftiness could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the side of virtue: if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the effect of insult, and the mark of inferiority^h. His love for

^f Plutarch. in Alexand.

^g Idem ibid.

^h Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

military

military glory, which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the passion of the great, could neither be controlled nor moderated; but, to rival this tyrant of the breast, still more exalted affections were inspired, which rendered Alexander as much superior to conquerors, as conquerors deem themselves superior to the lowest of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Aristotle's *Politics* which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty constitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and strengthening the bodily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one main-spring of mental energy. During this interesting period of youth, with the proper management of which the future happiness of the whole of life is so intimately connected, Aristotle observes that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too strenuously exercised, since powerful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor the habits of making them be simultaneously acquired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exercises, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency; after which, the whole bent of his mind was directed to the most profound researches of science.

It is the opinion of many, that a slight tincture of learning is sufficient for accomplishing a prince. Both Philip and Aristotle thought otherwise; and the ardent curiosity of Alexander

Aristotle's
acroatic
philosophy.

CHAP. I. himself was not to be satisfied with such superficial and meagre instruction as have been sometimes triumphantly published for the use of persons destined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be sharpened by whatever is most nice in distinction, and to be exalted by whatever is most lofty in speculation¹; that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidst objects of the highest intellection, might thereby be rendered capable of comprehending ordinary matters the more quickly and the more completely². This recondite philosophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, first to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of *acroatic*³; to distinguish those parts of his lectures which were confined to a select audience, from other parts called *exoteric*, because delivered to the public at large. It has been supposed that, in

¹ Plutarch. in Alexand.

² Arist. de Anima, l. iii. c. 5 & 6. & Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7 & 8.

³ This division of Aristotle's works into *acroatic* and *exoteric*, has given rise to a variety of opinions and disputes; which all have their source in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, on one hand; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Ammonius on the other. The former writers (Plutarch. in Alexand.; & Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 4.) maintain that the *acroatic*, or, as they call them, the *acroamatic* works, differed from the *exoteric* in the nature of their subjects, which consisted in natural philosophy and logic; whereas the subjects of the *exoteric* were rhetoric, ethics, and politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely coincide) are refuted by Aristotle's references, as we shall see hereafter, from his *Ethic* to his *exoteric* works. The latter class of writers (Strabo, l. xiii. p. 608.; Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 19.; & Ammonius Herm. ad Categ. Aristot.) maintain, that the *acroatic* works were distinguished from the *exoteric*, not by the difference of the subjects, but by the different manner of treating them; the former being discourses, the latter dialogues.

these

these two kinds of lectures, the Stagirite maintained contradictory doctrines on the subjects of religion and morality. But the fact is far otherwife: his practical tenets were uniformly the same in both; but his exoteric or popular treatises nearly resembled the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be explained in the following chapter) contained, in a concise energetic style peculiar to himself, those deep and broad principles on which all solid science is built, and, independently of which, the most operose reasonings, and the most intricate combinations, are but matters of coarse mechanical practice^m. The sublimity of this abstract and recondite philosophy admirably accorded with the loftiness of Alexander's mind; and how highly he continued to prize it, amidst the tumultuary occupations of war and government, appears from the following letter written soon after the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in pursuit of Darius: "Alexander wishing all happiness to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your acroatic works. Wherein shall we be distinguished above others, if the important

Highly
prized by
Alexander.

^m Simplicius and Philoponus allow other writings besides the dialogues to have been exoteric, as historical disquisitions, and whatever else did not require for understanding them intense thought in the reader. Simplicius says that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroatic writings: "ut seigniores ab eorum studio repelleret & dehortaretur." Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic. fol. ii. This would have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite: but the truth is, that the obscurity of Aristotle's works proceeds from a corrupt text. When the text is pure, his writings are as easily intelligible, as a mere syllabus of lectures on most abstruse subjects can well be rendered.

C H A P. things which we have been taught, be communicated to the public? I would rather surpass other men in the best kind of knowledge than in power. Farewell^a." Aristotle, not considering this letter as merely complimentary, answered it as follows: "You wrote to me concerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been published. Know that in one sense this still is the case, since their meaning will be fully apprehended by those only who have heard my lectures^o." Of those much-valued writings, the theological part, if at all published, was probably most involved in a sublime obscurity. To have maintained, in plain and popular language, the unity and perfections of the Deity, must have excited against the Stagirite an earlier religious persecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology, Alexander was carefully instructed; as his preceptor reminded him in the midst of his unexampled victories and unbounded conquests, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition; that "those who entertain just notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than those who subdue kingdoms^p."

Aristotle's
genius for
poetry.

Aristotle's love of philosophy did not, like that of Plato, set him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, particularly

^a Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.

^o Idem ibid. If these letters be ascribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Aristotle regarded his acroatic works; he considered them merely as text-books.

^p Plutarch. de Tranquillitate Animi, p. 474.

Homer;

Homer; and he prepared for his pupil a correct copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a casket, whence this transcript was called "the Iliad of the Casket^a." The Stagirite was not only the best critic in poetry, but himself a poet of the first eminence. Few of his verses indeed have reached modern times; but the few which remain prove him worthy of sounding the lyre of Pindar^b; and it is not the least singularity attending this extraordinary man, that with the nicest and most subtile powers of discrimination and analysis, he united a vigorous and rich vein of poetic fancy.

Aristotle carefully instructed his pupil in ethics and politics. He wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatise on government; and exhorted him to adjust the measure of his authority to the various character of his subjects; agreeably to a doctrine which he frequently inculcates in his political works, that different nations require different modes of government, respectively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of thinking^c. From the ethic writings of Aristotle which still remain, and which are the most practically useful of any that pagan antiquity can boast, it is easy to detect that wicked calumny of his enemies, "that, for fordid and selfish purposes, he accommodated the tenets of his phi-

The nature of his instructions to Alexander in ethics and politics.

^a Plutarch. in Alexand. vol. i. p. 688.

^b Menag. Observat. in Diogen. Laert. l. v. p. 189.

^c Plutarch. in Alexand.

C H A P. **I.** philosophy to the base morals of courts'." It may be safely affirmed that, if Alexander stands pre-eminent above other princes in love of knowledge and virtue¹, he was chiefly indebted for this exaltation to his preceptor: the seeds of his haughtiness and ambition were sown before Aristotle was called to direct his studies; his excellencies therefore may be ascribed to our philosopher²; his imperfections to himself, to Philip, above all, to the intoxicating effects of unbounded prosperity. This is the language of antiquity, and even of those writers who are the least partial to the fame of the Stagirite.

Aristotle recommends Callisthenes to Alexander. His character and behaviour.

After the most intimate communication during the space of eight years³, the pupil and the preceptor separated for ever, to pursue, in a career of almost equal length, the most opposite paths to the same immortal renown; the one by arms, the other by philosophy; the one by gratifying

¹ This absurdity is brought forward and insisted on by Brucker, *Histor. Philosoph.* vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more unintelligible than Brucker's account of Aristotle's philosophy. I have heard it said in his own country, that this laborious German did not understand Greek.

² See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 668. Alexander spared the house of Pindar, in the sack of Thebes; and the town of Erechus in Lesbos, in his war with the Persians, because it was the birth-place of Theophrastus and Phanias, Aristotle's disciples. In the midst of his expedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets, with the dithyrambics of Telestus and Philoxenus, and the history of Philistus. Alexander was declared by the Indian Mandanis the only proficient in wisdom ever seen at the head of a victorious army. Strabo, l. xv. p. 715.

³ Αριστοτελης, τα δεικναι συμβουλευων, Αλεξανδρῳ πολλοις ωφελιμος παρ' Αλιαν. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

⁴ Dionys. Halicarn.; & Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

the

the most immoderate lust of power, the other by teaching to despise this and all similar gratifications. During his eastern triumphs, terminated after the lapse of ten years by his premature death, Alexander (as we shall have occasion to relate) gave many illustrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous director of his youth. One incident, and one only, seems to have occasioned some disgust between them. At leaving the court of Pella, Aristotle recommended, as worthy of accompanying Alexander in his Persian expedition, his own kinsman Callisthenes, an Olynthian; a learned and certainly an honest man, but of a morose unaccommodating temper, pertinaciously attached to the old system of republicanism, which the father of Alexander had overturned in Greece; equally daring and inflexible in his purposes, and unseasonably bold in his speech². Aristotle himself perceived and lamented his faults, and admonished him in a line of Homer, "that his unbridled tongue might occasion his early death³." The prophecy was fulfilled. Callisthenes, not reflecting that "he who has once condescended" (in the words of Arrian) "to be attendant on a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageously opposed Alexander's resolution of exacting the same marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheer-

² Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. iv. c. 8.

³ Παιδαγωγὸς ἐν μὲν τίνος ἔσται δὲ ἀγέμενος. • Il. xviii. 95.

fully

C H A P. I. fully paid to him by the Persians^b. The manner of Callisthenes's punishment and death is related more variously^c than almost any historical event of such public notoriety; but most writers concur in opinion, that he met with the just reward of his rashness and arrogance. This transaction, it is asserted, much estranged Alexander from his ancient preceptor. The assertion however is not accompanied with any solid proof^d; and the absurd calumny, that Aristotle not only regarded this pretended displeasure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickedness of joining in a conspiracy against Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in history, but a hearsay preserved in Plutarch^e, and the affected credit given to the monstrous report by the monster Caracalla, for the unworthy purpose of justifying his own violence in destroying the schools of the Aristotelian philosophers in Alexandria, in burning their books, and in depriving them of all those privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyptian successors^f.

^b Arrian. ubi supra.

^c By Arrian, Curtius, Justin, Diogenes, Laertius, Philostratus, and Suidas.

^d Alexander's resentment is inferred from a vague and hasty expression in a letter to Antipater; "Τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς συνεπιμνησκόμενους αὐτοῦ—I will punish the Sophist (meaning Callisthenes) and those who sent him." Plutarch. in Alexand. p. 696. Alexander, it is true, sent presents to Xenocrates; but so did Antipater, who always remained Aristotle's sincere and confidential friend.

^e "Those who say that Aristotle advised Antipater to destroy Alexander by poison, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemis, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707.

^f Dion. in Caracall.

Having

CHAP.

I.

Plan of
Aristotle's
life in
Athens.

Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Aristotle returned to his beloved Athens; where he spent thirteen² years, almost the whole remainder of his life, instructing his disciples, and improving the various branches of his philosophy. His *acroatic* lectures were given in the morning to those who were his regular pupils³. A considerable part of them is still preserved in his works, which form an abstract or syllabus of treatises on the most important branches of philosophy. His *exoteric* discourses were held after supper with occasional visitors, and formed the amusement of his evening walks⁴; for he thought “such exercise peculiarly useful after table for animating and invigorating the natural heat and strength, which the too rapid succession of sleep to food seemed rather fitted to relax and encumber⁵.” Before his arrival at Athens, Speusippus was dead; and Xenocrates, whose dull gravity and rigid austerity a man of Aristotle’s character could not much admire, had taken possession of the academy⁶. The Stagirite, therefore, settled in a *gymnasium* in the suburbs, well shaded with trees, near to which the soldiers used to exercise, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whose *peripaton*, or walk, Aristotle and his followers were called Peripatetics⁷. It is reported that he opened his school, observing,

² Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.³ Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.⁴ Idem ibid.⁵ Plutarch. Conjug. Precept. p. 133.⁶ Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat.⁷ Menægius ad Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 2.

“ That

C H A P. "That it would be shameful for himself to be
 I. silent while Xenocrates publicly taught^a." Aristotle is not likely to have uttered such a presumptuous boast; but if it was really made, even this pretension to superiority was certainly very fully justified by the fame which the Lyceum speedily acquired, which the Stagirite himself maintained unimpaired through life, and which was ably supported by his disciple and successor Theophrastus.

Such is the genuine history of Aristotle's life, in the most important passages of which all the ancient writers^o, who have expressly treated the subject, unitedly concur. By arranging his biography, therefore, according to our present method, both my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time will be saved; for the calumnies against Aristotle will be no sooner mentioned than they will refute themselves, and they could not pass unnoticed, because they are perpetuated in the sarcasms of Lucian^p, and the lying whispers of Athenæus^q, which have been

^a Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysius Halicarn. read "Isocrates" instead of "Xenocrates." The reading in the text is the more probable, for Isocrates and Aristotle, following very different pursuits, were not naturally rivals; besides, the former is said to have died soon after the battle of Charonea in extreme old age, and Aristotle did not return to Athens till three years after that decisive engagement. Compare my life of Isocrates, and the History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

^o Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonius: the ancient Latin translation of this last, first published by Nunneius (Helmestadij 1767), contains some additional circumstances, but those of little value, and of doubtful authority.

^p Lucian treats both Aristotle and his pupil with equal injustice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. & Alexand. et Alexand. & Philip.

^q Athenæus Deipnos. l. viii. p. 354.

too often mistaken, even by the learned, for true history. C H A P.
I.

I.
Calumnies
against
Aristotle.

The absurd reports that Aristotle first served in the army, that he there dissipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then followed for bread the trade of an apothecary^r, may be confidently rejected by those who know, on unquestionable authority, that he became, at the early age of seventeen, a diligent student in the academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has seen the testimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not easily be persuaded that he could treat this revered master with the grossest brutality^s; and let him who reads and meditates the Ethics to Nicomachus ask his own heart as well as understanding, whether it is likely that the author of such a treatise should, instead of restraining and correcting, have flattered^t and fomented the vices of Alexander. Instead of farther examining these wild fictions, which stand in direct contradiction to the matters of fact above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence

^r Athenæus ubi supra, and Aristotle apud Eusebium. Their report rests on a supposititious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the ascription of Timæus of Tauromenon in Sicily; an author nicknamed Epitimus, the Deceiver. Diodorus Siculus, l. v. c. 1. Athenæus, l. vi. p. 272.

^s Ἀριστοτὴς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ λακτιστοῦ—“Aristotle has kicked at us;” a strong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. l. v. sect. 2. Ælian, Var. Histor. l. iii. c. 19. ascribes both to Plato and to Aristotle a behaviour totally inconsistent with every thing that we know of their characters. Comp. Ælian, Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 19. Photius, Biblioth. c. 279. Augustin. de Civitate Dei, l. viii. c. 12. Such contradictory reports mutually destroy each other.

^t Lucian. Dial. Diogen. & Alexand.

such

C H A P. such improbable tales could have originated;
 I. especially as this inquiry will bring us to the
 events which immediately preceded our philosopher's death.

Wherein
 they originated.

From innumerable passages in the moral and political works of which we have presumed to offer the translation to the public, it will appear that Aristotle regarded with equal contempt vain pretenders to real science, and real proficient in sciences which be deemed vain and frivolous. His theological opinions, also, were far too refined for the grossness of paganism. He sought only for truth, and was careless of the obstacles which stood in the way to its attainment, whether they were found in the errors of philosophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man in such a city as Athens, where, since the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and conversed freely with all descriptions of persons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophists and sciolists, soothsayers and satirists, and that worst of banes, satirical historians, heaped obloquy on a character, the ornament of his own age, and destined to be the great instructor of posterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly respected, even in the turbulent democracy of Athens; and it was not

* Aristocles (apud Eusebium) says, that Aristotle was attacked by a host of writers, "whose books and memories have perished more completely than their bodies." Even his fellow student, Aristoxenus, who had treated him most respectfully while he lived, heaped the most illiberal reproaches on his memory, because he preferred to himself Theophrastus for his successor. Suidas in Aristoxen. & Aristocles apud Eusebium.

till the year following the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous malignity, which had been long suppressed, burst forth against Aristotle with resistless violence. He was accused of irreligion before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus, a man of weight in the republic; and both of them instigated to this cruel prosecution by our philosopher's declared enemies*. The heads of the accusation were, "that Aristotle had commemorated the virtues both of his wife Pythias and of his friend Hermeias, with such ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens justly reserved for the majesty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a statue at Delphi; he also wrote an ode in his praise. Both the inscription and the ode have come down to modern times; the former simply relating "the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias;" and the latter "extolling virtue above all earthly possessions; and especially that generous patriotism, for the sake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquished the light of the sun; whose fame therefore would never be forgotten by the Muses, daughters of Memory; and as often as it was sung would redound to the glory of *Hospitable Jove*[†], and the honour of firm friendship[‡]." From the frivolousness of the accusation respecting Hermeias, which was

His accusation at Athens.

* Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 4 and 5.

† See above, p. 12.

‡ Laertius in Aristot. Athenæus, xv. p. 697.

C H A P. considered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjecture that the reproach of worshipping Pythias with honours due to Eleusinian Ceres, was altogether groundless: but, in a philosopher, whose intellectual rather than his moral virtues have been the object of panegyric, we may remark with pleasure the unshaken strength of his friendship, and the genuine tenderness of his love, since both affections must have been expressed with an amiable enthusiasm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry.

His tenets
ignorantly
calumni-
ated.

It must not be dissembled that the accusation, and consequent condemnation of Aristotle by the Areopagus, has been ascribed to a different cause from that above assigned, and referred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is said by those who had carelessly examined his works, to have denied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inefficacy of prayers and sacrifices: doctrines, it is observed, which could not but enrage the priesthood, as totally subversive of its functions, establishments, and revenues*. But never was any accusation urged more falsely or more ignorantly. Aristotle, as it will be shewn hereafter, enumerates the priesthood among the functions or offices essentially requisite to the existence of every community. In writing to Alexander he says, that those are not entitled to be high-minded who conquer king-

* Origines contra Celsum et Brukeri, Histor. Critic. vol. i. p. 799.

doms,

doms, but rather those who have learned to form just notions of the gods^b; and in his life, as well as in his works, he uniformly shewed his veneration for religion in general, by treating, with great tenderness^c, even that distorted image of it reflected from the puerile superstitions of his country^d.

He is said to have written his own defence, and to have inveighed, in a strong metaphor, against the increasing degeneracy of the Athenians^e. His discourse, of which the boldness would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court; since he escaped his trial by seasonably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Eubœa, saying, in allusion to the death of Socrates, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity of sinning against philosophy^f. He survived his retreat to the shores of the Euripus scarcely a twelvemonth; persecution and banishment having probably shortened his days^g.

His retreat
to Chalcis,
and death.

His

^b Plutarch. de Tranquillit. Animi, p. 474.

^c This tenderness, however, did not, probably, satisfy the Athenian priests; who, as it will appear from the following analysis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretended irreligion.

^d Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 16. But the best proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Aristotle's works.

^e Laert. l. v. sect. 16. Οἶνον καὶ οἶνον γυμνασίου. Homer's description of the gardens of Alcinoüs. "The fig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian sycophants, so called originally from informing against the exporters of figs.

^f Ælian, iii. 36.

^g St. Justin (in admon. ad gentes) and Gregory of Nazianzen (contra Julian.) say that he died through the uneasiness of discontent at not being able to explain the cause of the tides of the Euripus;

D 2

upon

C H A P.

I.

His testa-
ment.

His testament, preserved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumstances related concerning his life, and practically illustrates the liberal maxims of his philosophy. Antipater, the confidential minister of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demise, is appointed the executor of this testament, with an authority paramount, as it should seem, to that of the other persons who are afterwards conjoined with him in the same trust. To his wife Herpylis, (for he had married a second time,) Aristotle, besides other property in money and slaves, leaves the choice of two houses, the one in Cnalcis, the other his paternal mansion at Stagira; and desires, that whichever of them she might prefer, should be properly furnished for her reception. He commends her domestic virtues; and requests his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would distinguish her by the kindest attention; and should she again think of a husband, that they would be careful to provide for her a suitable marriage. To Nicomachus, the son of this Herpylis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his first wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with

upon which authority the puerile story is engrafted of his throwing himself into that arm of the sea, saying, "You shall contain me, since I cannot comprehend you." Others say that he ended his life by poison to escape the vengeance of the Athenians (Rapin's *Comparaïson de Platon & d'Aristote*). Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of observing the extreme improbability that Aristotle should have been guilty of suicide, since he always speaks of it as of a shameful and cowardly crime.

the

the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite scholar Theophrastus^a. He desires that his daughter, when she attained a marriageable age, should be given to Nicanor, the son of his ancient benefactor Proxenus; and failing Nicanor, that his esteemed disciple Theophrastus should accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his first wife Pythias, he ordered to be disinterred, and again buried with his own, as she herself had requested. None of his slaves are to be sold; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they seem worthy of liberty; an injunction conformable to the maxims inculcated in his "Politics," that slaves of all descriptions ought to be set free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a testimony, of external deference at least, for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the safety of Nicanor, should be presented at Stagira to Jupiter and Minerva, the saviours.

Thus lived, and thus died in his 63d year, Aristotle the Stagirite. His enlightened humanity was often seasoned by pleasantry. Many strokes of genuine humour, little suspected by his commentators, will be found in his political writings. His smart sayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by those incapable of appreciating his weightier merits.

His sayings.

^a Strabo, xiii. 413.

C H A P. Some of these sayings, though apparently not the most memorable, are preserved in Diogenes Laertius; of which the following may serve for a specimen. Being asked, What, of all things, soonest grows old?—Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from study?—That of doing through choice what others do through fear. What is friendship?—One soul in two bodies. Why do we never tire in company with the beautiful?—The question of a blind man! Such apophthegms would be unworthy of mention, had they not, by their perpetual recurrence in our philosopher's conversation, shewn a mind free and unincumbered amidst the abstrusest studies; and, together with the most intense thought, a readiness of wit, which never failed to repel sneerers, and to abash arrogance¹. He exhibited a character as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philosopher; inhabiting courts, without meanness and without selfishness; living in schools, without pride and without austerity²; cultivating with ardent affection every domestic and every social virtue, while with indefatigable industry he reared that wonderful edifice of science, the plan of which we are still enabled to delineate from his imperfect and mutilated writings.

The extraordinary fate of his writings.

The extraordinary and unmerited fate of these writings, while it excites the curiosity, must provoke the indignation of every friend to science. Few of them were published in his lifetime; the

¹ Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. & Diogen.

² Plutarch. de Virtut. Moral. p. 448.

greater part nearly perished through neglect; and the remainder has been so grossly misapplied, that doubts have arisen whether its preservation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Aristotle's manuscripts and library were bequeathed to Theophrastus, the most illustrious of his pupils. Theophrastus again bequeathed them to his own scholar Neleus, who, carrying them to Scepsis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undistinguished mass of his property. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and careless of books¹, totally neglected the intellectual treasure that had most unworthily devolved to them, until they heard that the king of Pergamus, under whose dominion they lived, was employing much attention and much research in collecting a large library^m. With the caution incident to the subjects of a despot, who often have recourse to concealment in order to avoid robbery, they hid their books under ground; and the writings of Aristotle, as well as the vast collection of materials from which they had been composed, thus remained in a subterranean mansion for many generations, a prey to dampness and to wormsⁿ. At length they were released

¹ Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 & 609. Bayle gives too strong a meaning to *idiotais, ἀφρονταῖς*, when he calls them "gens idiots:" *ιδιωτὴς* means one who confines his attention to the private affairs of life, in opposition to philosophers and statesmen.

^m Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608.

ⁿ Athenæus, l. i. p. 3. says, that Neleus sold Aristotle's books to Ptolemy Philadelphus; and Bayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Patricius (Discuss. Peripatet. t. i. p. 29.) to reconcile this account with that of Strabo, by supposing that Neleus indeed sold Aristotle's library

C H A P. released from their prison, or rather raised from the grave, and sold for a large sum, together with the works of Theophrastus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a scholar^o; through whose labour and expence the work of restoring Aristotle's manuscripts, though performed in the same city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfectly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writings themselves did not a little contribute. The most considerable part of his acroatic works, which are almost the whole of those now remaining, consist of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his discourses; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from transcribers, and highly unsusceptible of conjectural emendation.

library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken the precaution of having the whole carefully copied. According to those writers, the books thus copied, and not the originals, suffered the unworthy treatment mentioned in the text. This supposition is highly improbable; for, not to mention the difficulty of copying, in a short time, many thousand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in possession of the genuine works of Aristotle, would have purchased at a high price those counterfeits, which had no other connection with that philosopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. (Ammonius ad Categor. sub init.) Had a correct copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alexandria under the first Ptolemies, his genuine philosophy would have struck deeper root, and made farther progress than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. Vossius (de Sect. Philosoph. c. xvi. p. 89.) endeavours to prove that Athenæus's words (which are certainly incorrect) imply that Neleus retained Aristotle's works when he sold all the rest.

^o Scrobo says, "rather than a philosopher."

What

What became of Aristotle's original manuscript, we are not informed ; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with his whole library, seized by Sylla, the Roman conqueror of Athens, and by him transmitted to Rome^p. Aristotle's works excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amyfus in Pontus, who had been taken prisoner by Lucullus in the Mithridatic war, and insolently manumitted^q, as Plutarch says, by Muræna, Lucullus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the manuscript by paying court to Sylla's librarian ; and communicated the use of it to Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished as a philosopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pompey ; and who, having undertaken the task of arranging and correcting those long injured writings, finally performed the duty of a skilful editor^r.

C H A P.

I.

Published
at Rome
by Andronicus of
Rhodes.

Though the works which formed the object of Andronicus's labours had suffered such injuries as the utmost diligence and sagacity could

Their
number
and mag-
nitude.

^p Plutarch. in Sylla.

^q Plutarch speaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who feels himself superior to the prejudices of his times. " That to give liberty by manumission to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he naturally and essentially possessed." Plutarch in Lucull. p. 504. I have melted into one sentence, οὐ γὰρ ἐξίου (read ἀξίου) Λουκουλλὸς ἀνδρὰ διὰ παιδείαν ὑπὸ δουλοκρατίᾳ—and ἀφαιρέτης γὰρ τῇ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἢ τῆς δοκῆσης ἐλευθερίας δοσῆς.

^r Plutarch. in Syll. Porphy. in Vitâ Plotini. Boëtius in Proœmio libri de interpret. Strabo only says that Tyrannion, in the manner mentioned in the text, got possession of the manuscript ; which was copied for the Roman booksellers by careless transcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original : a negligence, he observes, too common among the transcribers both in Rome and Alexandria.

not

C H A P. not completely repair', yet in consequence of
 I. those labours the Peripatetic philosophy began to resume the lustre of which it had been deprived since the days of Theophrastus; and the later adherents to that sect, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their master, far surpassed the fame and merit of their ignorant and obscure predecessors'. From the æra of Andronicus's publication to that of the invention of printing, a succession of respectable writers on civil and sacred subjects (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Christian church) confirm, by their citations and criticisms, the authenticity of most of the treatises still bearing Aristotle's name; and of more than ten thousand* commentators, who have endeavoured to illustrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expected, whose vanity has courted the praise

* Even after this publication, Aristotle's followers were obliged *τα πολλά μικρῶς λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν*, "often to guess at his meaning, through the faultiness of his text." Strabo, in the place above cited.

* Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609. He observes, "that the Peripatetic philosophers succeeding Theophrastus had, till this time, but few of their master's works, and those few chiefly of the exoteric kind; so that they were more conversant about words than things; and instead of reasoning accurately and profoundly, were contented with displaying their skill in dialectic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphrased the obscurity of the original *φιλοσοφίῃ πραγματικῶς* and *θεορίῃ λεκτικῶς*, because Strabo, who had himself diligently studied Aristotle's philosophy, (Strabo, l. xvi. p. 757.) uses the word *πραγματικῶς*, most probably, in the same sense in which it occurs in Aristotle, as synonymous with *ἀκριβῶς*, *κατὰ ἀλήθειαν*; and in opposition to *διαλεκτικῶς* and *τὸ διαλεγίσθαι λεγικῶς*,

* Patricius Discuss. Peripatet.

of

of superior discernment, by rejecting any considerable portion of them as spurious². According to the most credible accounts, therefore, he composed above four hundred³ different treatises, of which only forty-eight⁴ have been transmitted to the present age. But many of these last consist of several books, and the whole of his remains together still form a golden stream⁵ of Greek erudition, exceeding four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyssey.

CHAP.
I.

² Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Aristot. Patric. Discuss. Peripatetic. Fabricius Bibliothec. Græc. & Bruckerus Histor. Philos. artic. Aristot.

³ Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Aristot.) makes Aristotle's volumes amount to four hundred; Patricius Venetus, a learned professor of Padua in the sixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. Discuss. Peripat.) The laborious Fabricius employs one hundred pages of his second volume in enumerating and ascertaining Aristotle's remains; which still exceed four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyssey. The whole works of Aristotle, therefore, must have contained a quantity of prose, equal to forty times 28,088 verses; a fact the more extraordinary, since the greater part of his writings are merely elegant and comprehensive text books, containing the heads of his lectures; laborious, but clear reasonings; and often original discoveries in the most difficult branches of science. The following passage concerning him in the French Encyclopédie, article Aristotelisme, must excite a smile of something more than surprise, "Le nombre de ses ouvrages est prodigieux; on en put voir les titres en Diogene Laërce . . . encore ne sommes nous pas sûrs de les avoir tous: il est même probable que nous en avons perdu plusieurs," &c.

⁴ The treatises de Plantis & de Mundo are rejected by most writers. The former is, indeed, of little value; the latter, of the greatest; but I do not cite it as an authority, because I would willingly place my account of his philosophy beyond the reach of cavil.

⁵ Veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles. Cicero, Academ. ii. 38.

CHAP. II.

A NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S
SPECULATIVE WORKS.

ARGUMENT.

Sensation—Its nature explained—Imagination and memory—Association of perceptions—Reminiscence—Intellect—Its power and dignity—Aristotle's organon—Origin of general terms—Categories—Division and definition—Propositions—Syllogisms—Their nature and use—Second analytics—Topics—Aristotle's organon perverted and misapplied—Demonstration—Aristotle's metaphysics—Proper arrangement thereof—Truth vindicated—Introduction to the first philosophy—Its history—Refutation of the doctrine of ideas—Elements—Analysis of the bodies so called—Their perpetual transmutations—Doctrine of atoms refuted—Motion or change—Its different kinds—Works of nature—How her operations are performed—Matter—Form—Privation—The specific form or sight—State of capacity and energy—Aristotle's astronomy—The earth and its productions—History of animals—Philosophy of natural history—His book on energy—The first energy eternally and substantially active—His attributes—Antiquity of the doctrine that Deity is the source of being—Inculcated in Aristotle's exoteric works—Objections to Aristotle's philosophy—Answers thereto.

CHAP.
II.

THE Works of Aristotle derive their importance and splendour, neither from their number nor their magnitude, but from their variety

variety and their aim. Disdaining the conquest of particular provinces, he boldly invaded the whole empire of philosophy; and his persevering and generally successful exertions in this mighty enterprise excites the justest admiration of his genius and industry. The heavens and the earth; things human and divine; God, man, and nature: under these comprehensive divisions of whatever is the object of human thought, the Stagirite distributes the different articles of his truly philosophical Encyclopædia; of which time has yet spared to us the distinct outline, with many groups imperfectly sketched, and others totally defaced, yet filled up in some of its most essential parts with exquisite skill, and delineated throughout with unexampled boldness and inimitable precision.

C H A P.
II.
The different branches into which it is divided.

In endeavouring to communicate to the reader, in few words, a clear and correct notion of the condition in which Aristotle found, and in which he left, philosophy, it will be impossible strictly to adhere to the capricious order in which his Works have been arranged by his editors. Agreeably to his own maxim, I shall begin, not with what is absolutely first either in time or in dignity, but with that which is first in relation to man; that is, with what is first in the order of his thoughts or conceptions; endeavouring, in my discourse throughout, to preserve the modesty and impartiality of an historian, and to be as faithful in explaining my author's opinions, as cautious in interposing my own judgment.

It

C H A P.

II.

The four-
ces of
human
know-
ledge.

It is the doctrine of Aristotle, a doctrine long and obstinately disputed, but now very generally received, that all our direct knowledge originates in perceptions of sense^a. Of the five senses, that of touch, he observes, is widely diffused through the whole animal frame, and cannot therefore be destroyed without destroying the animal^b. The sense of taste Aristotle regards as a particular kind of touch, requisite for the purpose of nutrition, and therefore essential to life^c. But the three other senses, always residing in particular organs, are in some animals altogether wanting, in others extremely imperfect; and even in those animals in whom they are most vigorous, are often, without destruction to the animal itself, overwhelmed, weakened, or totally destroyed, by the too powerful operation of their respective objects^d.

Sensation.

Colours and sounds are perceived respectively by the eye and the ear, and by them only;

^a De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656. ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ κοινὸν ἐστὶ . . . καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι αἰσθητοί μὴδὲν ὕδωρ αὐτῶν μαθόντες, ὕδασι συνίεν· τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τῇ διόσει τῇ μὴ φαντασματῶν εἶναι; ἢ ὕδασι ταῦτα φαντασματῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ φαντασματῶν; but I no where find in Aristotle the words universally ascribed to him, "Nihil est in intellectu, quid non prius fuerit in sensu."

^b Compar. Aristot. de Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 633. and c. xi. p. 624. & seq.

^c ὁ δὲ χυμὸς ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀπτῶν ἐστὶ. Comp. l. ii. de Anima, c. iii. p. 633, and c. 10. p. 643. & seq.

^d De Anima, l. ii. c. 6, 7, 8, 9.

ἢ τῇ αἰσθητῇ ἐνέργειᾳ ἐν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ; and again, ἢ δὲ τῇ αἰσθητῇ ἐνέργειᾳ καὶ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἢ αὐτῇ μὴ ἐστὶ καὶ μίαν. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 648.

motions

motions and figures are conveyed to the mind through the instrumentality of more senses than one; and a third class of perceptions are communicated and impressed through the united energy of all the senses*. Those of touch and of taste may be deemed nearly a-kin, because external objects *seem* to operate on them by direct and immediate application. This, however, is not probably the case; because, were it true, the analogy of nature would here be violated, since it is found by experiment, that external objects, directly and immediately applied to the organs of the three other senses, totally obstruct the motions on which their power of sensation depends, and render their respective objects, whether sounds, colours, and odours, altogether imperceptible†. By a rapid and continuous agitation of the air, sonorous bodies affect the ear; through the intervention of light, colours are distinguished by the eye; and odours are communicated in a subtile vapour, which must in some animals, before perception can have place, be accompanied with the act of inspiring by the nostrils‡. Agreeably to this analogy, it is probable that the fleshy and tender part of our external frame, which seems to us to be endowed with such a delicate sense of touch, is nothing more than the medium through which

* De Anima, l. ii. c. vi. p. 638.

† *ἵνα γὰρ τις θῇ το ἔχον χρομα ἐπ' αὐτῇ τῷ ὀφθ, ἀποφθαί . . . ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου καὶ σμύνης ἰσχυρῶς δεκ.* De Anima, l. ii. c. vii. p. 639.

‡ De Anima, l. ii. c. ix. p. 643.

the

C H A P. the perceptions of hardness, softness, and other
 II. qualities of that kind, are conveyed and communicatedⁿ.

Its nature
 explained.

The real qualities of external objects are supposed to be made known to us by our senses; but, in fact, these qualities, such as they are by us conceived and denominated, have not any actual existence until they are perceived¹. Previously to this, they exist only in power or capacity; which, in the language of Aristotle, here means that they exist only in their causes^k; causes, which though themselves imperceptible, have the power of moving and agitating our organs^l, and thereby of producing in them that variety of sensations, which relieves man from solitude, and connects him with the external world. To beings differently constituted, or to man himself, enjoying a direct and immediate intimacy with the causes of his perceptions, this world would probably assume an appearance

ⁿ De Anima, c. xi. p. 641. How far is this conjecture connected with the discovery of the nerves and their functions? And to how many discoveries might the shrewd guesses of Aristotle, attentively examined, still give birth?

¹ ἢ διὰ τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ, καὶ μίαν. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 638. And again, ἀναγκὴ αἶμα φθιμεῖσθαι καὶ σωθῆσθαι τὴν αἵτῃ λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, χυμὴν καὶ γυνεῖν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649.

^k Compare διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς, τὴν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, &c. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649. And τὸ μὲν ἐν μὴτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἔχει, μὴτι τὰ αἰσθητά, ἴσως ἀληθές. τῇ γὰρ αἰσθανομένην πάθος τὸτο ἐστὶ· τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι ἂ' ὅπου τὴν αἰσθησίν, καὶ αὐτὴν αἰσθητικῶς, ἀδύνατον. Metaphys. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

^l ἢ διὰ λεγομένην αἰσθησίν, ὡς ἐνέργειαν, κινήσει τις διὰ τὴν σωματικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ. De Somn. & Vigiliis, c. i. p. 685. ἢ διὰ αἰσθησίν ἐν τῇ κινήσει τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει. De Anima, l. ii. c. v. p. 636.

altogether

altogether different from that which it now wears; for all sensation directly and immediately depends, not merely on the nature of its external causes, but on that also of the motions and changes produced in the organs of sense. Aristotle, therefore, justly reproves Democritus for saying, that if no medium were interposed, a pismire would be visible in the heavens^m; asserting, on the contrary, that if vacuity alone intervened, nothing possibly could be seen, because all vision is performed by changes or motions in the organ of sight; and all such changes or motions imply an interposed mediumⁿ.

Between the perceptions of the eye and of the ear there is a striking analogy. Bodies are only visible by their colour; and colour is only perceptible in light; and unless different motions were excited by light in the eye, colour and the distinctions of colour would no more be visible, than, independently of different vibrations communicated to the ear, sound, and the distinctions of sound, would be audible^o. When the vibrations in a given time are many, the sensation of sharpness or shrillness follows; when the vibrations are, in the same time, comparatively

^m De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 639.

ⁿ De Sensu & Sensibili, c. ii. p. 665.

^o De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. See also l. ii. c. vii. p. 638. The intrepid ignorance of Voltaire might maintain, that Aristotle considered light as a quality merely; and that luminous and coloured bodies had qualities exactly such as they excited the ideas of in us. (Voltaire's Newtonian Philosophy.) But how could the learned Warburton assent to this erroneous account of the Peripatetic philosophy? See Divine Legation of Moses, &c. b. iv. sect. 6.

C. H. A. P. few, the sensation of flatness is the result:
 II. but the first sound does not excite many vibrations because it is shrill or sharp, but it is sharp because it excites many vibrations; and the second sound does not excite few vibrations because it is flat or grave, but it is grave because it excites few vibrations^p.

Imagination and memory.

The powers of imagination and memory originate wholly in the senses, and are common to man with many other animals. As sensation is carried on by means of certain motions excited in our organs, so imagination and memory, which are the copies of sensation, exert their energy by means of similar but fainter motions, representatives of the former^q. That independently of external causes such motions are produced, is demonstrable from what happens in sleep^r. In some kinds of madness too, the phantoms of the brain are mistaken for realities^s; and, in other kinds, realities are mistaken for phantoms^t. But when our senses are sound and awake, we can easily distinguish between perceptions arising from external causes, and those called into being by the mere agency of our internal constitution; and in many cases we can discover and explain the laws by which the

^p De Anima, l.ii. c. viii. p. 641.

^q ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶ αἰσθητικὴ καὶ αἰσθητικὴ. Rhetor. l. i. c. xi. p. 536.
 The same doctrine is maintained, De Anima, l.iii. c. iv. p. 652.
 and De Memor. & Reminisc. c. i. p. 680. c. ii. p. 682 & 683.

^r De Anima, l.iii. c. iv. p. 651.

^s Of this see an extraordinary example in Mirabil. Aufcult. p. 1152.

^t De Anima, l.iii. c. iv. p. 652. and De Mem. & Reminisc. c. i. p. 680.

energy

energy of this constitution operates". For the perceptions of imagination and memory, though not rigidly governed, like those of sense, by the power and presence of external objects, do not, however, float at random, but are subjected to a certain order and progression, conformably to established laws of association, which Aristotle was the first philosopher that attempted to investigate, to enumerate, and to explain". He investigated them in analysing the complex act of reminiscence or recollection, in which the principles of association operate under the immediate direction of the human will. He enumerated them as far as seemed requisite to the subject which he was then treating, by saying that they might be reduced to the four following heads: proximity in time; contiguity in place; resemblance or similarity; contrariety or contrast^x: and he explains them by shewing

^u De Memor. & Reminisc. c. i. p. 680.

^w Ibid. c. ii. p. 681.

^x Mr. Hume says, "I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems very worthy of curiosity. To me there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas; resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or effect." *Essays*, sect. iii. of the Association of Ideas, vol. ii. p. 24. Mr. Hume might be ignorant that Aristotle had attempted to enumerate the principles of association; but it is an unpardonable error in logic, to assign cause and effect, as one of these principles, since cause and effect, as far as association is concerned, resolves itself into contiguity in time or place; and according to Mr. Hume's doctrine, the very idea of cause arises solely from these connexions. *Essays*, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35. 88. 107. It may be remarked that "the association of ideas" is a modern expression. Aristotle did not need it, since the thing meant by it is referred by him to custom. *τῇ γὰρ ἐνὶ ἀκολούθῳ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλαις, ἥδη μετὰ τῆς*. De Memor. p. 682.

current of its thoughts, in turning them from one channel to another, in rejecting those which hold by no tie to the perception or image of which it is in quest, and in preferring, examining, and contemplating in all their relations, those which, by their connexion with this perception or image, have a natural tendency to rouse the one or to revive the other^a.

It is the characteristic of animals, in contradistinction to the inanimate parts of nature, to be endowed with sensation; and whatever is endowed with sensation must have perceptions of pain and pleasure; and whatever has such perceptions must feel the impulse of appetite; the great moving principle in all animated beings^b. But in the exercise of reminiscence, which is the immoveable boundary between man and other animals, he, and he alone, recognises the divine principle of reason or intellect co-operating with the coarser powers of fancy or memory; since every act of reminiscence, as above explained^c, implies comparison; and every the slightest comparison, expressed in the simplest proposition, indicates a substance different and separable from matter, a substance totally incon-

Reminiscence the first boundary between man and other animals.

^a τὸτο δὲ γίνεται κινεῖται πολλὰ, εἰς αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κίνησιν κινεῖται ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα. De Memor. & Reminisc. c. ii. p. 682. He adds, anticipating the philosophy of Hobbes and Hartley, τὴν δὲ αἰσθησὶν αὐτὴν εἴηται μὲν μνησθῆναι εἴηται δὲ μὴ αὐτὴν, ὅτι ἐπὶ πλείω ἐνδεχεται κινεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς—ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις πᾶν τὸ ἴδιον, &c. ibid. "But the cause that the same thing recalls sometimes one perception, and sometimes another, is, that different motions may spring from the same principle; for custom is like nature," &c.

^b De Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 632. & seq.

^c De Memor. & Reminisc. c. ii. p. 683.

C H A P. ceivable by man in his present state, where the
II. gross perceptions of sense are the only foundation and sole materials of all others, how lofty
 foever and refined; but a substance, notwithstanding, of whose existence we are assured by
 our consciousness of its energies^d. To illustrate
 this further by an example, Aristotle says, let
 the comparison or proposition be one of the
 simplest imaginable, that whiteness is not sweetness^e. These sensible qualities which the vulgar
 ascribe to external objects, the philosopher
 knows, as above explained, to depend on certain motions communicated to his internal organs, motions vivid and forcible when first produced by sensation, more faint and languid when afterwards revived by imagination or memory^f.

Proof of an
 intellectual
 principle in
 man.

^d Com. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and c. ix. p. 629.

^e De Anima, l. iii. c. ii. p. 649.

^f De Memor. & Reminiscent. c. i. p. 680, and De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. Sensible qualities as perceived by the mind, Aristotle calls, therefore, *παθηματα εν τη ψυχη*, of which, he says, words are the signs: De Interpret. c. i. p. 37: meaning, thereby, that language expresses things as they are perceived, not as they really are. *το μιν εν μητε τα αισθητα ειναι, μητε τα αισθηματα, ισως αληθει· τε γαρ αισθανομενη παθος τετο εστι· το δε τα υποκειμενα μη ειναι α ποιη την αισθησιν, αδυνατον. ε γαρ δη η αισθησις αυτη ιαυτης εστιν, αλλα εστι τι ετιρον παρα την αισθησιν, ο αναγκη πρωτερον ειναι της αισθησεως· το γαρ κινεν, τε κινεμεν φυσι πρωτερον εστι· καν ει λεγεται προς αλληλα ταυτα αυτα, εδεν ηττον.* Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879. "To say that things perceptible by sense, and the objects of our perceptions, do not exist, is perhaps true; for these are merely the affections of the percipient: but that there should not be certain causes producing sensation, and existing independently of it, is impossible; for sensation is not its own work, but there is something beside sensation necessarily prior to it, since the principle of motion is necessarily prior to the movement communicated; and not the less, that these things are relatives." The existence of imperceptible, and therefore unknown causes of our sensations, is maintained by Aristotle against the ancient sceptics; in whose errors he refuted, by anticipation, those of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, &c. as we shall see hereafter.

But

But the comparison of any two objects necessarily implies, that they should be both present in the same indivisible point of time, to one and the same comparing power. Yet their presence to the senses, the fancy, or the memory, is known to consist in nothing else but certain motions produced in our bodily organs. If the comparison, therefore, could be made by any of them, it would follow that this organ was susceptible of different and contrary motions, precisely at the same indivisible instant; for it is necessary that the same simple power should comprehend at once the sweetness and whiteness, or whatever else be the sensations compared, since if it comprehended them distributively, by its parts however minute, or successively in particles of time however short, it could no more draw the result of the comparison, than if the one sensation was recognised by one man, and the other by another, or one of them recognised in the last century, and another in the present. The perception of truth, therefore, being altogether unrelated to time and space, must be totally dissimilar to any corporeal operation, and so essentially one simple energy, that it cannot without absurdity be supposed capable of division. But all the motions and actions of body, being performed in space and time, are therefore indefinitely divisible; and although their smallness or quickness soon escapes the perception of sense, and soon eludes the grasp of fancy, yet the intellect still pursues and detects them, knowing that they can never vanish into nothing by their

CHAP. indefinite minuteness. By our divisions and sub-
 II. divisions without end, we still leave, in the
 smallest particle, body with its properties; and
 after all the steps that possibly can be taken, re-
 main precisely as distant from the goal, as at
 our first setting out. This goal, therefore, it is
 impossible for us ultimately to attain; since, in
 the language of geometers, infinite will be still
 interposed between operations divisible and in-
 divisible, between perceptions of sense and per-
 ceptions of reason, between the nature and pro-
 perties of mind and the nature and properties
 of matter. It is not sense or fancy, but mind
 alone, that recognises itself; and this intellec-
 tual substance, of which we must be contented
 in our present state merely to know the existence
 and to exercise the energies, is that which cha-
 racterises and ennobles the creature man, and
 which gives him a resemblance to his Maker.
 It is this which, separated from body, is then,
 only, properly what it is^s, immortal and divine;
 which

The power
and dignity
of this
principle.

^s De Anima, l. iii. c. 6. which passage is commented by Plutarch from Aristotle himself. Vid. Plut. de Consol. ad Apollon. p. 115. where he says, that the dead are happy and blessed; and that to speak ill of them falsely, is to blaspheme against those far superior to ourselves. This work of Aristotle's was a Dialogue, written in honour of Eudemus of Cyprus. It is mentioned by Plutarch in Dion. p. 967. The passage above alluded to, in the work De Anima, is strangely perverted by Aristotle's commentators; whose erroneous interpretation is adopted by Warburton in the following passage, as bold in assertion as defective in proof. "Aristotle thought of the soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth* out of his Nicomachean Ethics; where having spoke of the sensitive souls, and declared them mortal, he goes on in this manner: 'It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone pre-existing, enter

* Intellectual System, p. 55.

from

which does not decay with our corporeal powers; and whose energies are so totally different

C H A P.
II.

from without, and be only divine*.' But then he distinguishes again concerning this mind or intellect, and makes it two-fold, agent and patient, the former of which he concludes to be immortal, and the latter corruptible. The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage, and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly by his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substances are confounded together. But had that great man reflected on the general doctrine of the *τοῖς*, he would have seen the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the human soul's being part of the divine substance, here draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence, which though it now appears all the philosophers embraced, yet all were not, as we said, so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: "The agent intellect (says he) is only immortal and eternal, but the passive corruptible, *i. e.* the particular sensations of the soul will cease after death, and the substance of it will be resolved into the soul of the universe; for it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a *tabula rasa*, that human sensations and reflections were passions. These, therefore, are what he finely calls the passive intelligent, which he says shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the agent intelligent, we learn from his commentators, who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the divine intellect; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it *θεος*, divine†." On this passage I would first observe, that though I had frequently read the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I could not meet with the words cited by Warburton; and for this good reason, that such words are not there to be found. In the first edition of Cudworth's Intellectual System, that great Author is very negligent in citing his authorities; and in the second edition published by Birch, we are referred to Aristotle de Generatione & Corruptione, l. ii. c. 3. The passage quoted, however, is not to be found there, nor in any part of the work on Generation and Corruption. It is to be found, indeed, in the admirable treatise de Generat. Animal. l. ii. c. iii. p. 1077.; and words to the same purpose occur in the fifth chapter of the first book de Anima. *ὁ δὲ νῦς ἵστικεν ἐγγιγνησθαι, ὡσαύτως ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐφθίμωσθαι.* "It is likely that the mind is a substance existing in the body, and not liable to be destroyed with the body." From this and several other passages, where Aristotle always speaks with the

* *Λεπιταται δὲ τοῖς νῦν μοῖσι θυραθεν ἐπεκτείναι, καὶ θεὸν ἔσθαι μοῖσι.*

† Divine Legation, vol. i. book iii; sect. 4.

greatest

C H A P. different from those of organised matter, that
 II. whereas our senses are easily fatigued, over-
 powered,

greatest modesty on the subject of the human intellect, qualifying his words with a "perhaps," "it is likely," Warburton had no right to conclude that Aristotle maintained the pre-existence of the mind as a part of the Divinity. The argument which he brings in support of this assertion, "that Aristotle calls the active intelligent, Divine," is not conclusive, because Aristotle, with other Greek writers, might use the epithet "Divine" as synonymous with excellent, as the Lacedæmonians, when they admired any one greatly, called him *Σίος*; (instead of *θείος*;) *ἀνὴρ*. Ethic. Nicom. l. vii. c. 1. But the Stagirite seldom uses any word which he does not accurately define, and when he calls the intellect *divine*, or what is *most divine in us*; Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7. sub init.; he tells us plainly what he means by these expressions, which he says can have no other sense, but either that thought, *i. e.* the energy of intellect, from which only it derives its excellence and dignity, exists most perfectly in the divine nature; or, secondly, because intellect enables us, imperfectly indeed, to comprehend that nature. The learned reader may compare the following passages, Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. ii. p. 841. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and Metaphys. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. That *intelligence in capacity is prior in time to intelligence in energy, in the individual, but not absolutely*, means merely that the human mind is capable of intelligence before it becomes actually intelligent; but that all intelligence in capacity is derived from intelligence in energy, that is, from God. Metaphys. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938. & seq. and the last chapters both of his Physics and Metaphysics. That the mind when separated from the body is *only what it is*, means that it then assumes its true nature, activity, and dignity, and is then better and happier than it was before, in which Aristotle says that many agreed with him. *ὑπὲρ βέλτιον τῷ νῦν μὴ μετὰ σώματος ἵσται, καθάπερ ὠθεῖται λεγισθαι, καὶ πολλοὶ συνδοκεῖ.* Aristot. de Anima. l. i. c. iii. p. 623. That it then *perpetually energises*, not needing the assistance of memory, is explained by what Aristotle says on memory, in his book on that subject, c. ii. p. 681. & seq. in which he shews that memory depends on association of perceptions, and that association again depends on motion; whereas the intellect is simple, impassive; and, existing independently of space, incapable of motion; except by way of accession or appendage, as a sailor is moved in a ship. De Anima, l. i. c. 3.

Since writing the above note, I find that Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 165., cites and translates part of the passage which I have endeavoured to explain; but His Lordship, I think,

powered, and destroyed by the force and intensity of objects sensible^h, the intellect is roused, quickened, and invigorated by the force and intensity of objects intelligible: instead of being overstrained or blunted, it sharpens and fortifies amidst obstinate exertions, finding in such alone, its best improvement and most exquisite delightⁱ.

Having recognised the dignity and the powers of man, Aristotle, in his Works throughout, examines how these powers have been exercised in rearing the fair fabric of science, which it was his own ambition to complete and to adorn. Adverse accidents intercepted, as we have seen, from posterity the full benefit of his labours; yet the treatises which emerged amidst the general

Aristotle's
Works re-
ferred to
three
heads.

think, construes it wrong. On the words *οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ, ὅτι τὰτο μὲν ἀθάβει; ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νῦν φθαρτός, καὶ ἀνεὺ τῆς ἐνὸς νοῦ, he observes, "that what Aristotle here says of the mind's thinking of nothing without the passive intellect, refers to the progression from the state of mere capacity in which the intellect is, before it is impressed by external objects; which impression is absolutely necessary for its operating in this our present state." His Lordship here condescends to speak rather like a follower of Locke or Hume than as the disciple of Aristotle; and the text will not at all bear his interpretation, for the *ἀνεὺ τῆς* can only refer to the active intellect, without which Aristotle says the passive thinks of nothing. Plutarch expresses Aristotle's meaning in popular language: *παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖον, &c.* "That of all things belonging to man, the improvement of his mind alone is immortal and divine;—neither to be assailed by fortune nor shaken by calumny; not to be destroyed by disease nor weakened by old age." Plutarch. de Liber. Educand. p. 5. Edit. Xyland. My explication of the obscure passages in Aristotle concerning the soul is confirmed by what he himself says on the subject of education in the 15th chapter of the seventh book of his Politics. The reader will find the passage in the following translation, book iv. c. 15.*

^h De Anima, l. ii. c. xii. p. 646.

ⁱ De Anima, l. iii. cc. 5, 6, 7, 8. p. 653. et seq. and Ethic. Nicom. l. x. cc. 7 and 8.

wreck

C H A P. wreck of his writings, best arrange themselves
 II. under the three-fold division of the objects of
 human thought ; God, Nature, and Man: which
 division he himself seems continually to keep in

I. God. view. Whatever reasonings relate to theology,
 though scattered in different treatises, may be
 referred, therefore, to his *Metaphysics* ; a name
 unknown, indeed, to Aristotle, but given to his
 theological works by his editors, and importing
 that the fourteen books which bear it, should
 immediately follow his numerous treatises on the
 subject of physics or natural philosophy ; that
 we may not rest satisfied with the knowledge of
 bare effects, but proceed to the investigation of
 causes, and of the Deity himself, the primary

II. Nature. cause of all^k. His histories of the heavens and
 of the earth ; of animals, plants, and minerals ;
 and even of man, considered merely as a ma-
 terial and sentient Being, may conformably with
 modern language be arranged under the head
 of Nature ; though, in Aristotle's own accepta-
 tion, that term has a more limited sense ; and,
 for a reason which will appear hereafter, is
 confined to terrestrial objects, and those existing

III. Man. between this earth and the lunar sphere. Upon
 the Philosophy of Man^l, as our Author calls it,
 that is, of Man considered as a social and ra-
 tional Being, endowed with sentiment, affection,
 and intellect, Aristotle's writings are as clear
 and copious as they are solid and satisfactory.
 His treatises on Logic, Ethics, and Politics, as

^k *Metaph.* l. xiii. c. 7. p. 988.

^l ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. xi. c. ult.

well

well as his books on Rhetoric and Poetry, may all be referred to this one head, and viewed as connected parts of one great system of knowledge, to which, after the most patient examination, it will be found that the labours of his successors and detractors have made but slender additions.

C H A P.
II.

In endeavouring concisely, but clearly, to communicate to my readers the result of our Author's reasonings and discoveries under the three heads abovementioned, I shall begin, for a reason which will presently appear, with that work of his, recently the most decried of all, but long extravagantly magnified as the great engine of discovery, and sole instrument^m of universal science. Aristotle himself never viewed it in this false and flattering light, nor ever bestowed on it these pompous titles. The various tracts composing the Organon, as it is called, are not even given by him as parts of one and the same workⁿ. They all relate, however, to

The proper
subject of
his Orga-
non.

^m The word *organon*, *organum*, is found in Diogenes Laertius (L. i. sect. 28.); where Aristotle's philosophy is divided into practical and speculative; the practical comprehending his Ethics and Politics; the speculative, Natural Philosophy and Logic. Diogenes, however, does not use the word in the sense in which it was afterwards taken by Aristotle's commentators. Besides, when Laertius says, that logic is a part of speculative philosophy, he contradicts Aristotle himself, who divides speculative philosophy into the three branches of Mathematics, Physics, and Theology. Metaph. l. vi. cap. p. 904.

ⁿ These tracts formed so many distinct works which must have been arranged otherwise than they now stand, since in some of the first of them we find references to those now published as the last.

CHAP. one and the same subject; since dialectic^o, in
 II. the strict and proper sense, is merely the art of
 dialogue, that is, the art of conversing. Aristotle's Organon, therefore, rightly understood, is nothing more than an endeavour to teach the rational and skilful employment of that characteristic faculty of man, by which he expresses, through appropriate signs^p, not only his perceptions of sense, but what is indefinitely more various, the comparisons, abstractions, and conclusions of his own mind concerning them. It is in this sense that logic, or dialectic, in the order of communicating liberal and universal knowledge, ought to precede the more abstruse and loftier branches of philosophy, because, in carefully analysing the signs by which internal operations, as well as external objects, are expressed, we remount at once to the origin and source both of our notions and of our perceptions; discover their intimate connections with each other; and unfold, even to the unexperienced minds of youth, a vast intellectual

^o Dialectic is the word often used by Aristotle himself to denote what is commonly called his Logic, or the subject of the books composing his Organon. Vid. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 4. Rhetor. l. i. c. ii.

^p τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον συμβόλον ἐστίν. "Each word or name is a symbol or sign." De Sensu & Sensibili, l. i. c. i. p. 663. The whole passage, beginning with αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κρησῶν and ending with the words just cited, may be abridged as follows: "Hearing is the sense most instrumental to knowledge, not essentially or necessarily, for the sense of seeing discovers to us more of the differences of things; but because sound, the object of hearing, is the vehicle of language; which is composed of words, each of which is a sign." Vid. etiam De Interpret. l. i. c. i. p. 36 and 37.

treasure,

treasure, of which, without being aware of it, they were already in possession^a.

C H A P.
II.

His analysis
of lan-
guage.

Agreeably to these principles, the Stagirite defines discourse, or speech, to be found significant by compact, of which the parts also are significant^r; all discourse which simply affirms or denies, he resolves into arguments, arguments into propositions, and propositions into words; which last are the ultimate elements of language, because, though significant themselves, their parts are not significant^s. Sounds significant by compact are either nouns, that is, names denoting things without any reference to time; or verbs, whose signification is accompanied with the appendage of time^t. Nouns are either proper names or appellatives: a proper name denotes one individual only; an appellative denotes various individuals, and often various kinds or classes of individuals. The formation of appellatives is, according to Aristotle, the united work of abstraction and association^u; abstraction, by which we separate the combinations of

Origin of
general
terms.

^a Comp. Aristot. Topic. l. i. c. ii. p. 181. & Aristot. de Anima. l. iii. c. ix. p. 656.

^r De Interpret. l. i. c. iv. p. 38.

^s To obviate objections arising from the significant parts of compounds words, Aristotle says, *εν δε τοις διπλοις, σημαινει μιν τι, αλλα ε καθ' αυτο . . .* The syllables are significant, but not essentially; since the whole word is significant by compact; for however subtly words may be analysed, they will ultimately resolve themselves, not into *οργανα*, but into *συμβολα*: not into natural instruments, but into conventional signs. De Interpret. c. iv. p. 38.

^t Ibid. c. iii. Those parts of verbs, therefore, which do not imply time, are merely nouns. Ibid.

^u Compare Metaph. l. xi. c. ii. pp. 955, 956. Ibid. c. xii. pp. 957, 958. Analyt. Posterior. l. ii. c. xix. p. 179. & seq. De Memor. & Reminisc. p. 181. & seq.

sense,

CHAP. sense, and consider a complex object in one
 II. view, without attending to the other aspects
 under which it may be examined"; association, by which perceptions that are similar naturally revive each other in unbroken succession; and, in consequence of their similarity, are expressed by a common name, or appellative, which is equally applicable to them all*. In reference to this common name, which is merely a sign that different objects have been compared together, and found to agree in one or more respects with each other, different individuals are said to belong to the same species, and different species are said to belong to the same

* Metaph. l. xi. c. iii. pp. 956, 957.

* δηλον δὲ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα επαγωγή γνωρίζει ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις ὕψω το καθολῶν ἐμποιοῖ. The author here maintains, that even general principles can only be gathered by induction from perceptions of sense, or from repeated acts of memory coalescing into one experience (αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνημαὶ τῷ αἰσθῆναι ἐμπειρία μία ἐστὶ). And the comparison by which this intellectual operation is explained equally applies to that by which "τα καθολῶν," "abstract notions," gathered from repeated sensations, are generalised and embodied in language. "In a flying army, when one man stops, the next to him will often stop also, and so on in succession, until the whole will sometimes stand firm. The same thing happens in the irregular flow of our thoughts. The steady contemplation of any individual object, under that aspect in which it agrees with other individuals, will recall many similar objects to the mind; the stability of the one will communicate stability to the others, and thus give birth to what are called Universals, that is, to general terms, equally applicable to an indefinite number of individuals." γαντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφορῶν ἴσος, πρῶτος μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθολῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν το καθολικόν, ἡ δὲ αἰσθησις τὸ καθολῶν ἐστὶ. When Aristotle says that we perceive, by sense, the universal, he means that we view the object under that aspect in which it agrees with other objects; and the contemplation of it under that aspect only, or, in other words, the considering certain appearances of it apart from the rest, produces in the mind an abstract notion, of which, though itself be particular, the name is general. Metaph. *ibid.*

genus;

genus; for in order to explain the nature of things, and to see their agreements and differences, it is not necessary to suppose the existence of general ideas, but it is necessary that one word or term should, in the same sense, be applicable to many individuals, and also that one word or term should, in the same sense, be applicable to many species¹. Independently of this power in man, of expressing things that are alike by a common sign, his knowledge would be confined to the coarse and complex intimations of sense; he could not form even the most common notion of all, namely, that of number, since objects could not be enumerated, unless they were previously referred to the same genus or class, that is, unless they were expressed by one common sign. They must be so many trees, so many animals, or at least, so many beings; and thus generically united, before they can be specifically or even numerically distinguished. For this reason Aristotle observes, that "one" and "being" are, of all terms, the most universal; they are applicable to all other general terms; they can be said in the same sense of them all, but no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other term expresses the full extent of their meaning²; or, in other words, is used as a sign for all the variety of things which they are employed to denote.

C H A P.
II.

Their im-
portance.

¹ *Analyt. Poster.* l. i. c. xi. p. 141. *ibid.* c. xxiv. p. 155.

² *Metaph.* l. x. c. ii. p. 945. The *το ἓν καὶ τὸ οὐ* "unity and being," agree, he observes, in the universality of their signification. They contain all the categories, but are not confined within the limits of any of them.

C H A P. Next to them, in point of universality, the ten
II. categories immediately follow. These most
The cate- comprehensive signs of things are called, in
gories. Latin, Predicaments, because they can be said, or predicated in the same sense, of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them; whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning. They are: substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, passion, position, and habit*. All the objects of human thought that can be expressed by single words, arrange themselves under one or other of these general terms. Aristotle (not indeed in his "Categories," but in his works collectively) explains the nature and properties of each; and thus opens to the inquisitive mind a wide field of various knowledge, since the properties of each predicament belong

* *ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἀριθμῶν δέκα' τί ἐστι, πόσον, ποῖον, πρὸς τί, πού, ποτε, κινούμεν, ἔχον, ποιῶν, πάσχον.* Topic. l. i. c. 9. p. 285. What is here called *τί ἐστι*, the author elsewhere calls substance, as *Categor. c. iv. p. 15.*; where he says, that all single words denote either substance, or quantity, or quality, &c. This tenfold division had been made before Aristotle's time, and explained by the Pythagoreans, particularly by Archytas of Tarentum, in his book *περὶ τοῦ παντός*, "concerning the Universe." A great part of that work, in its primitive Doric, is preserved in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. But Archytas and the other Pythagoreans considered as "the principles of things," what Aristotle calls *σχηματα κατηγορίας*, "figures or forms of predication," and *λογὴς καθολῆς*, "universal denominations." Thus also they are called by Archytas the Peripatetic (Boeth. in *Predicam. p. 112.*), whom Mr. Harris (*Philosoph. Arrangements, c. ii. p. 31.*) confounds with Archytas the Pythagorean; though to consider these comprehensive genera as the *principles and causes of the universe with the Pythagoreans*, or merely as *universal denominations with Aristotle*, constitutes as wide a difference as that between a visionary and a philosopher.

to

to all the objects, or classes of objects, comprehended under^b it, and the properties of the ten predicaments together, extend to all things in the universe. But to avoid the reproach of bewildering his reader in barren generalities, the philosopher frequently applies his reasonings concerning signs to the things signified by them; perpetually inculcating that individuals only have a real existence, and that what are called, in the Pythagorean or Platonic philosophy, numbers, ideas, immutable and eternal essences, are merely the work of human thought expressed and embodied in language^c. This doctrine is

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^b Categor. c. v. to c. ix. inclusively.

^c Categor. c. v. p. 17. "That if individuals, or the first substances were not, nothing else could be;" so that, instead of ideas, &c. making them, every thing that exists is made by or from them. And again, *οὐδὲ μὲν ἐν εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τὶ παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ἐκ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ἀποδείξει, ἔστι· εἶναι μὲντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλὰ ἀληθεῖς εἰπὲν ἀνάγκη . . . διὸ ἀρα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἐπὶ πλείονσι εἰπὲν, μὴ ὁμοῦμον.* "For the purpose of demonstration, it is not necessary to suppose the existence of general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the same sense, to many individuals." *Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. xi. p. 141.* Compare *cxxiv. p. 155.* *Ἐπὶ δὲ ὑδὲμα ἀνάγκη τὶ εἶναι τὸτε παρὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν δῆλοι, ὕδεν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μὴ τὶ σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν, ἢ πρὸς τί, ἢ ποιῶν· ἢ δὲ ἀρχ, ἢ ἀποδείξει; αἰτία, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀκένον.* "It is not necessary to suppose that the general term, denoting any class of substances, expresses any thing beside the different particulars to which it applies, any more than the general terms denoting qualities, relations, or actions. One general term stands as the sign for a variety of particulars considered under one and the same aspect; but to suppose that this term requires one substantial archetype, or idea, as general as itself, is the hearer's fault; such a supposition not being necessary for the purpose of demonstration." The simplicity and solidity of Aristotle's Philosophy was early destroyed by combining and confounding it with Platonism. The evil has been perpetuated from age to age, by his commentators and pretended followers; not excepting the latest of them all, Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, who perpetually ascribe to the Stagirite the doctrine of general ideas, which, in the passages above cited, he formally

C H A P. is nearly allied to another of Aristotle's above
 II. explained, that all our direct knowledge originates

mally denies. Those last mentioned writers acknowledge that Aristotle opposed Plato, in denying the separate and substantial existence of ideas, but maintain, that he asserted their existence originally in the divine intellect, forming what we call the intellectual world. "From thence proceeds the material world, which is a copy of these forms, or ideas. The first kind of ideas, the Peripatetics called *πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν*, "before the many;" the other kind they called *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*, "in the many;" and these last are the substantial forms of the Peripatetics; that is, the form which gives the substance or essence to the thing. And, last of all, come the ideas in our minds, which, being formed from the many, and only in consequence of their existing in the many, are said to be *ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς*, "after the many." Monboddo Ancient Metaph. vol. i. p. 466. Mr. Harris, in describing this triple order of ideas, speaks to the same purpose. "By mind we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas these works are fashioned." Hermes, book iii. c. iv. p. 380. Again, To work and to know what one is about is to have an idea of what one is doing; to possess a form internal, corresponding to the external, to which external it serves for an exemplar or pattern. Here then we have an intelligible form which is prior to the sensible form." Ibid. p. 376. The same authors abound in repetitions of the same doctrine, which seems indeed to have been universally that of Aristotle's commentators. But what says the author himself? I shall repeat his own words, lest I should incur the reproach of speaking harshly. *το δὲ λεῖπεν παραδειγμα εἶναι καὶ μετεχὴν αὐτῶν τὰ ἄλλα, κινολογεῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ μεταφορὰς λεῖπεν ποιητικὰς· τί γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἀπαθλῆπειν: ἐνδεχεται τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνησθαι ὅτιναι καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον.* Metaph. I. xi. c. 5. p. 959. "To call ideas exemplars or patterns, and to say that other things are made in imitation, or by participation of them, is mere empty sound and poetical metaphor. Whoever, amidst working, considered an idea as his model? Things may exist or be made that never had an exemplar or archetype." According to Aristotle, "the definition is the idea of the thing, and the definition is composed of words." *ὁ λόγος εἶδος τῆ πραγματός. . . καὶ ὁ λόγος συνκείται ἐξ ὀνομάτων.* Comp. De Anima, I. i. c. i. p. 618. and De Sensu, c. i. p. 663. I cannot conclude this note without observing, that something nearly akin to Aristotle's doctrine concerning the categories or universals was revived, in the darknesses of the eleventh century, by the sect called Nominalists, which had for its authors John, surnamed the Sophist, and Roscellinus, a native of Brittany and Canon of Compiègne. But the Stagirite's genuine tenets were generally unknown

nates in perceptions of sense; and in both these capital points, the learned, after innumerable disputes, C H A P.
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unknown in that century, and so little understood afterwards, (being studied only in corrupt versions, Arabic and Latin,) that the sect of the Nominalists, after the complete triumph of the supposed Aristotelian philosophy in the twelfth and succeeding centuries, were regarded as rash innovators and philosophical heretics. Their sentiments, however, agreed more nearly with Aristotle's, than the opinions of those who believed themselves the Stagirite's most obsequious followers; although the language of the Nominalists seems to have been extremely liable to be perverted to the purposes of scepticism, as taking away the specific distinctions of things; and is in fact thus perverted by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, and their innumerable followers. But Aristotle's language is not liable to this abuse; he every where maintains the stability of truth, and the reality of those specific distinctions which general terms are employed to express. He agrees with the Nominalists, for example, that the words "horse" and "dog" have not any correspondent archetypes or ideas in the mind, as general as themselves, but he maintains that these words imply the result of the comparison of different individuals agreeing in the same *εἶδος*, the same *show* or appearance; for the sight, as he observes, is that of all the senses which enables us to perceive the greatest number of the agreements and differences of things, and is therefore most generally useful in classing them; or, in other words, in distinguishing those which are alike by a sign common to them all; that is by a general name. *Metaph. l. iv. c. 7. p. 881. Comp. De Sensu, c. i. p. 662. and Metaph. l. i. c. i. p. 838.* To prevent the possibility of mistake or obscurity in the above note, it is necessary to observe, that the word "idea" in English is popularly used, not merely to denote an object of thought, but thought itself. To deny ideas in this latter sense is to deny thinking. But this is not the philosophical meaning of the word, as understood by the pretended followers of Aristotle, any more than by Locke in his Essay on the Human Understanding; by whom, ideas are said to be the objects immediately present to the mind in thinking. *Essay, b. i. c. i. p. 13.* Now Aristotle, in the following passage, expressly denies the presence or existence of any object in the mind, when it theorises or thinks, distinct from the act of the mind itself. *ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν, ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡ νοησις· ἔχ' ἑτέραν ἐν ὅτῳ τὴ νοημένη καὶ τὴ νῆ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ· καὶ ἡ νοησις τὴ νοημένη μα.* *Metaph. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004.* In another passage he says, *ἡ ψυχὴ πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα.* "The mind is after a sort all things." *De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656.* What is meant by *τὰ καθόλου*, "generals, universals, ideas," as the words are translated by his pretended followers, he states clearly thus: *Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑκάστου λόγου δὲ καθόλου μὲν, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν γινώσκων*

CHAP. disputes, carried on with equal eagerness and
 { **II.** perseverance through many centuries, have generally embraced his opinion; and, what is most remarkable, chiefly since the time that undue deference ceased to be paid to his writings, and that his name was no longer superstitiously venerated by those who either read what they did not understand, or who affected to admire what they had never condescended to read.

Division
and Defi-
nition,

The reduction of things to genera or classes, by applying to them common names, is the foundation of division and definition, which have been called by a just metaphor, the firm Handles of Science. Each of the categories, or classes, above-mentioned, that of substance for example, may be variously divided according to the intent of the division, which may be undertaken for explaining the works of art or of nature; for delineating the institutions of civil policy, or describing the structure of plants and animals; in a word, for examining any object, whether material or intellectual, about which human thought is conversant. But for whatever purpose the division is intended, it can be perspicuous and satisfactory only when it descends from the more general classes, or terms, to those which are less general, until it arrives at the lowest species of all, which rejects every

γορισθαι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς δὲ, ὁ μὴ ὡς ἀνθρώπος, τῷ καθολῷ καλλίας δὲ, γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς, &c. De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. "The distinction is to be made between universals and particulars; universals, which can be predicated of many, as the term "Man;" particulars, as "Callias," the proper name of an individual."

other partition but into individuals only^d. The intermediate terms between the highest genus and this lowest species, stand each of them in two distinct relations, and therefore receive two different names, that of genus with respect to the less general terms which they contain, and that of species with respect to the more general terms under which they are contained^e. Such is Aristotle's own doctrine concerning classification and division; a doctrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as physical; and admirably illustrated by some modern writers, especially on the subjects of natural history.

Having explained the uses and functions of single words, the author proceeds to examine their combinations into propositions, and the combinations of propositions into reasoning or

Propositions.

^d Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175.

^e Compare Categor. c. ii. p. 15. and Analyt. Prior. c. i. p. 52. The subject has been strangely perplexed by mistaking Aristotle's language, which is in itself highly perspicuous. το δε εν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἑτερον ἑτέρῳ, καὶ το κατὰ παντός κατηγοριοῦσθαι βατερον βατερον, τ' αὐτον ἐστὶ λεγόμενον δι το κατὰ παντός κατηγοριοῦσθαι, ὅταν μὴδεν ἢ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ λαβῆται κατὰ ἑ βατερον ἢ λεχθῇσεται. "To say that one term is contained in another is the same as saying, that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its signification, when there is no particular denoted by the subject, to which the predicate does not apply." This remark, which is the foundation of all Aristotle's logic, has been sadly mistaken by many. Among others, the learned and truly respectable Dr. Reid writes as follows: "The being in a subject, and the being truly predicated of a subject, are used by Aristotle in his Analytics as synonymous phrases. And this variation of style has led some persons to think that the Categories were not written by Aristotle." See Kaim's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 316. But the two phrases of "being in a subject," and "being predicated of it," are so far from "synonymous phrases," that the meaning of the one is directly the reverse of the meaning of the other.

CHAP. discourse. According to the measure of our
 IL. desires or exigencies, our power or inability, language is variously moulded into commands, prayers, or wishes; but for the purposes of instruction or argument, it requires the form of an enunciative proposition, which is defined by Aristotle "the affirming or denying one thing of another." But all that can be directly affirmed of any subject is, either that it belongs to a certain class, or that it is possessed of certain qualities. These qualities are either such as necessarily inhere in the thing itself while it remains what it is, and retains its distinctive name; or secondly, qualities necessarily proceeding from the former; or thirdly, qualities which do not uniformly belong to the subject, nor proceed from those uniformly belonging to it, but which accede to it merely by way of adjunct or appendage^f. Thus we can say of man, that he is an animal, which is the class to which he belongs; that he is an animal capable of reason, which is the quality necessarily inherent in him, while he deserves his distinctive name; that he is capable of learning grammar or geometry, which are qualities necessarily flowing from the former; but when

^f Topic. l. i. c. viii. p. 285. The Greek word *συμβεβηκος* is, as far as I know, universally translated "accident;" *συμβεβηκοτα*, in the plural, "accidents;" from which, "Accidence," denoting the little book that explains the properties of the eight parts of speech, is generally held to be a corruption. But accident, in its proper sense of what is casual or fortuitous, has nothing to do with the one or the other; and Aristotle's meaning of *συμβεβηκος* ought to be expressed by a Latin or English word derived, not from 'accido,' but from 'accēdo.' The misunderstanding of this single term has hitherto been sufficient to darken and perplex the whole of Aristotle's philosophy, so perpetually does the term in question occur in his writings.

we proceed farther, and ascribe to him qualities not necessarily flowing from those inherent in the species, although they may be found in many individuals, and even many nations, it is plain that these qualities are mere accessions or appendages to his distinctive name or specific character.

To define a thing, or to define a term, (for when words are considered as signs, these expressions are synonymous,) is to tell, as precisely and perspicuously as possible, what that thing is, or what that term signifies. This can only be done by ascertaining the class to which the object to be defined immediately belongs, and the quality or qualities which, necessarily inhering in it, uniformly distinguish that object from other objects belonging to the same class or genus. That quality, therefore, or those qualities form what is called the specific difference, because they distinguish the species in question from the other species in the same genus, or the object in question from the other objects that most nearly resemble it. Thus, to define the number three, or the triad, we may say or predicate of it, that it is a quantity, and that kind of quantity called number, and that kind of number called an odd number; but each of these predicates, and all of them united, have a signification far more extensive than that of the subject; since there are other quantities beside number, and other numbers beside odd numbers, and many other odd numbers beside three. How then are we to proceed to find the exact definition of the triad? We must continue to combine

The specific difference.

CHAP.

II

bine still more of those predicates, until the whole of them unitedly will apply to the number three, and to it only; although each of them taken separately, and even any number of them short of the whole, have a far more extensive signification. Thus with the predicates "number" and "odd" we must join that of "first," defining the triad "the first odd number;" for though the predicate "first" applies to the number "two" as well as to "three," yet "the first odd number" applies to "three" only^c. It may be necessary here to remark, that, in the accurate language of Aristotle, unity is not number, but the element of number^d; all numbers are composed of units, but they themselves are indivisible and ultimate elements, incapable as units of farther resolution^e. For coarse practical purposes, arithmeticians talk of the parts of unit; but when they do this, they have always previously converted unity into number; as when we speak of the tenth of an inch, we must necessarily have first changed the one inch into ten portions; the inch therefore, before it can be divided, ceases to be an unit, and is converted into ten.

According to Aristotle, definitions are the fountains of all science^f; but those fountains

^c Analyt. Poster. l.ii. c. xiii. p. 173. & seq.

^d διότι το ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἀρχὴ, ἢ ἀριθμὸς. Metaph. l. x. c. i. p. 942.

^e οὐτε γὰρ τι ἰσχυατε, ἰσχυατοτερον μη αν τι. Ibid. c. iv. p. 946; and again, ἀντικεινται το ἐν και τα πολλα, ὡς ἀδιαμετρον και διαμετρον. Ibid. c. iii. p. 945.

^f αἱ ἀρχαι των ἀπαδειξιν, οἱ ορισμοι. Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. 3. p. 164. Compare Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. xvii. p. 178.

are

are pure, only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient comparison of the perceptible qualities of individual objects; for it is in that case only; that our words being the correct signs of things, the conclusions drawn from our intellectual operations on the signs, exactly apply to the things signified by them. We must cautiously proceed, therefore, from particulars to generals¹, that we may not be cheated by words^m; endeavouring to discover, in each object of our examination, that principal and paramount property in which all its other inherent qualities unite and terminateⁿ. To this property we must assign a name, when an appropriate name for it is wanting; and in the assignment of this name, we must respect the analogies of language^o, that the same relations may be preserved among words which subsist among the things which they denote^p. The name, thus invented, is called the specific difference; which, in the objects to which it applies, is not always that quality which is most palpable or most striking; for many other qualities are often actually discovered in them, before we distinguish that most important and most

¹ δια δε απο των καθολων επι τα καθολα μεταβαινουν. *Analyt. Poster.* l. ii. c. xiii. p. 176.

^m αι ομνησμαι λανθανουσιν μαλλον εν τοις καθολοις. *Ibid.*

ⁿ *Analyt. Poster.* l. ii. c. xiv. p. 176. & *Topic.* l. i. c. iv. p. 182.

^o ουτω δε βασις αν ισως τις λαβει ος μη κειται ονοματα, ει απο των περιων, και τοις προς αι αντιρριψουσι, τιθειν τα ονοματα. *Categor.* c. vii. p. 23.

^p *Comp. Metaph.* l. iv. c. vii. p. 881. ο γαρ λογος ε το ονομα σημειον, ορισμος γινεται τε περιγρηματος, & *Metaph.* l. vii. c. iv. p. 908. c. vi. p. 911. & seq.

general

C H A P. general one, which is implied in all the rest, and
II. which forms, as it were, the basis on which they
 all stand^a. This paramount property exists independently in its subject; but none of the other properties can subsist independently of the specific difference, which is therefore the principle in which they originate, and the source from which they flow. In many objects with whose sensible qualities we are most conversant, this source is concealed; yet to remount to it, when possible, is the main business of philosophy, since the more our knowledge is generalized, it will be the more satisfactory, and, therefore, the more delightful^r.

Syllogism. The patient examination of objects, and the accurate definition of terms, are continually employed by our philosopher, as the best means for arranging perceptions into science. These, and not syllogisms, are the sole instruments used by himself in the deepest and most various researches that ever exercised the ingenuity of man. Yet his art of syllogism (an art ignorantly depreciated in the present age, and more absurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real worth) is not therefore useless, although its real uses, as will presently appear, are altogether different from the purposes to which it was long most injudiciously applied. The art of syllogism was entirely Aristotle's invention;

^a το δε ταξαι ως δι εσται, εαν το πρωτον λαβη. τωτο δε εσται, εαν ληφθη, ο πασιν ακολουθει, ουκ εστι δε μη παντα. *Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175.* The word ακολουθει is used in the same sense, when he says (as quoted above) that *εσται* & *ω*, "unity and being," is implied in all the Categories.

^r *Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. xxiv. p. 155.*

and

and in appreciating his merit as a philosopher, C H A P. II.
 it becomes necessary to examine his first Ana-
 lytics, in which this art is contained, that we
 may be enabled to decide whether the supposed
 improvements of his system by some writers be
 not ignorant perversions, and the objections
 made to the whole of it by others, be not sense-
 less cavils.

It was formerly observed that every propo-
 sition, affirming or denying one thing of another,
 must affirm or deny that the subject, of which
 we speak, belongs to a certain class, or that it is
 endowed with certain qualities*. But to affirm
 one term of another when both of them are
 taken in the full extent of their signification, is
 merely to say that there is not any species or
 any individual contained under the name of the
 subject, to which the name of the predicate does
 not apply. It matters not whether those names
 denote substances or qualities, or any other of
 the ten predicaments. Whatever they denote,
 the name of the species, according to the prin-

* The author proves this by observing, that every subject must either reciprocate with its predicate, or not. If the subject reciprocates with the predicate, that is, if the subject can in its turn be predicated of it, then the predicate must have been either the definition or the peculiar and exclusive property of the subject: if the subject does not reciprocate, then the predicate must have been either something contained in the definition, namely the genus or specific difference, or something not contained in the definition, but acceding to it as an appendage. Topic. l. i. c. viii. p. 285. These relations of genus, difference, &c. which the predicates can stand in to their subject are called the Predicables. They are the only things that can be affirmed or denied of any subject, categorically; which means, in the language of Aristotle, that can be affirmed of any subject merely by the interposition of the substantive verb between two terms. De Interpret. c. x. p. 43.

ciples

CHAP. II. **c**iples on which all languages are constructed, may still be predicated of every individual, and the name of the genus of every species. When the definition of any term is predicated of that term, the definition and word defined, having exactly the same signification, they both necessarily apply to exactly the same number of things, and are therefore of exactly the same extent. But in all propositions not identical, but which affirm or deny one thing of another, the predicate is according to the structure of all languages, naturally more extensive than the subject¹; because, as before observed, to predicate one term of another is merely to say that there is not any thing contained under the name of the subject to which that of the predicate does not apply. The predicate, therefore, in every proposition is called the major term; the subject, the minor term; and these terms are conjoined in discourse by the substantive verb "is," called therefore the copula. When we say, "the wall is white," the substantive verb is expressed; the same verb is understood, when we say "Achilles runs;" because the word "runs" may be resolved into "is running;" being in fact merely an abbreviation of it for the purpose of communicating the rapidity of our thoughts with suitable rapidity of speech². To prevent imposition arising from the abuse of words, it is necessary to be

Nature and
use of syllo-
gism.

¹ Categor. c. v. p. 17.

² ὅτι γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ αἰθερόν, ὡς αἰθερὶς ἐστὶ, ἢ τὸ αἰθερόν, ὡς αἰθερὶς, &c. Metaph. l. v. c. 7. p. 889.

able

able quickly to discern whether one term can be justly predicated of another. Aristotle, for this purpose, invented the syllogism, which consists in comparing both the subject and the predicate of any proposition with what is called the middle term, because its natural place is the middle between the other two terms, called therefore the extremes. Let the question be proposed, whether temperance be a habit? I readily find a middle term which is contained under the more extensive appellation of habit, and which itself contains the more limited appellation of temperance. The terms, therefore, stand in this order. Habit, Virtue, Temperance; or, in the form of propositions,

Virtue is a Habit,

Temperance is a Virtue;

therefore, Temperance is a Habit. Now the whole cogency of this argument depends on that great principle which presides in the formation of language, that things, which have a common nature, receive a common name. They may differ in many important particulars, yet having received one common appellation from the particular in which they all agree, the term denoting the genus may be predicated of every species and every individual contained under it. Whatever is affirmed or denied of a more general term, may therefore be affirmed or denied of all the more particular terms, as well as of all the individual things to which its signification extends. This is the meaning of Aristotle, when he calls those things synonymous which

C H A P. which have the same name in the same sense.

II. Thus "man" and "ox" are, according to him, synonymous, because the name of animal is equally applicable to both²; an observation which must sound harshly to those English readers who have derived their knowledge of Greek through the circuitous channel of France.

Wonderful variety in a subject seemingly so simple.

On the basis of this one simple truth, itself founded in the natural and universal texture of language, Aristotle has reared a lofty and various structure of abstract science, clearly expressed, and fully demonstrated. To convince ourselves of the wonderful variety in a subject, seemingly so simple, it is sufficient to observe, that the middle term may either be the subject of both the premisses; or the predicate of both; or, as in the syllogism given above, the subject of the major premiss, in which it is compared with the major extreme, and the predicate of the minor premiss, in which it is compared with the minor extreme. These various arrangements form what are called the three figures of syllogism³;

² Categor. c. i. p. 14. Words, synonymous in the modern sense, have nothing to do with philosophy, whose terms, if accurate, cannot be interchangeable. Their proper place is poetry: accordingly we find that Aristotle, in his now imperfect treatise on that subject, had treated of *συνωνυμία ὅτι πλείων τὰ ὀνόματα, λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτός*; that is "of various words meaning the same thing;" which agrees with the modern acceptance. Simplicius in Categor. fol. viii.

³ It may be proper to remark, that in books of logic there is a fourth figure which is said to have been invented by Galen the physician. In this Galenical figure, as it is called, the middle term is predicated of the major, and the minor term is predicated of the middle. In this absurd figure, the more general term is placed as the subject of the more particular. The natural arrangement of the terms is thus totally reversed. But every syllogism in this figure, when properly expressed, naturally falls under Aristotle's first figure.

and

and in each of these three figures, every one of the three propositions may be either affirmative or negative ; and each of the affirmative and negative propositions may be either universal or particular ; universal, when their subject is taken in the full extent of its meaning, as " all men are mortal ;" particular, when their subject is restricted to a part of the things which its name properly denotes, as " some men are wise." If we express these four kinds of propositions ; the universal affirmative, the universal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative, by the four vowels, a, e, i, o, we shall find that they will afford sixty-four different combinations by threes, which are called the different modes in each figure ; and therefore one hundred and ninety-two combinations in the three figures collectively, But the variety does not end here ; for propositions themselves are either pure or modal. A pure proposition simply affirms or denies one thing of another ; a modal proposition affirms or denies with the addition of necessity or contingency, possibility or impossibility. When we consider, therefore, the numerous combinations that will result from these new elements variously joined with the old, and that every new combination forms a distinct syllogism, it is impossible not to admire the persevering energy of mind that could contemplate each separately, and examine how the truth of the conclusion was affected by each specific arrangement.

C H A P.

II.

All syllogisms reduced to those of the first figure.

From this induction, the most copious and complete that any speculation ever exhibited, Aristotle infers that all conclusive syllogisms whatever may be reduced to conclusive modes in the first figure²; of all which, the truth rests immediately on the grammatical principle above explained; and of which, therefore, the syllogism already given may serve for an example. When the three terms of a syllogism, therefore, are accurately defined, and the three propositions composing it are properly arranged, the strength or weakness of its argument may always be perceived by a rapid glance of the mind thrown on the premisses, and discerning, by means of the minor premiss, in which the subject of the conclusion is compared with the middle term, whether the major premiss, in which the predicate of the conclusion is compared with the same middle term, necessarily infers the conclusion. For enabling the mind readily to draw this inference in the case of all syllogisms whatever, whether their conclusions be affirmative or negative, universal or particular, and how awkwardly soever their terms may have been arranged, the Author has recourse to no other rules or axioms than those which concern what is called conversion and opposition; and that most extensive principle of reason which infers the truth of any proposition by shewing, that to suppose it false leads to an absurdity. To convert a proposition, is to make

Rules of
Conversion.

² Comp. *Analyt. Prior.* c. vii. p. 60. and c. xxiii. p. 79.

its

its subject and its predicate change places. This may often be done safely, because in many propositions the converse will retain that truth which was in the proposition to be converted. All universal negatives, for example, can always be completely converted. If no A is B, no B is A; for if A could be predicated of any thing called B, for example of c, then c would fall under the names both of A and of B, which is contrary to the first supposition, that no A is B; or that B cannot be predicated of any thing called A*. When one term, therefore, is universally denied of another, that other may, without hesitation, be universally denied of the first. An universal affirmative proposition does not admit of a complete conversion, because, according to what was formerly observed, in every such proposition the predicate must apply to all the species and individuals expressed by the name of the subject, but the subject needs not therefore apply to all the species and individuals contained under the name of the predicate. But an universal affirmative, though it rejects a complete, yet admits of a partial conversion. Thus, if every A is B, some B must be A; for if no B is A, then no A is B, as just proved in the case of universal negatives. Particular affirmatives admit of a complete conversion; for if some A is B, then some B is A; since, when no B is A, no A is B, as formerly proved in the case of universal negatives. Particular negatives do not at all admit of conversion, either com-

* *Analyt. Prior. c. ii. p. 54.*

CHAP. II. plete or partial. Thus, some A is not B, cannot be converted by saying that some B is not A, because, though the name of a species does not apply to some things comprehended under the name of its genus, it does not thence follow that the name of the genus does not apply to all the individuals comprehended under the name of the species^b. The rules concerning conversion then are, that universal negatives, as well as particular affirmatives, may be converted completely; that universal affirmatives can only be converted partially; and that particular negatives are totally incapable of conversion. These rules, perhaps, may all be resolved into one and the same primitive truth, of which they are only different expressions; yet these different expressions will on many occasions render the perception of that truth more distinct, and the application of it more easy as well as more expeditious^c. The same thing holds here, as with respect to the axioms of geometry, concerning

^b The doctrines of Aristotle's Organon have been strangely perplexed by confounding the grammatical principles on which that work is built with mathematical axioms. All the modern systems of logic that have fallen into my hands, employ in demonstrating the theory of syllogism these two axioms, "Things agreeing with the same third agree with each other:" "When one thing agrees with the third, and the other does not, they do not agree with each other." But Aristotle tells us, that these axioms do not at all apply to the predication of terms, the one of the other; except when those terms denote mathematical quantities. The reason why they do apply to mathematical quantities he says is, because in them, ἡ ἰσότης, ἰσότης, "equality is sameness;" and in them, equality is sameness, because ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἰς ἑαυτὴν. The definition of any particular object denoted by the one, is precisely the same with the definition of any particular object denoted by the other. Metaph. I. x. c. iii. p. 843.

^c De Sophist. Elench. I. ii. p. 299,

the

the whole and its parts, equality and inequality, greater and lesser, since the comprehension of any one of those terms necessarily implies the comprehension of them all^a. Yet geometers find it useful to represent the same elementary truth under a variety of forms, that it may be more forcibly impressed, and more readily applied; and the indefinite number of mathematical theorems ultimately resolve themselves into a few simple propositions, which may themselves perhaps be considered as only different expressions of one and the same original conception of the mind.

CH A P.
II.
Rules of
opposition.

Upon this great principle of translating the same truth into different words, in order to render it more familiar to our thoughts, Aristotle next examines the doctrine of opposition. Propositions may be opposite or contrary, which are not contradictory; because the truth of the one does not always infer the falsehood of the other. Thus, "all men are white," "no man is white," are contrary propositions, and both of them false. "Some men are white," "some men are not white," are contrary propositions, and both of them true. But if I say, "all men are white," "some men are not white," the truth of the one proposition infers the falsehood of the other; because in this last case only the predicate "whiteness" is affirmed of the whole species, and denied of some individuals belonging to it; which is inconsistent with the great

^a Topic. I. vi. p. 248.

C H A P. principle on which all language and all reasoning is founded^c.
 — II. —

The design
 of Aristotle's first
 Analytics
 misunderstood.

In the first Analytics, Aristotle shews what is that arrangement of terms in each proposition, and that arrangement of propositions in each syllogism, which constitutes a necessary connection between the premisses and the conclusion. When this connection takes place, the syllogism is perfect in point of form; and when the form is perfect, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premisses, whatever be the signification of the terms of which they are composed. These terms, therefore, he commonly expresses by the letters of the alphabet, for the purpose of shewing that our assent to the conclusion results, not from comparing the things signified, but merely from considering the relation which the signs (whether words or letters) bear to each other.

* De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. & seq. and Analyt. Prior. c. xv. p. 117. & seq. To shew how grossly Aristotle's logic has been mistaken, and with what contempt of reason and grammar, as well as of good manners, the character of this philosopher has been assailed, I shall cite the following passage from a late author (Lord Kaimes) of considerable reputation, and of very considerable merit: "His (Aristotle's) artificial mode of reasoning is no less superficial than intricate. The propositions he attempts to prove by syllogism are all self-evident. Take for example the following proposition, 'that man has the power of self-motion.' To prove this, he assumes the following maxim, upon which indeed every one of his syllogisms are founded, that whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together holds true of every one separately." Lord Kaimes' Sketches, vol. iii. p. 306. It would have been charitable in this acute author to have pointed out the passage where Aristotle maintains, that because it is true of a number of particulars joined together, that they are an hundred or a thousand, the same holds true of every one of them separately. It is impossible to restrain indignation at such unmeaning jargon, poured out against the most accurate of all writers.

Those^f, therefore, totally misconceive the meaning of Aristotle's logic, who think that, by employing letters instead of words, he has darkened the subject; since the more abstract and general his signs are, they must be the better adapted to shew that the inference results from considering them alone, without at all regarding the things which they signify.

The *form* of syllogisms may be perfect when there is much imperfection in their *matter*; that is, in the premisses from which the conclusion is derived; and which may be either certain or probable, or only seem to be probable, as a face may seem to be beautiful which is only painted. In his second Analytics, Aristotle treats of what he calls Demonstrative Syllogisms, because their premisses are certain. In his Topics, he treats of what he calls Dialectical Syllogisms, because their premisses are only probable; and, in his Refutations of Sophistry, he treats of those deceitful syllogisms whose premisses seem to be, but which are not really, probable. As sophistry consists, not only in reasoning from false principles, but in reasoning unfairly from principles that are true, the Author refers all such erroneous deductions to one head, which he calls "a mistake of the question;" because, in all of them, the "conclusion or answer" will be found

His second
Analytics

^f A truly respectable philosopher says, in speaking of this subject, "Aristotle's rules are illustrated, or rather in my opinion purposely darkened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the several terms." Reid's Appendix to Kaim's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 631.

C H A P. to come out otherwise than it ought to do, when
II. drawn agreeably to the rules of just inference*.

His Topics.

The four classes of predicates above explained, Genus, Difference, Property, and Appendage, are applicable to single things or single terms, considered separately; there are other predicates which are applicable only to more things or more terms than one, considered conjunctly. These conjunct predicates the Author reduces to four classes; Agreement, Diversity, Opposition, and Order; under which heads, as well as those first-mentioned, he examines in his Topics all the probable arguments by which our affirmations or negations may be either strengthened or invalidated; thus supplying a vast intellectual magazine, which, when compared with the slender additions made to it by subsequent writers, attests both the unwearied ardour of his application, and the incomparable richness of his invention.

His Organon perverted and misapplied.

In as few words as seemed consistent with perspicuity, I have thus endeavoured to explain the nature and design of Aristotle's Organon; a work which has often been as shamefully misrepresented, as it was long most grossly misapplied. In that scholastic jargon, which insolently usurped during many centuries the name of Philosophy, syllogisms were perverted to purposes for which their inventor declares them totally unfit, and employed on subjects in which his uniform practice shews that he considered them as

* De Sophist. Elench. c. vi. p. 287.

altogether

altogether useless. Our acquaintance with the properties of things, he perpetually inculcates, must be acquired by patient observation, generalised by comparison and induction; but when this foundation is once laid, the words by which our generalizations are expressed, deserve not merely to be regarded as the materials in which our knowledge is embodied, or the channels by which it is communicated, but to be considered in the two following respects, as the principles or sources from which new knowledge may be derived. First, by means of a skilful arrangement of accurate and well-chosen terms, many processes of reasoning may be performed by discerning the relations and analogies of words, with a certainty as great, and with a rapidity far greater, than these processes could possibly be carried on, were we obliged, in every step of our progress, to fix our attention on things. Every general term is considered by Aristotle as the abridgment of a definition^h, and every definition is denominated by him a Collectionⁱ, because it is the result always of observation and comparison, and often of many observations and many comparisons. The improvements in mathematics have advanced from age to age, chiefly by improving the language, that is, the signs, by which mathematical truths are expressed; and the most important discoveries have

Its real uses.

1. As an analytic art.

^h διαφέρει δε εὖδεν, εὖδε εἰ πολλὰ τις φωνή σημαίνει, μόνον δε ὁρισμὸς. τὴν γὰρ αὖ' ἐπ' ἰκαστῷ λόγῳ, ἕτερον ὄνομα. Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 873.

ⁱ εἰ δὲ μὴ τὴν, ἀλλὰ ἀκριβῶς σημαίνει φωνή, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ αὐτῆς λόγος. Ibid.

been

C H A P. been made in that noble science, by continually
II. simplifying the objects of our comparisons; or,
 in other words, by finding clear expressions for
 ratios, including the results of many others.
 In all other sciences, this investigation is of the
 utmost importance; and, in many of them, our
 knowledge will be found to advance almost ex-
 actly in proportion to the success with which
 our language is improved. When terms, there-
 fore, are formed and applied with that propriety
 which perpetually shines in the Stagirite's writ-
 ings, his general formulas of reasoning afford an
 analytic art, which may be employed as an en-
 gine for raising new truths on those previously
 established; and if modern languages do not
 afford the same advantage precisely in the same
 degree, it is not from the inefficacy of words as
 signs, but from the inefficacy of signs ill chosen
 and ill arranged; from impropriety of appli-
 cation, contempt of analogy, and abuse of
 metaphor.

As
 strengthen-
 ing the as-
 sociating
 principles,
 and there-
 by multi-
 plying the
 energies of
 thought.

Under another aspect, nearly connected with
 the former, yet really distinct from it, Aristotle's
 Analytics, and still more his Topics, have the
 most direct and most efficacious tendency to
 invigorate and sharpen the understanding; to
 cherish, nay, to rouse and quicken the seeds of
 invention and genius. The properties and re-
 lations of external objects, whether actually
 present to the senses, or treasured up in the
 memory, are confined, both as to their kind and
 number, within narrow limits. But our abstrac-
 tions, comparisons, and conclusions respecting
 these

these objects, expressed and embodied in words, are of a much wider and almost boundless extent. According to that law of mental action by which our Author proves that the current of thought is moved and regulated^k, the relations and analogies of words, therefore, will appear to form the main spring of intellectual energy; and their connections and dependencies, as compared and classed by Aristotle in his Topics, must have a direct tendency to invigorate and expand the thinking faculty; to revive and brighten those associating bands that might otherwise have been effaced; to suggest those principles of reasoning which would not otherwise occur; and thus to prevent that deception and error which most commonly proceeds from partial and incomplete views of our subject; from weakness of combination, and narrowness of comprehension. To say, therefore, that this part of our Author's Works is conversant entirely about *words*, is not to depreciate or reproach it; for Aristotle well knew, that, our

^k See the remarks above made concerning what is commonly called "the association of ideas." "Ideas are more powerfully associated," (to use modern language,) "in proportion to the attention with which they are simultaneously examined and observed." In Aristotle's language, the action of thought depends on the attentive examination of things, and of words which are their signs. When not only the things themselves, but the signs expressing them, are thus examined, the connections between these things will take faster hold of the mind; the perception of them will be more vivid, and the recollection of them more easy and more expeditious. But words are the signs not merely of perceptible objects and their qualities, but of the comparisons, abstractions, and conclusions of the mind with respect to those objects and their qualities. An attentive examination of the relations and analogies of words serves, therefore, not only to strengthen old associations, but to produce many new ones.

knowledge

C H A P. knowledge of *things* chiefly depending on the
 { **II.** } proper application of language as an instrument¹
 of thought, the true art of reasoning is nothing
 but a language accurately defined and skilfully
 arranged; an opinion which, after many idle
 declamations against his barren generalities and
 verbal trifling, philosophers have begun very
 generally to adopt. Let it always, however, be
 remembered, that the author who first taught
 this doctrine, had previously endeavoured to
 prove that all our notions, as well as the signs by
 which they are expressed, originate in percep-
 tions of sense; and that the principles on which
 languages are first constructed, as well as every
 step in their progress to perfection, all ultimately
 depend on inductions from observation; in one
 word, on experience merely.

Of Truth
 Demon-
 strative.

To abridge Aristotle's Works is to treat them
 unfairly, because (where his text is correct) no
 author expresses his meaning in fewer or more
 appropriate words. Yet, as it is the purpose of
 this discourse to afford such specimens of every
 part of his writings, as may satisfy the curiosity
 of one class of readers, while it heightens or
 inspires that of another, I shall collect within
 a narrow compass his observations on Truth De-
 monstrative, that is, on Science; and follow
 him in his application of these principles to the
 loftiest, and, as commonly treated, the most ab-
 struse science, that ever exercised the human
 intellect.

¹ Topic. l. i. c. 15. Metaph. ubi supra, and l. v. passim.

All instruction, and all intellectual discipline, he observes, proceeds on principles previously ascertained and established. This is manifestly the case in mathematics, in the arts, and in every kind of reasoning, which is universally carried on either by syllogism or by induction; the former proving to us, that a particular proposition is true, because it is deducible from a general one, already known to us; and the latter demonstrating a general truth, because it holds in all particular cases. Orators persuade by examples or arguments, examples being a rhetorical or coarser kind of induction, as arguments are a rhetorical or coarser kind of syllogism.

Truth is the exact conformity of human conception with the real nature of things^m. Demonstrative Truth, therefore, can apply only to those things which necessarily exist after a certain manner, and whose state is unalterable: and we know those things when we know their causes: thus, we know a mathematical proposition, when we know the causes that make it true; that is, when we know all the intermediate propositions up to the first principles, or axioms, on which it is ultimately built. Demonstration cannot be indefinitely extended, because the certainty, and even probability of every kind of reasoning would be destroyed, were we to call in question those first principles

Wherein it
consists.

Rules con-
cerning it.

^m το δε κυριωτατον ου, αληθες η ψευδος τινος δ' επι των πραγματων
εστι συγκεισθαι η διακρισθαι . . . εψευσαι δε ο εναρτιος εχων, η τα πραγ-
ματα ποτε εστι, η ουκ εστι. Metaph. l. ix. c. x. p. 941. Vid. etiam
Metaph. l. v. c. xxix. p. 901.

which,

C H A P. which, in matters of science, are recognised by
 { **II.** what Aristotle calls Intellect, and in matters of
 practice by what he calls Common Senseⁿ.

In demonstration, the premisses are the causes of the conclusion, and therefore prior to it. We cannot, therefore, demonstrate things in a circle, supporting the premisses by the conclusion; because this would be to suppose, that the one proposition could be both prior and posterior to the other. In all demonstration, the first principles must be necessary, immutable, and therefore eternal truths, because those qualities could not belong to the conclusion, unless they belonged to the premisses, which are its causes. An affirmative demonstration is preferable to a negative one, and a direct demonstration of any truth to that drawn from the absurdity of supposing it false; because, other things remaining the same, the shortest demonstration is always the best. Aristotle debates the question, whether an universal demonstration is better than a particular one; and, as his remarks on this subject form an apology for the universality and abstractedness of his own reasonings in many parts of his Works, I shall subjoin a translation, or paraphrase, of the whole chapter^o. 1st, To some a particular demonstration may seem preferable, because we know any object better by examining itself, than by examining the class to which it belongs. Thus, that the three

Universal
and parti-
cular;
which
preferable.

ⁿ ἀλλὰ αἰσθησις, ἢ τῶν ἰδίων. Ethic. Nicom. c. vi. p. 8.

^o Analytic. Posterior, L. i. c. xxiv. p. 154, & seq.

angles

angles of an isosceles triangle are equal to two rights, may be thought more convincing when proved with regard to the isosceles itself, than when proved with regard to triangles in general, to which class of figures the isosceles belongs; and therefore the particular demonstration may appear better than a general one. 2d. If individuals only have a real existence in nature, and every demonstration supposes the existence of its subject, a general demonstration must be worse than a particular one, because it leads us to suppose the existence of nonentities.

In answer to these objections let it be remarked, that the first does not apply, because if the property of having the three angles equal to two rights belongs to the isosceles, not as it is an isosceles, but as it is a triangle, he who demonstrates this truth respecting the isosceles only, less examines the object in itself, than he who demonstrates the same truth respecting triangles in general: for the definition of a triangle enters into that of an isosceles; and because it is a triangle, the isosceles has its angles equal to two rights; so that he who demonstrates universally, better shews the cause and reason of the conclusion, than he who demonstrates particularly; and he shews it from considering the object itself, that is, the definition of the object, and that part of the definition from which the conclusion results. Again, if universals are merely words, denoting certain classes or species, to all the individuals of which they equally apply, there is no reason to say that they are nonentities when

The former more informing and more satisfactory.

C H A P. when applied to those objects or individuals.

II. Their existence is even firmer than that of any *portion* of the individuals signified by them, which is continually liable to corruption or change; whereas the general name denoting the whole species is not liable to either, but has a precise and permanent meaning as long as any objects of that species continue to exist. But to suppose that universals, because they are employed in demonstration, have any existence independently of the objects or individuals which they denote, is a mistake chargeable, not on those who employ such terms, but on those who misconceive their use^P.

^P Had the learned Lord Monboddo proceeded to read this sentence, he would not surely have quoted that immediately preceding it, to prove it to be Aristotle's opinion, that "ideas, considered as in the Divine mind, have an existence, and an existence more real than particulars, because they are eternal and unchangeable." Monboddo's Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 470.

Aristotle speaks with great caution concerning the Divine mind, nor ever says that any thing exists *in* it. Of ideas or exemplars he speaks often, and always contemptuously, as of metaphors and vain flourishes. *Analyt. Post. l. i. c. xxiii. p. 151. Metaph. l. i. c. vii. p. 853.* So that it is plain what he would have thought of the distinction, *πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς*: which was adopted by his followers, and is so much insisted on, as the great doctrine of the Peripatetics, by Lord Monboddo and Mr. Harris. The following passage may be quoted to shew what Aristotle thought of the *πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν*, "those eternal exemplars." *αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι φασὶν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὕμνια, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲν παρακλήσιον μὲν ποιῶντες, τοῖς θεοῖς μὲν εἶναι φασκεῖσι, ἀνθρώποισιν δὲ. ὅτι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίησαν ἢ ἀνθρώπους αἰδῆς, ὅτι οὗτοι τὰ εἰδὴ ἅλλα ἢ αἰσθητὰ αἰδέα.* "They who maintained the eternal existence of such exemplars, as the ideas of man, horse, health, acted exactly like to those who maintained there were Gods, but that the Gods were of a human shape. The Gods of such theologians were nothing more than eternal or incorruptible men; and the ideas of such philosophers are nothing more than eternal or incorruptible objects of sense." *Metaphys. l. iii. c. xi. p. 861.*

The

The more universal the demonstration of any proposition is rendered, it becomes at the same time the more informing and the more satisfactory; the more informing, because it comprehends the greater number of particular truths; and the more satisfactory, because it demonstrates these truths from their first and ultimate cause; at least, approximates nearer to this cause in exact proportion to its greater universality. To descend from generals is also more natural; because, in matters of science, they are the source and fountain of particulars. It has also more dignity, because generals are the work of intellect, whereas the more particular propositions are, the more nearly they approach to perceptions of sense, with which, when strictly particular, they intirely coincide.

From this part of Aristotle's Logic, there is an easy transition to what has been called his *Metaphysics*; a name unknown, as above observed, to the Author himself, and given to his most abstract philosophical works by his editors, from an opinion that those books ought to be studied immediately after his *Physics*, or *Treatises on Natural Philosophy*. Considered under one particular aspect, those books may be properly thus arranged^o; because, as we shall see hereafter, the study of nature, conducted according to Aristotle's principles, necessarily leads to Deity, and to the most delightful of all contemplations, that of the Divine Goodness. But viewed in the full extent of their relations,

Aristotle's
Metaphysics

^o Topic. l. i. c. ii.

C H A P. II. Aristotle's Metaphysics are intimately connected with every branch of human science, whether natural or moral, since their real subject (which has been grossly mistaken through a preposterous arrangement of the treatises which they comprise) is the vindication of the existence and nature of truth against the cavils of Sophists, and those now called Metaphysicians; and this doctrine concerning truth illustrated in the demonstration of the being of one God, in opposition to Atheists on one hand, and Polytheists on the other. The whole of Aristotle's metaphysical works may be referred to one or other of these two heads; since to them the greater part of his treatises relate immediately, and the smaller part will appear to be merely preparatory, to their discussion.

Begin with
a Philosophical Vocabulary,

The unskilfulness of his editors^p has placed near the middle of the work, a book plainly preparatory, since it merely exhibits the different acceptation of the terms of which he has occasion afterwards to make use. This fifth book of his Metaphysics, which ought undoubtedly to stand as the first, contains, in thirty chapters, an accurate philosophical vocabulary, which Aristotle thought peculiarly requisite as an introduction to the first and most comprehensive^q of

^p Dr. Morton of the British Museum, who has long studied the writings of Aristotle, with equal diligence and success, first shewed to me, that Samuel Petit, in the fourth book of his *Miscellanea*, had already placed Aristotle's Metaphysics in nearly the same order in which I also had arranged them.

^q ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία περὶ τινα φύσιν ἰδίαι ἐστὶν ἐκκλησιᾷ δι' (ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, seu θεολογική,) καθόλου πάντων κοινή. Metaphys. l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

all

all sciences, that of which truth in general was the subject, since the terms employed in it having necessarily a variety of meanings, it was impossible to use those signs properly, without precisely ascertaining the things which they signified. Wonder and admiration, he observes, are the passions naturally excited by the contemplation of the universe, whose sublime obscurity, while it fixes the attention, inflames the curiosity of man, and makes him ambitious to know and comprehend so interesting and magnificent a spectacle. But it is impossible to know any thing without knowing its causes and principles.

Aristotle, therefore, begins his vocabulary with an explanation of these terms; observing that all causes are principles; and defining a principle to be that from which any thing exists, is made, or is known. The notion of a cause always includes that of priority, which is the specific quality belonging to all the different acceptations of the word principle. Aristotle enumerates four kinds of causes, the same word being taken in Greek in four different meanings.

1. The material cause, that is, the matter from which any thing is made; as brass of the statue, and silver of the goblet; and which are evidently causes, since, independently of them, neither the statue nor the goblet could exist. The brass and the silver have also their material causes, namely the substances from which those metals are composed; and in the works both of nature and of art, the first component substances, which are so simple as not to admit of any further

C H A P. resolution, are called Elements. 2. The formal cause, which is that specific form or shape, or quality, most commonly distinguished by sight, which characterises each particular object, and gives to it an appropriate nature and essence. It is from their agreement in the same form or essence, that different objects receive a common name; of which name, this form or essence is therefore the proper definition. In losing their appropriate form, objects lose their name and nature; this form, therefore, is a cause of those objects, since, independently of it, they could not have been originally, or would not continue to exist. 3. The efficient cause is the principle of motion or change; or, in other words, the maker; which term sufficiently explains itself. 4. The final cause, that is, the end or purpose for which any thing is made, and, independently of which end or purpose, the maker could not have exerted his power or skill; and therefore his work would never have commenced; that is, the thing made would never have existed'. Of these four causes, the two first are always in-

^r Justness of thought is inseparably connected with propriety of language. The several causes enumerated by Aristotle, the names of which sound awkwardly in English, were expressed briefly in Greek, each by a particular preposition. The material was the $\epsilon\kappa$ ϵ' : the formal, the $\kappa\alpha\theta'$ δ' : the efficient, the $\iota\phi'$ ϵ' : and the final, the $\delta\iota\alpha$ δ' : besides which, the Greeks indicated the means, or instrument, by which any thing is done, or made, by $\delta\iota\alpha$ ϵ' : and the model after which it was made, by $\pi\epsilon\sigma'$ δ' . This model, or exemplar, was considered as a cause by the Pythagoreans and Platonists; the former of whom maintained, that all perceptible things were imitations of numbers; and the latter, that they owed their existence to the participation of ideas: but wherein either this imitation or this participation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to shew.

herent

herent in the object caused: in works of art, the two last causes are always separate from this object; we shall see in the sequel, whether this is also the case with respect to the works of nature.

CHAP.
II.

Aristotle's enumeration of the different meanings of the word "cause," which must be carefully distinguished in all parts of his philosophy, may serve as a specimen of that book, which was intitled "An Explanation of Words with various Significations." That book is naturally followed by the tenth, which ought therefore to stand as the second; because, in it, words are considered, not simply in themselves, but as standing in the relation of opposition or contrariety to each other. It is briefly intitled "The Selection of Contraries," and treats of one and many; likeness and unlikeness; contraries in the same genus, as "white" and "black;" and contraries which are not in the same genus, as "corruptible" and "incorruptible." The first kind of contraries may subsist at different times in the same subject; the second never can; because the first kind are merely appendages to the subject in which they subsist, and may therefore be separated from it; but the second are essentials.*

The second book considers words as standing in opposition to each other.

The second and fourth books treat of truth and science; they ought to be considered as one, and to stand the third in order; since they naturally follow the definitions laid down in the

The third book treats of science.

* Metaphys. l. x. c. ix. and x. p. 951, & seq.

C H A P. first and second. His treatise on science opens
II. with great modesty. Its difficulty, he observes,
 arises not merely from the subject, but from our-
 selves, whose intellectual sight (as happens to
 the eyes of bats) is blinded by what is brightest.
 Much thanks are due, not only to those who
 have established truths worthy of reception, but
 to those, also, who have given us opinions worthy
 of examination. They set our faculties to work;
 and even their errors are useful to their suc-
 cessors. Had Phrynis never lived, we should
 not now enjoy the charming melodies of his
 scholar Timotheus.*

Of speculative philosophy, truth is the end;
 and each object participates of truth more or
 less, in proportion as it more or less participates
 of reality. Truth, therefore, is to be found in
 things eternal and unalterable, rather than in
 their contraries; because such things are not
 dependent for their reality on other things, but
 all others on them.

There can-
 not be an
 infinite
 progression
 of causes.

There must be some principle or first cause of
 whatever really exists; for if this were not the
 case, there would be an infinite progression of
 causes. But this infinite progression is im-
 possible: 1. With regard to material causes;
 that flesh, for instance, should be made of earth,
 earth of air, air of fire; and that to this series
 of productions there should be no end. 2. As
 to the efficient cause or principle of motion;
 that man, for instance, should be actuated by the

* Metaph. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

C H A P
II.

air, the air moved by the sun, the sun by strife, in endless succession. 3. As to the final cause; that exercise, for instance, should be taken for the sake of health, and health chosen for the sake of happiness, and happiness itself for the sake of some farther object. 4. As to the formal cause; that the characterising properties of things should be derived one from the other without ultimately terminating in one common source: For in all these four cases alike, to suppose an infinite succession of causes, is to say that things exist without any cause at all; since, in this infinite chain, every link is merely the effect of the link preceding it, and when the chain is endless, there is no first link, and therefore no cause. Were we desired to tell which of three things is the cause of the other two, we should name the first of the three. We could not say the last, for it is the cause of nothing; neither could we say the second, for it is the cause of one thing only; and though considered in relation to that one, it be really a cause; yet considered in relation to the whole, it is merely an effect; and in the same manner all the intermediate links are effects, how numerous soever they may be supposed. The very term "final cause" expresses an end and boundary; and if there was not something ultimately desirable on its own account, for the sake of which other things are desirable as means, all desire and all volition would necessarily cease; and all intellect would be destroyed, if the properties of things could be continually traced up to other

C H A P. properties still more essential ; that is, if formal
 II. causes might be traced back in infinite progression, there would be no firmness for the intellect to rest on ; in other words, no understanding."

The existence of truth vindicated.

Democritus had said, that truth either did not exist ; or that, by man at least, it was not to be discovered. In the same spirit of scepticism, Protagoras maintained that man was the measure of all things ; which were true or false, good or bad, merely according to the mind's conception of them. It is melancholy, Aristotle observes, to hear those who might be expected best to see what is true, since they most sought and loved it, maintain such opinions ; because, were they well founded, to aim at philosophy would be to court disappointment, and to pursue truth as puerile a folly as that of attempting to catch birds in their flight. But the misfortune of those philosophers is, that they confine their inquiries merely to sensible and sublunary objects, which from their own nature, as well as that of the senses by which they are perceived, are indefinite and variable, liable to decay and corruption, and continually appearing under different aspects to different men ; and even to the same man, according to the point from which he views them, and the actual disposition of his organs. But these variations as to the objects of perception by sense, take place chiefly in sublunary things, the whole mass of which is so inconsiderable in mag-

^u ἡ νοησις εἰσικεν πραγμασι τινη καὶ ἐπιστασι, μάλλον ἢ κινήσει. De Anim. l. i. c. iii. νοησαι δὲ ἐκ ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα. Metaphys. l. ii. c. ii. p. 257.

nitude,

nitute, that it bears not any proportion to the universe at large, where all is permanent and invariable, and the stability of whose arrangement ought to convince us, that there is an eternal arranging cause^w, and some measure at least of firmness and constancy in the world by which we are surrounded^x. Even here, it belongs to the eye to judge of colours, to the ear to judge of sounds, and to the other senses to judge of their respective objects; and they judge exactly alike, when similarly disposed and similarly circumstanced. If sublunary things are generated, and perish, there must be some material cause from which they are generated; and something that exists immutably, even while the destruction of one substance is the production of another. The sceptics are not convinced by their own arguments. None of them, while in Libya, because he can conceive himself in Athens, thinks of walking into the Odeum^y. They confide more in their eyes, with regard to near than remote objects. As to tastes and colours, they prefer the judgment of persons in health to those of persons in sickness; and when they are themselves indisposed, they will have more confidence in the prognostic of a physician than in that of a person ignorant of the healing art. But sensible objects are neither the whole, nor the principal, of things. There are, as shall be proved hereafter, existences firm and im-

^w *πῶς γὰρ ἔσται ταῖς, μὴ τινος οὐτος αἰδῶ, &c.* p. 983. Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. and c. iv. p. 332.

^x *Metaph.* l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

^y The Theatre of Music at Athens.

moveable

C H A P. moveable, and altogether imperceptible to corporeal organs. That our senses do not shew us things as they really are, is perhaps true, but that there should not be some cause of our sensation, existing independently of the sensations themselves, is impossible; because, whatever is produced by motion supposes a moving power², which exists independently, and is prior to the thing moved, in the order of causality and nature.³

It is the misery of the sceptics still vainly to reason, while they destroy the only base on which all solid reasoning must stand. Some of them do this through ignorance, and others through obstinacy. The latter stand in need, not of conviction, but correction, for there are truths the opposers of which ought to be chastised, not confuted; as those who deny that we ought to reverence the Gods, or to respect our parents. But it is the grossest ignorance not to know, that all truths cannot be demonstrated; for it is impossible that demonstrations should run back to infinity, without stopping at certain principles or first truths, which are called self-evident, because more certain and more necessary in themselves than any arguments that could be produced in proof of them. To deny a first cause, we have already proved, is to deny all causation: to deny axioms, is, for the same

² Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

³ The moving power does not infer the existence of the thing moved, μη αντιρροφει κατα την τε ισως αναλησιν, but the latter infers the former. Aristot. Predicam.

reason,

reason, to deny all demonstration, and to subvert the principles on which both reasoning and language are built^b. The very nature of words infers, that the things signified by them, have a certain determinate mode of existence; for words, even the most comprehensive, are nothing else but signs denoting that certain properties are characteristic of certain subjects. How numerous soever these properties may be, provided they be not infinite, they are still capable of being collected under one name; but if the properties were totally indefinite, there could not be any collection. Each term, therefore, affirms something definitely, respecting the object which it denotes^c; and to say with the sceptics, that truth is merely apparent, or that the same thing may be both affirmed and denied concerning the same object at the same time, is to maintain that it is impossible for man, either to reason within himself, or to discourse with his fellow-creatures.^d

The existence of truth may be evinced, from the various shades of error, which gradually

^b *Metaph.* l. iv. c. iv. p. 874.

^c ὁ γὰρ λόγος, οὗ το ὄνομα σημειῶν, ὁρισμός γίνεται τῷ πραγματος,
p. 881.

^d διὰ τοῦτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑκάστην εἶναι γνῶριμον, καὶ ὁλοῦν ἐν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ, μόνον δὲ εἶναι καὶ πλεονα σημασι, φανερὸν ποιεῖν ἵφ' ὃ φέρεται τέτομα τέτων· ὅ δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι τέτο, καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τέτο ὁ ὅλος εἶναι φησὶ· οὐ φησὶν ὥς ὃ σημαίνει τέτομα, τέτο οὐ φησὶ σημαίνει. p. 984. When it is said that each name should denote one, Aristotle means *in*, as explained, p. 888. τα δὲ πρῶτως λεγόμενα ἐν, ἢ ἡ οὐσία μὴ· μὴ δὲ ἡ συνήχεια, ἡ εἶδος ἡ λόγος. That unity is ascribed to things whose substance is one; one in continuity, form, or definition; one in form or appearance, is: what our eyes tell us is one; one in definition, is what our reason tells us is one; the specific quality being sometimes visible, sometimes intelligible. See above, p. 66.

receding

CHAP. II. receding from the regions of light, finally darken into perfect obscurity. As truth consists in the agreement of human conception with the nature of things, the brightest truths result from those sciences which treat of things simple and invariable. In this view, arithmetic and geometry have long held the pre-eminence. The geometer abstracts from body heat and cold, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, and all other perceptible contrarieties; and contemplates it only under the two properties of magnitude and continuity; concerning which he demonstrates innumerable affections, ascertaining either the magnitudes themselves, or their proportions to each other. His theorems therefore are more convincing than those of the natural philosopher, whose speculations are more liable to error, on account of their complexity^e. But there is a science preceding geometry in simplicity as well as dignity; which, instead of contemplating properties and their affections, contemplates being and its properties^f. This science may be justly called the first philosophy, and theology: it may be called the first philosophy, because all other sciences imply it, and borrow from it their principles^g; and it may be called theology, because all the classes of being, as quantity, quality, and relation, finally rest on substance; and God is the first, the one neces-

^e ἀκριβέσταται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν πρώτων εἰσι· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττοτέρων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθετικῆς λεγόμενων, ὡς ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρία, &c. p. 842

^f Metaph. l. iv. c. i. p. 869. and l. xiii. c. iii. p. 983.

^g Ibid. l. iv. c. ii. p. 871. & seq.

fary and independent substance, whose non-existence implies a contradiction, and from contemplating whose nature, our knowledge of being and its properties is ultimately derived ^h.

CHAP.
II.

Having given to his readers a glimpse of this sublime subject, our author proceeds in examining the principles of things according to his usual method ; first explaining the sentiments of his predecessors in science, before he endeavours to establish his own system. The book published as the first, and that published as the third, treat of principles ; and taken together, form only one discourse, which ought to stand as book the fourth. The elaborate exordium of this book seems to account for its being considered as the beginning of the whole treatise. “ That all men,” our author observes, “ are naturally fond of knowledge, is proved from the pleasure which they universally take in the exercise of their senses ; which exercise they love on its own account, independently of any end or use. But of all our senses, the sight is that which we most delight to exercise, and that independently of its assistance in the business of life ; for even when we have nothing to do, we prefer this exercise to all other employments ; the cause of which is, that the eye affords to us more knowledge, and makes us acquainted with more of the differences of things, than any of the other senses. All animals are endowed with sensation ; but in some only, sensation is fol-

Aristotle's
introduc-
tion to his
history of
the first
philosophy
or theo-
logy.

^h Metaph. c. iii. p. 872.

lowed

CHAP. II. **lowed by memory. Those who are endowed**
with memory, are susceptible of instruction ;
and even without instruction, (since incapable
of hearing,) attain a wonderful degree of saga-
city, as appears in bees, and in some resembling
tribes. The powers of hearing and remembering
infer the capacity of being taught by instruc-
tion as well as by experience : of which capacity
inferior animals participate in a small degree,
but which in man is exalted into art and science.
His experience, also, arises from memory ; many
particular remembrances combining into one
experience. From experience, again, both art
and science are derived ; art being nothing
more than the general result of various expe-
rience ; as when we observe that a certain me-
dicine is beneficial to Socrates, to Callias, and
many others, we infer that it will prove bene-
ficial to all similarly circumstanced ; that is, to
all men of similar temperaments, and labouring
under like maladies. Experiments being thus
generalised into system, causes may thenceforth
be assigned why in each specific case, a specific
medicine should be administered ; and the man
of art is preferred to the mere empiric, because
he can thus explain the reasons of his practice,
and communicate his skill to others. The prac-
tice of the empiric, however, may often be far
more successful ; and even his skill in the heal-
ing art may be far greater ; for, if his know-
ledge is derived only from individuals, it is with
individuals only he has to do. Arts, therefore,
are admired rather for their ingenuity than
utility :

utility : and the farther they are removed from the common uses of life, our admiration of them is the greater. Such arts, indeed, are the latest in invention ; for, men must be provided with necessaries and accommodations, before they can attain that freedom of mind which is requisite for speculation. The mathematical studies, therefore, first assumed a systematic form among the priests of Egypt, who enjoyed independent leisure. We make these observations to show, how men are led from sense and memory to experience ; from experience to art, and from practical arts to speculative sciences ; till they finally reach the most lofty speculations of all, concerning the first principles of the universe.

The science containing these speculations is called wisdom ; and those by whom it is cultivated, are eminently distinguished as the wise. The particulars in which it differs from other sciences are, that it is the most universal, the most difficult, the most accurate, and, merely for its own sake, of all sciences the most desirable. It is the most universal, because the knowledge of first principles is the source of all other knowledge ; it is the most difficult, because it is of all sciences the farthest removed from sensation ; it is the most accurate, because its object is the most simple, being unaccompanied with any accessories ; as geometry is more simple than physics, and arithmetic than geometry. It is also the most desirable on its own account, since in proportion as men possess all other goods of

The nature
and dignity
of this
science,

C H A P. of the mind and body, they become most ambitious of attaining this knowledge ; which is
 { II. coveted, loved, and sought merely for itself, independently of any farther end than the pleasure of enjoying it. A freeman, in opposition to a slave, lives for himself, not for another ; so this science is of all the most liberal, terminating completely in itself. It may therefore be thought above the reach of humanity, (since men are naturally slaves to innumerable wants,) and a science fit only for gods ; so that if the gods, as the poets say, are capable of envy, this science ought to draw down the divine displeasure on those who cultivate it. But the Divinity cannot possibly be subject to envy ; and the poets, even by the common proverb, are acknowledged to be liars. This science, therefore, is most valuable, because, in two respects, the most divine ; first, as the Divinity, being a cause or principle, is its immediate and direct object ; secondly, as the Divinity, to whom the universe is but one great truth, alone fully comprehends it. Although all other sciences are more necessaryⁱ than this, yet none is better.

Its history. With this preface, Aristotle introduces his history of what he calls wisdom, theology, and the first philosophy ; and then proceeds to show that of the two great schools, the Ionian and the Italic, the philosophers of the former were attentive solely to gross material causes, whereas those of the latter wandered in the chimerical

ⁱ Necessary, in the sense above explained, for supplying daily wants, and for procuring personal accommodations.

regions

regions of ideas and numbers ; substituting metaphysical abstractions for substantial operative beings. The materialists differed widely from each other. Thales maintained water to be the first principle of things ; probably observing that the nourishment, as well as the seeds, of most natural objects are of a humid nature ; and that heat, perhaps life, is produced by fermentation. He might also allege the opinions of divines and poets long before his own age, who considered Oceanus and Tethys as the fathers of generation ; and who make the gods swear by Styx, that is by water, as the most to be revered of all things, because the most ancient. Anaximenes and Diogenes perceived that water might be resolved into air ; and therefore maintained air to be the original principle of bodies. The cause of fire was defended by Hippasus and Heraclitus, who saw all things expanded, animated, and revived by heat ; and differing from each other, in proportion to their participation of the caloric, from the extreme of condensation to that of rarefaction. Empedocles, considering all these three as operative substances, added to them earth, as a fourth principle ; and called these four the elements, because he supposed that all things were composed of them, that all things might be resolved into them, and that they themselves were simple, indestructible, and totally incapable of farther resolution*. Anaxagoras introduced the obscure¹ doctrine of the

* Metaph. lib. i. c. iv. p. 844, & seq.

¹ This doctrine is elaborately and eloquently maintained by Buffon throughout the third volume of his *Natural History*, though
VOL. I. I the

C H A P. the omœomeria, or the production of bodies from
II. indefinitely small organic particles, exactly re-
 sembling the bodies themselves; and therefore
 maintained principles to be infinite.

In this investigation, which respected only the material cause, philosophers were naturally led to inquire what forced these principles or elements (whether one, many, or infinite) to undergo various and unceasing changes. In works of art, they perceived that the materials were totally inactive; that the iron did not make itself into a saw, nor the brass into a statue. To answer this question some maintained, contrary to experience, that all things were one, and unalterable. Others ascribed an active power to fire, which produced all the changes which we behold, by its operation on the other elements. But of the order and beauty which prevail in the universe, neither fire nor any similar substance could be conceived as the author: nor was it possible that such regular effects should result from blind chance. Philosophers were again compelled therefore, by the force of truth itself, to look for some higher principle; when one, far wiser than the rest, like a sober man among drunken babblers, pronounced mind to be the primary cause of the beauty and harmony of the universe. This opinion was asserted in plain language by Anaxagoras of Clazomené; but the first proposer of it was his countryman Hermotimus^m. Yet

the very first chapters of Aristotle's History of Animals might have convinced him of its futility.

^m *Metaph.* l. i. c. iii. p. 844.

Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras himself, though he employs mind as a machine for making the world, introduces it, however, only when compelled by necessity; and prefers having recourse rather to every other cause in explaining the phænomena of nature.^a

We shall not follow Aristotle farther in examining the tenets of the Ionian school; much less are we inclined to enter into his sixth, seventh, and eleventh books; where he examines, with a degree of attention, of which the subject would now appear totally unworthy, the *numbers* of Pythagoras^o, and the *ideas* of Plato; those intellectual abstractions which the wildness of philosophy had converted into real operative beings, thus substituting shadows for substances. These three books properly constitute one, which ought to stand as the fifth, and be intitled, Concerning Ideas or Universals considered as Causes of the Universe.

Fifth book, concerning ideas as causes of the universe.

In his eighth book, he explains his own doctrine concerning natural philosophy; that is, concerning things liable to motion or change; which subject is treated more fully in his eight books of Physicks, and in his treatise concerning Generation and Corruption. This eighth book ought therefore to stand as the sixth. The seventh book, which is now printed as the ninth, treats of Energy; a word, as we shall see, of

The proper arrangement of the five remaining books.

^a Metaph. l. i. c. iv. p. 844.

^o How erroneously the most sublime discoveries in theology have been ascribed to the first Pythagoreans appears from Metaph. xiv. 7. p. 1001. Aristotle's Works, and they only, afford a faithful and consistent history of the progress of the human mind in matters of philosophy.

CHAP. mighty import in the Aristotelian philosophy;
II. from the explanation of which he naturally passes to the three concluding books of his Metaphysics, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and twelfth, which treat of a being totally distinct from matter; necessary, eternal, infinite in perfection; one substantially and numerically; the primary cause of motion, himself immoveable^p. These three last books, which ought to stand as the eighth, ninth, and tenth of what is now called his Metaphysics, are intitled, by Aristotle himself, his Works concerning Philosophy^q; meaning thereby, as he elsewhere explains it, the first philosophy or theology.^r

Aristotle's
 natural philosophy.

In travelling over the vast space which still lies before us, we shall follow the order prescribed by our Author; beginning therefore with the Philosophy of Nature, which is treated in various parts of his works, where the same doctrines are repeated nearly in the same words. In his Analysis of Material Objects, his researches penetrate far beyond those vulgar and spurious elements, first proposed by Empedocles, earth, water, fire, and air; which are so far from being simple and unalterable, that they may be converted with great facility, and are in fact perpetually changing the one into the other^s. But, in relation to human perception, Empedocles' division is not without merit; since the sense of touch, the most sure

^p ἐν μὲν ἀρχαῖς καὶ λογῇ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον, κινεῖται ἀκίνητον οὐ. See p. 1001 and 1003.

^q Ethic. Eadem, l. i. c. viii.

^r Metaphysics, l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

^s De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. iii. p. 517.

and

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and scientific of all our senses, acquaints us with only four different qualities of bodies, distinguished by the names hot, cold, moist, and dry. Aristotle endeavours to prove, by induction, that all other differences perceived by the touch, resolve themselves into these four; whereas no one of these four can be resolved into any of the other three. The qualities, therefore, above-mentioned, may be regarded as the fittest for distinguishing the different kinds of bodies from each other; and these four qualities, in their most simple combination with each other, will thus form the characteristics¹ of the elements as discovered by the sense of touch. But these qualities combined by two, that is, in the manner the most simple, form only four combinations. The elements, therefore, are four. The combination of coldness with dryness is called earth; of coldness with humidity, water; of heat with dryness, fire; of heat with humidity, air. Those elements are most easily convertible, which have one quality in common. Thus water is changed into air, when the quality of cold is destroyed by the caloric². What was before water, has now the two characteristics of air, viz. humidity and heat; and, when the latter is added in due proportion, the water evaporates, and mounts to the sky, where it remains, until a new cause again deprives the air of its heat, and makes it

His analysis of the supposed elements.

Their continual transmutations.

¹ De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. iii. p. 515, 516.

² More properly calorific. Το θερμαντικόν—Το δὲ δυναμικὸν θερμὸν ἐστίν, παρὸν τῇ θερμαντικῇ καὶ πλησιάζοντι, ἀναγκὴ θερμαίνεσθαι. “What has the capacity of receiving heat, must be heated by the approach and presence of the caloric.” P. 508.

C H A P. fall to the ground in rain. In the same manner,

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fire may be converted into air, and air into fire; for fire is warm and dry, and air is warm and moist; and the element will therefore be denominated either fire or air, according to the prevalence of the dryness or humidity. Water, too, will be easily converted into earth; since both being cold, but the former moist, and the latter dry, the moisture need only to be overcome by the dryness to make water earth; and dryness need only to be overcome by moisture to make earth water. When the elements possess not any common quality, their transmutation is more slow and difficult. To make water into fire, it is necessary that both its cold and its moisture should be overcome by the contrary principles of heat and dryness; and to make air into earth, or earth into air, the two characteristic qualities of both elements must also be changed. These changes, however, are continually happening around us; the air being first converted into water, and the water into earth. Fire also is visibly generated; for flame, which is a species of fire, consists of nothing but burning smoke, which itself is composed of air and earth."

The perpetual changes of the elements and their compounds produce the ever-varying spectacle which we behold around us, and are themselves produced by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies acting in concert with those laws of motion which God has impressed on his

" De Generat. et Corrupt. l. ii. c. iv. p. 518.

lower

lower works^x. Earth naturally tends to the centre of the universe; water rises above earth; air above water; and fire above air. A gravitating principle, therefore, belongs properly to earth; and an anti-gravitating, to fire; which always seeks the extremities; and is therefore the great minister of the Almighty in moulding the forms of things^y. The intermediate elements of air and water have only a relative gravity, being heavier than fire, and lighter than earth^z; and this relative gravity disappears when they are either in, or below, their proper place^a: yet that air itself is heavy, appears evidently from this, that a bladder filled with air is heavier than when it was void of that element.^b

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From the active^c principles of heat and cold, and the passive^d ones of dryness and humidity, the density, rarity, hardness, softness, tenacity, friability, in one word, all the mixed properties

The immediate causes of the mixed properties of bodies, and

^x συντελεσσει το όλον ὁ Θεός ἐντελεχίᾳ ποιήσας τῆς γενέσεως ἕντα γὰρ μέγιστα συνειροῦτο τοῦ καὶ, διὸ το ἐγγύτατον ἔστι τῆς ἑσθίας, το γιγνέσθαι αὐτῇ τῇ γενέσει. De Generat. et Corrupt. l. ii. c. iv. p. 525.

^y De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. viii. p. 523.

^z De Cælo, l. i. c. viii. p. 444.

^a De Cælo, p. 490, et seq.

^b De Cælo, l. iv. c. iv. p. 490. The brevity of the expression renders it doubtful whether the experiment was made by exhausting or by accumulating the air. While writing this passage, a book fell in my way of a very eminent professor. Dr. Adam Smith, in which I met with the following passage: "Those facts and experiments, which demonstrate the weight of the air, and which no superior sagacity, but chance alone presented to the moderns, were altogether unknown to them (the ancients before the time of Archimedes)." Smith's Essays on Philosophical Subjects, p. 101.—The facts, however, were known to Aristotle, who flourished more than a century before Archimedes.

^c Meteor. l. iv. c. i. p. 584.

^d Ibid.

C H A P. II. of bodies are derived^c; and from them are compounded the highest meteors of heaven^f, as well as the metals and minerals in the bosom of the earth^g. The hardest of those fossils are produced from dry exhalations or humid vapours; which are the material causes of those permanent substances, and the efficient causes of the most tremendous convulsions; for the earthquakes are not caused, as Democritus suspected, merely by the agency of water bursting the too narrow caverns in which it had been accumulated and pent up, but by the agency of heat, which, converting this water into vapour, gives to it a power of overthrowing the weightiest mountains which oppose its expansion.^h

Refutation
of the doc-
trine of
atoms.

Aristotle's doctrine concerning the transmutation of the elements, vulgarly so called, (a doctrine long held visionary by his pretended followers,) is countenanced by recent experimentsⁱ, which show that water may be resolved into

^c De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 515.

^f De Meteor. l. ii. c. iv. p. 558.

^g De Meteor. l. iii. c. vi. p. 583. ^h Ibid. p. 566, & seq.

ⁱ I have just read a small German Volume, intitled, "Antiphlogistische Chemie," by Johann. And. Scherer, Vienna, 1792, 8vo. which is written with the purpose of proving, that the most important of the discoveries which have established the antiphlogistic system, called on the Continent the system of Lavoisier, had been made by our countryman Mayow upwards of an hundred years ago. This wonderful young man, for he died at the age of 34, was acquainted (as his words are quoted by Scherer) with the composition of the atmosphere; the nature of what is now called vital or dephlogisticated air; the origin and common nature of acids; the doctrines of combustion, fermentation, respiration, &c. as explained by Lavoisier, and other authors of the antiphlogistic system of chemistry. Scherer makes the comparison with great fairness, stating the modern doctrines in his own German text, and placing Mayow's Latin in notes

into different gases, or airs; that atmospheric air itself is capable of resolution; and that the most subtile fluids enter into the composition of solid bodies, which may again, by the agency of the calorific, be changed into fluids. But our Author did not rest satisfied with any discoveries that mere experiment could make, nor with any analogical deductions from such discoveries, of which the most celebrated was the System of Atoms, as explained by Democritus. That philosopher, whom Aristotle often cites and refutes, but on whom he bestows the just praise of unextinguishable curiosity and indefatigable industry^k, thought it an invincible argument in favour of his atoms, that if body was infinitely divisible, it would finally vanish into nothing. Aristotle denies both the position and the inference. The error of Democritus, he observes, arose from thinking, that, because a body might be divided *any where*, it might therefore be divided *every where*. In a line, a point may be taken *any*

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at the bottom of the page, from an edition of his works published at the Hague in 1681, intitled, "Johannis Mayow, Londinensis, &c. Opera Omnia Medico-Physica." Mayow was born in London, in 1645, where he died in 1679. He was a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. In 1668 he published there "Tractatus duo de Respiratione & de Rachitide;" and, in 1674, he published the same five Treatises, which were afterwards republished at the Hague. This work contains, besides the two tracts above mentioned, I. "Tractatus de Salnitro et Spiritu Nitro Aërio," (which he calls Spiritus Vitalis Igneus, p. 1. and Aër Purus Vitalis, p. 281, the name which is likely to prevail) II. "De Respiratione Fœtus in Utero." III. "De Motu Musculorum & Spiritibus Animalibus."

^k οὗτος δὲ Δημοκρίτης ἔοικε μὲν πρὸς ἀπαντὰς φροντισταί, p. 494. De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 2.

where,

C H A P. *where*, but points cannot be taken *every where*,
II. because one point cannot be contiguous to
 another¹. Bodies, therefore, cannot actually
 be divided to infinity, and therefore cannot
 vanish into nothing; but as the minutest par-
 ticle still possesses all the properties of body, it
 is still capable of division, and therefore not an
 atom.^m

Of change,
 and its
 different
 species.

Lation.

Change as
 to quan-
 tity.
 Alteration.

Generation
 and cor-
 ruption.

According to our universal experience re-
 specting the vicissitudes of sublunary things, our
 Author observes, that there are no realisations of
 non-entity, and no absolute reductions of exist-
 ence into nothing. These vicissitudes or changes
 may all be reduced to the four followingⁿ: 1. A
 change of place, called lation, the first and most
 simple species of change, which is implied in all
 the three following kinds. 2. A change of quan-
 tity, which must consist either in augmentation
 or in diminution. 3. A change of quality, called
 alteration; as from hard to soft, from health to
 sickness. 4. A change in substance, which con-
 sists in generation and corruption^o; and which
 is sufficiently exemplified in what is above ob-
 served concerning the transmutations of the
 elements. When any regularly organized object
 changes its place, its quantity, or its quality,

¹ De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. ii. p. 497.

^m The obscurity of this passage will be removed, by considering what he afterwards proves, that our notion of infinity is entirely negative; and that to suppose body actually divided to infinity implies a contradiction, *κατα εναντιον μιν εστι απειρον, δυναμι δε εκ της διαίρεσιν.* Ibid. p. 499.

ⁿ De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 498, & seq. & Physic. Aescul. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

^o Idem ibid.

the

the object itself, it is plain, still remains the same essentially, though altered in its accessories.

But when it changes in substance, that is in the unknown cause from which all its perceptible qualities proceed, is there reason to believe that the continuity of existence is broken, and that one thing is totally annihilated, and another actually created? Aristotle thinks not; and that in this change, as well as in every other, there is something that departs, something that accedes, and something that still remains; a something, indeed, that escapes sense, and even eludes fancy, but of whose existence reason assures us, as of a fluctuating and obscure being, susceptible of all qualities, but unendowed with any. What iron is to the saw, or marble to the statue, precisely the same is this *first matter* to all the natural productions which diversify and adorn the earth. It possesses not in itself any characteristic or essential quality; never existing therefore apart; but before it quits one form, constantly assuming another^a. As the

The first
matter.

secondary

Ἡ ἐξ ἀπαντων των γιγνομενων τωτο εστι λαβων, αν τις επιβλεπη, ωσπερ λεγομεν, οτι δι αιμι τι υποκεισθαι το γιγνομενον. Natural. Auscult. l. i. c. viii. p. 324.

^a ημεις δε φαιμεν ελναι τινα των σωματων των αισθητων, αλλα ταυτη η χωριστη, αλλα αιμι μετ' εναντιωσεις, εξ ης γινεται τα καλεμενα στοιχεια. . . η γαρ το θερμον ελναι τω ψυχρω· ωδε τωτο τω θερμω· αλλα το υποκειμενον αμφοιν. ως πρωτον μιν το δυναμι σωμα αισθητον, αρχη· δευτερον δε η εναντιωσις· λεγω δε οιοι θερμότης και ψυχρότης· τριτον δε πη πυρ και υδωρ. ταυτα μιν γαρ μεταβαλλει εις αλληλα· αι δε εναντιωσεις, η μεταβαλλουσι. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. i. p. 515. "We say that perceptible bodies have for their principle a certain stuff or matter, which exists not separately, but is always invested with the contraries, hot or cold, moist or dry; and from these two, matter and the contraries, the elements are composed. Heat supplies not the materials for cold, nor cold for heat; but there is a certain subject susceptible

C H A P. II. secondary elements, and all the compounds formed of them, are moulded into works of art by the hand of man, that instrument of instruments, to which human nature owes so much of its accommodation and comfort, so this primary element is moulded by the hand of God into what are called the works of nature; none of which exist in a rude chaotic state, but of which each is distinguished by its peculiar characteristic; and all admirably adapted to answer their respective ends. This peculiar characteristic, by which objects are distinguished, Aristotle calls their appearance or form, because the sight, of all our senses, is that which gives us most information concerning the differences of things.

What is
meant by
the works
of nature.

Works of art are easily distinguished by their outward shape, but the primary form of physical production lies within, since all their sensible differences result from that internal principle, decisive of their motion to or from a certain state, and of their rest during a certain time in that state; which principle is called their nature. Of this nature we see, for example, the effects in plants, when they fix their roots in the earth, rear their stems, expand their leaves, and scatter their seeds; which operations, were these organized bodies endowed with intelligence, could not be more skilfully performed for the

ceptible of either of these contraries. So that this subject-matter is the first constituent principle, or element of perceptible bodies; the second, the contraries of which this matter is susceptible; the third, the compound elements of fire, water, &c.; which, 'as we have said, change into each other; but the contraries do not so change.'" See also *De Generat. & Corrupt.* l. i. c. 6.

prefer-

preservation of the individual, and the propagation of the kind^r. Plants, therefore, act, not C H A P.
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^r Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. viii. p. 336, & seq. ἀποποιεῖται δὲ τὸ μὴ αἰετῶσαι ἐνεκά τῃ γίνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἰδῶσι τὸ κινεῖν βλαπταμένον· καὶ τοὶ καὶ ἡ τέχνη ὡς βλαπτεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἴσθι ἐν τῷ ξυλῷ ἡ καυπηγικὴ, ὁμοίως αὖ τῇ φύσει ἔποιε· ὥς εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνεγί· ἢ ἐνεκά τῃ, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐνεγί. μαλιστα δὲ ὁλοῦν, ὅταν τις ἰατρικὴ αὐτοῦ ἰαυτοῦ· τῶν γὰρ ἰσκειν ἡ φύσις. Ibid. p. 338. "It is absurd to think, that because we do not see the moving principle actually deliberating, that it therefore acts at random, and not with an end in view. Art, then, we must say, acts at random; for if the art of ship-building was in wood, it would not act more judiciously *for making a ship*, than nature *does for nourishing, preserving, and propagating a tree*. If there is design in art, there must also be design in nature. This is most plain when a man, being a physician, cures himself. Nature acts like this man. But nature, as well as art, sometimes acts beside or beyond her intention; and sometimes fails in the execution of her own purposes. De Republica, l. i. c. vi. p. 302. By the compound word αὐτοματον, (ὅταν αὐτοματῶν γιγνται,) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more or less than the specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend. Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. This, he observes, happens through the concurrence or accession of causes or circumstances, (indefinite in number, since things innumerable may accede to the same thing, and causes innumerable may concur with the same cause; Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. iii. p. 331.) vitiating Nature's operations and deforming her works. Nature operating *κατὰ συμβεβηκος*, and thereby producing effects not in her intention, is called *αὐτοματον*, or chance; and art operating *κατὰ συμβεβηκος*, and producing effects not in her intention, is called *τυχὴ*, or fortune. Thus, chance, or fortune, cannot have any existence independently of intention or design. Aristotle, therefore, concludes cogently and sublimely, that "if the heavens themselves were the work of chance, this would only prove that intelligence had been the cause of many still nobler works, and was the cause of the universe itself." Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. Chance and fortune then, are merely abridged expressions to denote nature and art producing unintentional and therefore unusual effects. Comp. Natural. Aufcult. l. ii. c. iv. v. vi.; Metaph. l. v. c. xxx. and l. vi. c. ii. Ethic. Nichom. l. vi. c. iv. Magn. Moral. l. ii. c. vii. How unjustly is our Author treated by modern writers, (vid. Brucker. Histor. Philosoph. in Aristotel. passim, & Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis, vol. v. c. lxiv. p. 349.) when they arraign his impiety, on account of his doctrine of chance and fortune! Our incomparable Poet far better expresses the sense of his philosophy:

Shall burning Ætna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires, &c.

Ethic. Epist. iv. ver. 123, & seq.

indeed

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II.

indeed with, but by intelligence, in consequence of that nature or form which they have received from the first cause of motion and order¹. The constituent principles of things, therefore, are matter and form; and in all the changes which they undergo, there is a form which departs, a form which accedes, and a substance which remains, namely the first matter. Unless this doctrine is admitted, the continuity of existence would, in this lower world, be perpetually interrupted; each destruction would be an annihilation, and each production an evocation of non-entity into existence. The first matter being totally inactive, all change must proceed from matter endowed with form². But things exactly similar cannot produce any change on each other, because, having all properties in common, the one cannot communicate any thing to the other, nor act on that other any more than on itself. Neither do things disparate, that is, totally dissimilar, admit of any reciprocal action. Whiteness has no action on straightness, any more than hardness has on bitterness; because neither of those qualities tends to exclude the qualities to which they are respectively opposed; and both the whiteness and

¹ τὴ χρομὴ αὐτὴ προλαμβάνει ἐνεργεῖα ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ὡς τῆς τῆ αὐτῆς κινήσεως πρῶτης. "There is a continual progression of efficient moving principles up to the first mover." Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.

² Natural. Aufcult. p. 325. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. vii. p. 506. The subject in which the contraries inhere is properly acted upon, and changed from the one contrary to the other; from cold to hot, white to black. When Aristotle speaks of the actions and passions of forms, qualities, or contraries, he always supposes them clothed with matter. Ibid.

straightness,

straightness, as well as the hardness and bitterness, may subsist harmoniously in the same subject. By the accession of whiteness, therefore, the subject is not altered as to its straightness, nor by the accession of any one quality is it altered as to any other quality totally dissimilar to the former. To effect this alteration or change, the qualities or forms must be incapable of remaining in the same subject, which no sooner admits the one, than it rejects the other. But this is the nature of what are called contraries, heat and cold, moist and dry, black and white, straightness and crookedness, order and confusion; and of all those things which belong to one common genus, but are of a different species, that is, as formerly explained, which are similar in one respect, and dissimilar in another. By the reciprocal actions and sufferings of those contraries, in their utmost extremes and their intermediate states, all the changes are effected which we behold in the world around us. One flavour destroys a flavour that is contrary to it, one colour its contrary, and complexly one body acts on a body endowed with many contrary qualities. Aristotle claims not for his own discovery, that contraries are the elements of generation and corruption, and of all the lesser changes observable in material objects. That doctrine, he observes, was first

How her
operations
are per-
formed.

Contraries.

^u The materials of white, black; order, confusion, &c. are the same. *ἔστι δὲ τῶν οὐτῶν τὰ μὲν ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν παθητικών. τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀντιστροφῇ, ὅσῳ ἢ αὐτῇ ἔλη ἔστι, καὶ ποιητικῇ ἀλλήλων, καὶ παθητικῇ ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων.* De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507.

established

C H A P. established by the school of Pythagoras^w, which
II. arranged contraries into two classes, the better
 and the worse: as light, darkness; good, evil;
 finite, infinite; and was thenceforth adopted
 by all philosophers, compelled thereto by the
 force of truth^x. One of these contraries, it was
 observed, departs as soon as the other accedes;
 three things, therefore, are concerned in every
 mutation or change, the matter, which still re-
 mains one and the same; the contrary which
 accedes, called in general form; and the con-
 trary which departs, which Aristotle calls in
 general privation^y. This term, like many
 others employed by our author, is merely a sign
 to mark a thing indefinite and unknown; for
 the contrary which accedes, or, in other words,
 the characterising quality, is something certain
 and definite; but the form which departed in
 order to make room for this characterising qua-
 lity, and without the departure of which the
 change could not have been effected, is, in a
 great measure, uncertain and indefinite: thus,
 there is but one form of health, and innume-
 rable forms of sickness; one form of order, in-
 numerable forms of confusion; or, in things
 more sensible and obvious, each body has its
 definite colour or colours; but it may have been
 changed into one distinct specific colour, for
 instance, into black, either^z from its contrary

Form and
privation.

^w οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ τινες αἱ ἐναντιότητες, ἀπεφθάνοντο, &c.
 Metaphys. l. i. c. v. p. 846.

^x Natural. Aufcult. l. i. c. v.

^y Nat. Aufcult. l. i. c. viii. p. 325. τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ ἑτέρα συνταχόμε-
 στήνους. Aristot. Metaph. passim.

white,

white, or from any one of the various shades between these opposite extremes.*

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II.

In the changes which material substances undergo, they reciprocally act on each other; in other words, both substances are agents, and both patients. This is illustrated by what happens in mixture; which, according to Aristotle, consists in this, that two substances, acting on each other, produce a third substance specifically different from either; and of which each, the minutest part, is specifically different from each, the minutest part, of either of the composing ingredients. Leucippus and Democritus, the fathers of the mechanical philosophy, endeavoured to explain mixture as well as all other natural appearances by atoms and a vacuum, commensurate pores, the motions, figures, and positions of the minute particles of matter. But Aristotle justly observes, that if mixture depended merely on mechanical causes, there would be no such thing to the keen sight of Lynceus, which could always distinguish these composing ingredients, how minutely soever they were subdivided, from each other; and easily perceive that what, to our obtuse senses,

* Natural. Auscult. l. i. c. vi. p. 331. Aristotle maintained a definite number of colours against the atomic philosophers, who made them depend on the indefinite variety of the figures and dispositions of minute corpuscles, τα ἡδη τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστὶ ὁρισμένα καὶ ἐκ αἰτηρᾶ. De Sensu & Sensibili, c. iii. p. 667. He considered colours also as bearing the same relation to light, which sharpness and flatness do to sound: ὡςπερ γὰρ αὐτοῦ φωτός ἐχ' ὁράται τὰ χρώματα· ἔτι ἂν αὐτοῦ ψόφου, το οἶον καὶ το βαρυν. De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. How strangely were his doctrines perverted by the scholastics! And how nearly did they in themselves approach to inductions from experiments with which he was not acquainted!

C H A P. appeared to be the production of a new substance, was nothing more than the minute subdivision and nice juxtaposition of two old ones.⁷

II.

Transition
to his theo-
logy.

Substances endowed with different characterising qualities, in other words, different forms which have the same matter, are fitted for reciprocally acting on each other. But there is a higher order of forms, which act, without suffering; and of which, the highest of all must *necessarily* be impassive. A patient is said, with equal propriety, to be cured, either by the physician's skill, or by the medicines prescribed. The medicines, while they act, are also acted upon; are warmed, cooled, or undergo some such alteration. But the physician's skill suffers nothing from the effect produced on the patient; and by this comparison, Aristotle says we may conceive why, of substances not immersed in the same common matter, the one may produce a change on the other, without being reciprocally affected by it.

The form,
species, or
figt.

To know physical objects, is to know their causes; the efficient and final, which are principles external to these objects; and the material and formal, which, existing in the objects themselves, are the elements into which they must intellectually be resolved. The formal cause is that by which each object is characterised and distinguished; and from which, as from a perennial and abundant spring, its sen-

⁷ De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507. Aristotle illustrates his doctrine by observations on the mixture of metals, one of which is noticed by my ingenious friend Dr. Pearson. See Philosoph. Trans. for the year 1796, p. 432.

fible

fible qualities, as well as latent powers, perpetually flow. Aristotle did not think that, in the present state of our existence, we could remount to this fruitful source, and behold things as they are²; but in all his inquiries, it is constantly his endeavour to approximate as nearly as possible to this *species, form, or fight*, which words he often employs merely as signs for things sought; and to discover in each object that essential characteristic, whether substance or property, on which its perceptible qualities depend³. Familiar with the correct geometry of his times, he discerned the concatenation of truths, which, being linked indissolubly together, unite the most distant, and seemingly unconnected extremes. Of each object he investigates the true definition; and of each science, the *principal* theorem; because the foundation and bond of union of its parts; justly thinking, that the variety of our apparent knowledge is often the proof of our real ignorance; and that genuine science improves in proportion to the reduction of many seemingly independent propositions into one general comprehensive truth. Under the influence of this generalising spirit,

² Metaph. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

³ Metaphys. l. vii. c. ii. xi. xiii. It is worthy of remark, that Aristotle *did* precisely that which he is blamed by Bacon, Hobbes, Malbranche, &c. for not doing; and declared it impossible to do that which he is blamed for having attempted. By examining, comparing, and classing the perceptible qualities of things, he endeavoured to make them known by a definition, affirming this examination to be the only method by which they could be known and defined: *ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐχομεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συνδεδηκότων, ἢ τῶν πάντων, ἢ τῶν ὁριστῶν, τότε περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἔχομεν τι λέγειν ὅτι μάλιστα*. Ibid.

CHAP. the true spirit of philosophy, he is carried some-
II. times beyond the bounds prescribed to the
 human intellect; but his errors are always those
 of a man of genius; and what intellectual ad-
 venturer ever successfully contended in the field
 of truth, without sometimes being tempted to
 launch on the ocean of conjecture?

Of the laws
 regulating
 this lower
 world.

Nothing in nature, he observes, exists in a
 totally crude and absolutely unorganised state;
 but it is the inward organization, or invisible
 form, which moulds the external shape of bo-
 dies; and imposes on the motion, producing
 their various figures and appearances, the laws
 and limits of its action. In exerting this in-
 herent power of forms, fire seems to be their prin-
 cipal minister, their great perceptible agent^b;
 for fire, the most subtle of material principles,
 and of which light seems to be a modification^c,
 always diffuses itself through bodies, and seeks
 their extremities, by which their outward con-
 formation is delineated and defined. There are
 forms of a peculiar nature, as we shall prove
 hereafter, totally separable from matter, because
 capable of energies and pleasures totally unre-
 lated to any of its properties; but the forms of
 most physical objects are inseparably combined
 with the material principle, because independ-
 ently of it, they would not answer any possible
 end. Of what use would be the nutritive power
 of plants, were there not some material substance

^b De Part. Animal. l. ii. c. vii. p. 986.

^c πυρρς η τοις τοις τινος παρρησια εν τη διαφανι. De Anima, l. ii.
 c. vii. p. 638.

to be nourished? To what purpose would serve the fierce instincts of the lion, separated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members? It is highly unreasonable, therefore, to believe the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the separate existence of substantial forms^d; and not less unreasonable to admit the opinion so strongly inculcated by some poets and philosophers, that such forms migrate from one body to another.^e

In the language of Aristotle, the word "nature" is confined to that part of the universe situate within the lunar sphere; which, according to a philosophy preceding his own times, was regarded as the intermediate isthmus separating terrestrial and perishing, from celestial and immortal, things^f. In its primitive and proper sense, "nature" peculiarly applies to this lower world, which is the region of perpetual change, and in which all things are continually

The state of capacity and energy between which all objects in it fluctuate.

^d Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. ii. p. 329.

^e De Anima, l. i. c. iii. p. 624. It is pleasant to find Hobbes, in the 4th chapter of his Leviathan, and in many other parts of his works, combating, under the name of Aristotle's philosophy, abstract essences, substantial forms, and innumerable other doctrines, metaphysical as well as moral and political, with nearly the same arguments by which Aristotle, their supposed author, had long before victoriously refuted them. Malbranche and the French philosophers in general treat the Stagyrte with not less unfairness, and speak of his opinions with not less ignorance. I scarcely except Rapin, whose account of Aristotle, hitherto regarded as the best, is disgraced by great inaccuracies. It is not easy to conceive how a writer, who had not acquired his notion of Aristotle's writings at second hand, should so totally mistake their aim as Rapin does in speaking of the Ethics to Eudemus. See Comparaison de Platon & Aristotle, p. 345. Edit. Amsterdam, 1686.

^f Vid. Gal. Opuscula Mythol. p. 516.

CHAP.

II.

fluctuating between the extremes of generation and corruption; whereas the heavenly bodies, whether originally created, or the eternal production of an eternal cause^g, appear, as far as our experience reaches, to perform their unwearied motions exempted from the vicissitudes of renovation or decay. Every thing therefore in nature, that is, in this lower world, may be conceived as existing in two different states; so called, though variable, because relatively more stable than the other changes to which they are liable. The first state of their existence, both absolutely^h, and in the order of human conception, is that of their maturity and perfection;

^g Natural. Auscult. l. viii. c. x. p. 422. : and we shall see hereafter that things existing in capacity must proceed universally from things existing in energy.

^h No tenet of the Peripatetic philosophy is thought more clearly ascertained than the eternity of the world; and this tenet, I believe, is universally ascribed to Aristotle by all writers whatever, both ancient and modern. The brevity and energy of our author's style often gives to him indeed the appearance of dogmatizing where he is only investigating; but, in the following passage, he speaks concerning the eternity of the world with the same becoming modesty that he shows on other subjects unfathomable to mere reason. Having mentioned that principle in the works of nature, analogous to art in the productions of man, which makes the stems of plants shoot upwards, while their roots fix deeply in the earth; which gives to animals their determinate organization and proper shape, distinguishable in their respective members, adapted to specific and salutary purposes, he proceeds thus: *μαλλον εικος τοις ηρανις γεγενησθαι υπο ταιαυτης αιτιας, ει γιγοντι, και εινα δια ταιαυτην αιτιαν μαλλον η τα ζωα τα θνητα το γε εν τεταγμενοι και ωρισμενοι πολυ μαλλον φαινεται εν τοις ηρανις, η περι ημας.* De Part. Animal. l. i. p. 970. "It is more likely that the heavens were produced by such a cause, if indeed they were produced, and that they subsist through the efficacy of such a cause, than perishing animals, since definite arrangement and regular harmony are conspicuous far more in celestial than in terrestrial things." Besides this, when Aristotle's doctrine of time is understood, we shall see that he means by the eternity of the world something very different from the sense commonly affixed to those words.

in the state of a tree, a horse, and a man. But with respect to the individuals of these, as well as all other classes, though they always universally proceed from other individuals in a state of maturity, it will be found that they all undergo innumerable changes, before they attain, by slow and insensible degrees, the perfection of their nature. As the rude marble is gradually formed by art into a beautiful or majestic statue, so do seeds and embryos, scarcely perceptible to the senses, expand, by assimilating their proper nourishment, into the wonderfully organised productions called plants and animals. Such progressive and ever varying natures may be considered therefore as existing either in a state of capacity for attaining a certain maturity and beauty, a thing as different from absolute incapacity as sleep is from death; or in a state of actuality and perfection, which qualifies them for performing their respective functions, and exerting their peculiar energies. What then is change or motion in its most comprehensive and philosophical sense? It is the passage from a state of imperfection to perfection, from disorder to form, from capacity to energy; or the reverse of this, from energy to mere capacity. For this reason Aristotle, anticipating the subtle principles which gave birth to the sublime geometry of Newton and Leibnitz, expresses an object in itself too fugitive for words to represent, by the limits or extremes between which it fluctuates; calling motion the perfection of mere capacity, because the immediate end at which mere capacity

Motion defined.

C H A P. aims ; and an imperfect energy or actuality, because until the productive motion stops, the object is only approximating to its most perceptible and most perfect state."

Space and time.

Aristotle observes, that the four kinds of change or motion, formerly described, all finally resolve themselves into lation, or change of place^o; and that place is only a modification of space, that unsubstantial being of which no other definition can be given but that it is the recipient of body^p. As our conception of space originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of space, so our conception of

ⁿ Aristot. Natural. Auscult. l. iii. c. i. ii. iii. p. 339, & seq. Had Mr. Locke known what Aristotle meant by motion, his candour would not have allowed him to speak of this definition as he does in the following passage: "What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition, 'the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully, asking a Dutchman what *beveeginge* was, should have received this answer in his own language, that it was "actus entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia," I ask whether any one can imagine he would thereby have understood what the word *beveeginge* signified, or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another, when he used that sound?" Essay on the Human Understanding, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 4. p. 26. But Aristotle, who had taught before Mr. Locke that, what the latter calls simple ideas, could not be defined, ("φανεραι τονυν, ότι επι των άλλων ηκ εστι τις ζητησις, ωδε διδασκεις. αλλα ιτερος τροπος της ζητησιως των τοιυτων.") Metaphys. l. vii. c. xvii. p. 925. Vid. etiam, pp. 910 & 929.) would have more easily explained to Mr. L. his own definition of motion, than Mr. L. could have explained to Aristotle what he meant by the idea of a triangle, which is neither rectangular, obtusangular, nor acutangular, but at once none, and all, of these together—the supposed existence of which ideas, and an infinity of others of the same kind, is the principal basis of the whole Essay on Human Understanding.

^o Natural. Auscult. l. viii. c. x. p. 421. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

^p Natural. Auscult. l. v. c. i. ii. &c. p. 351—364.

time

time originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similitude to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called time, with which they are conceived to co-exist. Time therefore may be defined the perceived number of successive movements; for as number ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, so time ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion performed^a. An instant is not a part, but the boundary of time^r; whose elements are the perceptible intervals bounded by instants^s. If body therefore had a beginning; so must space, motion, and time, which are conceived merely as affections of body, or of each other^t. If body cannot be supposed infinitely extended, without supposing a contradiction, (for what quantity can actually exist of which the magnitude cannot be ascertained and expressed?) so neither can any of its properties; and therefore motion cannot be infinite; nor time, which is conceived solely as the measure of motion; a mere fiction of the fancy, possessing no real existence independently of us and our thoughts. The very essence of infinity, again, consists in privation; it is a word denoting not a conception, but the negation of all conception; so that

^a Natural. Aufcult. p. 367.

^r Phys. Aufc. p. 397.

^s Ibid. l. iv. c. xiv. &c. p. 364—373.

^t Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 894.

the

CHAP. II. the errors committed on this subject by the ancients, and repeated by some modern philosophers, and even some modern mathematicians^u, proceed from their realising a non-entity, and assigning a positive archetype, or what they call an idea, to a word, which is merely a sign that no such archetype or idea exists. Body and space cannot be conceived as infinite either in greatness or littleness; and although its adjunct of motion or time is imagined to be so conceived, this arises from a mere illusion of the fancy, which, not retaining the parts of time first taken, continually adds new parts, but without increasing the whole; since the former parts are continually annihilated, as the latter are created^x. To realise infinity must, in all our

^u “La grandeur (says the admired Fontenelle) est susceptible d’augmentation sans fin. Elle n’est donc pas & ne peut être supposée dans le même cas, que si elle n’étoit pas susceptible d’augmentation sans fin : or si elle n’étoit pas susceptible d’augmentation sans fin, elle resteroit toujours finie ; donc étant susceptible d’augmentation sans fin, elle peut être supposée infinie.” See the same reasoning throughout his treatise, intitled, *Elémens de la Geometrie de l’Infini*. It is easy to perceive how much this ingenious man, and his innumerable followers, might have benefited by reading the third book of Aristotle’s *Physics*, c. iv. to chapter xiii. both inclusive, p. 342—350. *ἐκ ἀφαιρεῖται δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅτι τῆς μαθηματικῆς τῆς θεωρίας ἀκρίτων ὥτως εἶναι το ἀπειρον, ὥστε ἐντελεῖα εἶναι ἐπὶ τῇ αὐξήσει, ὡς ἀδιέκτιστον· ὅτι γὰρ νῦν διωνται τὰ ἀπείρα, ὅδε χροῖται, ἀλλὰ μοῖσι υἱαὶ ὅση αὖ βέλονται πεπερασμένη τῇ δὲ μεγίστῃ μεγέθει τοι αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τετμησθαι λόγον ὑπερλίκων μεγέθος ἑτέρον, ὥστε πρὸς μὴν τὸ διεῖλαι ἐκείνως ὅθεν διόσκει· τὸ δὲ εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς ἐσσι· ἐστὶ μέγιστον. Ibid. c. xi. p. 350. “We do not destroy the speculations of mathematicians, when we assert that infinite magnitude cannot exist. For in these speculations, they neither employ nor need to employ infinite, but only a finite magnitude as great as they please ; and the smallest may be divided in the same proportions with the greatest. For finding proportions, therefore, it is not necessary to suppose the existence of what is impossible.”*

^x *Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 350.*

reasonings,

reasonings, necessarily lead to absurdity ; thus, to give our Author's example, to suppose an infinite progression of causes in making and arranging the world, is the same thing as to suppose it made or arranged without any cause at all.⁷

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It is both the glory and the shame of Aristotle's abstract philosophy, that his general conclusions are correct, when some of the arguments by which he maintains them are faulty. This is peculiarly manifest in the use which he makes of the erroneous system of astronomy, which prevailed in his own age, to vindicate the doctrines contained in his books of Physics. His treatise concerning the Heavens, indeed, describes with perspicuity and precision the celestial phenomena ; while, at the same time, it informs us of the sublime notions entertained by the first Pythagoreans and their contemporaries, of the distances, figures, motions, and magnitudes of the planets² ; that the moon abounded with inhabitants ; that the milky-way consisted of contiguous clusters of stars³ ; and, conjecturing what it is the boast of modern astronomy to have confirmed, that the same principle which makes the heavenly bodies approach to their centre, perpetually impels them in their orbits, by proportionably increasing their celerity⁴. Aristotle's own sagacity led him to perceive that, in

Aristotle's
astronomy.

⁷ Metaph. l. ii. c. ii. p. 857.

² De Cælo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 465.

³ Meteor. l. i. c. viii.

⁴ De Cælo, l. ii. c. i. p. 452. Comp. c. xiii. p. 465. & l. i. c. viii. pp. 443, 444. & l. ii. c. ix. p. 462.

the

C H A P. the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, all was

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regular, easy, and harmonious; and to reject with disdain those childish fictions, by which the moving principles of the universe were degraded by a supposed analogy with the laborious exertions of mortals in sublunary and perishing scenes^c. But he did not think the astronomical theory of the Pythagoreans sufficiently justified by observation: telescopes were not to be invented till a far later period; and to those who held Aristotle's doctrine concerning space and time, the argument in favour of the earth's motion, resulting from the otherwise inconceivable velocity of the heavens, is but ill calculated to afford conviction, being, indeed, wholly destitute of philosophical precision. The earth, therefore, as the heaviest of bodies, he places at the centre; around which, the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars perpetually performed their respective revolutions^d; the only kind of motion or change to which these ethereal^e substances, unchangeable in their essence, were supposed to be liable; whereas the earth and all its productions, the metals and minerals in its bowels, the plants and animals on its surface, together with the vapours and meteors between that surface and the lunar sphere, were obnoxious to a great variety of complicated motions, which changed their characterising qualities or essence, and rendered the dis-

^c Ibid. p. 451. & c. vi. p. 458.

^d De Cælo, l. ii. passim.

^e Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 530.

solution

solution of one object the production of another. C H A P.
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 On the hypothesis, therefore, of the stability of the earth and the daily revolution of the heavens, Aristotle argues, that the material universe cannot be infinite; because, could a radius be infinitely extended from the earth's centre to the remotest body in the universe, that body could never perform a complete circular revolution^f; since an infinite extent of space could not be passed over in a definite time. Space therefore cannot be infinite, because space is only the receptacle of body, the place where body may subsist; and, if space is not infinite, neither is motion, which depends on space; nor time, which depends on motion. Unalterable and divine substances exist, therefore, in a manner totally unfathomable to our present faculties. In this manner, the first Supreme Deity exists necessarily^g; neither generated in space, nor growing old in time, unchangeable and impassive, enjoying the best and most perfect life through all eternity.^h

Aristotle makes amends for his airy speculations in astronomy, by well explaining, in opposition to Democritus, the true principles of corpuscular attraction, which gives to the earth its globular formⁱ. This, he observes, is farther ascertained by the phænomenon of lunar eclipses, in which

^f De Cælo, l. i. c. v. p. 437.

^g καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφημασι περὶ τὰ θεῶν πολλὰς προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμεταβλητὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ αἰῶν, καὶ ἀκροτάτου, p. 446.

^h De Cælo, c. ix. p. 446.

ⁱ Ibid. l. iv. c. vi. p. 492. & l. ii. c. xiv. p. 470.

the

C H A P. ^{II.} the bounding line is always perceived to be circular. The earth, therefore, he says, is plainly a sphere, and but a small^k one, compared with many others, its periphery not exceeding 30,000 miles^l. He speaks with such raptures, as the calmest of philosophers could feel, of the beauty and grandeur of the heavenly motions, whose celerities, how frightful soever to fancy, yet being harmonised by proportion, might be steadily contemplated by intellect^m. Had he known the discoveries of Galileo and Kepler, he might perhaps have been a Newton. But astronomy, being one of those sciences which requires long-continued observation for its basis, was left by Aristotle in the same imperfect state in which he found it; and yet, by the perverseness of stupidity, it was that part of his works which, in the ages of darkness, was most warmly admired, and most obstinately and most superstitiously defended.

His doctrine concerning the earth and its productions.

From the magnitudes and motions of the heavenly bodies, Aristotle descended to a humbler subject, the productions of the earth; which are connected, however, with man, by far more numerousⁿ and powerful relations, namely, those of his daily wants. This globe which we inhabit seems to have undergone various revolutions, to have been overwhelmed by inundations and shattered by convulsions, which swept away

^k Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 529.

^l Ibid. p. 471.

^m Ibid. p. 451 & 463.

ⁿ De Part. Animal. l. i. c. v. p. 974.

nations

nations with their cities and their arts; so that the most valuable inventions, innumerable times, have been lost, and times innumerable have been recovered. Of the productions with which our earth abounds, many give indications of these direful vicissitudes; and many appear to have emerged from the wreck of some dreadful catastrophe. Both as the historian and the interpreter of nature, our author endeavoured to embrace and exhaust the complete science of the globe; and, if we may judge of those parts of his works which are lost or imperfect, by those which have come down to us entire, it must have been no easy matter to determine whether most admiration was due to his descriptions of the great masses of nature, seas, rivers, mountains, and meteors^o, or to his minute diligence in treating the several objects of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. His books on plants and minerals no longer remain^p; but both his history of animals, and his philosophy respecting that history, have come down to us in a far more perfect state than any other portion of his writings concerning natural knowledge.

^o Meteor. l. i. c. i. See the great views which he there gives of his undertakings. See also the xivth chapter of the same book, where he explains the conversion of sea into land, and of land into sea, and the *alluvions* of rivers in a manner conformable, as far as he proceeds, with the admirable elucidation of that subject by the great philosophical geographer of our own times. Compare Rennell's Memoir, p. 255. & seq. and his Geography of Herodotus, p. 483, & seq.

^p The two short books on plants, p. 1007—1030. vol. ii. edit. du Val. are spurious. In the last chapter of the third book of his Meteorology, he says he is to proceed to give an account of all the different fossils and metals; but that account nowhere appears.

On

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His history
of animals
and other
works rela-
tive to that
subject.

On the subject of Zoology, his treatises are comprised in fifty books, of which twenty-five are happily preserved among his works. The history of animals occupies nine books; the following sixteen are employed in explaining their general affections or properties, and their principal parts or members. Four books treat of their parts; five, of generation; the remainder treats of their sensations and motions, inspiration and respiration, sleeping, waking, youth, old age, life, and death; in the knowledge of which particulars, the liberal study of Zoology, or, in Aristotle's language, its philosophy, appears to him principally to consist. As he extends that term to its full and proper sense, denoting by it the knowledge of whatever has animal life, the first four books of his history, beginning with what is most striking and palpable, the outward conformation of animals, divides and distinguishes, in relation to this complex object, and in comparison with the human form, as that which is most familiarly known, the inhabitants of the earth, the water, and the air, from the enormous whale and massy elephant to the scarcely perceptible productions of dust and rottenness⁴, enumerating and defining with incom-

⁴ Buffon (vol. iii. p. 223.) carries Aristotle's system of spontaneous generation much farther than the author intended, when he makes him say that "the first men sprung from the earth in the form of worms." Our author is constantly misrepresented by being made to speak absolutely, when he speaks merely hypothetically. His words are, *απὸ ἐγγύωντο ποτε γυνήεις*. De General. l. iii. c. ii. And we shall find hereafter, that the result of all Aristotle's inquiries into nature is a conclusion directly opposite to the following of M. Buffon, namely,

incomparable accuracy the agreements, differences, and analogies that prevail, in point of external organization, among all living tribes, and sometimes referring to his treatises on Comparative Anatomy, which are now unfortunately lost. In the three following books, he examines the different classes of animals with respect to the commencement, duration, and term of their generative powers. His eighth book examines their habitation and nourishment; and the concluding book of the history contains their manners and habits, enumerates their friends and enemies, and explains the ordinary means by which each class provides for its preservation and defence. In taking this wide survey of animated nature, Aristotle pretends not to comprehend its indefinitely varied branches (since infinities of every kind defy the grasp of science); but in the multitude of important and well-ascertained facts which he relates, and which is incomparably greater than will be found in any other work of equal compass, it is his main purpose to illustrate the general heads above-mentioned, and to explain the properties or affections common to the greatest or most distinguished portion of the whole animal kingdom. To these general heads or common properties, he constantly has respect in the historical

namely, " qu'il y a peut-être autant d'êtres, soit vivans, soit végétaux, qu'ils se reproduisent par l'assemblage fortuit de molécules organiques, qu'il y a d'animaux ou de végétaux qui peuvent se reproduire par une succession constante de générations." *Supplément à l'Hist. Nat. tom. viii. p. 18.*

C H A P. II. part of his work ; so that his minutest observations respecting the minutest insects and least-perfectly organized animals, will be often found to elucidate or confirm some important law of the animal œconomy.*

His philosophy of natural history.

His System, that is, in the popular sense of the word, his nomenclature, is indeed imperfect. The world created by the microscope had not any existence for the philosophers of antiquity ; and, by the improvements of his invention, new worlds perhaps may be brought to light in endless succession. But in the chain of being, mortal eyes, however assisted, can contemplate only the middle links, of which, though our glasses have shewn to us a greater number than were seen by Aristotle, yet have they not brought us nearer to what ought to be the result of beholding the extremity of the chain. This result, the history of nature in animals, the Stagyrice, by the intellectual eye of reason and analogy*, endeavoured to reach and reveal ; analysing, defining, demonstrating ; sometimes penetrating deeply into nature's mysteries ; sometimes en-

* Take the following example: The *σπιντα* is a species of the Mollia, (fishes so called because their soft parts are without, and their hard within,) which was long degraded by modern naturalists to a humble place among sea plants. Aristotle remarks, with regard to this species, "that when the female is attacked, the male boldly defends her; but when an attack is made on the male, the female consults her own safety by flight. Females, except in defence of their young, are less courageous than males, and less forward to give assistance." *Hist. Animal. l. ix. c. i. p. 922. & seq.*

* The expression of an anonymous writer, preserved in Suidas, is bold in the extreme: *Αριστοτελης γραμματεὺς ἦν τῆς φύσεως, τοῦ καλαμοῦ ἀποδριχῶν εἰς τὸν.* "Aristotle was Nature's secretary, having dipped his pen in intellect." Suid. in *Αριστοτελης*.

countering

countering difficulties which the human intellect is unable to surmount; often foiled in his exertions, yet always renewing the combat with re-animated hope. Knowledge, he thought, was more likely to be struck out from the collision of error than to emerge spontaneously from confusion¹; and while his theories are attacked and defended, exploded and revived, the facts which he collected with unexampled diligence, and which he relates with inimitable precision, will for ever support his fame, and instruct the most distant ages of posterity. Our wider survey of the globe has indeed increased our acquaintance with quadrupeds; and the invention of glasses has multiplied to our eyes the ever-diminishing tribes of insects, and enabled us to examine more accurately their germs and organs; yet it will not be easy to prove that modern writers have added any thing of importance to Aristotle's observations on birds, or that any of their works display even an equal degree of knowledge on the subject of fishes."

It

¹ Metaph. passim.

² In proof of this, I shall cite the testimony of an author, which derives great weight from the accuracy of his own observations, and the importance of his own discoveries. "Questi fatti finora rapportati in ordine allo sviluppo delle ouva nei pesci spinosi, sono quelli pochi che ho potuto osservare nelle rare occasioni che mi si son presentati delle loro covate gattate, & già sviluppantisi. E perciò la serie di tali fatti é di molto interrotta, ne' continuata come a giorni nostri é quella dello sviluppo del feto nelle ouva della gallina. E quando io riflettendo su di questa mancanza, scorro la Storia degli Animali di Aristotele, non posso non essere da stupore preso, in esso leggendo veduti quei fatti, che a noi non si son potuti che a stento manifestare; & rilevati poi con tutta la nettezza, & posti in parallelo coi fatti già riconosciuti nel feto di gallo: & tanto maggiormente in me cresce lo

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By what means he was enabled to render this philosophy so complete.

It may seem extraordinary that, on a branch of science, which, like all other parts of natural history, is naturally progressive, our author should have attained such accurate and extensive knowledge in so early an age of the world. But Aristotle was the friend of a man as extraordinary as himself, from whom he received two favours, which, to a mind like his, must have been of inestimable value. Alexander enabled him to rebuild and adorn his native city for the benefit of his contemporaries^{*}, and to improve

stupore, quanto che allora uso non vi era degli instrumenti microscopici, che a tempi nostri abbiamo grandemente perfezionati. E quindi non posso che di sdegno accendarmi contra dei moderni Ichthyologi, vedendo per lor balordaggine trascurato quanto la veneranda antichità avea scritto su questo particolare, & a quello sostituite false osservazioni, illazioni assurde ed incoerenti." "These are the few observations concerning the developement of the eggs of shell-fish, which I have been able to make on the few occasions on which I found the impregnated germs in the act of disclosure; observations, of which the series has been greatly interrupted, nor continued to the present times, like those which relate to eggs of birds. When I consider this defect, and turn to Aristotle's History of Animals, I am seized with astonishment at finding, that he should have fully and distinctly seen the facts which we have been able only very imperfectly to perceive; that he should have described them with the utmost precision, and compared them with the well-known observations concerning the eggs of birds. My astonishment is the greater, when I reflect that he was unassisted by microscopes, which instruments have in our days been greatly perfected: and I cannot therefore repress my indignation against those modern Ichthyologists, whose stupidity, neglecting the lights thrown on their subject by venerable antiquity, has substituted in their stead false observations, absurd and incongruous inferences." *Memorie Sulla Generazione dei Pesci*, di Philippo Cavolini. Compare p. 55. and p. 92. with Aristotle's History of Animals, b. vi. c. viii. and c. xiii.

To the petulant questions in Athenæus, l. viii. p. 352. "From whom did Aristotle learn the minute particularities which he tells of fishes? From Proteus or Nereus?" No, (we may answer with If. Casaubon,) but from fishermen. Vid. Casaubon Animadvers. in Athenæum, l. viii. p. 388.

^{*} Plin. l. vii. c. 29.

science

science for the benefit of posterity^γ. Upon his first entering Babylon, that inimitable Prince eagerly demanded, for the use of his preceptor, the astronomical tables preserved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries, and remounting 2234 years beyond the Christian æra^δ; and Pliny labours to describe with what ardour and zeal the same illustrious conqueror, during the course of his expedition, collected as presents to be sent to Aristotle, at the expence of 200,000l.^ε, and by the activity of several thousand men, whatever rarities were to be found in parks or ponds, in aviaries or hives, or were to be procured by hunting, fishing, and fowling, in the wide extent of Asia. Such were the resources of Aristotle for writing the history of animals, besides the assistance of a great library, which, according to Strabo, he arranged with an exactness of method before unknown^ς. By combining with the descriptions in his books, the observation of those living wonders transported from the East, Aristotle, who preferred a philosophical residence in Athens to the honour of personal attendance on the master of the world, composed, in the tranquillity of the Lyceum, his

^γ Plin. l. viii. c. 16.

^δ Porphyrius apud Simplicium in Aristot. de Cælo.

^ε Comp. Plin. ubi supra, & Athenæum, l. ix. p. 398. edit. Casaub. The sum of 800 talents which, according to Athenæus, was granted by Alexander to his preceptor, for the improvement of science, may be estimated at the fifth part of the annual expence of the army by which that matchless Prince conquered Asia.

^ς πρῶτος ὡς ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία, καὶ διδάξας τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλεως βιβλιοθηκῆς ἀνταξίῃ. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609.

C H A P. immortal work, which a Pliny professes to
 { II. } abridge^a, and a Buffon despairs to rival.^b

The soul
 or mind in
 its most ge-
 neral sense.

In the wide survey which our author takes of the heavens and of the earth, as well as in the minute diligence with which he examines the productions of the latter, whether inanimate or living, it is his perpetual aim to remount from effects to causes, and to lead us from perceptible qualities to those operative principles, by which they are produced. These principles, not being objects of sense, can be discovered only by patient inductions from observation and experience. In this manner Aristotle treats, in three books, a subject which naturally follows his history of animals, investigating those hidden principles on which their nutrition, sensation, and appetite, with all their perceptible powers and actions, depend. In this treatise, intitled "Concerning the Soul," his language is perpetually and necessarily metaphorical, because words, in their origin, being wholly confined to sensations and feelings, metaphors become indispensable in expressing the deductions of reason. Of material as well as intellectual substances our knowledge, he observes, results entirely from their perceptible qualities, that is, from what our universal experience teaches us to regard merely as the effects of hidden causes, scarcely conceivable to ourselves, and of which our notions are totally incommunicable to other men but by images and comparisons drawn from sensible

^a Plin. ubi supra.

^b Histoire Naturelle, t. i. p. 63. & seq.

objects.

objects. When Aristotle speaks philosophically of fire, he calls it "the power of communicating heat." In the same manner, the hidden causes necessary for explaining the properties and actions of animals, he calls "the nutritive, sentient, motive, and rational," that is, the collecting "power;" and as, from the phenomena of body, he inferred the existence of a substance called Matter; so, from the phenomena of sensation, reason, and intelligence, he inferred the existence of a substance called Mind; of which latter substance our knowledge is equally certain with that of the former^c. But as some of the most noted philosophers before him had attempted to explain every thing by matter and its properties^d, Aristotle, on the other hand, thinks that by mind chiefly all natural productions are characterised and distinguished; meaning, by mind, that inward principle and invisible form whose effects are displayed in the external organization of things, as well as in their perceptible properties and actions. In this sense, therefore, the terms "form" and "mind" are applied to whatever characterises and distinguishes, whether that be merely a specific and principal quality; or whether it be a substance inseparable from matter, because separately unfit for any end or use^e; or whether it be a substance capable of actions and pleasures peculiar to

C H A P.
II.

^c δηλον δε και οτι η μεν ψυχη εστιν η σωτην, το δε σωμα υλη· ο δε ανθρωπος η το ζων, το εξ αμφοιν. *Metaph.* l. vii. c. xi. p. 919. and l. i. *De Anima*, c. v. p. 625.

^d *Metaph.* l. viii. c. ii. p. 927.

^e *Ibid.* l. viii. c. iii. p. 929.

C H A P. itself, and so totally different from those of body,
II. and any of its variable affections, that when separated from this mortal frame, it will then, and then only, assume its natural activity, perfection, and dignity.^f

The book
intituled
"Concern-
ing Ener-
gy," con-
nects his
natural phi-
losophy
with his
theology.

This discussion concerning mind naturally brings Aristotle to what is published as the ninth book of his *Metaphysics*, but which, as above-mentioned, ought to stand as the seventh. It is intituled "Concerning Energy," a word of mighty import in our author's philosophy, since his doctrine on that subject is a link in the grand chain, by which he connects the earth with the heavens, and nature with the Deity. The state of energy, as opposed to that of capacity, was formerly explained; but it may be a matter of some curiosity more minutely to examine distinctions, independently of which this great philosopher thought it impossible to mount up from things visible and perishing to things invisible and eternal. Energy, then, as the word denotes, is always said in reference to action; and that is said to exist in energy, which executes its peculiar work, or performs its peculiar function^g. The state of energy is the most perfect state of existence in which any object can be exhibited; as a master thinks he has perfected his scholar when he shews him performing skilfully the proper work of the art in which he

The nature
of energy
explained.

^f *De Anima*, l. i. c. lii. p. 623. and c. v. p. 625. *Metaph.* l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. and *De Generat. Animal.* l. ii. c. iii. p. 1077.

^g *Metaph.* l. ix. c. viii. p. 339. *Comp. Metaph.* l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

was instructed^h. Though energy always implies action, yet all actions are not energies. The actions of building, carving, healing, learning, respectively terminate in a house, a statue, health, and science. But the actions of thought, of life, and of happiness, (which is a kind of life,) have not any natural limit, but may proceed eternally revolving on themselves, perfect without addition, complete in every instantⁱ. That things essentially different may be distinguished by different names, Aristotle calls limited actions, *motions*; the unlimited, *energies*; observing, that in the scale of being there is a continual ascent from mere powers and capacities to motions or imperfect energies, and from these last to energies properly so called, because terminating in nothing more excellent than themselves^k. Those operations, which terminate in a certain work, are only perfect in the work or production in which they are fixed and concentrated; as painting in the picture, building in the edifice^l. But energies not terminating in any work or production, are complete and perfect in themselves. The former belong in a certain sense to the work in which they are embodied^m; the latter can belong only to the energising principle, which, when unceasingly active, as the first efficient cause was proved

^h Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 339. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

ⁱ Ibid. p. 937.

^k Comp. Metaph. l. xiii. c. ix. p. 990. & p. 991. and Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938.

^l Idem Ibid.

^m Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

necessarily

C H A P. necessarily to be, is simple, unmixed, and pure
 II. energy.^a

The first
 energy
 eternally
 and sub-
 stantially
 active.

On such a principle as this, eternally and substantially active, both the heavens and the earth depend°. He is the spring of motion, the fountain of life, the source of order and of beauty^p. All our observations and all our reasonings lead us irresistibly to this conclusion; for in all the motions or changes of body or matter, there must always be one part acted upon, as well as another that acts, otherwise no action, and therefore no motion, could possibly take place. But when we separate this acting part from the inert mass with which it is united, the same reasoning will still apply to it; it cannot be self-moved wholly^q, and the part which gives the impulse must always be different from that which receives it^r. By our divisions and subdivisions without end, we shall therefore never come nearer to a solution than at first setting out, but shall always be compelled to consider matter as something fit to be moved, changed, or acted upon, and constantly deriving its motion, change, or activity from some foreign cause^s. The prime mover, then, is necessarily^t immaterial; and therefore indivisible, - immove-

His attri-
 butes.

^a ὁ γὰρ νῦν ενεργῶν. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999.

^o ἐκ ταύτης ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς κίνηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000. and Physic. Aufcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

^p τὸ πρῶτον πάντων κινεῖ πάντα. Metaph. l. xiv. c. iv. p. 998.

^q Comp. c. vi. p. 999. and l. xii. c. iii. p. 975. and l. ix. c. viii. p. 930.

^r Physic. Aufcult. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

^s Ibid. l. viii. c. vi. p. 417.

^t Ibid.

^u Ibid. p. 416. & seq.

able,

able, impassive, and invariable^c; ever actuating this visible system, as is plain from the phenomena, according to the best principles both of intellection and volition, which exactly coincide^d, when traced up to Deity, their ultimate source. The phenomena of the universe are not unconnected and episodical, like an ill-written tragedy; but all of them regulated and adjusted with consummate harmony^e. The Divinity, who comprehends and directs the whole, is not himself divisible in parts, nor comprehensible by magnitude, since all magnitude may be measured^f; and what finite magnitude can exert infinite power^g? He ever is what he is^h, existing in energy before time began, since time is only an affection of motion, of which God is the authorⁱ. That kind of life which the best and happiest of men lead occasionally, in the unobstructed exercise of their highest powers, belongs eternally to God in a degree that should excite admiration in proportion as it surpasses comprehension.^b

^c Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000 and 1001.

^d τῶν (in reference to the ορεκτον and νοητον) τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτὰ. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. ix. and l. xiv. c. vii.

^e ἐκ τοιαύτης ἢ φύσεως ἐπισποδωδῆς . . ὥσπερ μοχθήει τραγωδία. Metaph. l. xii. c. iii. p. 975.

^f Metaph. l. xiii. c. x. p. 991.

^g Ibid. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

^h δε ἀεὶ καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἢ ἡ ὅσια ἐνεργεῖα. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999. Comp. De Cælo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 466.

ⁱ Metaph. l. xii. c. viii. p. 992. and το κίνησιν αἰδίου, καὶ πρῶτον τῆς κινήσεως, καὶ το πρῶτον ὅσας, ὅσαι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1002.

^b εἰ δὲ πολλοὶ, ἐστὶ θαυμασιώτερον, l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001. φανερὸν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶντα αἰδίου ἀρίστον· ὥστε ζῶν καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδίου ὑπαρχεῖν τῷ Θεῷ· τὸτο γὰρ ὁ Θεός. Metaph. xiv. 7. p. 1001.

This

C H A P. This doctrine was delivered down from the
 II. ancients, and remains with their posterity, in the
 That Deity form of a fable; which, with many additions to
 the source of Being it, has been employed for the service of legisla-
 handed tion, and for bridling the passions of the multi-
 down from tude^d. The Gods have thence been represented
 antiquity. as endowed with human forms, and agitated by
 human passions; from which strange supposi-
 tions, many consequences, not less strange, have
 very naturally been derived. Yet, from the
 motley mass of fiction, if we separate this single
 proposition, that Deity is the first of substances,
 it will appear to be divinely said; and to have
 been saved, as a precious remnant, in the
 wreck of arts and philosophy, which, it is
 probable, have often flourished, and often fallen
 to decay.^e

Aristotle
 refutes the
 materialists
 and meta-
 physicians.

Such is Aristotle's doctrine in his books in-
 titled "Concerning Philosophy;" the far greater
 part of which is employed in refuting two classes
 of writers, who may very properly be called the
 Materialists and the Metaphysicians. The for-
 mer, contenting themselves with the properties
 and laws of matter and motion, beyond which
 they thought it impossible to penetrate, mistook
 effects for causes, and confounded the Maker^f
 with his works: The latter, who were the more
 modern, and also the more fashionable of the
 two, perverted logical analysis by applying it to

^d Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003.

^e Idem Ibid.

^f ΤΟ ΚΛΕΙΝ ΤΩΝΕΙ, l. xiv. c. x. p. 1006. This must sound harsh to
 those who do not understand Aristotle's notion of the eternity of the
 world, in the sense in which it is above explained.

physical

physical subjects^g; and substituting words for things, sought for first causes in numbers, ideas, contraries, and other metaphysical abstractions; or, in Aristotle's language, general terms; which, the more general they become, diverge the wider^h in their nature from energies, the only substantial and efficient principles in the universe;ⁱ and all proceeding from the first energy or substance, who is both specifically and numerically one^k. This doctrine perfectly agrees with that beautiful harmony discernible in the works of the First Mover; which are all of them connected by the most intimate relations^l; and whose arrangements uniformly conspire to one great and salutary end^m: For the perfection, excellence, and beauty, discernible in the universe, are to be ascribed to its Maker, not less than the regular arrangement of a well disciplined army is ascribed to its generalⁿ. This doctrine only is consistent:

CHAP.
II.

Goodness
of God.

^g Compare Metaph. l. xii. c. iv. p. 977. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 981. & seq. and l. xiv. c. i. p. 995.

^h Compare Metaph. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 982. and l. xiv. c. v. p. 998.

ⁱ Comp. l. xiii. c. vii. p. 988. and l. xiv. c. ii. iii. p. 996.

^k *ἐν μὲν ἀρα καὶ λογῶ καὶ ἀριθμῶ τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον οὐ.* l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. Things are one specifically or λογῶ, when they are collected into one count, and expressed by one word or κατηγορημα, the definition of which applies equally to them all. Material things may be one specifically, though many numerically: but this cannot hold as to energies; so that if there were as many different heavens as there are different men, the first necessary being would still be numerically, as well as specifically, one. Compare Phys. Aufcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418. & seq.

^l *ὅχ ἕως ἔχει, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατερον θατερον,* l. xiv. c. x. p. 1005. & Phys. Aufcult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

^m *προς μὲν γὰρ ὁ, ἀπαντα συντεταχται.* Ibid.

ⁿ Comp. l. xii. c. iv. p. 976. & l. xiv. c. x. p. 1004. Pliny, l. ii. c. i. & l. xxvii. c. ii. strangely mistakes his great master in natural history. The same errors he commits elsewhere in speaking of God, Nature, the world, &c.

“ One

C H A P. " One rules alone, one, only one, bears sway;
 II. " *His* are the laws, and Him let all obey^o."

The same doctrine inculcated in his exoteric or popular works.

Such is the solid and sublime theology which Aristotle tells us that he had often inculcated, not merely in his acroatic works, which were lectures confined solely to his pupils, but also in his exoteric or popular writings, intended for the instruction of the public^p. If this assertion cannot be disproved, his character will be rescued from the charge of dishonesty, in teaching a double doctrine, one to his pupils, and another to the world. Cicero^q indeed says, that the Greek philosophers (meaning our author in particular) did not " seem always to hold the same language in their popular and in their more accurate works;" which variation was, surely, to be expected; since, in the former, they often reasoned, as Aristotle himself tells us, loosely or according to vulgar conception, and in the latter strictly or philosophically. But, as to the fundamental points of his most important doctrines, Aristotle frequently refers from those of his books, " which were distinguished by pregnant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of transitions^r," to his more expanded,

^o Iliad, l. i. v. 204. quoted Metaph. l. xiv. c. ult. p. 1006. Cicero greatly misrepresents his original; " Inde deinde illi tot Dii si numeramus etiam Cælum, Deum," &c. De Natur. Deor. l. i. c. xii.

^p καθάπερ εν τοις εγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφίαις περι τα θεα πολλὰκις προφαίνεται τοις λόγοις, ότι το θεοι αμεταβλητοι παν το πρώτοι και ακροτατον. De Cælo, l. i. c. ix. p. 446.

^q De Fin. l. v. c. v.

^r Simplicius (ad Categor. in Proæm.) thus characterises the acroatic, in contradistinction to the exoteric works: " ή βραχυλογία, ή των εννοιων πυκνότης, και το της φραστις συνιστραμμενον." To the last clause I have given a sense more conformable to truth than that which the words naturally present.

more

more perspicuous, and more popular productions *. Much circumspection indeed became a philosopher, detesting superstition and detesting democracy, yet living and teaching in the bosom of Athens; a city shamefully deformed by whatever is most abject in the one, and most wild and outrageous in other. But there is not a shadow of proof that, in any part of his writings, he encouraged or approved either of those gross popular delusions; though it is highly probable that he arraigned their folly and absurdity with more freedom in the Lyceum, than his prudence would have allowed him to express in the Pantheon or the Forum.

C H A P.

II

An objection very commonly made to Aristotle's philosophy is, that he is regardless of experience, and too fond of hypothesis. In the whole extent in which this reproach is usually urged by his detractors, it betrays ignorance in the extreme; since the principles of every one of his treatises are drawn solely from experience; and, in almost every step that he takes, to experience he continually recurs for trying and confirming his conclusions. That he was not sparing of experiments, in the modern sense of the word, upon those subjects on which he thought that a philosopher might consistently make use of them, is evident from his mechanical questions, his problems, his discourses on the general properties or affections of animated nature, and above all, from his doctrine of sensation, memory, re-

The objection made to Aristotle's philosophy, as not built on experiment.

* Simplicius Comment. in Aristot. de Cælo, fol. 67. Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. iii. & c. xiii. l. vi. c. iv. Ethic. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. l. ii. c. i. De Republ. l. iii. c. vi. & l. vii. c. i.

collection

C H A P.

H.

collection and other powers of the soul or mind; which is entirely experimental. But Aristotle was contented with catching Nature in the fact, without attempting, after the modern fashion, to put her to the torture; and in rejecting experiments operose, toilsome, or painful, either to their objects or their authors, he was justified by the habits of thinking, almost universally prevalent in his age and country. Educated in free and martial republics, careless of wealth, because uncorrupted by luxury, the whole tribe of ancient philosophers dedicated themselves to agreeable only and liberal pursuits, with too proud a disdain of arts merely useful or lucrative. They ranked with the first class of citizens; and, as such, were not to be lightly subjected to unwholesome or disgusting employments. To bend over a furnace, inhaling noxious steams; to torture animals, or to mangle dead bodies, appeared to them operations not more misbecoming their humanity, than unsuitable to their dignity. For such discoveries as the heating and mixing of the various forms of matter, offers to inquisitive curiosity, the naturalists of Greece trusted to slaves and mercenary mechanics, whose poverty or avarice tempted them to work in metals and minerals; and to produce, by unwearied labour, those coloured and sculptured ornaments, those gems, rings, cups, and vases, and other admired but frivolous elegancies, of which (in the opinion of good judges¹

¹ I remember a strong expression of the late Mr. Wedgewood, in viewing with him the Portland Vase, that the making of it "implied a science of chemistry, of which we have not yet the elements."

of


of art) our boasted chemistry cannot produce the materials; nor, were the materials at hand, supply us with tools calculated to fashion them. The work-shops of tradesmen then revealed those mysteries which are now sought for in colleges and laboratories; and useful knowledge, perhaps, was not the less likely to be advanced, while the arts were confined to artists only; nor facts the more likely to be perverted, in order to support favourite theories, before the empiric had yet assumed the name, and usurped the functions, of the philosopher.

To the Stagirite, it appeared to be the proper business of philosophy, not to multiply or collect facts, but to arrange and to explain them. This can only be done through the medium of a well-defined and highly cultivated language; and the language of Aristotle will be found the most copious and complete, and at the same time the most precise and elegant, ever employed by any philosopher; serving at once as the readiest channel of communication, and the fittest instrument for discovery. In his physical, as well as in his moral works, facts known and ascertained are reduced to their simplest expressions, and those doubtfully inferred, or barely suspected, are, according to the true spirit of analysis, denoted by words merely expressive of relations to things previously known. It is true that, in ages of ignorance, when Aristotle's supposed tenets were read in barbarous and disgusting translations, the terms employed by him, as signs for things sought or investigated, and which, unless marked by signs, could never possibly

C H A P.
II.

His philosophical language

mistaken and perverted.

C H A P. **H.**  sibly be discovered, were as grossly mistaken, as they have been since shamefully misrepresented. In the scholastic philosophy, that useless mass of insipid dulness, which insolently arrogated to itself the name of Aristotelism, the schoolmen rested in the names of occult qualities for explaining the phenomena both of mind and matter; and neglecting the repeated warnings of him whom they called their great master, and who well knew how liable the best things are to abuse, they perverted the study of nature into metaphysical subtlety and vain logomachy. But the same stupid ignorance which made them incapable of appreciating the Stagirite as a philosopher, rendered them prone to worship him as a god. This imaginary divinity and his adorers were assailed by the giants of the sixteenth century; who, in their rage to punish such gross intellectual idolatry, confounded the master with his disciples, arraigned Aristotle for opinions which he had never held, degraded him from honours which he had never usurped; and, adopting his favourite method of analysis, endeavoured ungratefully and insidiously to destroy his well-earned fame with the instrument which he himself had formed and sharpened. But whatever unmerited disgrace may, in this manner, have accrued to some speculative doctrines, which I have here attempted briefly to explain, his practical philosophy, which may be read in the following translation, will still vindicate his fair claim to be regarded as one of the best instructors of mankind, on the more important subjects of Ethics and Politics.

SUPPLEMENT to the Analysis of Aristotle's Speculative Works ; containing an Account of the Interpreters and Corrupters of his Philosophy, in Connection with the History of the Times in which they respectively flourished.

THE quibbling logic which often disfigures Aristotle's acute reasonings is not justly chargeable on that philosopher, but on those captious or fanciful writers, whom, in many parts of his works, he was obliged to combat. This was a matter, not of choice, but necessity ; since several of those writers, in treating subjects of the utmost importance, had discovered such reach of thought, and such power of expression, as had widely diffused their renown wherever the Greek language was understood, and speculative science cultivated. The topics, above all others, on which Aristotle, to a modern reader, will appear most verbose and most trifling, are the doctrines of *Pythagorean numbers* and *Platonic ideas*. I ventured therefore to say in my Analysis, p. 115. that he had examined those doctrines with a degree of attention, of which they would appear altogether unworthy to the taste and reason of the present age ; and from respect merely, for the good sense of the public, I abstained from entering into any copious discussion of this useless and now despised subject.

Why Aristotle's works abound in quibbling logic.

This proceeding of mine has excited great wrath in the author of a book, intituled "A Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*^a." The translator, Mr. Thomas Taylor, following Aristotle's commentators, maintains that the Stagirite's "first principles of the universe are no other than those incorporeal causes called by Plato *ideas*^b." The same writer accuses me of "ignorance and falsehood" for saying that Aristotle has treated of *Pythagorean numbers* and *Platonic ideas*, in the VIIth and XIth books of his *Metaphysics*, whereas those matters, he says, are discussed only in the Ist, XIIIth, and XIVth books of that work.^c

His sublimest mysteries may be explained in English.

Reasons extremely different^d from Mr. Taylor's animadversions have determined me briefly to re-examine this matter. To this short discussion I shall give the utmost perspicuity, for I cannot agree with the man who has stepped forth as my literary antagonist, in condemning "the present fashionable mode of writing, in which every author endeavours to adapt every subject to the apprehension of the meanest capacity^e." In conformity with the aim of such "arrogant^f"

^a "The *Metaphysics* of Aristotle translated from the Greek; with copious notes, in which the *Pythagorean* and *Platonic dogmas* respecting numbers and ideas are unfolded from ancient sources." London, 1801.

^b Taylor's *Metaphysics*, p. 6.

^c Taylor, p. 21. Introduction.

^d The late Mr. Harris, Lord Monboddo, and all other writers on the Aristotelian philosophy, have explained it by the erroneous comments of the Alexandrian School. See my *Analysis*, pp. 67. & 96.

^e Taylor, p. 4. Introduction.

^f Taylor, p. 47. Introduction.

writers,

writers, I shall attempt to show that those matters which Mr. Taylor, after Aristotle's commentators, calls the sublimest mysteries of Grecian philosophy, may be easily explained by equivalent terms in very intelligible English.

According to Aristotle, then, definitions are the pure fountains of science, only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient comparison of individual objects; because in that case only, our words being correct signs of things, the conclusions deducible from reasonings on the signs will exactly apply to the things signified by them. Individuals have a real existence in nature; but general names, expressing many individuals of the same kind, have not any correspondent archetypes; they imply merely that a variety of objects, numerically different (each being a different unit or individual), have on account of certain resemblances been assigned to the same class, and denoted by one common term. Those supposed entities, therefore, called by the Pythagoreans *numbers* and by the Platonists *ideas*, and considered by them as eternal and immutable essences, the true causes of the universe, have not any real substantial existence in nature, but are merely fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting action of human thought, expressed and embodied in language. In many parts of his writings, and particularly in the VIIth and XIth books of his *Metaphysics*, though Mr. Taylor severely reprehends my "ignorance and falsehood" for saying that those subjects are there touched on, Aristotle affails

and demolishes those cloud-built castles of mystic philosophy, childishly admired in Greece in his own age, and which, rising under new forms in succeeding times, have continued to the present day to be the shadowy fortresses in which the nonsense called Metaphysick has lain intrenched. To illustrate these remarks, I shall translate the 14th chapter of the VIIth book, in preference to other chapters, merely because it is the shortest; and short as it is, I shall not be surprised if many of my readers should find it still too long.

His refutation of the doctrine of Platonic ideas.

The Stagirite, having in the preceding chapter spoken of Pythagoras's *numbers*, proceeds thus to treat of Plato's *ideas*. "With the same absurdities are those chargeable who regard *ideas* as substances, and separable substances; considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the same common term: for example, the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, as constituting and composing the *idea man*. Suppose *ideas* to be substances, and the *idea animal*, for instance, existing in *man* and *horse*; this *idea* in those two kinds must either be numerically one and the same thing, or two different things: in definition it is plainly one and the same, for we mean the same thing by the word *animal* when we say "that men are animals" and "that horses are animals." If the *idea man* existed as a separate being or entity, it would follow of course that the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, composing the *idea man*, should also exist as separate beings; so that the *idea animal,*

animal, if it were precisely one and the same thing in *man* and *horse* in the sense in which you are identically the same with yourself, would subsist the same individual entity in *man* and *horse*; and thus the same individual entity would subsist separately from itself! Farther; if one and the same *idea, animal*, subsists both in *man* and *horse*, in *man* a *biped*, and in *horse* a *quadruped*, must not the same individual be at once a biped and a quadruped, and thus the same subject be at once endowed with two mutually exclusive attributes? As this cannot happen by actual participation of those attributes, so neither can it possibly be brought about by juxtaposition, mixture, or in any other way. The *idea, animal*, must therefore be numerically different in *man* and *horse*; and there must be many separate entities having the *idea, animal*, for their essential constituent, since this *idea* enters not adventitiously, but essentially, into their respective definitions. The *idea, animal*, therefore is many, constituting *man*, *horse*, and other species or tribes; whose different names cannot be reciprocally predicated of each other, because in that case all those different *ideas* would be one and the same *idea*; which is totally absurd. It is impossible therefore that the *idea, animal*, can have any substantial or separable existence, or be any thing beside what is found in all the different tribes of animals. The absurdity of realising general terms will appear still more monstrous, if from species or tribes, we descend to the individual objects of our senses, and say that this

man or this horse is constituted and composed of *ideas*. There cannot therefore be any such *ideas* or *entities* as those spoken of by some philosophers."

Mr. Taylor's interpretation of the same passage.

The reader will perhaps think that I might have saved both his time and my own, if, instead of interpreting the above chapter, I had referred him to Mr. Taylor's translation. By a reference of this kind it may be said, the harsh charges repeatedly urged against me, might most victoriously have been repelled; since my accuser would thus have been convicted by his own words. But Mr. T. knows better; like a proficient in the arts of controversy, he has had the address to couch his translation in such terms, that it is impossible for a man of plain understanding to say precisely what any part of it contains. By way of illustrating this remark, I shall subjoin the chapter in question as interpreted by Mr. Taylor.⁵

"From these very things, that which happens to those who assert that ideas are separate essences, and who at the same time make form to consist from genus and differences, is manifest. For if forms and animal are in man and horse, there is either one and the same, or a different animal in number. For by definition it is manifest that there is one and the same; since he who says that it is in each will assign the same reason. If therefore, there is some man, itself subsisting by itself, this particular individual, and separate,

⁵ Taylor, p. 183.

it is necessary also, that those things from which it consists, as, for instance, animal and biped, should signify this particular individual, and should be separate, and essences: so that this will likewise be the case with animal. - If, therefore, animal is the same in man and in horse, as you in yourself, how will it be one in things which are separate, and why will not this animal also subsist separate from itself? In the next place, if it participates of biped and multiplied, it will be impossible that any thing should happen. For contraries will be at the same time inherent in the same thing, subsisting as one, and as this definite particular. But if it does not participate, what is the mode, when any one says an animal is biped, or capable of walking? but perhaps they form a composite, and touch, or are mingled. All those modes, however, are absurd. Shall we say that that which is different in number is in each? There will, therefore, be infinite particulars, as I may say, of which the essence is animal: for man is not from animal according to accident. Further still; animal itself will be many things. For animal which is in every individual is essence; since it is not predicated according to any thing else. But if this be not the case, man will subsist from that, and that will be the genus of man. And again, all things from which man consists will be ideas. Idea, therefore, will not be of one thing and essence of another: for this is impossible. Hence each of those things contained in animals will be animal itself. Besides, this will subsist from
a certain

a certain particular; and how will animal subsist from it? Or how is it possible that there should be animal, which is itself essence, besides animal itself? Further still: these things will happen in sensibles, and things still more absurd than these. But if it is impossible that this can be the case, it is evident that there is not idea of them, in such manner as some assert there is^h.”

Observation thereon.

Into this unintelligible gibberish has Mr. Taylor travestied an author, whose thoughts will always command respect, when faithfully rendered. But I call that only a faithful translation, which gives the sense of the original precisely and clearly; merits unattainable by him who, following merely the order of construction, interprets the philosophical language of antiquity, of which each expression is good and pure Greek, by the significations usually assigned in Dictionaries, to the different words of which the several phrases are composed; which will for the most part make absolute nonsense, in Latin, English, or any other language. Having endeavoured to learn from a far higher authority than Aristotle's, to forgive injuries, I feel not the smallest ill-will to Mr. Taylor, and sincerely lament that his labours on so respectable a subject have not been better directed. He assures the public “that what he says of Dr. Gillies is not dictated either by malevolence or envy;” adding obligingly: “May his reputation in what he has deserved well of the public be last-

^h Taylor's Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, B. vii. c. 14.

ing,

ing, and his laurels among his countrymen ever bloom! But it was surely some evil genius in an evil hour, that tempted him to abandon history for philosophy, and Herodotus for Aristotle. Touch not Hector, Hector is my due. Touch not the obscurity of Aristotle, it is not to be vanquished by you¹."

Notwithstanding this modified compliment, my reputation, if I had any, must have been deservedly blasted for ever, if one half of what Mr. T. says of me had been well founded. In refutation of his reproach of "ignorance and falsehood," I have shewn that the subject of Platonic ideas is really treated in the VIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. It is also treated in the XIth book, as will appear from citing the short titles prefixed by the Latin translators. *Demonstrat non esse ideas*, lib. xi. cap. 4.; *agit de ideis numerorum*, c. 6.; *tollendas esse ideas*, c. 12.

Answer to Mr. Taylor's animadversions on my Analysis of Aristotle's philosophy.

Before turning from the subjects of Mr. T. and myself to matters more generally interesting, I must entreat my readers to accompany me a little further in the tiresome journey to which this severe critic has condemned me. In my *Analysis*, p. 115. I say "that the VIIth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which now stands as the IXth, treats of energy, a word of mighty import in the Aristotelian philosophy; from which subject, the author naturally passes to the XIIIth, XIVth, and XIIth books, which treat

¹ Taylor's, p. 43. Introduction.

of

of a Being totally distinct from matter ; necessary, eternal, infinite, one substantially and numerically, the primary cause of motion, himself immoveable." Mr. T. says, " This also is perfectly false^k," for the XIIth book only treats of this Being, the XIIIth and XIVth books being intirely employed in the discussion of numbers and ideas. Yet the reader has only to turn to Du Val's Aristotle, and he will find in his XIIth book, or XIVth of Mr. Taylor and Aldus, *Bonum & pulchrum primo principio convenire*, l. xiv. c. 4. ; a theological doctrine the most important of all, and independently of which all the rest are of no value ! *Veterum alios negasse primum principium ob imperitiam, alios ob pertinaciam*, l. xiii. c. vi. *Esse aliquam scientiam physica priorem de substantia separata & immobili*, l. xiii. c. 7. It is unnecessary, I believe, to proceed farther in citation ; but I think it right to observe that this deep student in Aristotle seems not aware that the book published as the XIIth, by Aldus and Bessareon, stands as the XIVth in Du Val's noble edition, Paris 1619 and 1629 ; and that even this XIIth or XIVth book is not confined to theology alone, as may be seen by perusing the titles to the third and fourth chapters. Mr. Taylor has accused my proposed arrangement of the " *Metaphysics*," of absurdity, because I would place the fourth book before that printed as the third : " which third book," he says, " consists wholly of doubts which are solved in

^k Taylor, p. 21. Introduction.

the fourth and succeeding books¹." But what do the titles to the chapters of this third book say? *Quæstionem aliam solvit*, c. iii.; *dubitationes multas suprà præpositas solvit*, c. iv.; *aliam dubitationem solvit*, c. v.

With profound veneration for his masters Plotinus and Proclus, to whom we shall see presently what credit is due, Mr. T. is highly provoked at my opinion "that the real subject of what is called Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is the vindication of the existence and nature of truth against the cavils of sophists and those now called *Metaphysicians*; and this doctrine concerning truth illustrated in demonstrating the being of one God, in opposition to Atheists on one hand, and Polytheists on the other^m." Mr. T. replies, "that if by Polytheists Dr. G. intends to signify men who believed in the existence of divine natures the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united, Aristotle is so far from opposing this doctrine in his *Metaphysics*, that in the eighth chapter of his XIIth book he demonstrates their existenceⁿ." In the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, which is the eighth of the XIVth book in Du Val's edition, Aristotle in deference to the opinion delivered down by the ancients, and which prevailed in most ages of paganism, speaks of different gods presiding over the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the sentence immediately preceding this passage,

¹ Taylor, p. 21. Introduction.

^m *Analysis*, p. 98.

ⁿ Taylor, p. 48. Introduction.

and

and which Mr. T. entirely omits in his refutation^o of my opinion, maintains “the unity of the first cause, the eternal spring of motion, himself immoveable. This principle on which heaven and earth depend is one in number, as well as essence^p.”

The existence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause “with which they are profoundly united,” is not asserted by the Stagirite in the chapter alluded to by Mr. T., or in any other part of his invaluable writings. Such mysterious language, indeed, occurs frequently in the works of Plotinus and other eclectics, or new Platonists, as they are called, the pretended reconcilers of Plato and Aristotle; visionaries whose wild dreams seduced the old age and dotage of reason under the declining empire of Rome, and imposed on its childhood and imbecility at the first revival of letters in modern Europe. Of such philosophers Mr. T., as will appear presently, is not an unworthy pupil.

To Aristotle’s practical treatises on the affairs of social and civil life, I prefixed an account of his speculative works, in order to do justice to his incomparable merit, and particularly to show that he had kept clear of the delusions in which philosophers both before and after him, not excepting his own interpreters, had universally been bewildered. In that part of my under-

^o Taylor, p. 48.

^p Metaph. l. xiv. c. 8. p. 1003. Conf. Physic. Aufcult. l. viii. c. 7. p. 418. & Metaph. l. xiv. c. 7. p. 1000.

taking,

taking, I constantly refer the reader to the precise text, copying, where they are few, the words of the original. This method, for instance, is pursued in the question concerning the first cause, that most momentous of subjects, on which no philosopher ever argued with more cogency and brilliancy than the Stagirite in the passages which I have translated in the 154th and following pages of my Analysis. But as truth, and truth only, was my aim, I observed^a that in explaining the causes of the heavenly motions, he is misled by the faulty system of astronomy that prevailed in his own age, and through all following ages of antiquity. In this system however, he acknowledges himself to be a very moderate proficient, "leaving to those more skilled in it, to determine the number of the heavenly motions and that of their immoveable causes".^b But with regard to the first cause of all, his reasonings rest on firm principles of demonstration; and not to perceive this difference, is to remain blind to the main drift of his metaphysics, or what he calls theology. If Mr. T. had sufficiently examined this venerable ruin, he would not have treated me as a *Northern Goth*^c for endeavouring to give to it an arrangement more natural and easy than that in which it has hitherto appeared, merely because a sentence in the Xth book, which, according to my view of the subject, ought to precede, is borrowed, as he pretends, from the VIIth book, which, in my

^a Analysis, p. 139, & seq.^b Metaph. xiy. 8. p. 1003.^c Taylor, pp. 20. and 50. Introduction.

opinion,

opinion, ought to follow. He would have known that, in whatever order the "Metaphysics" are disposed, many such objections will occur; he ought farther to have known, that the several books now composing that work, no, nor even the several treatises now forming the far more complete performance printed under the name of the *Organum*, were ever given by Aristotle as correlative parts of one connected disquisition.

Transition
from Mr.
Taylor to
his masters.

Having now endeavoured to answer every one of Mr. Taylor's accusations (for as to the pomposity and other imperfections of my style¹, the reader's taste must decide) with as much brevity as the abstruseness of the subject would permit, I proceed with pleasure to the main subject of this discourse, the literary enemies of Aristotle himself; those fanciful explainers and commentators, who, by misrepresenting his sense, have thereby disgraced his philosophy. Under this important head I intend not to discuss the trite subject of the schoolmen, those *profound*, *irrefragable*, and *angelic* doctors, whose dark reign extended from the eleventh to the sixteenth century, and whose works have ceased to be known, since their real merits came to be duly appreciated. It is still less my purpose to din my reader's ears with the Arabian names *Alfarabius*, *Avicenna*, and *Averroes*, able precursors of the western schoolmen; since it will be more agreeable as well as more instructive to proceed

¹ Taylor, p. 44. Introduction.

at once to the fountain head, the Greek interpreters themselves, from whom, as will appear in the progress of this discourse, all subsequent misrepresentations flowed.

A strange diversity of fortune befel the founders of the *Lyceum* and *Academy*, the two principal schools of Athens: the writings of Aristotle having been given to the world in a mutilated and most corrupt state; whereas those of Plato descended to posterity in a condition of greater purity and integrity, than any other pagan compositions of nearly equal extent, the poems of Homer alone excepted. Independently of this important circumstance, the philosophy of Plato, in itself, was far better calculated than that of his disciple and rival to gain an ascendancy in the unfortunate times which followed naturally, almost necessarily, the golden ages of Alexander and Augustus. In explaining the completion and consequences of Grecian and Roman conquests, ancient historians have chiefly directed our attention to the bright side of the picture; Barbarians subdued, the ravages of Nomades restrained, the knowledge of the habitable globe extended, communication facilitated by sea and land, with the happy diffusion of laws and arts wherever the Grecian Minerva afforded protection, or the Eagle of Rome pursued her flight. Dazzled by the magnificence of this spectacle, the most clear-sighted writers have overlooked the deep and incurable wounds which a long series of triumphs inflicted on the conquerors themselves. They have not perceived

Picture of the ages following the completion of Grecian and Roman conquests.

that, in the boundless communication of nations, the far greater proportions of mankind are more likely to be injured than benefited by the reciprocal exchanges of opinions and manners; and that insolent crowds, while they mutually deride each other's real advantages and pre-eminences, will be all of them alike prone to adopt fashionable follies and foreign superstitions. In the heterogeneous assemblage of inhabitants crowding the great cities that hastily arose upon the establishment, first of the Macedonian, and afterwards of the Roman power, the ferment of such jarring materials corrupted into unexampled virulence*. The vast multitude of dupes gave encouragement to a correspondent number of knaves. The unbridled folly of the capitals was imitated or surpassed by the provinces; in both, the progress of society was inverted; just taste in writing as well as propriety in acting became extinct; and the thickening shade at length settled into that perfect gloom which confounded every principle and every maxim by which the Greeks and Romans had deserved admiration and acquired empire.

Their degeneracy precipitated by the

This fatal degeneracy was not, materially, either promoted or obstructed by the four great schools of Athens, whose tenets I endeavoured to

* Per urbem (scil. Romam) quo cuncta undique atrociora aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque. Tacit. Annal. xv. 44. Words highly applicable to my subject, but strangely misapplied by the pretended philosopher, (for true philosophy will not conclude, much less condemn without examination and proof,) when he thus absurdly stigmatises the Christian religion.

explain

explain in a former work^t. Neither the Academics nor Peripatetics, any more than the enthusiasts of stoical virtue, or the votaries of epicurean pleasure, who flourished after the age of Alexander, were eminently conspicuous as improvers or corrupters of philosophy. They followed without deviation the respective founders of their sects. The works of their great masters were perpetually in their hands; their study by day, their meditation by night; admired as the fountains of wisdom, and revered as the standards of excellence. Amidst the celebrity of far inferior works, those of the Stagirite, as observed above, were marked with a peculiar fatality; since his copious writings, containing, together with the author's own discoveries, the literary treasures of all preceding times, were snatched, as it were, from the world and long buried in concealment; and it was not until their imperfect revival in the age of Cicero^u, that the Peripatetics regained for a short time that pre-eminence to which they were justly entitled through their master's incomparable merit. The innovators in speculation as well as practice, who may be regarded as the great agents in the ruin of both learning and morals, belonged not properly to any of the sects of Greek philosophy, though under Alexander's successors they affected the name of Pythagoreans^x, as they afterwards did that of

Pythagoreans after the age of Alexander, and the Platonicians after that of Augustus.

^t History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 40.

^u See above, pp. 2, 3. and 42.

^x See my account of Pythagoras, History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi.

Platonists or Platonicians¹ under the Roman emperors. It had been a maxim of the Peripatetic school, which Aristotle continually enforced by example as well as precept, "never to intermix the concerns of philosophy with those of the popular superstition²." In opposition to this sound advice, the great object of both Pythagoreans and Platonists was to combine philosophy and mythology into one system, to embellish truth by fiction; and whether they aimed at confirming or invalidating the creed of their ancestors, to effect either purpose by new invented fables and lying prodigies.

Chain of
romancers
and vision-
aries, down
to the Pla-
tonicians in
the third
century.

In this manner Diodorus of Aspendus and other Pythagoreans in Egypt under the first Ptolemy, adapted the tenets of their pretended master to the dark imaginations and childish credulity of the Alexandrians³. Other self-entitled philosophers travelled over the Greek conquests of Asia, collecting every rite of superstition and every tale of wonder, which they afterwards amplified in their fabulous compositions for the amusement and delight of the idle multitudes assembled in the great cities built and hastily peopled by the Macedonian conquerors. From the age of Alexander himself to that of Sylla the Dictator, a chain of such

¹ See my account of Plato, History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii.

² περὶ τῶν μυθικῶν σοφίζομεθα ἐκ αἰσίου μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν. Aristot. Metaphys. ii. 4. & passim.

³ Conf. Diogen. Laert. in Pythagor. Heracleid. & Empedoc. Athenæum. l. iv. p. 165. Jamblich. in Vit. Pythag. c. ult. Joseph. Cont. Apion. i. 22. p. 1345.

romancers

romancers may be traced in the remains of Heraclides Ponticus^b, Diogenes Antonius^c, Timæus of Taurominium^d, Evhemerus of Messene^e, Hermippus of Smyrna^f, Neanthes of Cyzicum^g, and Alexander of Phrygia^h surnamed *Polyhistor.*, as we should say the *omniscient*; a title of false honour which heaps much real disgrace on those who conferred it. To such early impostors, who all flourished before the age of Cicero, we may trace the origin of those extravagancies and follies, which still disgrace the biography of Pythagoras and other sages of ancient Greece: to them also must be referred that preposterous admixture of Greek learning with Asiatic superstition, which in the countries of the West first introduced the *theurgy* of philosophers; a thing equally contemptible with the magic of jugglers. The reports and the

^b Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Heracleid.

^c Photius, Biblioth. Cod. lxxvi. p. 355. He thinks that Diogenes lived shortly after Alexander the Great. In that case he was the first traveller that brought into Greece the doctrines of magic and enchantment exactly as they are described in the Arabian tales and the romances of chivalry. See particularly Photius, p. 359. & seq.

^d He was nicknamed Epitimæus from his calumny, and the old woman from his credulity. Suidas, Conf. Polyb. xii. 15. & Diodor. xiii. 90. His fables concerning Pythagoras, as we shall see, were greedily swallowed by the Alexandrian school.

^e Diodor. v. 41. & seq. & Fragment. ex Lib. Sext. p. 633.

^f According to Pliny, xxx. 1, & 2., Hermippus is the first Greek philosopher who wrote circumstantially concerning magic. He flourished in the reign of the third Ptolemy, surnamed Euergetes. From his time it came to be a prevailing opinion that the ancient Greek philosophers were famous magicians. Pliny assures us of the fact; and inconsistently enough with his own opinion of the futility of magic, treats Democritus and Plato as abettors of that art, in which he believes them to have been great proficient.

^g Plut. Sympotic. p. 628. edit. Xyland.

^h Diogen. Laert. viii. 36. & Clem. Alexand. i. 304.

doctrines of those marvellous writers were greedily received, for reasons that will appear in the progress of this discourse, by Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and the other Platonicians, or later Platonists as they were called, who began with the third century, and flourished in an unbroken chain, chiefly in Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, for the space of three hundred and fifty years. From those Platonicians a spurious philosophy, under venerable ancient names, was communicated to the idle loquacity of the Greeks of Constantinople, and by them finally diffused over the nations of the East and West; among the Arabs under the Abassides in the eighth century; and, at the revival of letters, among the Italians and other nations of modern Europe.

Why Plato's philosophy better adapted to their genius and views than that of Aristotle.

From the accounts which I have already given of the respective systems of Plato and Aristotle, it will be easy to perceive that the writings of the former were best adapted to the purposes of both Pythagoreans and Platonicians; whether, as was most usual with the Pythagoreans, they wished only to deceive others, or, as was most common with the Platonicians, they were equally industrious in imposing on themselves. A short comparison of Plato and Aristotle, the result of a careful study of their inestimable works, will place the matter in a clear point of view. Plato's practical philosophy nearly coincides with Aristotle's. Both of them are impressive teachers of a pure and sublime morality; but their several modes of enforcing the same maxims are as different as the opposite
bents

bents of their genius. In Aristotle, demonstration is the principal; and illustration, sparingly used, as a decent *accessory* or *appendage*: careless of the pomp of words, he regards only the truth of things. Plato, on the contrary, disdains no ornament within his reach; delights, after exciting surprise, to gratify well-prepared expectation; and condescends, on subjects peculiarly within the province of reason, to use the language of passion and fancy, to strengthen argument by fable, and fortify belief by wonder; whereas his rival with more commanding authority subdues even the heart and affections through the resistless conviction of the understanding. The form of composition almost perpetually employed by Plato is that of pure drama, a mode of writing excellently adapted to the display of his versatile genius and flowery fancy; of a mind stored with images that he could combine with taste, and crowded with ideas that he could acutely discriminate. Yet with all these advantages, his *enthusiasm* and love of the *marvellous*, his doctrine of *ideas*, and his *Dæmon* world, his explanation of mythology by allegory, thus confounding the provinces of philosophy and popular superstition¹; these shadowy prominences of Plato were calculated to allure and delight many who remained blind to his brightest merits, and thereby fitted the labours of this great genius rather to co-operate with, than counteract, the perverters of sense

¹ Conf. Platon. in Symp. p. 187. in Tim. p. 481. in Repub. l. i. p. 420. and Theætet. passim.

and science, who sprang up with wild luxuriance among the Greeks and Romans, after those nations had lost, as it were, their love of truth, together with their passion for true glory, their manly spirit, and their liberty.

Origin of
the Eclectic-
tics.

Under the Romans, these corrupters of learning as well as philosophy assumed the name of Eclectics, because they selected from all the different schools the tenets most agreeable to their fancy. But as Plato was their favourite idol, they were called also the later Platonists or Platonicians; and having new-moulded to their own taste the wildest doctrines of their master, they applied them in this corrupt state to the interpretation of the philosophy of Aristotle. It was their opinion that, though the complete truth might not be found in any one of the several schools, it resided, however, in the whole of them collectively: that upon due examination, they might all be reconciled and united into one general system; and thereby, instead of rancorous adversaries, be rendered useful allies to each other as well as to the established idolatry prevalent throughout the Roman world. If we followed very respectable guides, the laborious Brucker^k, the learned Mosheim^l, the elegant and critical Gibbon^m, we should ascribe the origin of the Eclectics to the third century, and consider their decided hos-

^k De Sect. Eclectic. vol. ii. p. 211. & seq.

^l De turbata per recentes Platonicos Ecclesia: and in both his histories.

^m Decline and Fall, vol. i, p. 474, & 679. 4to. edit.

tility

tility to Christianity as the foundation of their maxims, and the principle of their union. These observations indeed apply, as far as concerns the name; but the Eclectic doctrines themselves remount to a far earlier source, to the fabulous writers above mentioned between the age of Alexander and that of Augustus; from the latter of which periods history also enables us to trace an unbroken chain of visionaries or impostors down to Ammonius Saccas the first of the Eclectics, and great Platonic luminary of the third century.

At the head of this chain, I shall mention ^{Thrafsyllus of Rhodes.} Thrafsyllus of Rhodes, a man eminently skilled in musicⁿ and mathematics, and who by his astrological predictions, gained the confidence of Tiberius, before that detestable monster succeeded to the empire^o. With his other studies, Thrafsyllus joined an unwearied application to the philosophy of Plato, which he regarded merely as a verbal explanation of *Pythagorean numbers*^p. In conformity with this notion, he first divided Plato's Dialogues into *Tetralogies*^q, and every where discovered in them the supposed tenets of the Pythagorean school as described by Diogenes and Diodorus, Heraclides and Hermippus, and the other fabulous writers above mentioned. Most of the subjects were

ⁿ Plutarch. de Music. He makes him by birth a Phliasian.

^o Tacit. Annal. vi. 21. Dion Cassius, p. 555. & Sueton. in Caligul.

^p Confer Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir. & E. apud Delphos & Diogen. Laert. iii. 56.

^q In reference to the Tetractys, that is, 4 multiplied into 9, by which the sacred Pythagorean oath was sworn. Plutarch. ibid.

treated

treated by Thrasyllus, which two centuries afterwards exercised the mystical pen of Plotinus, and which even this writer, with all his impenetrable obscurity and wildness of confusion, is said to have discussed with greater precision and clearness.¹

**Apollonius
of Tyana.**

Contemporary with Thrasyllus, we meet with the famous Cappadocian, Apollonius of Tyana, who was born about the Christian æra; and extended his long life of an hundred years beyond the reign of the Emperor Nerva². Apollonius was in reality such a man as Pythagoras, by his lying biographers, is described; a pretender to prophecy and miracles, sometimes the vilest of cheats, and at other times the filliest of bigots. I have derived some amusement from his life, preserved in the memoirs of his followers, Maximus a Macedonian, and Damis an Assyrian, and from them compiled by Philostratus an Athenian rhetorician, who flourished in the court of Septimius Severus towards the close of the second century. The wondrous narrative, which frequently betrays the vain glory of Apollonius, sometimes startles the relater himself, since in describing the most extraordinary performances of his hero, particularly his raising the dead, he endeavours awkwardly to explain them by natural causes³; thus, with strange inconsistency denying the miraculousness of the actions for

¹ Longin. apud Porphy. in Vit. Plotin.

² Philostrat. in Vit. Apollon. p. 428.

³ Vit. Apollon. p. 206. I refer to Morell's Edition, Paris 1608; not being in possession of the more splendid one of Gottfridus Olearius, Leipzig, 1709.

which

which he would exalt the performer to divine honours. The theurgy of philosophers indeed, he affects to distinguish from the magic of jugglers^u; but neither Philostratus nor any succeeding Platonist has attempted to point out any real difference between them.

From Apollonius of Tyana, there is an easy transition to Alexander the Paphlagonian prophet; since Lucian informs us that this impostor, adorned by every talent and polluted by every vice, had from early youth attended a certain Tyanean, intimately acquainted with Apollonius and deeply skilled in all his mysteries^x. After the death of his master, Alexander, at setting up for himself, found a fit coadjutor in Kocconas, a lying chronicler of Byzantium; with whom he travelled over Lesser Asia in the character of a Pythagorean philosopher, and acquired great credit with the multitude for such prodigies and predictions as, Lucian observes indignantly, “had been absurdly ascribed to a wise and good man like Pythagoras.” The reader may see, in the clear and lively narrative of a satirist, whose flashes brighten the closing night of Greek literature, by what vile and detestable artifices Alexander raised and maintained an oracle, in his native city Abonotichos in Paphlagonia, whose responses were revered not only by the provincials of Asia, but by Romans of the highest rank in the court and

Alexander
the Paphla-
gonian pro-
phet.

^u P. 3. & passim.

^x Luciani Alexander seu Pseudomantis.

army

army of the Antonines. Fame had been the main pursuit of Apollonius, who was born to hereditary opulence; whereas wealth was the principal object with Alexander, who had been educated in rags and servitude. But in comparing their respective characters, we must remember that Apollonius is handed down to us by an impassioned admirer, whereas Alexander is delineated by the pen not only of a general satirist but of a declared personal enemy¹.

Moderatus
and Nico-
machus.

While those impostors successively employed their philosophy for the deception of the public at large, their respective contemporaries Moderatus and Nicomachus were more innocently exercised in deluding the learned and themselves. Following the footsteps of Thrasyllus, those cloudy writers combined into one mystical system, Platonic *ideas* and Pythagorean *numbers*, both of which they explained allegorically as symbols of all things in the universe, whether perceptions of sense or merely objects of intellect². The monad denoted God; the duad, matter; the triad, all objects or actions having a beginning, a middle, and an end; while the

¹ Lucian. *ibid.* He tells of himself an action worthy of a froward child. When the prophet, according to custom, held out his hand for him to kiss, Lucian bit it pettishly with his teeth. Notwithstanding a feigned reconciliation, the prophet laid a plot for drowning Lucian; which perfidy probably gave birth to the treatise of which Alexander is the subject, since the satirist, with anger sparkling through his laughter, says, at the outset of his work, he would gladly have seen him torn in pieces by apes and foxes for the amusement of a public theatre: a wish characteristic of the bloody and abominable sports then generally prevalent through the Roman world.

² Stobæus, *Eclog. Physic.* iii.; & Photius, *Biblioth. cod.* 187.

decade

decade formed the emblem of sublime excellence, being the most perfect of numbers, as containing the greatest variety of properties, relations, and resemblances. Not contented with this egregious trifling, Nicomachus deviated into total absurdity, by making the same number express things the most unlike and even contrary to each other; good and evil, beauty and deformity, dignity and meanness: so that as his biographer pleasantly observes, he was at once its calumniator and panegyrist^a.

The chimeras of those visionaries, which would Plutarch. now entitle their professors to cells in a mad-house, (so unaccountable to one age seem the follies of another!) were adopted by the whole tribe of later Platonists, and nearly a century before their times, by the learned and sensible Plutarch^b, one of the finest painters of actions and manners in public and private life. But this excellent writer, an exuberant source of instruction and entertainment to all ages and nations, was both a Platonic philosopher and a priest of Apollo. In the sentiments and behaviour of illustrious men, with whom he had lived, as it were, in his warm and impressive descriptions of them, he found paganism as much ennobled by Greeks and Romans in happier days, as it was afterwards debased and polluted by Egyptians and Syrians, and even by many of his own slavish countrymen and contemporaries. In the zeal of patriotism, Plutarch sincerely re-

^a Photius, Biblioth. cod. 187.

^b Plutarch. de Ei apud Delphos.

spected

spected even the vilest legends of his country, and eagerly closed in with any doctrines that might serve to clothe their nakedness, and hide their infamy^c. Nothing seemed better adapted to this purpose than the application of allegory, sparingly employed by Plato himself, his great master, but lavishly abused in all subjects of mythology as well as philosophy, by Thrasyllus, Moderatus, Nicomachus, and other now forgotten visionaries of the same stamp. In his speculative writings throughout, the Hierophant and Archon of Chæronæa shows a perpetual anxiety for explaining the superstition of his country in a manner the least shocking to morality and reason. He thus comments, in numberless passages, even the most childish fables by such plausible glosses, as served to reconcile his incongruous characters of priest and philosopher;—priest of a most contemptible worship, and a philosopher who, being bred in the practical school of legislators and heroes, through the brightest exemplars of human virtue, had ascended to sublime conceptions of Deity.

Plutarch says admirably, that the fear of God destroys all other fear^d; but that religious fear itself, when pushed to the extreme, degenerates into mad and *impious* terror; since, in the sight of the Almighty, the character even of the atheist who denies his being, is less odious, than that of the bigot who invents or believes the

^c Vid. Lib. de Isid. et Osirid. passim.

^d In Tractat. ne suaviter quidem vivi posse secund. Epicuri decreta.

vilest

vilest calumnies against his nature^c. Neither the eloquence of Seneca, nor the wit of Lucian, nor the glowing invective of Juvenal, exposes more clearly and more forcibly, than the priest of Chæronæa, the danger of superstitious innovations and foreign worship, and particularly of those cruel and disgraceful rites for propitiating the divinity, which, though excluded from Greece and Rome under their respective commonwealths, and even under the first Cæsars, soon began to deluge and deform every part of the empire. Yet Plutarch is hostile to all other superstitions, chiefly because he is infatuated with those of which he was the minister. His writings, whether of philosophy or history, are crowded with signs and prodigies. His veneration is unbounded for the most senseless ceremonies consecrated by the custom of his country. Oracles and omens are the unceasing objects of his credulous wonder^f; and he confesses ingenuously and weakly, that he had long abstained from eating eggs, in compliance with a certain dream^g, which probably appearing ridiculous even to himself, he has forborn to communicate to his readers.

Another Platonic philosopher who touches the times of Plutarch, and forms the link, as it were, between him and those usually denomi-

Apuleius of
Madaura.

^c Plutarch. de Superstition. But in this he is not consistent, for in the treatise cited in the preceding note, he maintains the atheist to be more odious and more miserable even than the bigot.

^f Vid. Plutarch. de Oracul. defectu, & cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracul. carmine.

^g Quæstion. Conviv.

nated

nated Eclectics, is the famous Apuleius of Madaura, a city and Roman colony on the confines of Numidia and Getulia. Apuleius was equally conversant with the learning of Athens and of Rome^b but after the waste of his patrimony in expensive travels, being obliged to exercise for bread the profession of an advocate in the latter capital, he preferred the use of the Latin tongue, in which he falls farther below the younger Pliny who preceded him only fifty years, than the same Pliny in a century and a half had degenerated from the classic eloquence of Cicero. But to Platonic adepts, the matter rather than the style recommended the "Metamorphoses" and other writings of Apuleius, in which he is continually corrupting philosophy by false religion, and religion by false philosophy^c: an allegoriser of fables, an expounder of mysteries, and even a worker of miracles^d: while in conformity with many writers immediately before and after him, as well as with his contemporary the physician and philosopher Galen^e of Pergamus, he ranged at large in the speculative world, adopting, as occasion required, and embellishing the tenets of discordant sects, without yielding exclusive allegiance to the authority of any master.

Com-
mence-
ment of the

From the foregoing narrative it appears that the opinions and proceedings, peculiarly ascribed

^b Apuleius in Apollon.

^c Apuleius, Metamorph. Apollon. & Florid. passim.

^d Id. ibid. Con. Lactant. Divin. Inst. v. 3.

^e Vid. Galen. περί αμαρτημάτων και παθών της ψυχης.

to the Eclectics or later Platonists, remount to a far earlier date than that usually assigned to them. Immediately before and after the age of Cicero, the mystic philosophers or romancers, whose names I have recorded, selected dogmas from discordant sects, reconciled those sects with each other and with the popular superstition, allegorised mythology, and either wrought miracles themselves, or believed in their performance by others. But, in as far as concerns the name merely, the Eclectics begun with Potamo of Alexandria, the master of Ammonius. Potamo's philosophy is but imperfectly explained: we learn however that its groundwork was Plato's doctrine of ideas^m, which thenceforward continued to be the airy phantom that deluded the whole school. The fame of Potamo was totally eclipsed by that of his contemporary and hearer Ammonius; a name common to many Greeks before and after the close of the second century, when, in the pompous language of his disciples, the light of Ammonius Saccas first broke on the worldⁿ, and shone conspicuously in reconciling Plato and Aristotle with each other, as well as with all the most revered teachers of wisdom in the heathen world. Ammonius derived the epithet of Saccas from a circumstance expressive of his humble origin, and the lowly occupations to which this future luminary of science had in some part of his life been con-

Eclectics as far as concerns the name.

Potamo.

Ammonius Saccas.

^m Diogen. Laert. 21. sect. 21. *ὡς δ', ἐὼν τῆς ἀκριβοῦς φαντασίας.*

ⁿ Hierocles apud Photium, cod. ccciv.

demned. It is derived from a word nearly the same in sound, and bearing the same sense universally in all languages; and it indicates that he once carried the sack, which has ever continued to be the badge of low drudgery, or mean traffic, in all countries of the East. He is carefully to be distinguished from the Christian Ammonius, who wrote concerning the harmony between the Mosaic and Christian dispensations^o; though Ammonius Saccas is said to have been himself born of Christian parents, and is perhaps one of the first apostates who turned the pure streams of the Gospel into the foul marshes of corrupted Platonism. In the writings of his scholar Plotinus, for Ammonius left nothing behind him, we find lofty notions of Deity deformed by that mystical jargon^p, which Plato was supposed to have copied from Pythagoras, and which Pythagoras himself was believed to have stolen from the priests of Egypt and the East. Even some peculiar doctrines of the Gospel are clothed in such swelling bombast by the new Platonists, as has shaken the faith of able and ingenuous men^q, and led them to doubt whether the momentous truths of our religion were not originally derived from Egyptian and Indian sources, and employed with pious fraud by the first propagators of Christianity for adorning the edifice of the church. But just and

^o Euseb. Hist. vi. 19.

^p Plotin. Ennead. vi. 4.

^q Vid. Luc. Holsten. de Vit. Porphy. apud Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. v. iv. c. 6. p. 236.

solid criticism, which in this case may be firmly established on the genuine and copious writings of Plato himself, will evince, that the false philosophy usurping his name, instead of being despoiled by Christians, was itself the despoiler.

Ammonius left many disciples; particularly Longinus. the dark Plotinus; the sublime Longinus; and the philosopher Origen, contemporary with the Christian father of the same name, and too frequently confounded with him. The fame of Longinus towers above other Platonists in a small and imperfect treatise, sometimes deformed indeed by the loaded Alexandrian style, but replete with such just criticism and such manly sentiments as might be expected from an author who was honourably accused of having the works of the ancients perpetually in his hands to the dislike or contempt of those of his contemporaries. The course of his extensive travels led him to Alexandria, where he was a hearer of Ammonius; but, having returned to Athens, his native city, he composed several philosophic works in which it should seem that he combated the *ideas* and other leading doctrines of the new Platonic school^a, though he held Plato himself in such high veneration, that he regularly celebrated the anniversary of his birthday^x. His subsequent history, it is foreign from

^a Even by the learned Lucas Holstenius, in his Life of Porphyry.

^b He was thence named *Φιλαρχαιος*. Porphyry. in Vit. Plotin.

^c Longin. de Finibus, apud Porphyry. *ibid*.

^d This I infer from the titles of his last works; *De Ideis*, adversus Plotinum, — *De Principiis*, — and, *De Finibus*.

^x Euseb. *Præparat. Evangel.* x. 3.

my subject to relate. Fortune, it is well known, conducted him to splendour and a premature death' in the service of the ill-fated Zenobia, fovereign of Palmyra and transient Queen of the East. The rebellion of the mistress was punished by the Emperor Aurelian in the blood of her secretary and servant. But instead of ignominy, Longinus derived immortal glory from a public execution, since he died with noble fortitude, exhorting to patience his less enduring indignant friends.²

The
Golden
Chain of
Plato-
nicians.

The philosophical heresy of Longinus on the subject of *ideas* excludes him from a place in the *golden chain* of Platonicians, who flourished from the reign of Septimius Severus, three centuries and a half, until their schools were abolished by the Emperor Justinian about the middle of the sixth century. The links of this *golden* and *sacred* chain, for so it was characterised not only by its *own members*, but by a great proportion of their contemporaries, are chiefly filled up by Plotinus the hearer of Ammonius, whose life is described by his scholar Porphyry; by Ædesius and Chrysanthius, admired luminaries of the apostate Julian, whose lives, with those of about twenty other Platonists from Plotinus downwards, are written by the credulous sophist Eunapius of Sardes; by Plutarch the Athenian, and the Egyptian Syrianus; and finally by Proclus and Isidore, whose biogra-

* A. Dom. 273.

² ἢν (ζημιαν θανάτου) ὡς γενναίως περὶ τοῦ Λογγίνου ὡς καὶ τὰς σχετλιαζούσας ἐπὶ τῷ πατρὶ παραμυθισθαι, Zosimus, i. 56.

phy is given by their respective scholars Marinus and Damascius. It may be an undertaking not unacceptable to the lovers of learning, to comprise in few words the result of much dry and rather uncommon reading, and clearly to describe the manners, doctrines, method, and style of a school that swallowed up every other, and through the muddy channel of which, Greek philosophy was communicated in modern times both to the East and West.

Of all the disciples of Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, himself also an Egyptian, most completely imbibed the mystical spirit of his master; and most excelled in the profundity of his speculations, and in the efficacy of his *theurgic* works. Having frequented for ten years the school of Ammonius even to the death of that teacher, Plotinus was seized with the desire of emulating Pythagoras and Apollonius, those great proficient in hidden wisdom, by a new philosophical expedition to the East. The war undertaken by the third Gordian against the Persians^a, gave him an opportunity of following the standard of that unfortunate Emperor to the Euphrates. There, his progress ended with that of the Roman arms; Gordian being slain by conspiracy, and his murderer and successor Philip hastening back to Rome to solemnize the secular games, and confirm his usurpation^b. The connections,

^a An. Dom. 242.

^b An. Dom. 244. Histo. August. p. 162 & seq. Brucker, vol. ii. p. 221. says, "Parthis bellum illaturus;" but the empire of the Parthians had been demolished by Artaxerxes and the Persians, An. Dom. 226. Agathias, l. ii. p. 63.

however, which Plotinus had formed in the imperial army led him, in his fortieth year, to Rome; on which ample theatre, he soon distinguished himself by his lectures, by his writings, and above all, by the singular fanaticism of his life^c. Aspiring to a perfection far exalted above the dependent condition of man, he denied himself the use of meat and of wine, as well as of the bath and of frictions, then deemed indispensable conveniencies; and he firmly resisted the earnest entreaties of his friends, who longed to possess his portrait, because, forsooth, he was ashamed of being exhibited under a human form. Instead of indulging his disciples in the fair pursuit of profit or honour, he warmly recommended to their imitation Rogatianus a Roman senator, whose understanding had been so completely subverted by his philosophy, that, in order to attain proficiency in Platonism, he had divested himself of his dignity and office of Praetor which he then held^d, discharged his splendid household,

^c Porphyry. in Vit. Plotin.

^d Resolving the whole duty of man into monkish contemplation, the Platonicians recommended to their disciples a proud dereliction of the ordinary employments of life, and particularly of all offices of government. They explained literally the sublime description of the philosopher in Plato's Theætetus, p. 128 & 129. *διὸ καὶ πωρεσθαι καὶ εὐθεὶς εἶναι φησιν*, &c. But that ravishing writer, when he descends from his enthusiasm and rapture, maintains that philosophers, and they only, are qualified for the administration of government. Men, he observes, can never be fitted for that high trust who know not something still higher: if that is not the case, they will over-rate the value of political power, and live in continual strife with each other for the sake of acquiring, maintaining, recovering, or extending an object that, to them, appears of inestimable importance. But if they have once learned that the culture of our intellectual and moral powers in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue forms the true health and happiness of

household, and parted with his whole property. In this extraordinary proceeding, indeed, the disinterestedness of Rogatianus met with an unforeseen reward. By providing for the health of his mind, the lazy voluptuary recovered that of his body; since he had not long persevered in the Platonic regimen of one spare meal in a day, when the same man, who had formerly been so much tormented by the gout that he was obliged to pay his shortest visits in a litter, recovered the perfect use of his members; began to walk nimbly, and to exercise his arms as vigorously as the sturdiest mechanic*. Of the *theurgic* works of Plotinus, a single example shall suffice. Among his fellow-students under Ammonius, a certain Olympius of Alexandria became his rival and enemy. The hostility of Olympius was exerted in various attempts to hurt Plotinus by theurgy. But the planet of Plotinus had the ascendancy; a dæmon of superior power was his familiar; and the arts of Olympius were thus made to recoil so effectually on himself, that his body became contracted like a purse, and retained that decrepitude of form, until he

of man, they will descend to government as a task essential to the public good, and regard this condescension as their bounden duty. Ignorance and tasteless folly would otherwise be raised to dignity and armed with power. Governments, as had often happened, would be seized by knaves of vile intrigue and vulgar talents, whose bastard knowledge was worse than total ignorance, since such selfish and short-sighted politicians would be continually found wanting on great occasions; they would infallibly mistake main points and controlling principles. Conf. Repub. L. iv. p. 647. L. vi. p. 675. & L. vii. p. 696.

* Id. *ibid.*

ceased contending with a man who greatly surpassed him in occult science'.

His writings.

Plotinus was an indefatigable writer; but the weakness of his eyes hindered him from revising his voluminous compositions. This was the more unfortunate, because the task of correction could be but ill-performed by others, since Plotinus wrote with scarcely any regard to the form of his letters, and was as careless of orthography as of the purity and perspicuity of his style. All these particulars he regarded as contemptible externals, whereas inward meditation was the only exercise in which a true philosopher ought to delight and excel. The meditations of Plotinus were reluctantly remitted during his short hours of imperfect slumber, and obstinately maintained amidst the salutations and visits of his numerous friends, so that he frequently boasted of being at once alone and in company^f, accustoming himself, at the departure of those who came to compliment or consult him, to join the thoughts that arose in his own mind during the interview, with those which he had put on paper before their admission. His works on the Platonic philosophy were comprised in fifty-four books; which Porphyry his scholar, who performed the office of editor, divided into six *enneads*, conformably with the prevalent superstition concerning Pythagorean numbers, exemplified in the *tetralogies* above-mentioned, into which Thrasyllus had di-

^f Porphyry. in Vit. Plotin.

^g συνῆ και ἑαυτῷ ἅμα και τοις ἄλλοις. Porphyry. *ibid*.

vided

vided the Dialogues of Plato. About two centuries after^a Porphyry, Proclus the Lycian undertook to explain those *enneads*, accumulating darkness on obscurity; and at the restoration of letters in the fifteenth century, Marfilius Ficinus the philosopher and friend of Lorenzo de Medici, who had adopted all the visionary doctrines of the later Platonists, translated Plotinus into latin, and prefixed arguments by way of commentary.ⁱ

Plotinus was succeeded by Porphyry; the Porphyry, most distinguished link in the Platonic chain, by his learning, credulity, inconsistency, and his implacable animosity to the whole Christian name. He was born in Tyre in the earlier part of the 3d century, and in his native tongue An.Dom. called Malchus^k, a word denoting a royal de-^{233.} scent, in allusion to which he received his Greek name of Porphyry from Longinus, under whom he had been sent to prosecute his studies at Athens. But he afterwards quitted Longinus for Plotinus, and Athens for Rome; where his dark and melancholy mind readily forsook the founder maxims of his youth, to surrender his whole faculties, subdued and bound, to the authority of his new master; who treated Longinus

^a An. Dom. 510.

ⁱ The work of Ficinus appears with different title-pages bearing respectively the dates of 1580 and 1615. As the sale of the work was slow, this device, which has been frequently employed since that time, was contrived for the purpose of alluring readers. Conf. Fabric. Bib. Græc. vol. iv. p. 157. & Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. vol. ii. p. 223.

^k The root of the word is discernible in the Nahr-Malka, the royal canal between the Tigris and Euphrates. Plin. Nat. Hist. vi. 28. Conf. Rennell's Herodotus, p. 335.

as a philologist indeed of some merit, but as a superficial and contemptible philosopher'. As the fruit of consummate proficiency in the studies of the Alexandrian school, Porphyry was tempted to the design of destroying his own life, that his soul might be no longer encumbered or polluted by the body, and was only prevented from effectuating his purpose by a journey to Sicily, where the constituent principles of his nature were reconciled to each other, by the agreeable and magnificent scenery of that delightful island, and the cheerful conversation of Probus an elegant and ingenious friend then residing at Lilybæum. In Sicily he continued during the most busy^m period of his life, since from thence he sent into the world his numerous writings against the Christian religion; writings of which the lossⁿ ought not surely to occasion much satisfaction to the one party or any regret to the other; because, if we may fairly appreciate them by the confusion and inconsistency of his works still extant, they are only the more

ⁱ Φιλόλογος μάλλον η φιλοσοφος. Instead of indignantly repelling this reproach, Longinus with the becoming temper of a philosopher, commends Plotinus' pithiness and brevity, but laments that he cannot understand him. Longin. Epist. ad Porphy. in Vit. Plotin.

^m Thence he is sometimes called a Sicilian. Augustin. Retract. ii. 31.

ⁿ The lost treatises of Porphyry against the Christians consisted of thirty books. Lactantius Divin. Inst. v. 2 & 3.; and Gibbon, vol. i. c. 16. Speaking on this subject, Gibbon says: "They," the Platonicians, "composed against the faith of the gospel many elaborate treatises, which have since been committed to the flames by the prudence of orthodox emperors." However laudable may be the orthodoxy of those emperors, I am not inclined to commend their prudence.

eminently

eminently conspicuous^o because they are no where to be seen. At his return to Rome, he succeeded to the vacant chair of Plotinus, and wrote the life of that venerated teacher, which may be regarded also as a satisfactory delineation of his own character. In this piece of biography, the fanaticism of both is placed in the strongest light, since Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, by following the means prescribed in Plato's Symposium, was rapt into divine extasy, carried out of the body, and intellectually united with the first transcendent deity; an event which, he says, also happened to himself in his sixty-eighth year.^p

Porphyry disappears from history towards the close of Dioclesian's reign, and before a third An.Dom. 303. part of the time had elapsed that is occupied by the long succession of *divine men* as they are called by their disciples and by each other. But as the celebrity of the sect attained its summit in this extravagant visionary, we shall not detail the lives of Iamblichus of Chalcis in Cœlosyria, the scholar of Porphyry; of Ædesius and Chrysanthius, philosophers and oracles of

^o Præfulgebant Cassius atque Brutus, eo ipso, quod effigies eorum non visebantur. Tacitus, Annal. iii. 76.

^p Vit. Plotin. p. 137. The Socratic school uniformly taught that men sadly mistake their real interest, when they are tempted to prefer the body to the mind, pleasure to virtue, or time to eternity. But it was the misfortune and peculiar disgrace of the Platonicians to mix with those noble lessons, a spurious mass of gross and palpable error; and thereby unwarily to expose them to the sneer of worldly-minded craft, and the rude scoffs of brutish sensuality. Aristotle frequently observes, that the cause of truth is never more deeply injured than by introducing falsehood in its train; since in removing the latter, the former is also carried away and lost.

the

the Emperor Julian; and of the famed scholar of Iamblichus, Plutarch the Athenian; by whom the new Platonic school was translated to his native country; and the groves of the Academy, with the hallowed banks of the Ilissus, thenceforth usurped by his followers, Syrianus the Egyptian, Proclus the Lycian, Marinus of Naples, Isidorus of Gaza, and Damascius of Damascus; all of them once celebrated philosophers, and all as remote from Athens in lineage and country, as they are unlike to the genuine ornaments of that city in genius and character.

Proclus the
Lycian.

After Plotinus and Porphyry, Proclus the Lycian forms the most conspicuous link in the Platonic chain, both for the strength of his powers and his strange misapplication of them^a. His life is written in the true spirit of the sect by his scholar Marinus, who, in the hope of adorning his fame, describes him by strokes exhibiting alternately the impostor Apollonius and the fanatic Porphyry. Damascius has indeed an inferior subject in the life of his master Isidore of Gaza, but he treats it with nearly equal pre-eminence of mysticism and folly^b. Isidore and Damascius were the last teachers in the Platonic academy, whose revenues were sequestered and its schools silenced in the old age of Isidore^c, by the Emperor Justinian; neither the first nor the last example in history when

^a Procli Vita; Scriptore Marino Neapolitano. Hamburg. 1700. Conf. pp. 7. 43. 45. 53. 55. & 69.

^b Photius, Biblioth. cod. clxxxi. p. 407. & cod. ccxlii. p. 1027.

^c Conf. Johan. Malala. vol. ii. p. 187. & Asseman. Biblioth. Orient. iii. p. 404.

dangerous

dangerous follies have been punished under the usurped name of philosophy.

Having dwelt so long on the *history* of the Platonicians, I shall reduce within a narrow compass what remains to be said concerning their *specific tenets*. Upon a careful analysis of their writings, the whole of their pretended philosophy will be found to resolve itself into the two great doctrines of theurgy and perfectibility; the former of which has lost all credit within the two last centuries, and the latter has vainly struggled for revival under the visionaries of the present times. Taking for their foundation Plato's *Ideas* and his *Dæmon World*, commented and amplified by the philosophical legends through which Greek learning began shortly after the age of Alexander the Great to be amalgamated with Asiatic fables and Egyptian superstition, the later Platonists raised a strange and motley edifice, bulky without greatness, and dazzling without real or steady splendour. They invented new and endless orders of dæmons and dæmonides¹, with whom they were all of them more conversant than with their despised fellow-creatures and miserable embodied brethren. According to their fanciful notions, all things in the universe being linked in the invisible chain of sympathies and

¹ Jamblich. de Myſter. Egypt. vii. & xi.: Plotin. Ennead. paſſim: and Proclus' commentary on Plato with his Platonic theology; which ſcience he conſiders as handed down through Pythagoras from the Thracian Orpheus and the Egyptian Hermes. α γαρ Ορφειν, δ' απορρο- των λογιων μυſτικη παρειδουκε, ταυτα Πυθαγοραſ εξιμαθεν, &c. Proclus in Tim. l.v. p. 291.

antipathies,

antipathies", every object was qualified for operating on another, and might be made powerfully so to operate by men skilled in the theurgic art. Thence the ineffable energies, unobserved by vulgar minds, in certain classes of minerals, plants, and animals; in the various compositions and images of those original productions of nature; above all, in mysterious forms of words, revealed by the gods themselves to pious Barbarians, and which cannot be translated into the smoothness of the Greek tongue, without losing their controlling power and supernatural authority*. As all things in the world operated on all, and each agent produced its specific effect, so all things, also, were signs of all and each event predicted its most remote consequence. Thence the various modes of divination, particularly by the stars and by dreams, through which the pious theurgist might obtain complete information concerning the secrets of futurity. He had, moreover, certain orders of dæmons always at his call', though he was sometimes disturbed by dæmonides of a different class, and occasionally possessed or inspired by every kind

* ἡ συμφωνία των ὁμοίων καὶ ἡ ἐναντιώσις των ἀνομοίων, &c. Jamblich. de Myst. iv. 6.

* Id. ibid. xi. 12 & 15.

† The part of theurgy remained in force towards the end of the 15th century of which we have an example in the famous Hermolaus Barbarus, the admired friend of Lorenzo de' Medicis, ambassador of the Republic of Venice to Innocent VIII.; and by that pope created patriarch of Aquileia. Hermolaus called up a dæmon to explain the meaning of the word *πυλαρχία* in Aristotle's physics; but the devil disappointed him by answering in too low a voice. Petrus Crinitus de Honest. Disciplin. vi. 11. and xv. 9.; and Bayle's Dictionary, artic. Barbarus.

of

of spirit save that of plain sense and unclouded reason. Even Porphyry, "the learned and enlightened Porphyry," speaks of the workings of evil dæmons in language that would disgrace the filliest bigot in the darkest ages of popish superstition². Conformably with the precept of this great luminary of the sect, "that the sage should totally abstract himself from all other concerns to dedicate his whole soul to divine contemplations and theurgic works," each member of the Platonic fraternity endeavoured to surpass his brethren by new and bolder discoveries in the spiritual world; accumulating gods on gods, and virtues on virtues; gods not only immaterial, but gods clothed in matter, over whom incantation displayed its most absolute power; and virtues till then undiscovered in the schools; theoretic, theurgic, soul-purifying, contemplative, and divine³, all of which sprang

² Porphyry, in the beginning and in the end of his letter to Anebo the Egyptian, speaks as if he had seen through the cheat: *μηπω δαίμων ἰδιός μοις τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστίν, &c.*, and again, *αἱ τε λυταίαι, &c.* "Whether each man's dæmon be not merely a part of his soul, and that he is truly possessed with a good dæmon, who has a wife and well regulated mind." But as this letter of Porphyry was written long before his *Life of Plotinus*, the doctrine contained there may be considered as his last word. The progress of his inconsistent mind was directly the reverse of that conjectured of Socrates in the following splendid but illogical passage in Gibbon's *History*, vol. v. p. 250. "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery. The dæmon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wife man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." But if Socrates was deceived himself; he could not deceive others, in the sense in which it is remarkable that a good man should practise deceit.

³ *ἐτι δὲ τὰς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα καθαρτικὰς τε καὶ θεωρητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἄνω καλλωμένηας θεωρητικὰς τὰς δ' ἐτι ἀνώτερον τύπων σιωπῶσάντας, &c.* *Marinus in Vit. Procl. p. 4.*

up

up with rich luxuriance under the worst corruptions of imperial despotism, though even their names had remained unknown during the purity and manly simplicity of the ancient commonwealths. But the virtues of the Platonicians are as unsubstantial as the rest of their philosophy, since they are founded on distinctions that contain not any real difference, and are needlessly multiplied by vague expressions and obscure circumlocutions, which, when reduced to precise terms, present exactly the same identical sense. The main end of their philosophy was to attain intellectual union with God^b, and thus to see all truths at one glance in the divine understanding^c. Deity, they mysteriously describe as every where and no where; penetrating and sustaining all things, yet in nothing present and ever totally unmixed: as the unity of unities, the root of being, the perennial fountain of spiritual existences; and the more irreverently they strove in this mystical language to exalt the Creator, the more material became their images, and the wilder the contradictions in which they were inextricably involved^d. In descending from the giddy heights of their incomprehensible theology to the intellectual and moral powers of man, the Platonicians con-

^b ο ὅλος τῷ δημιουργικῷ Θεῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντιθεσθαι. Lib. De Myster. p. 177.

^c τὰς κοινὰς ἐνεργείας θεωμένη τὰ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἢ παραδειγματὰ. Marin. in Vit. Procl. p. 53.

^d ὁ Θεὸς πάντα καὶ ὕδατος, &c. Porphy. de non necand. ad epuland. Animal.: see still more wild inconsistency in his treatise πρὸς τὸν πρὸς τὰ ῥήματα ἀφορμῶν, joined to the last cited work, Florence 1548.

fusedly

fusedly jumble^e the Stagirite's clear deductions from patient observation with the airy hypotheses of Plato, whom they denominated his divine master. The continual object indeed of the whole school, from Ammonius downwards, was to reconcile^f Aristotle with Plato, and to prove that in all capital speculations, their tenets perfectly coincided; in other words, that the philosopher of Greece, whose rational piety was singularly exempt from superstition, and whose strong reason opposed and curbed fancy with a firm rein, patronized the fond illusions of an amiable enthusiast, whose rich exuberance of wit and learning enabled him deeply to impress on others the visions that floated in his own exalted imagination, and which, however beautiful and charming when arrayed by his plastic art, degenerated into nakedness and deformity under his unworthy followers.

It was the distinction and the shame of the Platonicians to carry their speculative follies into the affairs of common life, and to interweave them with their daily habits of conversation and action. Aspiring beyond the imperfect condition of humanity, Plotinus and Porphyry longed to be divested of the body; and fancied, as we have seen, that they sometimes attained to this desired pitch of extatic felicity. *Ædesius*,

^e Examples of this frequently occur in Syrianus' Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and in Philoponus' Introduction to his Interpretation of the invaluable treatise *De Anima*.

^f Thence Proclus was called "*utriusque philosophi glutinum*." I. C. Scaliger in *Lib. Aristot. de Plantis*.

a favourite philosopher of the emperor Julian, told the royal and credulous apostate, that when he had completely imbibed the Platonic doctrines, he would be ashamed of his birth, and blush at being called a man^s. Proclus, one of the deepest of those teachers of darkness, professed himself an adept in all mysteries; conversed familiarly with Pan and Æsculapius; worshipped with their appropriate rites the gods of all nations, even of the Arabian Nomades; and undertook by Chaldæan oracles and Orphic

^s Eunapius in Vit. Chrysanth. Plato says divinely, "The two fountains of pleasure and pain perpetually flow; upon our befitting use of which, and our skill in drawing from them respectively, on fit occasions, and in due measure, the happiness or misery of life will perpetually depend." De Legib. l. i. p. 776. What do his mystical followers say? "There are two poisonous and enchanted wells, through which men are rendered forgetful of their past state, and regardless of their future destiny. Through the fastenings, and as it were the cramps of pain, and still more of pleasure, the soul is riveted to the body, and the material part augmented and invigorated at the expence of the intellectual. Pleasure therefore is always to be shunned; with its first emotions our intellectual faculties begin to suffer decay, and by any liberal indulgence in it, are irrecoverably lost. Porphy. de Abstin. i. 30. Synes. de Insomniis, p. 15. Plotin. & Procl. passim. By the ingraftment of such extravagant absurdities on their master's philosophy, did the Platonicians expose themselves to the reproach of weakening the cause of truth by a crude admixture of palpable error. The same unnatural speculations were carried to an extravagant pitch by the Jewish sect of the Essenes. (Josephus de Bell. Judaic. ii. 8 and Antiq. xviii. 1.) whose false philosophy St. Paul condemns in the ivth chapter of the Philippians and 2d of the Colossians. The 23d and 24th verses of Coloss. ii. are not clearly translated in our Bibles. The words mean "that the ordinances with regard to meat and drink, &c. are according to the doctrines of men, bearing a shew of wisdom, humility, and *voluntary worship*, (or, in the language of later times, "of works of supererogation,") but denying due honour to the body by withholding the things requisite to its support." A spurious Platonism had in consequence of the Macedonian dominion in the East been early introduced among the Jews. In the apocryphal book intitled "the Wisdom of Solomon," we find even the technical expressions employed by the Greek adepts in that mystic philosophy.

hymns

hymns to avert or cure the numerous infirmities of mind and body.^a

The style of the Platonicians must be acknowledged an express image of their thoughts; intricate, loaded, deformed by the monstrous coinage of new words, or the strange misapplication of old ones. In the whole of the golden chain there is not one luminous link. Porphyry's famous work against eating animal food, and both his and Iamblicus' life of Pythagoras contain indeed some less exceptionable passages patched and joined together from the fabulous writers above mentioned under the Ptolemies. But where themselves are the sole authors, few pages will be found in any of the Platonicians, which are not either disgraced by palpable contradictions or involved in impenetrable darkness¹. In the dialogues of Plato their pretended master, as well as in the various writings of his more legitimate disciples, Cicero, and Seneca, and Plutarch, philosophy is enlivened by history, and the dryness of abstract speculation perpetually relieved by references to the momentous concerns of public or private life. But the Platonicians shut their eyes to the transactions of the times, and even to the objects immediately

Style of
the Plato-
nicians.

^a Proclus used often to say that if it depended on him, these (counterfeit) hymns and (spurious) oracles, together with Plato's *Timæus*, should be the only works of the ancients freely permitted to the use of the public; because forsooth, other writings hurt some people who read them unadvisedly, *Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλὰς λήγειν*, &c. *Marinus*, p. 94.—A passage worthy of the Caliph Omar!

¹ Eunapius acknowledges that Porphyry's writings transcend human thought, yet he extols his style as perspicuous compared with that of Plotinus. *Eunap. in Vit. Sophist.* pp. 17, & 18.

around them. In proud disdain of the inferior powers of our nature, they scorn to be at all indebted to the senses or the fancy. Their inharmonious and distorted compositions are without colour to allure, or form to fix, or grace to captivate; and therefore, were their matter even praiseworthy, their manner only would expose them to the censure which Cicero passes on authors^k of an opposite sect, but similar in point of style, that they grossly abused the benefits both of learning and of leisure.

The Platonicians
coeval with
the decrepitude of
Reason and
Manhood.

It may seem extraordinary that a succession of men, deserving only of ridicule or of pity, should have been held in great estimation by their contemporaries for upwards of three centuries. But the Platonicians were coeval with the decrepitude of reason as well as manhood, since they began and flourished amidst the corruptions that ensued after the Roman world had been deformed by conflicting usurpers, overwhelmed by desolating barbarians, and remained in every province a prey to a brutal soldiery, as formidable to the tyrants whom they alternately exalted and debased, as those tyrants themselves were terrible to cowardly slaves or vanquished rivals. Through the pestilent intrigues of courts, or the acclamations of venal multitudes, men destitute of talent obtained power, and men devoid of taste acquired vogue and fashion. The

^k The first Epicurean writers among the Romans. See *Tusculan. Quæst. i. 3.* "Sed mandare quemquam literis cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec illustrare possit, nec delectatione aliquâ allicere lectorem, hominis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et literis." *Tusculan. Quæst. i. 3.*

rostrum, which Cicero had ennobled, was occupied by brawling advocates equally repulsive in style, and abject in sentiment. Contemtable sophists filled the gardens and porticoes, still adorned by the names of ancient sages. In the narrative of even recent events, truth and probability were most impudently violated, and the rules of just composition as completely disregarded as if they had never been established; the sole object of the disgusting romances given as histories of the times, being to flatter princes unworthy to reign, ministers incapable of deliberation, and generals unfit for execution. Such is the faithful picture¹ of Grecian and Roman degeneracy towards the close of the second century; a picture which continually assumed darker shades, until the total eclipse of sense and reason in the *theurgic* mysteries of the Platonic school.

This school, having reigned upwards of three hundred years in Alexandria, in Rome, and in Athens, was silenced, as we have seen, by Justinian towards the middle of the sixth century².

To avoid the farther persecution of this intolerant emperor, Damascius and Isidore, the last Platonic teachers in Athens, with five other philosophers of their sect, sought refuge in the court of Chosroes king of Persia, expecting to be received with still higher honours in that

The Platonicians, after the abolition of their schools by Justinian, remove to the East.

¹ See the works of Lucian throughout. He was the only writer of taste in his age; and the justness of his satire is confirmed by every monument of the times.

² Johan. Malala, vol. ii. p. 404.

Reception
there.

country under the revived authority of the Magi, than their precursor Apollonius^a had been five centuries before, while those wise men of the East, the supposed masters of Pythagoras and Plato, still groaned under the despotism of the Parthians. But here their illusion ended. The Magi were not those profound philosophers that they had been taught to believe. The Platonicians were offended at their impious custom, which had prevailed before the days of Herodotus^o, of exposing their dead bodies to dogs and vultures. They were disgusted also with the incestuous marriages of the Persians, their plurality of wives and concubines; the pride of their nobles, the servility of their courtiers; and determined therefore, with one consent, to return and die on the frontiers of the Roman Empire, rather than longer behold the odious manners of such abominable barbarians^p. Yet Chosroes gave a lesson of true wisdom, far surpassing all their philosophy. At his powerful interposition, expressed in a formal treaty with Justinian, the Platonicians were rescued from the penal statutes enacted against Paganism by that magnificent but ill-advised emperor, and permitted to end their days in peaceful obscurity^q. In that condition their names also might remain, did not one of the number, Simplicius the Cilician, form a noble exception to the

Simplicius
the Cili-
cian.

^a Philostrat. Vit. Apollon. p. 28—41.

^o Herodot. i. 140.

^p Agathias, l. ii. p. 69, & seq.

^q Id. ibid.

myfticism

mysticism and folly of his brethren. But Simplicius, though connected with the Platonicians by his age and fortune, daily nourished his mind with the works of ancient and more genuine philosophers. In explaining, indeed, Aristotle's abstruse doctrines on physics and theology, he is often betrayed by the whims of the eclectics and the fashion of the times^r; but in his excellent comment on the morals of Epictetus, we perpetually see the paradoxical roughness of stoicism smoothed into plain and sound sense by the *sure* conclusions of the Stagirite, because flowing spontaneously from a copious and pure source of well-digested experience.

The abolition of the Platonic academy by Justinian, did not destroy the credit of the sect itself. The wildest visions of the Platonicians were greedily adopted by the credulous Greeks of the declining empire of Constantinople, and by them frequently combined^s with the spurious Christianity long prevalent in that gloomy and corrupt capital. While the Abassides held the Caliphate of the Saracens in the eighth century, they failed not to observe the superiority of their

Adoption
of Greek
philosophy
by the
Arabs.

^r Vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. viii. p. 622. That he gave into the mode of allegorical interpretation, appears from the following short sentence, containing the just praise of Aristotle's perspicuity: *ἐπεὶ μύθοις ἢ διὰ συμβολικοῦς αἰνῆμασι ὡς τῶν προ αὐτοῦ τινες ἐχρησάμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ πάντος ἀλλῶ περιεκτασματος τῇ σαφείᾳ προτιμῶσι.* Simplic. in Proem. Lib. τῶν κατηγοριῶν. "He made not any use of fables, or dark symbols, like some philosophers before him, but preferred perspicuity to every other ornament."

^s A remarkable specimen of this mixture may be seen in the elaborate work of Michael Psellus *περὶ ἐνεργειᾶς δαιμονίων*, "concerning the operation of devils." Psellus was the favourite of the emperor Constantine Ducas about the middle of the eleventh century.

Greek subjects in learning above the other inhabitants of their vast empire. In the year eight hundred and twenty, the caliph Almanon demanded publicly from the Greek emperor Leo V. the most instructive and most precious writings of his countrymen. In the opinion of the Arab, these epithets belonged exclusively to works of science or philosophy, for the idolatry of Greek poets would have shocked his pious ears, and the liberty of historians and orators was incompatible with the spirit of his government and the genius of his people, who, as Giannone^t in relating this passage of history observes, never opened their mouths but to praise their tyrants. Of all the writings of the ancients, the works of Aristotle, as least infected with polytheism, most delighted the Arabs, after they had become their own through the labours of Honain a Greek physician at Bagdad^u, who with the assistance of his sons and disciples carried on there a sort of manufacture of translations during a considerable part of the ninth century.

By them
communicated in a
corrupt
state to the
scholastics.

Those Arabic versions expressed the letter of Greek philosophy without its spirit. In explaining Aristotle in particular, the interpreters were entirely guided by the fanciful glosses of their Alexandrian predecessors, as appears sufficiently from their copiers and imitators, the German Albertus Magnus, the Italian Thomas Aquinas,

^t *Historia del Regno de Napoli*, vol. ii. p. 93. Edit. Venez. 1766.

^u Honain died in that city A.D. 876. D'Herbelot *Biblioth. Orient. Artic. Honain.*

and

and other European scholastics of the thirteenth century. Those translations of translations gave birth to that strange compound of Gothic and Saracenic darkness, brightened occasionally by a few sparks of false subtlety, which long enslaved the Catholic world under the arrogated title of Aristotelian philosophy^{*}; but which, when compared with the genuine works of the great man whose name it disgraced, will be found to contain the husk of science without the kernel.

During the intellectual slumber of the Western world, Constantinople, after being long threatened, was finally conquered by the Turks. The danger and distress of that city filled Europe with Greeks successively craving public assistance and private protection, but whether they appeared as ambassadors or as fugitives, always ready to assume the character of professors, and to teach the language and learning of their country in the schools of Florence, Rome, and other great cities of Italy[†]. In that country, Manuel Chrysoloras, the Cardinal Bessarion, and the venerated master of both, Gemistus Pletho, together with many contemporary Greeks of inferior renown, are

Revival of letters in Italy by Greek ambassadors and fugitives.

^{*} The prosperity of Aristotelism was not always unclouded. Launoy enumerates eight different revolutions of its authority in the university of Paris. In the year 1209, Aristotle's writings were censured as the pestilent sources of heresy, and condemned to the flames. In the reign of Francis I. A.D. 1542, the same writings were held in such veneration that whoever denied their orthodoxy was persecuted as an infidel. Launoij de Var. Fortun. Aristot. in Academ. Paris. Oper. tom. iv. p. 206. Aristotle was not concerned either in the glory or disgrace; the attachment or dislike was merely to a name.

[†] Hodus de Græcis Illustribus, p. 25, & seq.

celebrated

Their philosophy concentrated by Ficinus; — his errors.

celebrated as the revivers of letters in the fifteenth century, and particularly for substituting, instead of the scholastic philosophy which then reigned in Christendom, one more graceful and liberal, as well as more accurate and more profound*. Without examining minutely how far they are justly entitled to this comparative praise, it may be observed that the new doctrines were warmly embraced by the great and learned in Italy, and by none more zealously than the illustrious Cosmo de Medici, the constant hearer of Gemistus Pletho, and the establisher of the Platonic academy in his native city of Florence; which after enriching it by commerce, he was ambitious to adorn by learning. Of this academy, Marsilius Ficinus continued during four successive generations of the Medici to be the ornament, or rather the oracle, having addicted himself from early youth to the study of the new science, and persevered in it unremittingly through life, uniting and concentrating all the scattered rays of the Greek teachers in his translations of Plato and Plotinus, and his elaborate comments on those authors. From the admired writings of Ficinus a just estimate may be formed of the merits of his Grecian contemporaries; and a very slight examination will suffice to convince us, that both he and they viewed ancient philosophy through the delusive optics of the Alexandrian school. The writings of this learned Italian are deformed by the myf-

* Tiraboschi, *Histor. Litterar.* vol. vi. p. 259. & seq.

tical

tical virtues of words and numbers, the dreams of astrology, the doctrines of perfectibility and theurgy, above all, the corruption of religion by false philosophy, and of philosophy by false religion^a. The reveries of the Platonicians, thus embodied by Ficinus with Plato's genuine doctrines, found their way into the subsequent edition of the works of that philosopher by Seranus, published an hundred years afterwards^b under the auspices of Henry IV. of France, when better things might have been expected both from the reformation in religion and the advancement of learning. But that which time has conjoined, it is a hard task for reason to differ.

The tenets of the Alexandrian school, as we have seen, were sometimes interwoven with the spurious Christianity of Constantinople. The logic of the Western scholastics, pretended followers of Aristotle, long upheld the superstitious hierarchy of Rome. Thus by a strange fatality, hitherto little remarked, the two great masters of Socratic philosophy, whose works, properly understood, lead men, as it were, to the very threshold of the gospel^c, being misinterpreted, perverted,

Platonicians wished to revive the exploded superstitions of Greece.

^a Vid. Ficin. de Vitâ cœlitûs comparand. The chapters de virtute verborum ad beneficium cœleste captandum, &c. breathe the spirit of Plotinus' Enneads, not of Plato's Dialogues.[†]

^b A.D. 1578.

^c Plato abounds in the rapturous yet rational enforcement of the self-denying, as well as of the more presumptuous virtues. From this circumstance chiefly, he is confidently opposed to the divine author of our religion by the first learned adversaries of the gospel, who sometimes consider Christianity as a peculiar species merely of that Oriental or Pythagorean philosophy, which had been translated, embellished,

Hopes of
Gemistus
Pletho.

perverted, and corrupted, were called in as auxiliaries to stifle conscience which they had laboured to awake, and to cloud reason which they were admirably fitted to illumine. But the perversions of Platonism, taking their rise, as we have explained, in the incongruous mixture of philosophy and mythology, always continued favourable to the childish fables of antiquity. As the Platonicians under the Ptolemies exerted themselves to rivet the chains of paganism, so the Platonicians under the Roman emperors combated furiously to defend it, and the Platonicians, under the Medici, hoped to see the world resume that exploded superstition. Gemistus Pletho, who assisted at the council of Florence in 1438, maintained in the learned conferences held there, that all mankind would in a few years become of one religion; and being asked "whether the Christian or Mahometan?" replied "neither of these, but a religion nearly akin to that of the Gentiles:" meaning thereby the mythology of the Greeks improved by the conceits and allegories of the Platonicians.^d

embellished, and purified in the works of Plato. At the same time, he is the only heathen philosopher that many Christian fathers, after lopping off certain redundancies, were inclined to admit within the pale of the church. But before he could be entitled to this benefit, Plato must have submitted to a dreadful moral circumcision; and a decisive passage in his *Phædrus* (p. 1218. edit. Ficin.), equally unremarked by his admirers and his detractors, will prove how far below the blameless purity of the gospel are the highest attainments of human reason, ever liable to be influenced by custom, institution, and the most abominable examples of the times.

^d Leo Allatius de Georgiis apud Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. tom. x. p. 751.

In

In the popedom of Paul II. several members of the Platonic academy of Rome were persecuted for impiety and paganism^c. Persecution of all kinds is inconsistent with Christianity as well as with good policy: but that the charges against those Platonicians were not altogether groundless, appears from a letter, still extant, of an illustrious member of the sacred college during the reign of Paul II. and four preceding pontiffs. Cardinal Bessarion, to whom I allude, has been already mentioned as the pupil of Gemistus Pletho, and a zealous propagator of his opinions in Italy. Upon the death of this venerated preceptor, the Christian Cardinal thus addresses his surviving sons Demetrius and Andronicus: "I have just learned that the common father and instructor of us all has thrown off his earthly covering, and taken flight to the pure regions of heaven, to join in the mystic dance of Bacchus with the Olympian Gods. I rejoice in having been the friend and companion of such a man, than whom, after Plato himself, Greece cannot boast a wiser. To those who embrace the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the perpetual ascent and descent of souls, I should not hesitate to affirm that the soul of Plato, bound by the resistless laws of fate, had fulfilled the stated return of earthly pilgrimage in the body of Pletho, as its fittest terrestrial mansion. You will not act worthily unless you rejoice and clap your hands; for it would be

Strange,
letter of
Cardinal
Bessarion.

^c Tiraboschi, ubi supra.

impious

impious to lament such a man ; a man who confers glory on Greece, and whose glory will never perish with posterity.”^f

Roger Bacon.

It may be asked with just surprize, whether no voice was raised in favour of genuine philosophy amidst the gross corruptions which assumed its name, and usurped its honours ? A voice indeed was raised, but stifled by the barbarism of the times. The calumniated, persecuted, and oppressed life of Roger Bacon embraced nearly the full extent of the thirteenth century. The greatest, or rather the only astronomer of his age, the reformer of the calendar, the inventor of gunpowder, the contriver of various sorts of glasses, to magnify or diminish objects ; his discoveries instead of enlightening, dazzled the weaker eyes of his contemporaries, by whom they were referred to magic and other abominable infernal arts. Of this great man, the real glory of England, the name was afterwards borne by an illustrious philosopher, who rivals his fame, without possessing any share of his candour. The Chancellor Bacon is continually copying Aristotle, and continually abusing him for the errors of his interpreters and commenters. The more equitable friar maintained that Aristotle, rightly understood, was the fountain of all knowledge ; but asserted with equal firmness, that those who had undertaken to translate him were totally unequal to the task.^g

^f Fabricius, tom. x. p. 757.

^g Vid. Opus Majus, London, 1723. Conf. pp. 45. 262. & 410.

The

The justness of such observations will not be disputed by those who know both the invaluable writings of the Stagirite himself, and the vile logomachy which passed for science under his venerated name. During the five centuries and a half that the scholastic philosophy prevailed, those called the learned, obstinately shut their eyes to the two only genuine sources of knowledge, nature and antiquity, of both which the works of Aristotle contained an unrivalled and exhaustless treasury. They stopped short at his logic, and thus stuck as it were at the very threshold of the noble edifice which he had prepared for the reception of worthy and liberal followers. From the time of Roscellinus canon of Compiègne in the eleventh century, and his more famous scholar Abelard, immortalized by his amorous follies and misfortunes, the scholastics were divided into the two sects of Nominalists and Realists; the former of whom were so called because they held the doctrine of universals in logic to depend solely on *names* or words, and treated the Platonic ideas of the Realists as mere illusions of the fancy. Thenceforward the whole succession of scholastic doctors enlisted under the adverse standards of Roscellinus, the reputed founder of the Nominalists; and of Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, who espoused the cause of *ideas*, whose champions received the correlative appellation of Realists. In their fierce and scandalous disputes, which, proceeding from words to blows, often ended in the mutilation and death of the combatants, the name of

Scholastics,
Nominal-
ists and
Realists.

of Aristotle was continually invoked on both sides, though both of them most flagrantly violated his authority: the Realists animating and embodying wild creations of the fancy under the name of substantial forms, while the Nominalists subtilised all knowledge, even theology itself, into shadowy notion and mere empty sound.^a

Extravagances of the former traced up to Alexander Aphrodisiensis.

In these two extremes of opposite absurdity, the scholastics had not the merit or disgrace of originality. The extravagances of the Realists flowed naturally from the Platonic visions, above explained; and the false subtleties of the Nominalists may be traced more immediately to Alexander Aphrodisiensis a Greek commentator of Aristotle in the time of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, towards the commencement of the third century. Alexander derived the epithet affixed to his name from Aphrodisias a city of Caria in which he was born, but flourished at Rome and Alexandria as a distinguished teacher of Peripatetic philosophy, until, by the emperor Severus, he was placed at the head of the Lyceum in Athens. By the few who rejected the fanciful glosses with which the Platonicians had loaded Aristotle's philosophy, Alexander was called *the Interpreter*, by way of excellence; although he only avoided one extreme, to fall into another equally erroneous and still more dangerous. The reader, who is not possessed of the works of this famed commentator, may see

^a Vid. Brucker, *Histor. Philosoph.* vol. iii. p. 709. His *Section de Scholasticis* is one of the least faulty of all those parts of his work which bear any relation to Aristotle.

a short

a short and faithful account of them in the Greek library of Fabricius¹; and he will not proceed far in examining their contents, without perceiving that, with respect to many important questions, the Aphrodisian dogmatizes in a manner altogether unwarranted by the text of his admired original. As an example of this audacity, I shall adduce his execrable doctrine concerning the human soul! Alexander on this subject patronizes the *fallacious* notion (because contrary to the surest of all things, divine justice) of eternal sleep; asserting with the rash pendency of an unfeeling scholastic, that those who maintained the soul's immortality lied as manifestly as if they affirmed that two and two made five.

He denies the soul's immortality.

It is not impossible to explain precisely how Alexander came to hold this impious language, at complete variance with the sentiments of his acknowledged master. The Aphrodisian was a decided enemy, as already observed, to *Platonic ideas*, or what the schoolmen afterwards called *substantial forms*; in other words, he denied that general terms had any general corresponding archetypes. In this, he defended genuine philosophy against the Platonicians, since Aristotle continually repeats that, from their agreement in characterizing qualities, various individuals are gathered^k, as it were, and ranged by the

How led into that error in opposition to Aristotle.

¹ L. iv. c. 25.

^k ὁ λογος υἱος τῆ πραγματος . . . καὶ ὁ λογος συγκαταί εἰς οὐματα. Aristot. de Anima, l. i. c. 1. p. 618. & de Sensu, c. 1. p. 663. The word λογος, here denoting "definition," is derived from the word λαγειν, signifying primarily to gather.

understanding under one common term, which term has not any separate archetype or model beside what is found in the different individuals so marked or named. According to this doctrine, those specific powers of mind by which man is denominated and distinguished from other animals, have not any separate archetype or model beside what is found in the different individuals collected under the term "man." Aristotle says farther, "that the characterizing qualities, or forms, of many physical objects are inseparably combined with matter, because independently of it they could not answer any possible end. Of what use would be the nutritive principle in plants, were it not contained in a material substance to be nourished? To what purpose would the fierce instincts of the lion serve, if separated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members? It is therefore," he observes, "unreasonable to admit the Pythagorean and Platonic notion concerning the separate existence of such forms or souls, and their perpetual migration from one body to another. The several arts can only make use of their appropriate instruments; and in the same manner different souls must have bodies respectively adapted to them¹. To interchange them at random, would be not less absurd than to implant the power of building into a flute." These just observations, directed against the fanciful but popular doctrine of "transmigration," which the Greeks with other follies borrowed from the East, bear

¹ Aristot. de Anima, L. i. c. 3. p. 624.

not,

not, when properly understood, any relation to the question concerning the immortality of the human soul; since, in Aristotle's philosophy, the terms "species or form" are applied to whatever serves to characterize and class objects, whether that be merely a specific and principal quality; or whether it be a substance inseparable from matter because separately unfit for any end or use; or whether it be a substance capable of actions and pleasures peculiar to itself, and so totally different from those of gross matter, and any of its variable affections, that, when separated from this mortal corporeal frame, it will then, and then only, assume its native activity, perfection, and dignity.^m

I have thus written a *short* account (thinking such only would be acceptable) of Aristotle's *Greek* commentators. The *Arabic* and *Latin* Mr. T. abandons generally to my just censureⁿ: but with regard to my opinion of the Greek interpreters, he exclaims, "What! after a period of more than two thousand years, after the abolition of the Academic and Peripatetic schools, when philosophy has retired into deep solitude, and even echo no longer answers to her lyre, shall one who is no native of Greece, and who

Errors in explaining Aristotle, originating in Greek commentators,

^m See the texts cited in my Analysis, p. 153. The error of Alexander Aphrodisiensis was early seen through. Hence the respectable observation, casually preserved amidst many reveries; *ὅτι Πλάτων, φησι, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀθάνατον ὁμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τινὲς ὡς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκ ἐμβάθυνοντι, ὅτι τὴν κομίζουσι αὐτοὶ λέγουσι.*— "That Plato and Aristotle agreed as to the soul's immortality: though some men, not founting the depths of the Stagirite's philosophy, made him hold a contrary opinion."—Photius, Biblioth. cod. cclix. p. 1318.

ⁿ Taylor, p. 42., Introduction.

is totally unskilled, as we have seen and shall still farther see, in the sublimer parts of Aristotle's works, presume to vilify the writings of men of exalted genius, who devoted their lives to the study of the Peripatetic and Platonic philosophy, of which they had a traditional knowledge, and had the felicity of having the Greek for their native tongue, and of being able to consult books written by the immediate disciples of Aristotle and Plato, and which are now irrecoverably lost?" If my time was mispent in perusing such writers, my adversary assures the public, "that it was because I did not understand them". Concerning this accusation, the reader will decide: I shall only observe that, if my "Analysis of Aristotle is more consistent and satisfactory" than other accounts of his philosophy, it derives these advantages solely from my rejecting foreign aid, and making this inestimable writer a perpetual commentary on himself. How far Mr. T. has enlightened the world by pursuing an opposite course, will appear from his work throughout, and may be discerned even in the first page of his Translation. Under the guidance of his *divine Plotinus*, he

° Taylor, p. 43, Introduction.

p Ibid.

q I arrogate not those epithets to my own performance, but refer to the general voice of public criticism in the years 1798 and 1799: the Monthly, Critical, and Analytical Reviews, the Antijacobin and the British Critic. Mr. T. will perhaps scorn this verdict of "Reviewers," whose "dull impertinence and savage malevolence" he bitterly complains of, p. 51. Naughty Reviewers! whose *dullness*, *impertinence*, and *malevolence*, could insult so *lively*, *modest*, and *candid* a writer, as Mr. Taylor must by this time appear to be!

maintains at the outset, a proposition contradictory both to the spirit and the letter of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. His proposition is, "that no action is desirable for its own sake;" adding, "that Plotinus beautifully proves that all things desire contemplation, and verge to this as their end; not only rational, but also irrational animals, plants, and whatever participates of life, however debile and obscure." Sublime truths! far exalted above ordinary comprehension, which the bright intellect of Plotinus alone could produce and hatch, and the congenial understanding of Mr. T. adopt and cherish!

If that translator of "the Metaphysics" had been as skilful in Greek as he is profound in philosophy, he would not have recommended, as essential to the right understanding of Aristotle, the commentary of Alexander Aphrodisiensis. Alexander's commentary on the Metaphysics now exists only in a Latin version; and cannot therefore afford much assistance to a man capable of reading the Greek original, and who wishes to convey its sense clearly, to his countrymen, in their native-tongue. For it has often been truly observed, "that Latin translations from the Greek are seldom intelligible, except where their assistance is superfluous to a Greek scholar: they glide over difficulties with impunity; when they cannot resolve, they elude them; enfolding their ænigmas in plausible sounds, which often

and in
Latin
translations.

[†] Taylor's Metaphysics, p. 1.

^{*} Introduction, pp. 24. 54. & passim.

fail to convey any determinate meaning'." This criticism applies with peculiar force to the Latin commentary of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, as well as to all the other Latin interpretations of Aristotle, that I have ever happened to examine.

Conclusion
in answer
to Mr. Tay-
lor's stric-
tures.

The nature and scope of my literary labours are so totally different from those of Mr. Taylor, that it is not easy to understand how our roads could cross, or why he should step forth as my determined antagonist. Utility, common and vulgar utility, above which that sublime author proudly soars, was my great or rather sole aim. Aristotle's Ethics to Nicomachus had long appeared to me, and to far superior judges, the most instructive and most persuasive system of practical morality which the world had ever received from an uninspired pen: his Politics, also, are not less advantageously distinguished, since they contain exclusively the correct and genuine elements of a science, often cramped by the narrowness of system, and often perverted by its wildness; above all, recently poisoned by doctrines dangerous in every age, but, taken in conjunction with the events of the present, fraught with unspeakable mischief to our own and succeeding generations. In hope of being useful to my country by seasonable service, I suspended a literary undertaking of far more allure-ment, in which having spent a dozen years of my life, I am still diligently employed; and endeavoured to translate for the first time the Sta-

* See preface to my translations of Lyfias and Ifocrates.

girite's

girate's two most valuable treatises, popularly, to obtain readers, and faithfully, to deserve them.

But before offering my work to the public, it occurred to me that ethics, and still more, politics, belong not to that class of sciences, which contain their evidence so completely in themselves, as to disdain all support from authority. To the student in Euclid's Elements, it is not material to know under what condition of society and among what sort of men that mathematician lived, and in what degree of esteem his talents or his virtues were held by his contemporaries. To the reader of Aristotle's Politics, the same questions are not unimportant. Besides a translation of those practical works in which my author's intellectual exertions are still unrivalled, I therefore thought proper to give a general account of his life and writings, (not omitting his Physics and Metaphysics,) that his undeviating worth of character and real pre-eminence in abstract science might appear in a striking light; and thereby his moral and political lessons, instead of being invalidated by the trifling subtleties or glaring absurdities erroneously ascribed to him, might derive due weight from his virtues as a man, and his attainments as a philosopher. Amidst the unparalleled multitude of books, of which my author has been the subject, had I known of any thing in any language answering the design of the "Analysis" which has provoked Mr. Taylor's strictures, I should most willingly have referred to it, and

thus have spared myself an unpromising and very difficult task. But, in the want of better performances from others, I endeavoured, with as much brevity as the subject would admit, to explain the nature and end of Aristotle's *speculative philosophy*; an undertaking essential to my main purpose of impressing with full force *momentous practical truths*.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE poet Gray writes thus in a letter to a friend: "For my part I read Aristotle, his poetics, politics, and morals; though I do not know well, which is which. In the first place, he is the hardest author by far I ever meddled with. Then he has a dry conciseness, that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents rather than a book: it tastes for all the world like chopped hay, or rather like chopped logic; for he has a violent affection for that art, being in some sort his own invention; so that he often loses himself in little trifling distinctions and verbal niceties; and what is worse, leaves you to extricate him as well as you can. Thirdly, he has suffered vastly from the transcribers, as all authors of great brevity necessarily must. Fourthly and lastly, he has abundance of fine uncommon things, which make him well worth the pains he gives one." See Gray's Letters.

In

BOOK
I.

B O O K

I.

In this first book, our author says “ abundance of fine uncommon things,” on the subjects of human nature, virtue, and happiness. His mode of composition, however, is so totally different from that to which the caprice of fashion has given its temporary sanction, that much labour and much skill must be employed, to adapt the form of his work to the taste of modern readers ; to whom both his method and his style, which formerly appeared to deserve admiration^a, may now seem to demand apology. His method requires, that every subject of discussion should be accurately defined, and completely divided ; and that, how complex soever its nature may be, the compound should be resolved into its constituent elements ; viewed in its birth and origin ; and examined, in all its various modifications and changes, intensions or remissions, augmentations or diminutions. This mode of proceeding appeared to him peculiarly useful in moral and political questions, whose connections and relations are so intimate and so extensive, that erroneous conclusions, on such subjects, proceed far more frequently from narrowness of survey, than from inaccuracy of reasoning. In practical matters above all, this full and comprehensive examination seemed indispensably necessary, to prevent hasty decision, to inspire cautious distrust ; and thus to arrest the progress of passion and frenzy in a mad career which, longer indulged in, might leave them without retreat.

^a Cicero, Topic. c. i. p. 171. edit. Olivet. & passim.

But,

But, with whatever other advantages a treatise written with this strictness and severity of method may be accompanied, it certainly is not calculated to afford *gratuitous* information. To apprehend its meaning distinctly, and to perceive its full scope, demands much attention and much reflection on the part even of the reader. His patience is likely to be soon exhausted by the too painful task; especially if his taste has been corrupted by those flowery and fallacious productions of the times, whose authors (men of narrow views and selfish minds, and so long habituated to party politics, that they have lost all relish, and almost all perception of truth,) are contented to confound and darken a whole region of science, provided they can throw a false glare on one favourite and fashionable spot. This darling topic they exert themselves to beautify and illumine; adorning with all the tinsel of rhetoric, and all the embroidery of declamation, the dangerous inference that is drawn from their erroneous, because imperfect, argument. Nothing can be more smooth or more easily followed by the reader, than the whole progress of their discourse. But the very circumstance which renders it so easy and so popular, also makes it of no value. The subject has been considered under one partial aspect; a different view of it is taken; the incomplete theory is attacked by another equally imperfect; and both of them so flimsy and cloud-built, that they are unable to withstand even the soft mutual assaults of their adverse debility.

Yet

B O O K
I.

BOOK Yet each party triumphs for a while in the bubble of its own creating, and vainly deems it irresistible; a false confidence, that often gives birth to the greatest practical errors. Aristotle's method is directly the reverse: his works require attention, but they repay it: they will fully compensate, in solid instruction, for their defect (if it may be called one) in point of delusive entertainment.

I.

The Stagirite's style is not less unfashionable than his method. It displays not any allurements to catch the reader's fancy; it disdains every attempt to excite surprise, to provoke mirth, to inflame, soothe, or gratify passion. The thirst for knowledge is the only want which the author professes to supply; and this thirst, he was of opinion, will ever be best quenched in the clear stream of unadorned reason; as that water is the purest and most salutary, which has neither taste nor colour.

Aristotle did not, like his master Plato, banish poets from his Republic. He himself courted the Lyric muse, and reached her loftiest flights. But he never understood by what perversity of purpose the agreeable illusions of poetry could be associated and mixed with the sober science of politics. In all practical matters, he knew the danger of saying any thing to the heart and passions, which would not bear to be examined by the light of the understanding. In translating incomparably the most valuable part of his works, I have attempted therefore to imitate his precision and energy, as far as that can be done without

without leaving the faintest trace of his obscurity. **BOOK**
 My aim throughout is to adhere rigidly to his **I.**
 sense; to omit nothing which he says; to say
 nothing which he has omitted; but to en-
 deavour, to the best of my abilities, to express
 his meaning, agreeably as well as forcibly; since
 a mere verbal translation would convey not only
 an inadequate, but often a very false, impression
 of the Greek original.

Words, as our author teaches, are both the
 signs of things, and the materials in which our
 comparisons, abstractions, and conclusions con-
 cerning those things are embodied. The words
 of one language, therefore, will often be very
 imperfectly expressed by those of another; and
 the more complex their significations are, the
 diversities between them will naturally be the
 wider. To the terms employed in the sciences
 of Ethics and Politics, this observation is pecu-
 liarly applicable. The original term, and that
 by which it is translated, not comprehending
 exactly the same identical notions, the English
 word which corresponds to the Greek in one of
 its meanings, will often not express it in another.
 The phraseology, therefore, must be occasionally
 varied; and the ambition to attain propriety and
 excellence will thus sometimes give to a trans-
 lation the appearance of looseness and inac-
 curacy. In many cases, exact equivalents to
 single Greek words are not to be found either in
 English, or in any other language. One term,
 therefore, must frequently be rendered by
 several; and the translation, necessarily de-
 generating

BOOK ^{I.} generating into a paraphrase, will often gain in perspicuity and popularity, what it loses in precision and energy^b. From the philosophical arrangement of the Greek tongue, and the singular fondness of Greek writers for abstract and universal conclusions, words denoting the higher genera or classes, are employed by them on many occasions, when terms more specific would answer the purpose better, and sound more gracefully, in English. With regard to this particular, I have sometimes ventured to prefer to strictness of version, a compliance with the genius of modern tongues, and with the taste of modern readers.

My principal design and only ambition is to convey, in the present state of public opinion with respect to fundamental principles, a clear notion of those writings of the Stagirite which he intitled his "Philosophy concerning Human Affairs^c." His Ethics, I believe, few men will read without becoming the better; and his Politics, I think, no statesman can study, without

^b When the Greek language was more familiarly known than it is at present, Aristotle's style was acknowledged by the best critics to possess the highest of all merits, that of conveying his deep and various wisdom always in the fittest terms. *Dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia, tum etiam suavitate.* Cicero, *Topic. c. i. p. 171.* edit. Oliveti. Quintilian speaks to the same purpose: *Quid Aristotelem? quem dubito scientiâ rerum, an scriptorum copiâ, an eloquendi suavitate, an inventionum acumine, an varietate operum, clariorem puto.* "Why need I mention Aristotle? concerning whom I am in doubt, whether he is rendered more illustrious by the magnitude and variety of his writings, his universal science, the acuteness of his inventions, or the suavity of his diction." Quintil. *Inf. Orat. l. x. c. i. p. 224.* edit. Bipont.

^c *ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία.*

becoming

becoming the wiser. But the corrupt and mu- BOOK
 tilated state of his works compelled me, reluc- I.
 tantly, to use some freedom with their form, in }
 order the more completely to preserve their
 substance. In different books, and even in dif-
 ferent chapters of the same book, the same
 thoughts often recur in nearly the same words.
 These useless repetitions, proceeding commonly
 from the fault of unskilful editors, I thought it
 my duty to retrench; and continually to aim
 at selecting that expression in which the sense is
 most fully conveyed. A translation is a portrait;
 but that the portrait may please, the original
 should be shown with its most becoming ex-
 pression, and in its best attitudes.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Human action—Operations and productions—Happiness—Opinions concerning it—It consists in virtuous energies—Proved by induction—Solon's saying concerning it explained—Analysis of our moral powers.

BOOK
I.

Chap. I.

Human action terminates either in operations or in productions.

SINCE every art and every kind of knowledge, as well as all the actions and all the deliberations of men constantly aim at something which they call good; good, in general, may be justly defined, "that which all desire." But among the various ends and purposes of our activity and pursuit, there is this important difference, that some consist merely in operations, and others chiefly in productions. Of those arts or actions of which production is the chief end, the work is more valuable than the operation by which it was produced; and, as there is a wide variety of arts and actions, there must be a correspondent variety of ends: of the medical art, health; of ship-building, a vessel; of generalship, victory; of œconomy, riches. It often happens that arts rise one above another in dignity, and that all those of an inferior sort are subservient to one principal, their natural and acknowledged sovereign. Thus bridle-making is subservient to horsemanship; and horsemanship to war; and the

the end of the subservient art is plainly less valuable than that of the art to which it ministers, because the former is pursued merely for the sake of the latter. This holds universally, whether the ends of human action consist in operations or in productions.

B O O K
I.

But if there be an ultimate end of all human pursuit, an end desirable merely in itself, (and unless there be such an end, desire, proceeding to infinity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this ultimate end must be what is called good; and of goods, the best. The knowledge of it, also, must greatly contribute to the benefit of life; serving, as a butt to bowmen, for the direction of our views and actions. Let us, therefore, endeavour to delineate it carefully, first premising that the investigation of it belongs to that master-science called politics; a science which regulates and appoints what are the other sciences, as well as what are the arts that ought to be introduced into cities, what kinds of them the different classes of citizens ought respectively to learn, and to what extent each in particular ought to be known and cultivated. The most honourable functions of a civil or military nature; those of the orator, financier, or general, are but instruments employed by politics for promoting human happiness; which, if precisely one and the same in states and individuals, must, with regard to the former, be more difficult both to produce and to maintain. How delightful is it to make individuals happy! but to effect the happiness of states is an employment still more divine.

Chap. 2.

It belongs
to politics
to investi-
gate the
chief end
of man.

B O O K divine. Such then is the aim of this work,
 I. which is entirely of a political nature.^d

Chap. 3.

The proper method of treating moral and political philosophy, and the fit character of its hearers.

It will be our endeavour to attain that accuracy which the nature of the subject admits; for perfection is not required in all the labours of the mind, any more than in all the works of the hand. Political justice or virtue seems liable to this uncertainty, that it depends rather on law than on nature. The good, or end, at which this virtue aims, seems to be not less doubtful; since much evil is frequently its result. Many are ruined by their wealth, and many by their courage. In matters so little stable we must be contented, therefore, with catching the general features of truth; and our conclusions will deserve to be approved, if in most cases they are found to be useful and applicable; for it is the part of wisdom to be satisfied in each subject with that kind of evidence which the nature of the subject allows; it not being less absurd to require demonstrations from an orator, than to be contented with probabilities from a mathematician. Of performances in each science, those only can appreciate the merit by whom that science has been studied. From a work on politics, therefore, those alone can derive much benefit who have acquired a general and practical knowledge of human nature. Youth is not

^d In the *Magna Moralia*, l. i. c. i. p. 145. the following reason is given why Ethics should be considered as a part of politics, *εἰς δὲ εἶθις ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατόν προεῖναι αὐτὴν τὴν ποιοῦν τινὰ μὲναι, &c.* "That it is impossible to do any thing in politics, without having men endowed with certain habits; wherefore Ethics," he observes, "are likely to be a part, as well as the principle and source, of politics."

the

the season for such a study; for youth is unexperienced in the business of life, which is both the source and the object of all sound political reasoning. It makes not any difference whether a man is young in point of years, or in point of character; for his inaptitude arises entirely from his boyish pursuits, and childish opinions. But to those whose passions have been disciplined by the maturity of years and reason, this kind of knowledge will afford both pleasure and profit. Thus much concerning our subject, the mode of treating it, and the character of those to whom our discourse is addressed.

Let us resume, therefore, by inquiring, since all our thoughts and desires aim at some kind of good, what is the end of the science called politics: or, in other words, what is the principal of all those goods resulting from the proper direction of human action? Its name is universally^e acknowledged; both the learned and the multitude call it happiness^f. But as to the thing itself, there is a wide diversity of opinion between philosophers and the vulgar. The latter place happiness in things visible and palpable: in pleasure, wealth, honour; and, often changing their minds, they place it, when sick, in health; when poor, in riches; and when they reflect on their own ignorance, they deem those

Chap. 4.

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Different
opinions
concerning
happiness.

^e σχιδον ὑπο των πλειων ὁμολογεται. "Almost acknowledged by the most," which seems merely a modest way of speaking, not tolerable in English.

^f το δε ευ ζην και ευ πραττειν ταυτον ὑπολαμβανον τη ευδαιμονειν. "To live well and to act well, they reckon synonymous with being happy." This sentence is omitted.

BOOK ^{I.} most happy who can boast their attainments in science. Some philosophers again think, that, besides all these particular and relative goods, there is a good in itself absolutely, the cause of this quality in other things, which deserve to be called good merely because they participate of this absolute goodness. It would be useless to enumerate all the variety of opinions; let it suffice to mention and afterwards to examine, the most prevalent, or the most reasonable; premising that in all our inquiries, we may either proceed from principles, or mount up towards them. Plato, therefore, doubted which of the two was the best mode of investigation; as, in the Olympic Stadium, whether the proper course proceeded from the judges to the goal, or from the goal to the judges^f. In other sciences, we ought to begin from the things best known; either absolutely in themselves, from the simplicity and stability of their nature; or relatively to the inquirer, because most familiar to his senses, his observation, and experience^g. But in politics, we ought to begin by operating on the moral nature of man, since the first requisite is to have disciples habituated to the practice of virtue. Such persons either know, or will soon understand, principles^h. But for those of a different character, let them hearken to Hesiod.

The

^f See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. v. p. 228.

^g For the sake of perspicuity, I have here expanded Aristotle's thought by borrowing expressions frequently repeated in his Analytics and Metaphysics.

^h Aristotle says, they know that the thing is, and therefore need not be taught its cause; they have a practical knowledge of virtue, which is

The best and noblest of the human kind,
 Are those endow'd with a deep-thinking mind ;
 Nor are *they* useless, who such men obey,
 Submitting still to wisdom's lawful sway ;
 But he, who though unfit his ways to rule,
 Yet will not to a wiser go to school,
 That man is, sure, a good-for-nothing fool.¹ }

To return from this digression; men's notions of happiness may easily be conjectured from the lives which they lead. The gross vulgar of mankind think of nothing but pleasure, and therefore pursue a life of mere sensual enjoyment; constrained like slaves, and stupid as cattle. Their error is excusable, since many of the great set them an example which themselves seem to have copied from the sottish Sardanapalus. A second plan of life is that preferred by men of activity and enterprise, who eagerly engage in the public concerns of their country, and have honour for their object. But this honour is a thing too superficial and flimsy to be the happiness of which we are in quest. It seems to depend, not less on those who confer honours, than on those who pursue them. But of happiness, we augur that must be something independent and permanent. Besides, these troublesome honours

Chap. 5.

Those opinions examined.

is better than its theory; and this practical knowledge is itself a principle instilled and confirmed by experience and custom. See the end of chapter vii. It may be further observed, that our author, with his usual modesty, says, *perhaps* we ought to begin with the things best known to ourselves; and *therefore* those only are qualified to study politics with advantage, who have been previously trained to good morals. I have inverted the order, because the latter is proved in chapter iii.

¹ Hesiod, *Eglog.* l. 293.

B O O K are courted chiefly for the purpose of flattering self-love, for removing just suspicions of our own unworthiness, and for rendering us in our own conceit virtuous and happy. For this reason we take most pride in being honoured by men of sense, by those who best know us, and for meritorious actions. Virtue, therefore, is plainly more valuable than honour, even in the estimation of those by whom honour is most coveted; since the latter is pursued merely as the sign and shadow of the former. But virtue alone does not constitute happiness. A man possessed of virtue may be asleep or inactive; he may never, through life, have an opportunity of exhibiting his good qualities; and notwithstanding these qualities, he may frequently be involved in the greatest disasters. Such a man was never, except for argument's sake, pronounced happy. But enough on this subject, which has been already treated in our popular discourses. A third plan of life is that of the speculative philosopher, which shall be examined in the sequel. A life of money-making and commerce is plainly a state of toil and trouble; and riches cannot be the good inquired after, because they are desired, not on their own account, but for the purposes which they answer; and are valuable, not as ends, but merely as instruments. The other schemes of happiness are, therefore, preferable to that of the money-maker; but even those, it appears, are defective; in confirmation of which, many arguments may be produced, which we shall not at present urge.

I I

It

It may, perhaps, be better to consider good, absolute and universal; which, according to some philosophers, is the only real good, by the participation of which alone, other things can be entitled to this epithet. To me the task of examining this opinion is unpleasant and irksome, because the doctrine of universals and ideas was introduced by those for whom I have the greatest friendship*. Yet even his own systems a philosopher will be the first to demolish, when they stand in the way of truth; nor ought the sacred name of friendship ever to obstruct a thing still more sacred than itself. Those who introduced the doctrine of ideas allow that it is not applicable to things prior in order the one to the other¹, and therefore not applicable to number. But the word "good" applies equally to substances, to modes, and to relations; although substances are certainly prior in order to modes and relations, which are the affections or appendages of substances. The word "good" therefore when applied to both, is not taken in the same sense; and therefore it does not denote

BOOK

I.
Chap. 6.Examina-
tion of
Plato's opi-
nion con-
cerning the
chief good;
and refuta-
tion of the
doctrine of
ideas.

* The author means Plato. He says, in his *Magna Moralia*, p. 145, that Pythagoras first treated of virtue, but improperly; since he explained the science of Ethics by that of numbers, confounding speculations altogether heterogeneous. Socrates spoke better and more perspicuously: but his theory is imperfect, because he makes the virtues matters of science; for science belongs only to the intellect or rational part of the soul, whereas the virtues belong not only to that, but (as will be fully explained hereafter) to the irrational part, consisting in the passions and appetites. Plato followed, well distinguishing the rational and irrational principles, but perplexing and darkening the subject of Ethics, by mixing with it the doctrine of ideas. See *Analytics*, p. 59, & seq.

¹ *Eudem*, *Ethic.* l. i. c. viii. p. 201.—See also *Analytics*, p. 68, & seq.

B O O K any common idea. Good, indeed, is said in as
 I. many ways as being: thus, it is applied to God,
 and the human mind, which are substances; to the virtues, which are qualities; to utility, which is a relation; to mediocrity, which is quantity; to the critical moment, which is time; and to a fit residence, which is place^m. It is plain, therefore, that the word "good" applied to things so different, does not denote any one idea common to all those classes or categories. If it did, all kinds of good would belong to one and the same science. But we find that various sciences are requisite for ascertaining the different kinds of good, even in one and the same category. Thus, the critical moment in war is ascertained by a general; in disease, by a physician. The medical science determines what is mediocrity with respect to diet; and the gymnastic, what is mediocrity in point of exercise. It is difficult to know wherein consists the difference between the idea of a man and a man, since both must be defined by the same terms. The same observation applies to good, and the idea of good. The eternity ascribed to the latter, does not make any difference; for that which is white now, is as much white, as what has continued white for an indefinite length of time. The Pythagoreans reason better when they distinguish various kinds of good and evilⁿ; in which they seem to be fol-

^m Aristotle says, *εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ*, meaning the other categories. See above, p. 68.

ⁿ Aristotle says, they placed one in the co-arrangement of good. See above, p. 129.

lowed

lowed by Speusippus°. But of this subject we shall treat hereafter. Some uncertainty seems still to adhere to the observations above made, because we have not sufficiently distinguished the two kinds of goods; those which are loved and pursued for their own sake only, and those which are loved and pursued merely because they are fitted to produce or preserve the former, or to ward off the contrary evils. Let us separate, therefore, from things merely useful to some further end, things called good in themselves, and consider whether this epithet is bestowed on all of them precisely in the same sense. What are these intrinsic goods, unless such things as we wish to obtain and enjoy for their own sake only; pleasures, honours, the exercise of our sight or understanding? Such things may be useful, but they are not merely useful, since, independently of any purpose which they answer, they are desired on their own account. Are all such things then called good, for the same reason that snow and ceruse are both called white, because they excite one and the same simple perception of whiteness? This is not so; for pleasure is good in one sense, honour in another, intellection in a third; in each of the three, the word "good" has a different meaning; which would not be the case if the idea of good

° Aristotle is supposed to have taken it amiss that Plato should have preferred to him his own nephew Speusippus as his successor in the academy; and this private pique is thought to have influenced him in his philosophical opposition to his master's doctrines. Were this true, it might be expected that his opposition would not have been less marked to Speusippus, whom he here goes out of his way to commend.

was

B O O K was as simple and uniform as that of white; a
 { ^{I.} doctrine that totally confounds the specific distinctions of things. Why then is the same appellation applied to such different objects? Not surely by chance; but because those objects are somehow related to each other, as proceeding from one cause, tending to one end, or connected by some analogy; as the understanding is called the eye of the mind, having the same relation to it, which the eye has to the body. But such nice speculations belong not to the present subject^p; for if there be a general idea of goodness, common to all things called good, and separable from them, it is plain that this separate goodness cannot be an object of human attainment, and therefore need not be an object of human pursuit. None of the arts or sciences contemplate this general idea as their example or pattern^q; or consider it as affording the smallest assistance for attaining the different ends at which they respectively aim. Of what benefit would such a contemplation be to the embroiderer or the architect? The physician does not consider good in general, but the good, or health of man, or rather of that particular man who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only he has to do.

^p Aristotle says, that it is not necessary at present accurately to ascertain why different things are called good, any more than to treat accurately concerning the general idea of goodness.

^q The author says, that though this general good be neither *πραξις* nor *κτῆσις*: neither an object of human practice nor human attainment, yet it may be thought to serve as a *παράδειγμα*, or pattern; and therefore removes this objection, which he had proposed to himself. See *Analys.* p. 69. and *note*.

Let

Let us return again to the sought-for good, and try to find out what it can be. We see that it is a different thing in different arts and actions: one thing, for example, in the art of physic; another in the art of war. What then is the good peculiar to each? Is it not that for the sake of which all the other operations of the art are performed; as in physic, health; in war, victory; in architecture, a house; and in all our actions and deliberations, the end at which they aim? If then there is an end or purpose in life itself, the good sought for must consist in this; and if more ends than one, in these. This investigation therefore brings us back to the same conclusion as before; but we must endeavour, if possible, to render the matter still more perspicuous. Since there are various objects of our pursuit, some of which are desired merely for the sake of other things, and never rationally for their own, such as riches, a flute, and whatever comes under the description of means or instruments, it is plain that none of these can be the good of which we are in quest, and which must be something complete and perfect in itself; for we call that more perfect which is desired on its own account, than that which is desired as a means towards some further end; and that more perfect which is never desired but as an end, than that which is desired both as a means and as an end. Happiness is never desired but for its own sake only. Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue, are desirable surely on their own account, but they are also desirable as means

BOOK

I.

Chap. 7.

A delineation of the supreme good;

B O O K means towards happiness. But happiness, we
 I. have said, is never desired as a means, because
 it is complete and all-sufficient in itself, which
 the good sought for ought to be; and all-suffi-
 cient, not merely for the individual, but for his
 parents, children, family, friends, and fellow-
 citizens, since man is by nature a social being;
 yet to this social principle limits are assigned,
 for if it diverged to infinity', there would be a
 desire without an object': but of this we shall
 speak hereafter. That is all-sufficient, which,
 taken by itself, renders life an object of desire.
 Such we say is happiness, which separate and
 alone, is the most desirable of all things; and
 therefore united with the least of other goods,
 still entitled to pre-eminence'; complete and
 perfect in itself, and the ultimate end of all our
 designs and actions.

which con-
 sists in vir-
 tuous ener-
 gies.

But to call happiness the best thing in the
 world, (which none will dispute,) does not clearly
 explain wherein human happiness consists. This
 will best appear, if we consider what is the pe-
 culiar work and proper business of a man. A
 musician, a sculptor, and every other artist, has
 his respective operation and work, in the per-
 formance of which his main excellence lies;
 and can it be imagined, while shoemakers and
 carpenters have their proper tasks assigned to
 them, that Nature intended man for idleness?

' Aristotle says, to his children's children, and the friends of his
 friends, in endless succession.

' See above, p. 105.

' The good added to happiness is *ὑπερβολὴ τῶν αγαθῶν*, super-
 abundant.

His

His eyes, and hands, and feet, and all his other BOOK
 parts, have their peculiar functions; and shall I.
 there be no function different from any, or all, }
 of these, belonging to the whole? Wherein does
 this function consist? To live, is common to him
 with plants. The mere power of growth and
 nutrition belongs not therefore to the present
 question. The sensitive life follows next, which
 is common to man with horses, oxen, and the
 whole animal kingdom. There remains then a
 life of rational action; whether he exercise rea-
 son himself, or obey the reason of another. In
 such a life his real business consists; and that
 man does his business the best¹, who acts most
 rationally through life; the virtue of each indi-
 vidual of a species, depending on the excellence
 with which he performs the work peculiar to
 that species alone. The proper good of man
 consists then in virtuous energies², that is, in
 the exercise of virtue continued through life;
 for one swallow makes not a summer; neither
 does one day, or a short time, constitute happi-
 ness. Let this serve for a sketch of good—that
 universally coveted object, which will afterwards
 be more fully delineated: for, it should seem,
 that an accurate outline may easily be filled up;
 especially with the assistance of time, from which

¹ The author illustrates this, by saying that the business of a harper, and of a good harper, is the same; the difference between them arising only from the superior excellence with which the latter performs his work.

² Aristotle here introduces his distinction between virtue and the energy of virtue. See above, p. 154. This sense is expressed in the text, in language more familiar to the modern reader.

arts

B O O K arts derive their improvement. Let us remember also what was before observed, that more accuracy should not be expected in a writer, than is consistent with the nature of his subject, and his design in treating it. Both the bricklayer and the mathematician are conversant about perpendiculars; but the former considers them only as useful in his work; the latter examines their nature and properties, because abstract truth is the object of his study. Unless the example of the bricklayer be followed in other matters, the principal subject will often be overwhelmed or obscured by the mere accessories. Let it also be remembered, that we ought not to be over-curious in the investigation of causes; concerning some things it is sufficient to know that they are, without knowing their reason. This is the case with those first principles which result from perceptions of sense, from induction, and from custom*. We ought carefully to draw them from their respective sources, and exert our utmost care that they be correctly ascertained. This is of the highest importance in all our inquiries; in which, that which is begun well, is more than half ended; since much light is thereby diffused through every subsequent part of our speculations.

* Our author adds, *αλλαι δε αλλως*, which may be translated, “and other principles arise from other sources.” But this does not appear to me to be his meaning, because I do not find any other sources mentioned in any part of his works: The *αλλαι αλλως* must then mean that some of those principles arise from one of those sources, and some from another, which is implied in the translation.

We

We shall examine this chief good or happiness, not merely in its definition, but in the properties rightly ascribed to it. Truth only is consistent; and if our notion of happiness be just, it will not be discordant with those properties. Goods are divided into three kinds: those of the mind, those of the body, and those consisting in externals. We give the preference to the first of the three, which we regard as the sovereign good; placing happiness in mental energy; an opinion ancient and universal among philosophers. We do right also in placing the chief end and main purpose of life in action. From this, it results that happiness is seated in the mind; a truth confirmed by the common sense of mankind embodied in language; "living well," or "doing well" being expressions synonymous with happiness. In all their inquiries on the subject, men seem to have been led to conclusions nearly resembling the notion of happiness above given. Some place it in virtue, others in prudence, others in wisdom; some join pleasure; others add externals; and those different opinions have either been long held by the greater part of mankind, or more recently introduced by most respectable philosophers. It is not credible, that either party should totally mistake the truth. Our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue; for we say that it consists in the action of virtue; that is, not merely in the possession, but in the use¹. The mere possession is consistent with a

¹ Aristotle here opposes habit to energy, as well as possession to use.

B O O K I. state of sleep, or listless apathy, from which no good can result. But the virtuous man, when he acts, must act well, and be happy; as, in the Olympic games, the prize is gained only by the combatants; not by those, whatever their abilities may be, who decline entering the lists. To such men virtue is the highest pleasure; for pleasure resides in the mind, and each is most pleased with what he most loves. Thus the lover of horses is pleased with horses; the lover of shows, with shows; and the lover of justice is no less pleased with justice; and the lover of virtue, with virtue. The multitude, indeed, pursue different pleasures, because they do not rightly apprehend in what true pleasure consists. But pleasure, strictly so called, is the delight of a virtuous man, whose life needs not an appendage of false joys, containing the perennial spring of true pleasure in itself. For he is not a good man who delights not in good actions; and vain is the praise of justice, liberality, and other virtues, by those who feel no gratification in their practice. In the estimation of a wise man, virtue is pleasant because it is honourable and good; his happiness is one regular whole; not broken and disjointed like that in the Delian inscription:

“ The fairest good is justice; health, the best;
 “ The sweetest far, to taste of what we love.”

All these qualities belong to the best energies, in which, we say, happiness consists. The opinion of those who add externals, is not ill-founded;

founded; since, independently of them, it is often impossible, at least very difficult, to exhibit virtue in its full lustre^a. Many operations must be performed by instruments; under which name I include friends, wealth, and political power. The want of some advantages, for example, of honourable descent, of promising children, or of dignity of presence, deprives happiness of its splendour: and the man seems less qualified for attaining it, who is deformed in body, friendless, childless, and forlorn^a. Wherefore some place happiness in external prosperity^b.

BOOK
I.

It comes then to be considered, whether happiness is acquired by instruction, custom, or some other kind of exercise; or merely by the dispensation of fortune and the gods. There is not any gift surely that might more reasonably be expected to descend from heaven, since, of all human possessions, happiness is the most valuable. But this question will be more fitly examined in another place. For happiness, even

Chap. 9.

Which depends on our own exertions.

^a In the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. ii. p. 196., Aristotle makes an important distinction between the things in which human happiness consists, and those without which it cannot be completely enjoyed; *ἢ τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τινος αὐτοῦ, τοῖς ἀδελφείοις ἢ ἐνδεχέσθαι αὐτοῦ*, &c. "Health is different from the things by which it is upheld, and life from those by which it is rendered comfortable." The same holds with regard to all the actions and habits of men." The confounding happiness with the externals, without which, in our dependent state, it cannot be completely enjoyed, is considered by our author as one of the great sources of immoral practice, as well as of erroneous theory.

^a Aristotle adds, "or who, having had good friends and promising children, has lost them."

^b What is added, *ποῦ δὲ τὸ κέρειν*, "and some place it in virtue," seems superfluous.

VOL. I.

S

though

BOOK though it descend not from heaven, but be attained by study and exercise on earth, is yet most divine in itself; the end and prize of virtue, which all may gain by due exertion, who are not maimed in their minds. The acquiring of happiness by ourselves is better than owing it to fortune^c; it most probably therefore is thus acquired; since nature always effects her purposes by the best means; a point aimed at by art, and every intelligent cause, and which the best cause always attains: and to leave happiness, the fairest and best of things, to the disposal of fortune, would be a mark of negligence not discernible in any other of the arrangements of nature^d. That happiness is acquired by ourselves, agrees also with its definition, "that it consists in virtuous energies." Other things, we have said, are necessary, as a certain length of time; and others are serviceable, as instruments. The same conclusion corresponds with what we said in the beginning, namely, that politics aimed at

^c For this he assigns two reasons in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. iii. p. 197. « δὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ποιοῦν τινα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θυοτέρον, &c. "If good or happiness consists in the quality of our actions and characters, it must be both more common and more divine; more common, because a greater number may attain it; and more divine, because it will depend upon our own exertions." Idem ibid.

^d There is, perhaps, an intentional obscurity in the whole of this passage. Aristotle does not expressly deny the interference of the gods; but afterwards, confounding this interference with fortune, says, that it is not reasonable to believe that nature, or (as explained in other passages) the God of nature, should commit such an important object as human happiness to the direction of so blind a guide as fortune. But in the strict philosophical sense, happiness, as well as all other things, is ultimately to be referred to the Deity as its cause. Metaphys. l. i. c. ii. p. 841.

promoting

promoting the highest felicity of man; the principal care, therefore, of all good statesmen has always been, to form their fellow-citizens to virtue. Neither an ox nor a horse, nor any other animal, is denominated happy; because virtuous energies cannot be ascribed to them. Nor is this epithet bestowed on children, whose imperfect age affords only a promise of happiness. But many are the vicissitudes of life; and those who have long been prosperous, may, towards the conclusion of their days, be involved in calamities rivalling the far-famed disasters of Priam. None will call those happy, who, after suffering such evils in life, die a wretched death.

Ought we, then, to adopt the opinion of Solon, "that no man can be called happy while he lives?" Is he therefore happy when he dies? or is not this too absurd to be said, especially by those who place happiness in action? It does not appear that Solon had this meaning, but only that a man might, at death, be congratulated upon his escape from the evils and calamities of life. Yet this opinion is liable to contradiction; for a man, when dead, is, with regard to prosperity and adversity, in the same state with a man who meets with either of them when alive, without being sensible of them; and is in this manner still within the reach of the good or bad fortune which befalls his children and their descendants. And how unstable is the prosperity of families! What vast degeneracy in the sons of happy and illustrious fathers! Yet it seems absurd to suppose the state of the

Chapter 10.

Solon's saying, that none can be pronounced happy till dead.

BOOK I. dead affected and altered by these revolutions, and not less absurd to suppose that the happiness of children should not be shared by their parents. But the solution of the question first proposed, will enable us to solve the other difficulties. Solon said that we must look to the end; meaning thereby, that we might then justly say, not that a man was, but that he had been, happy. Is it not therefore absurd to think that, while he actually was happy, this epithet could not be applied to him, because of the vicissitudes of life to which he was exposed? If happiness changes with fortune, it will be as variable as the colours of theameleon. But this is not true: for propriety of conduct depends, not on our fortune, but on our manner of using it; and virtuous energies are the genuine source of happiness, as the vicious are of misery. This is attested by the question just started concerning the importance of stability to happiness. Of all human things, habitual energies of virtue are the most stable; they are more permanent than even the sciences; and of the virtues themselves, the most valuable are the firmest; forming the continual meditation and delight of those whom they adorn. For this reason, they alone are not liable to be forgotten or lost; but are an immoveable property in the thoughts and life of a good man; who, whatever may befall him, will behave gracefully; approving his conduct exact, square, and blameless. Slight misfortunes are unable to shake his well-balanced happiness; but, in the use of a great prosperity, his excellence

This saying explained.

The peculiar stability of virtuous energies.

lence will shine more conspicuous: and when **BOOK**
 persecuted by painful and afflicting calamity, ^{I.}
 which not only impedes his present exertions,
 but darkens his future prospects, his worth will
 irradiate the gloom, while he resists and sur-
 mounts the severest sufferings, not by stupid in-
 sensibility, but by generous magnanimity; for,
 if our own actions be the sovereign arbiters of
 our lot, a virtuous man can never be miserable;
 because he will never render himself an object
 either of hatred or contempt. Of the circum-
 stances in which he is placed, he will always
 make the best and most honourable use; as a
 good general, and a good artist, employs the
 forces, and the materials, with which they are
 respectively entrusted, always to the best advan-
 tage. A happiness, founded on such a basis,
 can never sink into wretchedness; although it
 must be shaken by tragic misfortunes, from
 which it will not soon recover its natural state.
 Yet, in consequence of virtuous exertions, con-
 tinued through a sufficient length of time, a
 good man, competently furnished with the ac-
 commodations of life, will resume his wonted
 serenity; and may be pronounced happy, not-
 withstanding the vicissitudes to which he is still
 exposed; at least possessed of such happiness as
 is consistent with the condition of humanity.

We are not therefore to ascribe happiness **Chap. 11.**
 only to the dead, (for thus Solon's sentiment is
 commonly understood,) especially since to sup-
 pose that the dead are totally insensible to the
 misfortunes of their kinsmen and friends on
 earth, ^{How the dead are affected by the condition of the living.}

B O O K earth, is neither conformable to common opinion,
L nor consistent with the social principles belong-
 ing to human nature. It would be endless to
 enumerate and describe the various forms of
 calamity and woe, by the differences of which
 even the living are very differently affected;
 but the sympathy of the dead with such mis-
 eries, bears less proportion to that of the living,
 than the sympathy of spectators at the theatre
 bears to that of spectators in the real tragedies
 of life. It may deserve consideration, whether
 the dead at all participate in the good or bad
 fortune of their living friends; but if they do,
 it is reasonable to think that the events of this
 world affect them too slightly, to render such of
 them as are miserable happy, or those that are
 happy miserable.

Chap. 12.

That hap-
 piness is
 above
 praise.

Let us proceed then to determine whether
 happiness be the object of praise, or rather of
 honour; for it is plain that its nature is not
 doubtful, and that it never can be blamed or
 despised. That only is an object of praise which
 is endowed with certain qualities or habits, that
 naturally terminate in some salutary effect. For
 this reason we commend justice and courage, as
 well as strength and swiftness, and every virtue;
 but the praises which belong to men, are ridicu-
 lous when applied to the gods, whose perfections
 are the objects of nobler emotions, and more
 lofty eulogy; we bless and honour and magnify
 them; and even those things which, from some
 resemblance to them, are called divine. Hap-
 piness, therefore, is exalted above praise, by the
 excel-

excellence and divinity of its nature. Wherefore Eudoxus^e ingeniously defended the pretensions of pleasure to be called the sovereign good; saying, that it was confessedly not the object of praise, and therefore something better. But praise properly belongs to virtue, the only source of those exertions of mind or body on which just encomiums are bestowed; to examine which particularly belongs to the subject of Rhetoric. This, then, is clear, that the value of happiness is not relative, but absolute; it is complete and perfect intrinsically; and, being the ultimate end to which all praise-worthy things are referred, is itself the object, not of praise, but of veneration and honour.^f

But since happiness results from virtuous energies, by examining the nature of virtue, we shall be more likely to understand that of happiness. The true statesman is chiefly solicitous about virtue, exerting himself to the utmost to inspire his fellow-citizens with a respectful deference for good laws. Such were the legislators of Crete and of Sparta; and others, perhaps, who were animated by the same enlightened principles of public spirit. To investigate

BOOK
I.

Chap. 13.

The knowledge of the mind a necessary preparation for moral science.

^e Eudoxus, the scholar of Plato, and legislator of his countrymen, the Cnidians.—He is again mentioned by our author in the tenth book of his Ethics.

^f This subject is explained more clearly in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. i. p. 203. The author discriminates the words *εὐχρηστον ἔπαινος* and *ευδαιμονισμὸς*: the first of which applies to particular actions; the second to habits; and the third to the ends and enjoyments which are thereby accomplished or attained. The English language does not admit of such nice distinctions; and *ευδαιμονισμὸς*, “beatification,” is an appropriate term in the Romish church, which could not, without doing violence, be distorted to a philosophical sense.

BOOK I. the nature of virtue, belongs to every liberal system of politics, and therefore to our present subject, of which human happiness is the end, and human virtue the means; understanding, thereby, the virtue of the mind, in the exercise of which happiness consists. The true statesman therefore ought to know the mind, as much, or rather more, (because his pursuit is still more excellent,) than the physician does the body; and we see that the more liberal sort of physicians bestow no small pains in gaining an accurate knowledge of the latter. To enter into speculations, not connected with practice, is beside our present purpose. We shall make use of that distinction between powers rational and irrational, which is sufficiently explained in our popular discourses, without inquiring whether these two are separable from each other, like the parts of the body and every thing divisible, or whether they be two merely to the intellectual eye, though as incapable of corporeal division as are the convexity and concavity of the same circle*. The irrational powers of the soul are distinguishable into different kinds. Those which contribute to nutrition and growth are

* διαφέρει δὲ ὅθεν ὅτι ἡ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι ἡ ἀμετὰ ἔχει μὲν δύναμιν διαφόρων, Eudem. l. ii. c. i. p. 204. Aristotle says, that it makes not any difference as to the present subject, whether the soul be divisible or indivisible; it is sufficient that it have distinct powers or faculties; to which, as principles and sources, all the complicated operations of the mind, and all the wide variety of human action, may be traced. It will not be easy to point out what improvement has been made since the days of Aristotle, either in the investigation of those principles from the phenomena, or in the application of them when discovered, to explain the highly-diversified operations observable in the intellectual and moral world.

the

the same in man arrived at maturity, and in the child unborn, and even in plants. Any virtue belonging to them cannot be dignified with the epithet of human, since their energies are most perfect in sleep, during the total inactivity of those higher powers, by which men are peculiarly characterised and individually distinguished; wherefore it is said, that for nearly one half of their lives, the same lot befalls the good and the bad, the happy and the miserable; except that, in consequence of some remains of wakeful motions, the dreams of the former will commonly be more agreeable. But enough of this, which is foreign to our present subject. There is another part of the soul, which, though irrational itself, is capable of combining with reason; and, when thus combined, is virtuous and praise-worthy. This appears in persons endowed with self-command, but not completely confirmed in that habit. Reason exhorts them to prefer the better part, but another power impels them to the contrary side, and violently resists reason; in the same manner as limbs affected by the palsy refuse obedience to our determinations, and assume one direction when we wish them to move in another. A similar resisting power exists in the mind, though the false motion impressed by it is not perceptible to the senses. This power, though irrational^b, is capable of combining with reason, and submitting to its-control, as appears in men

Our moral powers compound ed of the rational and irrational principles of our nature.

^b This power, he says, is something different from reason, but how different it is unnecessary to inquire: which relates to what is explained above.

endowed

B O O K I. **I.** endowed with self-command¹ or continency, and still more in those whose minds are harmonised by temperance. The appetites therefore are of a higher order than the mere powers of growth and nutrition, because they are capable of listening to reason, as children do to their parents, whose admonitions they understand and obey, in a sense quite different from that in which they afterwards understand and know mathematical truths. If we choose to call also this part of the soul rational, there will then be two different principles of reason in the mind, the first of which possesses reason absolutely in itself, whereas the second is only capable of hearkening to the reason of another. On this distinction, the division of the virtues into the intellectual and moral, is founded. Wisdom, intelligence, and prudence belong to the former class; liberality and temperance to the latter. In reference to morals, we do not say that a man is wise or intelligent, but that he is meek or temperate. Good men are praised for good habits; and all praise-worthy habits are called virtues.

¹ Self-command or continency, in Greek *ἐγκράτεια*, implies that a man is impelled by corrupt appetites, which he has strength of mind sufficient to resist; temperance, in Greek *σωφροσύνη*, implies that his appetites have been so thoroughly subdued by custom and reason, that they no longer have any tendency to rebel. This latter, in its highest perfection, is that delightful harmony of soul in which our moral improvement terminates.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

THE most profound as well as the most elegant of all modern writers on the subject of political Ethics, the immortal Grotius, in his treatise on the laws of war and peace, observes, that Aristotle holds the first rank among philosophers, whether we estimate him by the perspicuity of his method, the acuteness of his distinctions, or the weight and solidity of his arguments*. This criticism is fully justified by the book before us, in which our author treats of the nature of moral virtue, shews by what means it is acquired, proves by an accurate induction that it consists in the habit of mediocrity, and lays down three practical rules for its attainment. This part of his work will bear that trial which he himself has established as the test of excellence; "it requires not any addition, and it will not admit of retrenchment." The objections made to it, as falling short of the purity and sublimity of Christian morality, will equally

BOOK
II.

* Grotius in Prolegom.

apply

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II.

apply to all the discoveries of human reason, when compared with that divine light which, coming into the world, gives, or offers, light to every man in it^b. But the critics who make objections^c to Aristotle, would urge them with less confidence, if they attended to two remarks on which our author often insists; first, that practical matters admit not of scientific or logical accuracy; secondly, that the virtues of which he is in quest, are all of them merely relative to the condition and exigencies of man in political society, being those habits, acquired by our own exertion, in which, when confirmed, we shall uniformly act our parts on the theatre of the world, usefully, agreeably, and gracefully. In Aristotle's philosophy, man is the judge of man; in Christianity, the judge of man is God. Philosophy confines itself to the perishing interests of the present world; Christianity, looking beyond these interests, takes a loftier aim, inspires the mind with nobler motives, and promises to adorn it with perfections, worthy of its inestimably valuable rewards. Yet to the man of piety, it may be a matter of edification, to compare the virtue of philosophical firmness with the grace of Christian patience; and to observe how nearly the rules discovered by reason and experience, as most conducive to the happiness of our present state, coincide with those precepts which are given in the Gospel in order to fit us for a better.

^b John, c. i. v. 9.

^c See some of them stated in Grotii Prolegom. de Jure Belli & Pacis.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Moral virtues acquired by exercise and custom—Consist in holding the mean between blameable extremes—Test of virtue—The virtues, habits—The nature of these habits ascertained—Why vices mistaken for virtues, and conversely—Practical rules for the attainment of virtue.

VIRTUE being twofold, intellectual and moral, the former is produced and increased chiefly by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; the latter is acquired by repeated acts, or custom, from which, by a small change^d, its name is derived. None of the moral virtues, therefore, are implanted by nature; for properties given by nature, cannot be taken away or altered by custom; thus the gravity of a stone, which naturally carries it downward, cannot be changed into levity, which would carry it upward, were we to throw it in that direction ten thousand times; and fire, which naturally seeks the extremities, cannot be brought by custom to have a tendency towards the center: nor, in a word, can any law of nature be altered by custom. The moral virtues, therefore, are neither natural nor preternatural; we are born with capacities for acquiring them,

BOOK
II.
Chap. I.

The moral
virtues not
implanted
by nature.

^d ἡθος ἀπὸ εἶθους.

but

BOOK

II.

Proof of
this.They are
acquired
by exercise
and cus-
tom.

but they can only be acquired by our own exertions. Powers, implanted by nature, precede in the order of existence their operations; which is manifest with regard to the senses. The powers of seeing and hearing are not acquired by repeated operations of those faculties; but, on the contrary, they existed in us before we exercised them, and continue to exist in us, though they should cease to be exercised. But the habit of moral virtue, like all other practical arts, can be acquired or preserved by practice only. By building, we become architects; by harping, musicians; and, in the same manner, by acts of justice, we become just; and by acts of courage, courageous. This is attested by what happens in whole nations; whose characters result from their conduct. All legislators wish to make virtuous and happy citizens: but they do not all attain this end; for the virtues are like the arts, acquired by a right, and destroyed by a wrong, practice. Architects and musicians thus become good or bad; and if this were not the case, instruction would be superfluous. The same holds in the virtues. By correctness, or the contrary, in our transactions with mankind, we become just or unjust; according to our behaviour in circumstances of danger, our characters are formed to courage or cowardice; and in proportion as we indulge or restrain the excitements to anger and pleasure, we become adorned with the habits of meekness and temperance, or deformed by those of passionateness and profligacy. In one word, such as
our

our actions are, such will our habits become. **BOOK II.**
 Actions, therefore, ought to be most diligently attended to; and it is not a matter of small moment how we are trained from our youth; much depends on this, or rather all.*

Since the present treatise is not merely a theory, as other parts of our works, (for the inquiry is not "wherein virtue consists," but "how it may best be attained," without which the speculative knowledge of it is not of the smallest value,) we must begin by examining, by what rules our actions ought to be shaped, because by them our habits and characters are moulded. That our conduct ought to be agreeable to right reason, may be here assumed as an axiom; but it will afterwards be shewn what this right reason is, and what reference it has to the other virtues. Let us not forget, what was formerly observed, that practical matters admit not of logical precision; and that greater accuracy of language ought not to be expected, than is consistent with the nature of the subject. The propriety of action admits not of definite rules, any more than the exact quantity of food or exercise conducive to health. This observation holds true with regard to the science of morals as well as of medicines; but is peculiarly applicable to the particular cases belonging to both sciences; which cases are so dissimilar to each other, that it is impossible to include them under any common precept; and the man of morals,

Chap. 2.

What are the rules by which our actions ought to be shaped in order to attain virtue.

* The same subject is treated in the *Magna Moralia*, l. i. c. vi.; and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, l. ii. c. ii.

like

BOOK like the pilot and the physician, must comply with the exigencies of the moment, and vary his behaviour with the variation of circumstances. Notwithstanding this instability in the nature of the subject, we must endeavour to give some assistance to those who aim at virtue. First, then, it is worthy of remark, that propriety of conduct always consists in a mean or middle between two vicious extremes; and as the health and strength of our bodies visibly depend on a due proportion of food and exercise, equally remote from superabundance or penury; so is the health and vigour of our minds destroyed by superabundance or penury of those very things or qualities, by the due proportion of which those excellencies are acquired, maintained, or augmented. This we may perceive holds true with respect to courage, temperance, and every other virtue. He who flies from every danger, is a coward; he who rushes on every danger, is a madman; the man who indulges in every pleasure, is a voluptuary; and the man who, with rustic austerity, rejects the most allowable pleasures, may be justly charged with an insensibility misbecoming his nature. The virtues of courage and temperance, which are destroyed by excess or deficiency, are therefore preserved by mediocrity; and, on observing this golden mean, depend not only the origin and increase of the virtues^f, but the energy or operation, by which

That it consists in holding the mean between two vicious extremes.

This proved by induction.

^f Aristotle adds, "their destruction," which is produced by a departure from this mean, so that their energies have the same causes with their generation, augmentation, and destruction; only with regard to the last, these causes act in a contrary direction.

their

their proper work is effected; for as a strong constitution, which is produced or confirmed by much food and much exercise, enables a man to bear with safety a great measure of either; so, by resisting the temptations of pleasure, we acquire temperance; and having become temperate, we can resist such temptations: by resisting the emotions of fear amidst dangers, we acquire courage; and having become courageous, we are able to face dangers.

The pleasure or pain resulting from acts of virtue, affords the best criterion concerning the confirmation of the habit. He who abstains from bodily pleasures, and rejoices in his temperance, is truly possessed of this virtue; he who grieves at his abstinence is, on the other hand, a voluptuary. A man of courage faces dangers with pleasure, at least without pain; a coward is otherwise affected. Moral virtue is therefore occupied about regulating our pleasures and pains; for the love of pleasure stimulates us to profligacy, and fear of pain withholds us from the path of honour. Plato says well, that right education consists in teaching us to rejoice, and to grieve, at such things as are the proper objects of those emotions. Virtue is seen in affections and actions, all of which are accompanied either with pleasure or with pain; and therefore virtue is necessarily conversant about pains and pleasures; as is proved, also, by the necessity of rewards and punishments, which are moral medicines; and, like all other medicines, in their nature contrary to the diseases which they are fitted to cure. Besides, every

Chap. 3.

The surest
test of vir-
tue is the
pleasure
felt in ex-
ercising it.

BOOK

II.

habit of the mind is intimately connected with those things by which it is rendered better or worse ; which happens to virtue with regard to pleasure and pain ; for our morals are vitiated by pursuing or avoiding either of them with undue eagerness, at improper times, in improper places, or on improper occasions. The virtues, therefore, have been supposed to consist in apathy ; erroneously indeed, because they consist in the regulation, not in the extinction, of passion ; and passion, properly directed, is productive of happiness ; improperly, of misery. For, as there are three objects naturally preferred, namely, honour, profit, and pleasure ; and three naturally shunned, namely, disgrace, loss, and pain ; a virtuous man knows practically how to estimate the value of all those things in their relation to human happiness ; a knowledge, of which the man enured to vicious habits is totally unsusceptible. But the two characters are principally distinguished by their various degrees of sensibility to the different kinds of pleasure ; the love of which is implanted in all animals, and of which one kind or other necessarily accompanies every object of preference ; both profit and honour being pursued as pleasures. Our natures indeed are deeply tinged, and as it were engrained, with the love of pleasure, which, being nourished and growing stronger with our frame, is most difficultly moderated ; especially when it has become the standard by which things and actions are appreciated. The great business of morality, therefore, lies in restraining the undue pursuit

pursuit of pleasure, and the undue aversion to pain. As Heracleitus says, it is more difficult to contend with pleasure than with anger; but the most difficult part is that best fitted for shewing the excellence of the performer. The moralist and statesman, therefore, must bend their utmost attention towards regulating the behaviour of those intrusted to their care, in those particulars on which their merit or demerit chiefly depends. But enough has been said to shew, that moral virtue is conversant about pains and pleasures; that the actions from which it originally springs, either augment or destroy it, accordingly as they are well or ill directed; and that the same good works in which it originates, are those in which it delights to be constantly employed.

BOOK
 II.

A doubt arises, why we should say that men acquire justice by doing just actions, or become temperate by observing the rules of temperance; since if they perform such actions and observe such rules, it should seem that they must be already endowed with those virtues; in the same manner as a man who writes or who performs according to the rules of grammar and music, is already a grammarian and a musician. But this does not hold true even with respect to the arts; for a man may write grammar, merely by imitation, by chance, or by the direction of another; but to be a grammarian, he must himself understand the art. Besides this, the perfection of works of art is in themselves; but the whole merit of virtuous actions depends on the disposition

Chap. 4.

Solution of
 a difficulty
 respecting
 the mode
 of acquiring
 virtue.

BOOK

II.

Four things
requisite to
constitute
a virtuous
character.

fition of the actor : first, that he performed them with knowledge ; secondly, with deliberation and preference ; thirdly, that he preferred and performed them on their own account ; and lastly, that he is firm and immoveable in his virtuous resolutions. The first of these requisites only, viz. that of knowledge, is essential to the artist ; but in constituting the character of a virtuous man, mere knowledge is of little avail, and the other three particulars of the greatest : stability in virtuous practice results from repeated acts of virtue ; in consequence of which, not only those acts are such as a virtuous man would perform, but he who performs them is rightly disposed, and virtuously affected. It is therefore truly said, that we acquire justice and temperance from acting justly and temperately ; since, independently of our own actions, we never could acquire these virtues. But the multitude, neglecting practice, think to acquire virtue by theory ; like those patients who consult physicians, but use none of their prescriptions. Such physic will not benefit the body ; nor such philosophy, the mind.

Chap. 5.

That the
virtues are
neither pas-
sions nor
capacities,
but habits.

We must next examine, whether virtue be a passion, a faculty, or a habit ; for these are three distinct principles in the mind. By passion, I mean every emotion accompanied with pain or pleasure ; as love, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, tenderness, emulation, pity. By faculty, I mean, in this place, the capacity of being affected by those passions ; by anger, grief, or pity. By habit, I mean the habitude

habitude or relation which our minds bear to those passions; as whether we are affected too much or too little by anger, both which are wrong; or affected by it moderately, on just grounds and proper occasions, which only is right: the same observation applies to all other passions. Neither the virtues nor the vices therefore can be passions; because it is not in reference to the passions that we are denominated good or bad, and are regarded as the objects of praise or of blame. It is not our fear or anger simply, but the degree of those passions, that constitutes the propriety or impropriety of our conduct; and renders us the just objects of commendation or reproach. Besides, fear and anger, and all other passions, are emotions independent of deliberation and preference; but the virtues always imply an act of comparison, and the preference of one sort of conduct to another. Farther, we are said to be moved and impelled by passion, but our characters are disposed and settled by virtue; for which reason the virtues cannot be called capacities; and also, because we are neither praised nor blamed in reference to our being susceptible or capable of passion. These capacities, besides, are implanted by nature; which the virtues, as we have already proved, are not. Since then they are neither passions nor faculties, it remains that they should belong to that class called habits.*

* The same subject is treated in *Magna Moral.* l. i. c. v.; and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, l. ii. c. iii.

B O O K

II.

Chap. 6.

The nature
of this habit
ascertained.

It is not enough to say that virtue is a habit ; we must farther ascertain what is the nature of that habit. Every virtue, then, tends to constitute the perfection of that object to which it belongs, and to qualify it for performing properly its peculiar functions. Thus, the virtue of the eye constitutes the perfection of that organ, and qualifies it for seeing distinctly : and the virtue of a horse constitutes the perfection of that animal, and fits him for running swiftly, for bearing his rider, and for disdaining fear at the approach of an enemy. The virtue of a man, therefore, must be that habit which constitutes the perfection of his nature ; and fits him for performing properly his peculiar functions. How this habit is to be attained, we have explained already ; but the matter will be rendered more perspicuous by farther examining the nature of virtue. From every thing continuous and divisible, we may take the half, a greater part, or a lesser. The half may be considered as the mean proportional between the extremes of too much and too little, from which it is equally remote ; and considered in relation to the object itself, this mean proportional is always one and the same ; but considered in relation to man, this just mean continually varies, because the middle between the two vicious extremes of too much or too little is, in reference to him, that which is neither more nor less than propriety requires. Thus, if ten be the greater extreme, and two the lesser, six must be the arithmetical mean, because it exceeds the lesser, as much as it is exceeded by the

the greater. But in regulating human actions, which, like all other motions, are things continuous and divisible^a, the same simple rule will not apply: for two pounds may be too small an allowance, and ten too large; yet he who directs the regimen of the wrestlers, will not therefore prescribe universally six pounds, which might be too little for Milo the wrestler, though far too much for one beginning his exercises: the same thing holds as to the quantity of labour which he enjoins to be performed, in running, wrestling, and the other branches of the gymnastic. Thus, he who is skilful in directing all such actions and operations, will carefully avoid excess or defect, but find out and prefer the golden mean; which is the object that every good artist always keeps in view, since the highest commendation of works of art consists in saying that they admit neither of addition nor retrenchment.

But virtue, which is the perfection of nature itself, is far superior to art, which only imitates her operations, in aiming at the just mean between two vicious extremes. I speak here of moral virtue, which is conversant about passions and actions, all of which admit of mediocrity, as well as of excess or defect. Thus we may be too much or too little affected, with desire or aversion, courage or fear, anger or pity, pain or pleasure. Both extremes are bad; and the passion is then only proper and correct, when we are affected suitably to its causes, its objects, and

That the virtues do not admit of excess or of defect, nor the vices of mediocrity.

^a ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχής· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις, Eudem. I. ii. c. iii. p. 205.

BOOK

II.

its ends : when this is the case, both the passion, and the action proceeding from it, are justly praised as virtuous ; because they do not deviate from the mark at which they ought to aim. The Pythagoreans, therefore, did well in assigning “ definite ” to the co-arrangement of good, and “ indefinite ” to that of evil^a ; for there is only one right road ; but the ways of error are innumerable. The former is as difficult as the latter is easy ; it is difficult to hit the mark, but easy to miss it ;

“ Virtue is still the same, but vice has various forms.”

The former, therefore, is the habit of preferring and observing mediocrity in our passions and actions, agreeably to the rules of right reason : virtue, then, in its essence, is mediocrity ; in its effect, it is excellence, and the highest excellence¹.

^a See Analysis, p. 129.

¹ This is the clearest meaning I can affix to *κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρετῇ*. But Aristotle when he calls virtue, in one sense, an extreme, seems to allude to what is said in his second Analytics concerning the *ἁπλοὶ συμπέρασματις*, the termini conclusorii, and the difference between them and definitions, shewing the essence, that is, the cause which makes any thing to be what it is. Thus, What is it to square an oblong ? This question may be answered, or in other words, the squaring may be defined by saying, either that it is to find a square equal to an oblong ; or, that is to find a line which is a geometrical mean between the sides of the oblong. The former definition is called *συμπέρασματις*, because when the mathematician demonstrates, that the square constructed on a line, which is the mean proportional between the sides of the oblong, is equal to that oblong, he draws the conclusion, “ a square, therefore, is found equal to an oblong : ” but the second definition tells, not only that the square is equal to the oblong, but the cause which makes it to be so. In the same manner, when we call virtue the highest excellence or perfection of any object, we only tell, in other words, what is meant by virtue ; but when we call it mediocrity, we define it by its essence, and shew the cause which makes it to be the highest excellence.

But

But neither all passions nor all actions admit of mediocrity; for there are many whose very names infer excess and blame; as the passions of impudence, malice, and envy; and the actions of adultery, theft, and murder. Such passions and such actions are in themselves detestable excesses: and for the same reason, there cannot be any mediocrity in cowardice, injustice, or intemperance; nor any excess or defect in the virtues of courage or wisdom; nor universally can mediocrity or virtue admit of excess or defect; nor the vices, which are all of them extremes, admit of a virtuous mediocrity.

In practical morality, general principles are of little use, unless they be applied to particulars, in which all practice consists, and by which all general principles must, if true, be confirmed. Let the various passions or emotions therefore be arranged in a diagram^k, and we shall see that the degree of them consistent with propriety always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes. Thus, in encountering or avoiding dangers, courage holds the middle place between rashness and timidity: in obeying or resisting solicitations to pleasure, temperance holds the middle place between voluptuousness, and a vice which, being uncommon, is nameless, but which we shall call unfeeling apathy. In pecuniary matters, liberality is the mean between extravagance and parsimony. The prodigal is too

Chap. 7.

That all the virtues consist in mediocrity proved by induction.

^k The diagram, or delineation, which is here wanting, may be partly supplied from *Ethic. Eudem.* l. ii. c. iii. for even there it is extremely incomplete.

careless

BOOK careleſs in throwing away money, and at too
 { **II.** little pains to acquire it. The miſer pays ex-
 ceſſive attention to the acquiſition of money,
 and exceſſive attention to the keeping of it.
 There are other qualities relating to money, as
 magnificence, with its contrary extremes of nig-
 gardlineſs and waſteful profuſion; which diſtinc-
 tions will be afterwards explained¹. As to ho-
 nour and diſhonour, magnanimity is the middle
 term between boaiſful pride and mean-ſpirited
 abaſement; and there is another quality or habit
 which bears the ſame proportion to magnanimity
 which liberality does to magnificence, conſiſting
 in the propriety of our affection with reſpect to
 ſmall and ordinary marks of honour, whereas
 magnanimity conſiſts in the propriety of our
 affection with reſpect to thoſe which are great
 and extraordinary. In the common intercourſe
 of life, men are diſtinguiſhed by too much or
 too little deſire of honour; the exceſs and the
 defect are both marked by names^m, but the in-
 termediate and praiſe-worthy degree of the af-
 fection is nameleſs; wherefore the extremes
 contend with each other about the middle place;
 and, as either happens to obtain it, we praiſe a
 decent pride or a becoming humility. The rea-
 ſon of this incongruity in our judgments will be
 afterwards explained: we proceed at preſent ac-
 cording to our propoſed method. With regard

¹ In the firſt chapters of the Fourth Book.

^m The perſons diſtinguiſhed by the exceſs and defect, were called *φιλοτιμοι* and *αφιλοτιμοι*; but there was only one of theſe adjectives, which afforded an abſtract *φιλοτιμία*, denoting the diſpoſition or habit.

to anger, some men are too susceptible, and others too unsusceptible of this passion; and others commonly indulge it only in that degree which is laudable. These different dispositions or habits are not accurately distinguished by names. We shall call the intermediate and proper degree of the affection, meekness; which inclines, however; more to the extreme of phlegmatic endurance, than to that of immoderate irascibility. There are three other virtues or proprieties, which, though different, are yet nearly allied to each other, and all of them distinguishable in the ordinary intercourse of words and actions; bearing different relations, the one to truth, and the other to pleasure; and that which relates to pleasure, either confined to matters of pastime and amusement only, or comprehending all the complicated businesses of life, whether they be gay or serious. Neither these proprieties themselves, nor the various and contrary deviations from them, are accurately distinguished by names; but it is necessary that they should here be considered, in order to shew that the praise-worthy habit in trivial as well as in important actions, always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes; and as names are wanting, we must, as in other cases, take the liberty of making them, both for the sake of perspicuity, and to keep unbroken the connexion of our discourse. In the habit or disposition relative to the true exhibition of our characters in word and action, let the propriety or virtue which lies in the middle be called plain-dealing; and

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II.

and the impropriety or vice, by which we assume good qualities which do not belong to us, be called ostentation; and that, by which we divest ourselves of the good qualities with which we are really endowed, be called dissimulation or irony. In matters relating to pleasure and merriment, there is a virtue in facetiousness; buffoonery is the impropriety on the one side, and rustic simplicity on the other. In the more serious concerns of life, but which have still pleasure for their object, the virtue of companionable friendliness is distinguished, on the one hand, from quarrelsome moroseness; and, on the other, both from unmeaning officiousness, and interested flattery. Even in mere affections which do not exert themselves either in words or deeds, modesty is praised as holding the middle place between bashful timidity, and frontless assurance. An honest indignation at the prosperity of the worthless is easily distinguishable, both from envy which pines at the prosperity of all alike, and from that depraved pleasure which none but the most vicious can receive from beholding the unmerited success of artful villany or ruffian violence". But concerning those habits,

ⁿ επιχαιρικανία in the Latin versions is translated *malevolentia*, which does not at all express Aristotle's meaning: malevolence wishes ill to all mankind, even to the good, and therefore is grieved at their prosperity: but the vice here spoken of is that depraved pleasure which wicked men take in beholding the success of arts like to their own. In this sense only, Aristotle could say *νημισι, ης μεσοτε;* φθονι και επιχαιρικανιας, that indignation was the middle between envy and the vice here specified: for envy grieves at prosperity well merited, but επιχαιρικανια rejoices at prosperity unmerited; which

are

habits, we shall treat more fully hereafter, and also concerning justice, which must be divided into two kinds, before we can distinguish wherein the propriety of each kind consists; and likewise concerning the intellectual virtues.

B O O K
II.

Of those three dispositions or habits, of which that in the middle is only right, the extremes are contrary to, and at variance with, each other, and also with the virtue which lies between them. For, as in a line divided into equal, and also unequal, parts, the half is great when compared with the smaller division, but small when compared with the greater; so of human passions and actions, their proper and moderate degree appears an excess or defect just as it happens to be compared with either extreme. To the fool-hardy, courage appears cowardice; and to the coward, rashness°. The voluptuary deems temperance, insensibility; and the spendthrift calls liberality, avarice; each pushing the extreme, which happens to form part of his own character, into the place of honour. It is worthy of remark, that the extremes are not only more contrary to each other than either of them is to the middle, but also that one of them often bears a false resemblance to this middle, and is frequently mistaken for it. Thus rash-

Chap. 8.

Why vices
are often
mistaken
for virtues;
and con-
versely.

are two extremes equally remote from that affection by which we rejoice at the prosperity of good men, and grieve at the prosperity of the wicked.

° Aristotle says, that the courageous man, compared with the coward, seems fool-hardy, and therefore the coward calls him rash.

ness

BOOK II. **K**nefs often paffes for bravery, and profufion for liberality; but cowardice is never mistaken for courage, nor voluptuousnefs for temperance; although temperance is fometimes called infenfibility, and infenfibility, temperance. This irregularity proceeds from two caufes; firft, the one extreme is really nearer than the other to that proper affection which lies between them. Rashnefs is nearer than cowardice to the virtue of courage; and therefore cowardice, the moft diftant extreme, is moft properly oppofed to courage. The fecond caufe is, that, mankind in general being more inclined to one extreme than the other, thofe vices, to which we are naturally moft prone, are moft the objects of our blame as well as of our attention. Thus, with regard to pleafure, moft men are prone to err rather on the fide of indulgence, than on that of abftinence. Voluptuousnefs therefore is the vice naturally oppofed to temperance.^p

Chap. 9.
—
Practical
rules for
the attain-
ment of
propriety
of affection
and action.

Enough has been faid to fhew that virtue confifts in mediocrity. But this middle point, either in paffions or actions, it is not eafy to hit; for, as a man muft have fome knowledge in geometry to find the centre of a circle, fo it belongs not to thofe ignorant of Ethics to obferve the rules of propriety^q. Every one is capable of being angry, or of giving away money; but how much, when, to whom, in what manner, and for

^p The fame thoughts are expreffed in other words, and illuftrated by other examples, in the Ethics to Eudemus, l. ii. c. v.

^q Non prætoris erat ftultis dare tenuia rerum

Officia, atque ufum rapidæ permittere vitæ. Perſius, v. 93.

what

what end or purpose, are questions which it is **BOOK**
 not easy for every one to resolve; and of which, **II.**
 as the proper solution is extremely rare, so is it
 highly praise-worthy. He therefore, who would
 not err widely from the point of propriety, must
 make it his first care to keep at a distance from
 the most blameable extreme; and, as Calypso
 advises,

"Steer by the higher rock; lest whirl'd around
 We sink, beneath the circling eddy drown'd."^r

In doing this we shall imitate the skilful pilot who, when he cannot hold the direct course sails the nearest to it possible; and of two evils prefers the least. We ought next to consider to which of the two extremes or faults we are most prone; for different men are more or less easily beset by different faults or vices, and what these are by which each is most liable to be entangled, he will best discover by attending to the pleasure which he has in indulging, or the pain in restraining them. In order to correct his character, he must bend it, in a contrary direction, as we straighten a crooked stick; but, above all, he must beware of the blandishments of pleasure, of which we are seldom impartial or uncorrupt judges: treating this fair enchantress, as the aged senators in Homer did the beautiful Helen: his words on this occasion cannot be too often repeated, nor their lesson too earnestly inculcated.

^r Pope's *Iliad*, b. xii. v. 263, 264. But Ulysses, and not Calypso, says this, *Il.* xii. v. 108.

"They

B O O K
II.

“ They cry’d, No wonder, such celestial charms
For nine long years have fet the world in arms ;
What winning graces ! what majestic mien !
She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen !
*Yet hence, O Heaven ! convey that fatal fate,
And from destruction save the Trojan race.”*^a

By thus banishing pleasure, we shall be less liable to error. Such, briefly, are the precepts by which propriety of affection and action may be attained ; a thing for which it is extremely difficult to lay down general rules, which are at all applicable to the indefinite variety of particular cases ; and to ascertain, for instance, with whom we ought to be angry, how long, to what degree, and for what reasons or purposes. Sometimes we praise the defect, and call insensibility, meekness ; sometimes we praise the excess, and call irascibility, manhood. He who deviates but a little from the middle point, commonly escapes blame ; great deviations become perceptible, but the precise degrees of blame which they respectively merit cannot be accurately expressed in words ; and in such practical matters^b, common sense is the sole and ultimate judge. This only is certain, that mediocrity is always praise-worthy ; and that, in order to attain it, we must, for the reasons above given, incline ourselves, according to circumstances, sometimes to the one extreme, and sometimes to the other.

^a Iliad, iii. v. 203, &c.

^b In things perceptible by sense, or objects of sensation, as contradistinguished from objects of intellection ; in which latter only, accuracy is attainable. See above, p. 163.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Book, Aristotle examines the specific distinctions between moral virtue and other habits of the mind. The habit of moral virtue implies the deliberate preference of one kind of conduct to another; and deliberate preference implies freedom of choice. Those actions are voluntary, which have their principle in ourselves; those are involuntary, which proceed from an external cause. Building on accurate definitions and solid distinctions, the philosopher proves, with equal perspicuity and energy, that our moral conduct is the proper object of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. His reasonings and speculations soar above and supersede the abstruse, or rather the frivolous question, introduced by his perverters the schoolmen, concerning the freedom of the human will; a question which continued to be agitated long after their other subtleties were condemned to oblivion. With Aristotle, all will is free-will; since nothing can be more free than that which is voluntary: and although some actions originating

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nating in ourselves are considered as of a mixed nature, because they are performed reluctantly, though spontaneously, this happens merely because, of two evils, we naturally choose the least : such actions, how contrary soever to our will in their own nature, being nevertheless voluntary in reference to the unfortunate circumstances in which we happen to be placed.

His work, hitherto, proceeds with great regularity. He began by proving that the happiness of man consists in the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues ; or, in his own technical language, “ that happiness is energy directed in the line of virtue.” As his definition of happiness implies an acquaintance with the nature of virtue, and the knowledge of virtue implies that of the mind in which this habit resides, he explains the different parts or principles of the mind, whether rational or irrational ; shewing that both principles necessarily co-operate in the acquirement of good moral habits, as well as in the approbation of good moral characters. This system is totally different from that which regards morality as founded solely or ultimately on feeling ; whether a moral sense, sympathy, or any other modification of merely sensitive nature ; an absurd doctrine, liable to gross and dangerous perversion ; and which has often been employed to justify, and even to produce the wildest practical errors. Having explained his theory of Ethics, the Author proceeds to the practice ; and concludes this Book with the examination of courage and temperance.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

*Moral election and preference—Our habits voluntary—
 Courage—Its different kinds distinguished—Tempe-
 rance—Natural and adventitious wants—Comparison
 of intemperance and cowardice.*

VIRTUE is relative to passions and actions; of which those only which are voluntary, are the objects of praise or blame; and those which are involuntary, are the objects always of pardon, and sometimes of pity. In treating of virtue, therefore, it is necessary clearly to explain what is meant by the epithets *voluntary* and *involuntary*; the force of which words ought to be fully understood by legislators, when they establish rewards and punishments. Those actions and those crimes, then, are involuntary, which are either done by compulsion or committed through ignorance. We are said to act or move by compulsion, when the principle of action or motion is not in ourselves, but external; as when we are driven before the force of the wind, or impelled by strength greater than our own. But it is doubtful whether those evils are voluntary which we either encounter through motives of honour, or endure through the fear of greater calamities. Thus, if a tyrant commands

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 Chap. I.
 —
 What is
 meant by
 the epithet
 voluntary
 as applied
 to human
 actions.

B O O K III. ¹mands us to commit some act of baseness, having in his power our parents and children, whose fate depends on our obedience; and when sailors or merchants in a storm throw their goods overboard to save their lives; such actions are of a mixed nature, but rather voluntary, because, at the moment of doing them, they are matters of choice; and the true motive to any action is that by which we are actuated at the time of performing it. Besides, the principle of motion is in ourselves, and may be exerted or not at pleasure. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary in reference to the unfortunate circumstances in which we are placed, though independently of those circumstances they are much against our will; and therefore, considered absolutely, are involuntary.

Actions of this mixed kind are sometimes the objects of high panegyric, when we boldly encounter pain and disgrace for the sake of great and honourable advantages: and when we decline this conflict, we often render ourselves the objects of reproach. But to encounter difficulties and disgrace without the expectancy of honour or advantage, is the part only of a fool. On other occasions, though we receive not any praise, yet we meet with pardon, when our virtue yields to terrors too powerful for the weakness of humanity: but the degree in which it yields, is still in our power; for there are some criminal acts to which neither threats nor violence can ever compel those who, rather than commit them, would suffer the most wretched death. In Euripides'

Euripides' Alcæon, the reasons for which that hero says he is forced to commit matricide are worthy only of ridicule. BOOK
III.

It is difficult to determine what goods are to be preferred, and what evils are to be encountered; and still more difficult in time of action and danger, to adhere firmly to our predetermined resolutions. For the most part, men are forced to suffer disgrace, only for the sake of avoiding pain; and as these evils are of a different kind, it is not easy fairly to compare, and exactly to appreciate them: but when pain is preferred to disgrace, our manliness is praised; when disgrace is preferred to pain, our dastardly is blamed. On the whole then, what actions are compulsory? Are they those only whose principle is external, and in which the immediate agent has not any voluntary share? Or, shall we call those actions compulsory, which, though matters of choice relatively to the unfortunate circumstances in which we are placed, are yet, when considered in themselves, absolutely against our will? We say, that such acts ought to be considered rather as voluntary, because all actions, being conversant about particulars only, must depend on circumstances, and leave room for the preference of one motive to another. If it should be said, that pleasures and honours consisting in things external to ourselves, the actions performed for their attainment are also compulsory, all actions whatever would then deserve this epithet, because all proceed from such motives. But it is absurd to

B O O K accufe pleasure, which cannot be the object either
 III. of punishment or blame ; and not ourselves,
 who are too easily seduced by it ; and equally
 absurd to consider ourselves as the cause of our
 good actions, and pleasure as the cause of our
 bad ones. Those actions only, therefore, are
 properly compulsory, whose principle lies with-
 out, and which are totally independent of our
 own voluntary co-operation.

We said that crimes committed through ignorance are involuntary. But this assertion is not universally true ; for those only are involuntary, which produce pain and repentance. He who has committed wickedness through ignorance, and feels no compunction for the act, cannot be said indeed to have done voluntarily what he did not intend ; nor, on the other hand, is his evil deed involuntary, since he feels not any uneasiness for the commission of it. But as *his* action is *involuntary* who repents ; *his*, who repents not, may be called *not voluntary* : that things of different natures may be expressed by different names. A distinction is also to be made between, acting *through* ignorance and *with* ignorance. A man drunk, or in a passion, is guilty of violence *through* intoxication or anger, not *through* ignorance, though ignorantly ; and every bad man is ignorant of what things it is his duty either to do or to avoid ; an ignorance profound and universal, inseparably connected with his pravity of will and purpose, and therefore inexcusable. But in the particular actions,
 which,

which, because committed through ignorance, seem entitled to pardon or pity, it will often be useful to distinguish, between the agent and the action, its subject, end, the manner how, and the instrument with which it is performed. None but a madman can be ignorant with regard to all these particulars. In whatever he has done, every one in his senses must know that he himself was the agent; but he may not know that he was doing wrong; as those who blab in speaking, beg pardon for words which escaped them unintentionally; or, as *Æschylus*[†] profaned the mystical terms, not knowing them to be such; and, in actions, a man showing a catapult, discharged that formidable engine; and *Meropé* would have slain her own son, taking him for an enemy: poisons have been given instead of remedies: some persons have been killed by those who instructed them in their exercises; and others have been slain with spears thought to be blunted, or with stones mistaken for pumice. The result of such actions being totally different from what the agents intended, they are justly deemed involuntary, when accompanied with pain and repentance; whereas those actions seem most voluntary, which not only proceed from our own movements, but which are begun, carried on, and terminated with a clear perception or knowledge of their

[†] *Æschylus* was acquitted by the Areopagus for divulging some expressions used in the mysteries, having proved that he was not initiated, and therefore did not know what he said. *Clemens Alexandrin.* from. ii.

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III.

real nature and end. To which of the two classes then shall we ascribe things done through anger or appetite? If we call them involuntary, brute animals, and children, who are yet incapable of reason, can never act voluntarily. But appetite and anger are principles of human nature, as well as reason itself; and when they prompt us to act amiss, are not less voluntary than when they prompt us to act rightly; to repel injuries, and to defend our persons; to gratify hunger which prevents death, or to gratify curiosity which promotes knowledge. That which is involuntary is painful, but the gratification of our natural appetites is highly pleasing. Besides, what does it import us to say, that things done in passion are less voluntary than those done on reflection, since guilty transports of passion ought to be as carefully avoided and shunned as deliberate villainy? The actions of man too often proceed from fretfulness or concupiscence; which irrational impulses, being moving principles in the human frame, cannot, without absurdity, be considered as involuntary.^u

Chap. 2.

Of moral
election
and preference.

Having thus distinguished actions and passions as voluntary and involuntary, we next proceed to treat of that intentional election or preference of one plan of conduct to another, which seems, still more than actions themselves, to compose the nature and essence of virtue, and to constitute the distinction of characters. This election

^u See *Magna Moralia*, b. i. c. xiii.; and *Ethic. Eudem.* b. ii. c. vii.

or

or preference is not only voluntary, but something more^x; for it belongs not to brute animals and children, whose actions are voluntary; nor to voluntary acts done suddenly, with such precipitate haste as leaves not any time for comparison, election, or choice. Those who name it inclination, passion, or opinion, seem to mistake its nature. For the passions, whether originating in anger or pleasure, are common to man with the brute creation; but this election or preference is peculiar to himself. The intemperate man acts from passion, without election; but the man of true temperance acts from election, without passion^y. The calm motive, by which he is actuated, is a thing so different from passion or desire, that it is frequently set in direct opposition to them: but desire cannot be opposed to desire, nor any one passion to itself. Pleasure and pain are the ultimate moving principles which set all the desires and passions to work; but the actions of good men, depending on a higher cause, do not obey their impulse. Neither ought this intentional preference or

^x ἐπὶ πλεον το εὐαισιον. "Voluntary" is an epithet of more extensive application. It applies to actions that are not "deliberate." Moral election therefore implies something more than merely what is "voluntary."

^y ὁ ἀκρατής ἐπιθυμῶν μὴ πράττει, προαιρεμένος δὲ ὁ ἐγκρατής ὁ ἀναπαύει, προαιρεμένος μὴ, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ. "The intemperate man acts desiring, not preferring; the temperate man (quite the reverse) acts preferring, not desiring." The full sense of this passage will appear hereafter, when we come to treat of the important distinctions between temperance and self-command on the one side, and, of those between intemperance and confirmed profligacy on the other: distinctions, generally overlooked, though essential to a complete theory of Ethics.

election

BOOK election to be confounded with mere inclinations or wishes, though it appears to be nearly connected with them. We may wish for things impossible, as immortality; or things not depending on ourselves, as that such a player or wrestler may gain the prize. But to prefer impossibilities, is the part only of a madman; and moral election or choice implies, that the goods preferred may be obtained by our own exertions. Besides, our wishes relate principally to ends; our preferences, to means: we wish for health, we prefer the means necessary for attaining it; "to wish for happiness," is correct language; "to prefer happiness," is an expression highly inaccurate: our preferences seem universally to relate to things within our own power. Moral preferences therefore, are not merely opinions: which latter may relate to things impossible, eternal, and unchangeable; and which are characterized by the epithets "true" and "false," not by those of "good" and "bad;" which apply only to our preferences or elections. These last differ not only from opinion in general, but from every opinion in particular; for by no opinion whatever, and which is merely an opinion, are our characters marked as good or bad. Our preferences ascertain the morality of our actions and habits. But our opinions merely tell us what it is that we choose or reject; wherein it may be useful or hurtful; and how it may prove either the one or the other. Our opinions are estimated by their truth, our preferences by their propriety; the former are unstable like
their

their causes, the latter are regulated by our own experience; and what opinion tells us to be the best road, is not always that which we choose to follow, our vices dragging us in an opposite direction^a. To determine whether this moral preference is either preceded by, or accompanied with, opinion, belongs not to the present question, which consists only in deciding whether these two be one and the same. We see that they are not. What then can this moral preference be, since it belongs not to any of the classes above mentioned? It plainly is voluntary, but also something more, since it implies deliberation and reason; and, as its name indicates, is that which, after due comparisons made by the understanding, the will prefers as best.^a

But it is worthy of consideration, whether all questions be the objects of such deliberations and comparisons, or some questions only. There are some points concerning which none but a fool or a madman would hesitate a moment; and we are not said to deliberate concerning things eternal and unalterable, as the existence of the universe, or the incommensurability of the sides of a square with its diagonal. Neither do we deliberate concerning things merely fortuitous, as the finding of a treasure; nor concerning those which either naturally or necessarily always happen after the same manner, as the seasons of

BOOK
III.

Chap. 3.
About
what ob-
jects it is
conversant.

^a ——— Video meliora proboque;
Deteriora sequor.

HOR.

^a See Ethics to Eudemus, b. ii. c. vii, viii, ix, x.; and Magn. Moral. b. i. c. xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii.

droughts

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III.

droughts and rains; the rising, setting, and motions of the planets. Nor do all human affairs, that is, all those depending on the exertions of man, form a fit subject for our deliberation. The Lacedæmonians do not deliberate what is the constitution of government most suitable to the Scythians; because the conduct of the Lacedæmonians cannot have any efficacy in establishing it. The proper object of deliberation, therefore, consists in those practical matters, which depend on our own exertions; since these are the only things that remain unmentioned. Nature, necessity, fortune, intellect, are all of them considered as causes; but our deliberations bear a reference to those causes only which it is in our own power to influence and control. Things subjected to strict rules, admit not of deliberation; for example, in writing the letters of the alphabet, we have only to follow the practice prescribed. But the great field for deliberation lies in those practical arts which are uncertain and doubtful; in physic, œconomy; and in navigation rather than in the gymnastic; because the more precarious their operations are, the more patient deliberation is requisite: it is more necessary therefore in arts than in sciences; and must be constantly exercised about those things which, as they are not fortuitous, happen, for the most part, after the same manner; but concerning which, it is not easy for human wisdom to foresee how they will, in any given case, fall out. In matters of this kind, which are of high moment, we do not choose to

act without the advice of counsellors, mistrust-
 ing our own sagacity. It was before observed, BOOK
III.
 that we do not deliberate concerning ends, but
 concerning the means by which they may be at-
 tained. A physician never examines, whether
 he shall cure his patient; nor an orator, whether
 he shall persuade his audience; nor a statesman,
 whether he shall promote public prosperity. But
 the means through which these several purposes
 may be best attained, are the proper objects of
 their respective deliberations; which often ex-
 tend to a long series of reasoning: for the im-
 mediate instruments, or agents, through which
 their designs may be effected, must often be pro-
 cured by means of others more remote, and
 those, by others naturally prior; until they ar-
 rive finally at the first efficient cause, which, as
 in a mathematical investigation or analysis, is
 frequently the last in the order of discovery.
 The statesman, too, as well as the mathema-
 tician, when he comes to an impossibility, there
 stops; and tries some other road, which may
 lead to the end in view: as for example, if
 money be wanted, and cannot possibly be found,
 his schemes, which must be ineffectual, without
 it, are immediately laid aside; but he does not
 desist from his purpose until he has examined
 not only his own resources but those of his
 friends; for what may be done by our friends,
 is in our own power, since they may be set to
 work by a principle in ourselves. Our delibera-
 tions, therefore, relate to instruments, to agents,
 to materials, and to means; and not only to the
 causes

BOOK causes by which, but to the manner in which,
 III. our actions are to be performed, our conduct regulated, and our purposes effected. On the other hand, our ends and purposes themselves are never subjects of deliberation; neither are we said to deliberate concerning those particulars, which are merely perceptions of sense^a. Neither can our deliberations be indefinite or endless, because this would imply a desire without an object. Moral preference, then, is not deliberation, but that which, after mature deliberation, is preferred as most agreeable to the commanding principles in our nature. In this preference, deliberation terminates; and from it, action commences. This natural progress appears in the Heroic Politics, faithfully delineated by Homer. The wisdom of the senate deliberates and prefers, and declares its resolves to the people; who immediately carry them into execution. Moral preference, then, relates to those things only, which may be accomplished by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason^b; and,

as

^a He says, whether this bit of bread, for instance, be well baked: the example seems superfluous.

^b The sagacious Polybius analyses with Aristotle the moral principle or faculty into reason or intellect, operating on the social and sympathetic nature of man. The passage is in the part of Polybius translated by Hampton, in whose words I shall give it. "From the union of the two sexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of these therefore, being arrived at perfect age, instead of yielding suitable returns of gratitude and assistance to those by whom they have been bred, on the contrary, attempt to injure them by words or actions, it is manifest that those who behold the wrong, after having also seen the sufferings and the anxious cares that were sustained by

as above observed, conversant, not about ends, **BOOK III.**
 but about the best means by which they may be attained.

Volition, on the contrary, is, as above said, **Chap. 4.**
 conversant only about ends; which consist, according to some, in real, and, according to **The causes which move the will.**

by the parents in the nourishment and education of their children, must be greatly offended and displeased at such proceeding. For man, who, among all the various kinds of animals, is alone endowed with the faculty of reason, cannot, like the rest, pass over such actions with indifference: but will make reflection on what he sees; and comparing likewise the future with the present, will not fail to express his indignation at this injurious treatment; to which, as he foresees, he may also at some time be exposed. Thus again, when any one who has been succoured by another in the time of danger, instead of shewing the like kindness to this benefactor, endeavours at any time to destroy or hurt him; it is certain that all men must be shocked by such ingratitude, through sympathy with the resentment of their neighbour; and from an apprehension also, that the case may be their own. And from hence arises, in the mind of every man, a certain *notion* of the nature and force of duty, in which consists both the beginning and the end of justice. In like manner, the man, who in defence of others, is seen to throw himself the foremost into every danger, and even to sustain the fury of the fiercest animals, never fails to obtain the loudest acclamations of applause and veneration from all the multitude; while he who shews a different conduct is pursued with censure and reproach. And thus it is that the people begin to discern the nature of things honourable and base, and in what consists the difference between them; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be detested and avoided." Polybius, l. vi. c. 6. The doctrine contained in this passage is expanded by Dr. Adam Smith into a theory of moral sentiments. But he departs from Polybius in placing the perception of right and wrong in sentiment or feeling ultimately and simply. This also was the doctrine of Hutcheson, who ascribes our notions of virtue and vice to what he calls a moral sense*. Polybius, on the contrary, maintains with Aristotle, that these notions arise from reason or intellect operating on affection or appetite; or, in other words, that the moral faculty is a compound, and may be resolved into two simpler principles of the mind.

* Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy.

others,

BOOK

III.

others, in seeming, good. The opinion of those who think that the will is moved only by what is really good, involves this contradiction, that the volitions of a bad man are not voluntary; and the opinion of those who think that the will is moved only by seeming good, destroys all natural motives to volition, and makes it dependent merely on human caprice. If such opinions must at first sight be rejected, let us, then, say, that real good is the natural cause of volition, but that each individual prefers what seems good to himself; a good man, what is truly good; and a bad man, what he happens to think so; just as we see, in different habits and constitutions of body, the same things are not equally conducive to the health of all alike, but wholesome things agree with healthy constitutions, whereas the sickly often delight most in things naturally unwholesome. In the same manner the moral constitution of a virtuous man, being congenial with truth, appreciates things by their real worth; for such as our habits are, such will be the estimates which we form of honour, pleasure, and every object of desire. This perhaps is the chief excellence of virtue, that it enables us to see the true value of things, and to measure them by a correct standard. But the multitude, deceived by appearances, pursue pleasures as the only good, and shun pain as the only evil.

Chap. 5.

That our
habits are
voluntary.

Ends are, then, the objects of volition; and the means of attaining them are the objects of deliberation and preference; which, being constant

verfant only about fuch things as are in our own power, the virtues immediately proceeding from them muft alfo be in our own power, and voluntary, as well as the contrary vices. The poet's fentiment therefore is but partially true :

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III.

“ None covets wretchednefs, or fpuins delight^c.”

The latter claufe cannot be difputed ; but the former muft be denied, otherwife we muft reject the doctrine juft eftablifhed, that man is the author of his own actions ; and that thofe things, whole principles or caufes are in ourfelves, are alfo in our own power. Yet thefe truths are attested by common fenfe and univerfal experience. Criminal actions are punifhed by law, when not committed either through compulfion or ignorance ; in which cafes they are pardoned, as not proceeding from ourfelves. Praise-worthy actions, on the other hand, are encouraged and honoured ; that as men are deterred from vice by the dread of punifhment, they may be excited to virtue by the hope of reward. But were not our conduct voluntary, fuch purfuafives to virtue would be ufelefs and abfurd ; and there would be no more fenfe in exhorting a man to his duty, than in perfuading him not to feel cold

^c οὐδὲς ἴκαν πονηρὸς ὡδ' ἀκαν μακαρ. “ Nobody is willingly wicked, or happy againft his will.” The fentiment is afcribed to an ancient tragedian. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Oxford, p. 108. and to Hefiod, “ Ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις.” Euftrat. in Moral. Aristot. p. 62. The verfe originally meant that nobody was willingly *miferable*, &c., that fenfe being given to the word *πονηρὸς* in Hefiod. Suidas fays, that Hefiod wrote a catalogue of illuftrious women, in five books, from which work Euftratus conjectures this verfe may be copied.

BOOK or heat, thirst or hunger. Crimes committed
 { **III.** through ignorance are only excusable when the
 ignorance is involuntary; for when the cause of it lies in ourselves, it is then justly punishable; as in that ancient law which inflicts a double penalty on crimes done in drunkenness^d. The ignorance of those laws, which all may know if they will, does not excuse the breach of them; and neglect is not pardonable, where attention ought to have been bestowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This however is our own fault; since the incapacity has been contracted by our continual carelessness; as the evils of injustice and intemperance are contracted by the daily commission of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in voluptuousness. For such as our actions are, such must our habits become; a truth confirmed by such universal experience, that to be ignorant of it betrays the grossest stupidity. It is plain therefore that our vices are voluntary; since we voluntarily do those things which we know must create them. But does it depend merely on our own wills to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of his physician, to recover that health which is lost by his own profligacy. When we have thrown a stone, we cannot restrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourselves, whether we should

^d This, and other laws of the same tendency, will be considered in the "Politics."

throw

throw it or not. The villain and the voluptuary **BOOK**
 are therefore voluntarily such ; because the **III.**
 cause of their turpitude lies solely in themselves. }
 Not only the vices of the mind, but even the
 imperfections of the body, are just subjects for
 reproach, when they are not natural, but pro-
 duced through our own indolence or neglect.
 We pity blindness, lameness, or deformity, when
 they proceed from causes independent on those
 afflicted with them ; but they are just objects of
 reproach, when contracted through drunken-
 ness or any other species of debauchery ; and,
 in the same manner, all vices and imperfections
 are blameable which originate in ourselves.*

But should any endeavour to excuse their **Objections**
 wickedness, by saying that all men aspire after **answered.**
 apparent good, but that the appearances or phan-
 tasms which make us assign to things this impor-
 tant epithet, arise not from our own suggestion,
 but depend on our constitution and character,
 it may be answered, that in as far as we ourselves
 are the causes of this constitution and character,
 we also must be the causes of these phantasms
 or appearances. But if the two former depend
 not at all on ourselves, and villains, when they
 commit wickedness, do it merely through igno-
 rance of the ends at which they ought to aim ;
 and virtuous men, on the contrary, when they
 perform virtuous actions, do them merely through
 Nature's bounty in furnishing them with a moral
 or intellectual eye, which enables them to dis-
 cern what is truly good ; this surely would, in

* The Magna Moralia, and Ethics to Eudemus, as above.

BOOK III. the latter, be the best and fairest of pre-eminen-
 nences, a prerogative not adventitious but innate^f, not acquired by instruction or example, but growing up spontaneously with the admirable frame of their natural constitution. First of all, if this were the case, virtue would not be voluntary any more than vice, since both would solely depend on the original organization of our minds. But if we ourselves are in any degree the artificers of our own characters; and, if it depends on our own voluntary acts, what sort of habits we shall form; and, if not entirely what ends we shall pursue, at least what means we shall use for their attainment; then both our virtues and our vices must be voluntary; and, as such, the former will be the objects of praise and reward, and the latter of blame and punishment.

Transition
 to the con-
 sideration
 of each vir-
 tue in par-
 ticular.

We have thus given a sketch of the virtues in general, shewing that they are practical habits, consisting in mediocrity, dependent on ourselves, voluntary, and agreeable to right reason. Actions and habits are not precisely in the same sense voluntary; the former are voluntary throughout, from beginning to end; but the beginnings only of habits, which gain force,

^f This word is used in other parts of Aristotle's works to distinguish natural powers from those acquired by our own exertions. Thus in his *Metaph.* l ix. c. v. *Ἀπασων δὲ τῶν δυναμένων οὐσῶν, τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τῶν δὲ ἐκεί, ὅσων τῇ τε αὐλείῃ, τῶν δὲ μαθησῶν ὅσων τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν.* "The most general division of powers is into three, which are innate, like the senses; those acquired by custom like the power of playing on the flute; and those acquired by instruction, like many of the arts."

like

like maladies, by degrees, until they become irresistible; even these however are also voluntary, since their causes were such, namely, the actions by which they were formed.—We now proceed to consider the several virtues in particular; wherein each consists, to what object it relates, and in what manner it relates to them; whence their number will be manifest:—and first, concerning courage.

This virtue, as we formerly observed, consists in the moderation and propriety of our affections and actions in reference to those causes and circumstances which either excite fear, or inspire confidence. Since whatever is evil is in some degree formidable⁸, fear is defined “the dread of evil,” and of evil of every kind, infamy, poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But courage is not displayed in universal fearlessness; for not to fear infamy is the part of impudence and baseness; whereas the worthy and respectable character has always the keenest sense of shame, and the greatest abhorrence of disgrace. Yet impudence sometimes passes for courage; and may be so called, by a metaphor; since it resembles that virtue in being equally fearless. Neither poverty nor disease, nor any evil that proceeds not from voluntary turpitude, ought, perhaps, to be much dreaded by those who aspire to the dignity of virtue; yet fearlessness, as to such objects, does not constitute what is pro-

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Chap. 6.
—
The definition and nature of courage.

⁸ φοβεμένα δε δηλοῦσι τὰ φοβερά· ταῦτα δ' εἰσι, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, κακά. “We fear things formidable, which, to express them in one word, are evils.”

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perly called courage, though it sometimes receives metaphorically that name: for those who tremble at the sound of war, may be liberal of their money, and fearless of poverty; those, surely, are not cowards, who dread the insults likely to fall on their wives or children; nor are those to be dignified with the epithet of courageous, who, with the calm intrepidity of slaves, endure the prospect of disgraceful stripes. To what kind of terrors, then, does courage render us superior? To the greatest of all,—the fear of death; for death seems of all things the most formidable; being in vulgar estimation the ultimate limit of all our pains and pleasures, beyond which there is neither good nor evil. Yet courage is not alike shewn in contempt for every form of death. This virtue appears not conspicuous in disease or shipwreck, but in an honourable death in the field of battle, which is, of all, the fairest and most illustrious, as is attested by the honours with which it is rewarded, both by republics and kings. Courage, therefore, is peculiarly displayed in encountering death in battle, and in setting warlike dangers at defiance: not but that a brave man will be fearless during a storm at sea, or on a sick-bed; but his fortitude is different from that of sailors, who are rendered fearless through experience and custom; whereas he, perceiving no means of safety, submits with indignant^b intrepidity

^b ἢ ὡς ταῖς τοιαύταις δι' φόβου ἀντιφρονῶν παρχει. Both Ulysses and Eneas thought with our author:

With

trepidity to a death, from which no honour can be reaped, and in which no exertion of manhood can be displayed. BOOK
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The same evils which terrify one person are not formidable to another; though there are some of such an irresistible nature, as to shake the firmest minds, and to inspire fear into all endowed with understanding. But those objects of terror which surpass not the strength of human nature, differing from each other in magnitude, as well as do the grounds of confidence, courage will discriminate between real and apparent dangers; and make us meet the former, as brave men ought, unshaken and dauntless, subjecting the instinctive emotions of fear to the dictates of reason and of honour. For we betray our weakness, not only when we fear things really not formidable, but when we are affected in an undue degree, or at an improper time, by objects of real danger. A brave man avoids such errors; and, estimating things by their real worth, prefers the grace and beauty of habitual fortitude to the delusive security of

Chap. 7.

With what a cloud the brows of Heaven are crown'd?
 What raging winds? What roaring waters round?
 'Tis Jove himself the swelling tempest rears;
 Death, present death, on every side appears.
 Happy! thrice happy, who, in battle slain,
 Press'd, in Atreides' cause, the Trojan plain! &c.

ODYSSEY, V. v. 390.

And Æneas,

O ter quaterque beati,
 Quis ante ora patrum, Troje sub mœnibus altis,
 Contigit oppetere, &c.

ÆNEID, l. i. v. 98.

X 4

deformed

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deformed cowardice. Yet he is not less careful to avoid that excess of intrepidity, which, being rarely met with, is, like many other vices, without a name; though nothing but madness, or a most stupid insensibility, can make any man preserve, amidst earthquakes and inundations, that unshaken composure, which has been ascribed to the Celts¹. An overweening estimate of the causes of confidence, and a consequent excess of courage, is called audacity; a boastful species of bravery, and the mere ape of true manhood. What the brave man *is*, the rash and audacious man wishes to *appear*; he courts and provokes unnecessary dangers, but fails in the hour of trial; and is, for the most part, a blustering bully, who, under a semblance of pretended courage, conceals no inconsiderable portion of cowardice. But the complete and genuine coward easily betrays himself, by fearing either things not formidable, or things formidable, in an undue degree; and his failing is the more manifest, because it is accompanied with plain indications of pain: he lives in continual alarm, and is therefore spiritless and dejected; whereas courage warms our breasts, and animates our hopes. Such then is the character of true courage, as opposed to audacity on one hand, and cowardice on the other. It holds the middle place between these vicious extremes; it is calm and sedate; and though it never provokes

¹ Alexander, who perhaps knew them better than his preceptor, considered the "Κελταις or Καλαται, or Γαλαται," the Celts or Gauls, as an arrogant and boastful nation. ὁ Κελτοὶ αἰεὶ ἀλαζονεῖς. The Gauls are always braggarts. Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. i. p. 5.

danger,

danger, is always ready to meet even death in an honourable cause. But to die, rather than endure manfully the pressure of poverty, or the stings of love, or any other cruel suffering, is the part of a coward; who basely flies from an enemy that he has not spirit to encounter; and ignominiously quits the field, where he might have sustained a strenuous and honourable conflict.

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There are five kinds of courage, besides that properly so called. The first kind is the political, which most resembles that above described; because it is inspired by legal honours and rewards, and upheld by legal punishments and infamy. Courage therefore chiefly prevails, where cowardice is most stigmatised. Homer will supply us with examples; hear those of Hector and Diomed:

Chap. 8.

Shall proud Polydamas before the gate
Proclaim, his counsels are obeyed too late;
Which timely follow'd but the former night,
What numbers had been sav'd by Hector's flight?*

And Diomed,

But, ah! what grief, should haughty Hector boast,
I fled inglorious to the guarded coast!†

This political courage most resembles genuine valour, because it originates in the love of glory and the shame of reproach, which are virtuous and honourable motives. Nearly alike to it, is that bravery which is inspired into soldiers by

* Il. xxii. v. 140, & seq.

† Il. viii. v. 179, & seq.

their

B O O K their generals; but inferior in merit, since en-
III. gendered not by shame, but by fear; and by the
 dread not of disgrace but of punishment. For
 generals compel by threats; as Hector:

On rushed bold Hector, gloomy as the night;
 Forbids to plunder, animates the fight,
 Points to the fleet; for, by the Gods! who flies,
 Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies;
 No weeping sister his cold eye shall close,
 No friendly hand his funeral pile compose!
 Who stops to plunder at this signal hour,
 The birds shall tear him, and the dogs devour.^m

Those who advance, fearful of stripes, should they retreat; and those who stand their ground, in consequence of obstacles to their flight;—all such lose the merit of bravery, because they are brave on compulsion. Experience and custom may produce likewise an artificial bravery; wherefore Socrates thought that courage was a matter of science. Each is most courageous in what he best understands; and therefore soldiers in battle; since they know the emptiness of many of the terrors with which the parade of war is accompanied. To the ignorant, therefore, they appear truly valiant; besides, their experience has taught them skilfully to employ their weapons, and by what means they may best defend themselves, and most effectually assault their enemies. They contend therefore with all the advantage which a practised prize-fighter enjoys over an ignorant rustic; or that men completely armed enjoy over naked troops; for in such

^m Il. xv. v. 194, & seq.

combats,

combats, spirit and manhood yield to armed BOOK
dexterity. But when the odds are against them, III.
the courage of disciplined mercenaries speedily
fails, and they are the first to fly; whereas the
national troops remain and are slain; which re-
cently happened at the Hermæus, where the
Theban citizens preferred death to an ignomi-
nious safety, while their auxiliaries, though they
behaved valiantly in the beginning of the action,
no sooner discovered their inferiority in strength,
than they basely betook themselves to flight;
fearing death more than disgrace. Anger is
often called to the assistance of manhood; and
men seem courageous through passion, like wild
beasts which turn, when wounded, and attack
their pursuers; for both valour and anger make
us regardless of danger.—Whence Homer says:

Inflaming thus the rage of all their hosts;^a

And

Each Trojan bosom with new warmth he fires.^o

These passages imply, that the excitement of
anger is auxiliary to courage; which, however,
in man, ought to originate in a sense of honour,
whereas, in beasts, it springs only from the smart
of pain; for they turn on their pursuers, only
when they are afraid or hurt; but, in their native
woods or marshes, they venture not to approach
human kind. Manly courage, therefore, cannot
result from the irritation of pain, or from that

^a Il. xvi. v. 658.

^o Il. vi. v. 626.

blind

BOOK III. blind passion which rushes, improvident, on unknown dangers. Even the unfeeling ass, when hungry, does not, through the fear of blows, forsake his pasture; and adulterers, impelled by lust, have exhibited signal examples of boldness; but such things are far remote from true courage. Yet, of all passions, anger is the most nearly allied to this virtue, and would entirely accord with it, if directed by mature deliberation, and controlled by maxims of honour. Even in men, anger is painful, and revenge is sweet: yet, acting under the impulse of such passions, they are not courageous but quarrelsome; for neither reason nor moral principle has any share in their behaviour; which has something in it resembling courage, but is not that virtue. Nor are persons buoyed up by hope, courageous; for they are confident of success, only because they have often conquered. This confidence, indeed, resembles that of true courage; but it proceeds from a different principle, the opinion of superiority, and the consequent sense of safety; and, like the spurious valour of drunkards (who are brave while successful), fails them under the slightest reverse of fortune. But true courage surmounts real and known dangers, because it is honourable to resist them, and base to sink under them. It is best seen in sudden emergencies, because, on such occasions, undisturbed firmness cannot be assumed, but must be the result of confirmed manly habits. Persons ignorant of the dangers which they encounter, have also a false semblance of courage; they are somewhat allied to

to

to those buoyed up by hope, but are of a stamp still inferior, their boldness being founded on mistake, and therefore destitute of merit: for when they either know or suspect the truth, they betake themselves to shameful flight; as the Argives did, after encountering the Lacedæmonians, whom they mistook for Sicyonians. We have now described who are truly courageous, and who only seem to be so.

Chap. 9.

Though the office of courage consists in moderating the impulse of rash boldness, as well as the excess of cautious timidity, yet its principal business is employed about the latter; because it is more difficult, and therefore more praiseworthy, to endure pain, than to resist pleasure; and we endure pain when we silence the dictates of fear, and encounter real dangers with manly fortitude. Yet the end and essence of courage are truly pleasant, though the pleasure disappears amidst the crowd of painful circumstances with which it is accompanied. In the Gymnastic games, the prize-fighters contemplate with pleasure the crowns and honours with which their victories are rewarded: but their laborious exertions, and repeated wounds, are uneasy and painful, and the splendour of the prize, which is small, is obscured and lost in the gloomy magnitude of surrounding circumstances. In like manner death and wounds are painful to a brave man, and reluctantly encountered; yet he meets and defies them, because it is honourable to do so; and although the more distinguished he is in virtue, and therefore in happiness, he may regard

B O O K **III.** **III.** guard his loss in death as the greater, and the more deeply regret the dangers to which he is exposed; yet, on this account, his courage is only the more conspicuous in preferring a glorious death to a happy life. The exercise therefore of laborious virtue is painful in its progress, and delightful chiefly as it approaches the goal. But there are mercenary ruffians, who, though endowed with little true courage, are ready, for their miserable hire, to throw away their lives, which are of still less value. Thus much concerning courage; of which we may delineate the nature, from the observations above made.*

Chap. 10.

Of the definition and nature of temperance.

We now proceed to speak of temperance, which, as well as courage, is employed in regulating the irrational, and merely animal part of our constitution. Temperance, we have said, is the habit of mediocrity in our affections with respect to objects affording pleasure; and also (though in a different manner, and an inferior degree) with respect to those which give pain. Ungoverned voluptuousness is the reverse of temperance. We farther proceed to examine what kinds of pleasure it is the office of temperance to regulate. Pleasures are commonly distinguished, as either corporeal or mental. Of the latter kind is the pleasure which we derive from virtue or from knowledge; with both of which we are delighted, because we love them; and that, without any bodily sensation, but merely through mental affection. Neither

* Vid. *Magna Moral.* l. i. c. xiii.; and *Eudem.* l. iii. c. i.

tempe-

temperance nor voluptuousness are conversant about such pleasures, nor about any others not originating in the body. Men fond of the marvellous, and who delight in relating idle stories from morning to night, are called prattlers, not profligates: nor are those guilty of intemperance who indulge excessive grief for the loss of their fortunes or of their friends. Temperance relates therefore to bodily pleasures only, but not even to them universally. It restrains not the gratification which the eye receives from colours, figures, and pictures, nor that given to the ear by declamation or music. There is a propriety, doubtless, in the affection with which we desire, and the degree in which we indulge, those pleasures; but they who act properly in such particulars, are not denominated temperate; nor those who act improperly, intemperate. Nor do temperance and intemperance apply to our restraint or indulgence with regard to the pleasures derived from the sense of smell, except by way of accession, that is, when grateful odours are considered as an accessory to agreeable sensations derived from the taste or touch. To be delighted with the fragrantcy of flowers and fruits, and of those aromatics which perfume the altars of the gods, is never regarded as sensuality; but a propensity to vicious indulgence may appear in the pleasures received from those artificial scents which are employed for heightening personal allurements, and from the odour of those delicacies which form the luxury of our tables; because, in these cases, the perceptions of one sense

B O O K sense naturally bring into our thoughts the perceptions of other senses, which are too often indulged with gross and beastly intemperance. The inferior animals, when hungry, are delighted with the smell of their food ; but this delight in them happens also, as above explained, by way of accession ; dogs are pleased with the scent of the hare, because they delight in eating that animal ; and lions are pleased not with the bellowing of the bull, but with devouring him : and the bellowing only pleases them, because it is a proof that their prey is near to them. The sight of the deer or wild goat also delights them, because it affords the expectation of soon tasting their flesh. Temperance, therefore, is conversant about those pleasures only, which are common to us with beasts ; and in which an excessive indulgence is therefore justly deemed the lowest depravity. Those pleasures depend entirely on the touch and taste, but far more on the former ; the taste being properly that sense which discriminates different flavours, as is done by those who critically examine wines and sauces. But the beastly sensualist has little or no pleasure in any thing except mere corporeal contact in eating and drinking, as well as in venery. Wherefore the voluptuary Philoxenus wished his neck as long as a crane's, that his gratification in the act of swallowing might be the more durable. Temperance, therefore, is chiefly conversant about regulating the pleasures of that sense, of which, as it is of all the most common, the improper indulgence is the most blameable

and most debasing ; since it belongs to us, not as men, but as mere animals. To love and take delight in such gratifications, is to divest ourselves of the man, and to put on the wild beast : for the more liberal pleasures of the touch, such as the warmth produced by friction and exercise in the *gymnasia*, fall not under this head ; intemperate voluptuousness in contact not extending to the whole body, but centering in particular parts of it.

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III.

Of our desires and appetites, some are common and natural ; others, peculiar and adventitious. Every animal needs and desires nourishment, either dry or moist ; and sometimes both ; and in the vigour of life, every man, as Homer says, wishes for a mate. But all do not desire either the same objects ; nor is every particular object alike necessary to the happiness of every individual ; the desire of particular objects, therefore, is often considered as peculiar and adventitious. This desire may nevertheless be natural to him who feels it, since different men have different inclinations ; and one person may receive much delight from that which cannot afford any gratification to another. In our natural desires, there are few improprieties : the sole error consisting in excessive indulgence. Gluttony, which, instead of satisfying, overloads the stomach, is the vice only of the most abject of the human kind. But in adventitious and unnatural pleasures, there is scope for the wildest and most various errors ; which result, not only from the excessive degree, but from the improper

Chap. 11.

Natural
and adventitious
desires.

B O O K

III.

and even odious objects, of our desires; as well as from the unbecoming manner and unseasonable occasions on which they are indulged. Intemperance, then, is an excess with regard to pleasure; and justly reprobated. With regard to pain, the office of temperance is different from that of fortitude. The intemperate man is grieved at missing pleasure; which, by his perversity and folly, is thus absurdly converted into a perpetual source of pain; since he desires it with distressing anxiety, and both abuses it when present, and sorrows after it when it is gone. But temperance, which is not to be seduced by pleasures within its power, cannot grieve at the loss of those which are placed beyond its reach. Extreme insensibility to pleasure is not the lot of human nature; even brute beasts prefer one kind of food to another. The fault therefore of being too little affected by pleasure, as it seldom or never occurs, is not distinguished by a name. But temperance holds the middle place between this nameless vice and the opposite extreme. The man endowed with temperance is so far from delighting in, or enjoying, the pleasures of the voluptuary, that he beholds them with detestation and disgust. He indulges in none but lawful pleasures, and in them seasonably and soberly; and not being intoxicated by them when present, does not painfully long for them when absent. His health, his fortune, and, above all, his honour and his duty, prescribe laws to his appetites. The profligate prefers sensual pleasures to all things beside: the man
of

of temperance estimates them at their true value, and that a low one.^a

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice: the former proceeding from the desire of pleasure, the latter from the aversion to pain: and such is the nature of pain that it disturbs and destroys the frame of mind of those who behold its approach, and anticipate its pangs. Pleasure not producing these effects, the intemperate indulgence in it is therefore more voluntary, and consequently more blameable; especially since there are innumerable opportunities in life for restraining our pursuit of unlawful or improper pleasures, and thereby acquiring a confirmed habit of temperance, the several acts of which are unattended with danger. The reverse of this happens as to cowardice; the opportunities for correcting it are much fewer in number, and the experiment is dangerous. But though particular instances of cowardice are in some measure involuntary, through the invincible terror which produces them, and which impels those affected with it to throw away their shields, and to commit other shameful actions, yet the frame and habit of mind from which such actions flow, seems to be more a matter of choice; whereas the frame and habit of mind from which intemperance flows, seems less voluntary than the particular instances of it; for no one can will or choose, that by his internal constitution he should be the sport of vicious propensities,

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Chap. 12.

Comparison of intemperance and cowardice.

^a Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii. Eudem. l. iii. c. ii.

BOOK and ungovernable appetites. The word denoting intemperance in Greek is applicable to the wanton and unchastised petulance of boys, which bears a near analogy to what is called intemperance in men. Which of the two was the primary meaning of the word, it is not material to inquire; for the transition is extremely natural from the one signification to the other, nothing standing more in need of chastisement than depravities which increase by indulgence; to which depravities, passions as well as boys are peculiarly liable. For boys are actuated almost solely by passion, pleasure being their ruling pursuit; the desire of which, unless it be restrained by higher principles and controlled by authority, will transgress all reasonable bounds; and gaining strength by repeated acts of indulgence, will finally destroy and extinguish the light of reason itself. Our desires therefore ought to be few and moderate, and as obedient to the dictates of reason, as boys to the commands of their master. By such habitual regulation, they will gradually harmonise with the higher powers of our nature, and at length terminate in the same excellent and honourable end; exhibiting the steady lustre of virtue; and exactly conforming, as to their object, degree, time, and all other circumstances, to the strict rules of propriety. So much concerning temperance.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING treated of the virtues of courage and temperance, which, how different soever in many respects from each other, agree in this particular, that both of them consist in the proper government of the irrational or merely sensitive part of our nature, the author proceeds, in the fourth book, to ascertain the limits of liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, meekness, courtesy, plain-dealing, and facetiousness. As things are best understood by comparison, he points out and defines the blameable extremes (for example, of niggardliness and profusion) which stand in direct opposition to each other; and which are both of them contrary, though not always in a like degree, to the praiseworthy habit which lies between them. He shows that there is an intermediate, but anonymous habit, highly deserving of approbation, between the extremes of ambition and blameable insensibility

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to honour: observing on this and other occasions, that many of the virtues, as well as of the vices, are not accurately distinguished by names; and that from this imperfection of language, much confusion results; for when the intermediate and praiseworthy habit is nameless, each of the extremes will strive to thrust itself into the middle place, which is the post of honour; and that habit which is approved as virtue by one class of men, will be condemned as vice by another. He examines whether shame can be classed with the virtues, since it seems rather a passion than a habit. He explains what is meant by a conditional virtue, in opposition to virtue simply and absolutely; and proves that shame is at best only a virtue of the conditional and imperfect kind.

BOOK IV.

ARGUMENT.

Liberality; vices opposite thereto. — Magnificence; its contraries. — Magnanimity. — Meekness; its contraries. — Courtesy; its contraries. — Plain-dealing; its contraries. — Facetiousness; its contraries. — Shame.

WE proceed to speak of liberality, which seems to be that virtue which bears a peculiar relation to property. For the praise of liberality is not acquired by courage in war, moderation in pleasure, or justice in judgment, but by the propriety of our behaviour in receiving or bestowing money, or whatever things can be measured by money; and principally in bestowing them. Of the propriety of our conduct in relation to property, prodigality and niggardliness are the two contrary and blameable extremes. Niggardliness always refers to those who set more than a just value on money: but prodigality is sometimes employed to express extravagant profusion joined with inordinate intemperance; for those are called prodigals, who waste their fortunes in ruinous pleasures, and thus signally debase themselves by complicated worthlessness. Yet prodigality more properly signifies one simple vice, that of ruining ourselves by our own fault; for he ruins himself by his own fault;

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IV.
Chap. I.

Liberality,
and the
vices con-
trary to it.

B O O K IV.
} who wastefully consumes his property, that is, the means by which his life is supported; and in this acceptation we take the word. Property falls under the description of things useful; which may either be used rightly or abused; and he only can use them rightly who is adorned with the virtue appertaining to them; namely, liberality. The use of money consists in expending or bestowing it: for the taking or keeping of money relates to possession rather than to use. The virtue of liberality therefore is more conspicuous in bestowing handsomely, than either in receiving what is our due, or in refusing what we ought not to accept. For virtue consists rather in acting our part well, than in avoiding what is amiss. This active virtue alone is the proper object of praise and gratitude; for it is more meritorious to part with what is our own, than to abstain from what belongs to another; which latter may be praised indeed as justice, but not as liberality; and to accept what is strictly due to us, is not entitled to any degree of praise. None are more beloved than the liberal, because their virtue is extensively useful, diffusing itself in benefits. But the motive from which their actions proceed, is what chiefly constitutes their excellence; for liberality, like every other virtue, must keep the beauty of propriety in view; selecting its objects, and proportioning its extent, according to those rules which right reason prescribes. In conferring favours the critical moment must also be carefully studied; and they must be conferred cheerfully, at least
not

not painfully : and when any one of these conditions is wanting, whatever acts of bounty a man may perform, he will not carry off the palm of virtuous and graceful liberality. If the gifts bestowed on others occasion pain to ourselves, it is a proof that we prefer money to the beauty of generous actions ; and if we are rapacious in acquiring money, we cannot be truly liberal in employing it. A man of real beneficence will not be importunate in solicitation. He will be delicate as to accepting favours ; but will enrich himself by the diligent management of his own affairs, that he may acquire materials for his bounty, which will be distributed with caution, that it may never fail the deserving. It belongs to his character to be more provident for others than for himself ; and to extend the measure of his beneficence far beyond those limits which the prudence of selfishness would prescribe. But our liberality is relative to our wealth ; it consists, not in the value of our gifts, but in the temper and habit of the giver ; and he who gives the least of all, may be the most liberal of all, if what he gives bears the highest proportion to his substance^r. Men of hereditary estates are more inclined to liberality, than those whose fortunes are their own work ; the former have never known the severities of want ; and all men are disposed to love and cherish their own works, as parents and poets. It is not easy for

^r Verily I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast more in than all they which have cast into the treasury. St. Mark, c. xii. v. 43.

a liberal

BOOK IV. a liberal man to be rich, since he is nice in receiving money, not retentive in keeping it; and always ready to give it away, on no other account than that of the proper or beneficent purposes to which it may be applied. Fortune, therefore, is continually accused of enriching those who are least worthy of her favours. But this happens naturally, without the interference of fortune; since wealth cannot well be possessed by those who employ not the ordinary means by which it is acquired and accumulated. Yet true liberality avoids unnecessary and superfluous expence, lest the source should be dried up, from which only its salutary streams can plentifully flow. Whoever lives beyond his income, is strictly a prodigal, and he only; for kings, how great soever their expenditure may be, are never branded with this appellation; because it seems difficult for their munificence to exceed the measure of their resources. The liberal man, both in great and in small matters, and both in giving and receiving, behaves with cheerful serenity, because his behaviour is always proper, and always consistent with his character. As propriety, in giving and receiving, depends on the same principle of moderation in our desires with regard to money, he who gives properly, will not improperly receive; since contraries cannot result from the same principle, nor subsist in the same subject. Should it happen that a liberal man consumes more than he ought, and on an improper occasion, he will doubtless lament it, but with that calm and moderate composure which

which becomes his character ; for it is the part of virtue not only to joy and grieve from fit motives, but to assign proper limits to those emotions. The liberal man is, in matters of interest, of an accommodating temper ; he is open to imposition and injury, because he does not value money beyond its real worth, and is more uneasy at having omitted to do what he ought, than at doing too much ; living in direct opposition to the sordid maxims of Simonides*. The prodigal, again, is directly the reverse ; both his joy and his grief spring from improper motives, and both shew themselves in unseemly and immoderate degrees ; which will be more manifest in the sequel. Prodigality and avarice are both of them excesses, and both of them defects. Prodigality is excessive in giving, and defective in receiving ; avarice is defective in giving, and excessive in receiving ; scraping together the meanest and vilest gains. The qualities which compose and support prodigality, are not easily united : it is difficult for him who is careless of receiving, to continue lavish in bestowing ; for his funds, if he is a private man, will soon be exhausted. The prodigal, therefore, is better than the miser, because his malady is

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* A poet of the Isle of Ceos, and the first on record who prostituted his mercenary muse for the declared purpose of gain. He was born 558 years before Christ, and lived ninety years ; the companion and favourite of many of the princes and grandees of his time. As his avarice increased with his age, he endeavoured to extenuate it by saying that the pursuit of money was the only delight which time had left to him. Conf. Fragment. Callimac. apud Spanheim. V. i. p. 264 and 333. Plutarch. An seni capiend. Respublica, V. ii. p. 786. Athen. xiv. c. xxi. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. V. i. p. 591.

more

B O O K more curable. Age, and the experience of want,
 IV. will correct his extravagance; and, as he still
 shows a generosity of nature, though unwisely
 and unseasonably, custom and good example will
 convert his thoughtless profusion into decent and
 graceful liberality; since his deviations from the
 right path proceed rather from folly than from
 depravity and turpitude. For this reason such
 a prodigal is preferable to the miser; and also,
 because the former benefits many, and the latter,
 no one; not even himself. But those who are
 prodigal of their own, are for the most part rap-
 acious of what belongs to others; and finding it
 impossible to supply their wild extravagance by
 honourable means, abstain from no source of
 gain, however impure and polluted it may be;
 so that even their bounties have nothing liberal
 in them, being withheld from virtue in distress,
 and lavished on parasites, flatterers, and on the
 idle retinue of vice and folly. For the greater
 part of prodigals unite profligacy with prodig-
 ality; and, insensible to the beauty of virtue,
 fall victims to the allurements of pleasure. But
 though this happens to the undisciplined prodigal,
 yet, under proper management, he may be
 brought into the middle and right path; whereas
 avarice is incorrigible; for it is increased by old
 age and every kind of infirmity; and it seems
 more congenial to human nature than the con-
 trary vice, there being in every country more
 hoarders than spendthrifts. It also extends to
 extraordinary lengths, and assumes a variety of
 forms; the immoderate love of money leading
 some

some men to daring rapacity, and others to sordid parsimony; for there are niggardly misers, and tenacious scrape-pennies, who either through a sense of justice, or through fear, are careful in abstaining from shameful gains, and meanly sparing of their property, lest they should be forced, as they say, on dishonest expedients for subsistence. Their maxim is, neither to borrow nor to lend, neither to give nor to receive; because, should they accept any thing from others, they think it will be difficult always to avoid giving to others something in return. But rapacious avarice sticks at no expedient by which money may be acquired; submits to the basest drudgery, practices pimping or usury, and thinks no profit too infamous or too minute, which, by frequent repetitions, may accumulate into a great gain. Both kinds are alike disgraced by their false estimate, and inordinate love of money; since, to obtain a profit, and that a small one, they encounter and endure a burdensome load of infamy; which is an evil that even the greatest profits cannot possibly compensate. Those who aspire to great and sudden acquisitions of wealth, such as tyrants who storm cities and plunder temples, are not branded with the reproach of avarice, but of impiety and villainy. The pirate, the pickpocket, and the gamester, are guilty of illiberal rapacity; since the two first encounter, for the sake of gain, not only danger but disgrace; and the last plunders and ruins his friends and acquaintances, whom a man of liberal principles wishes always to benefit. They
are

B O O K are all equally debased by a shameless preference
 IV. of wealth to worth ; and by bartering things incomparably more valuable, for unjust and illiberal gains. Illiberality, therefore, is the vice most properly opposed to the virtue of liberality ; for it is a greater, more extensive, and more universal evil, than the vice of prodigality, which holds the contrary extreme. So much concerning mediocrity in our passions and actions with regard to money, and whatever money can purchase, as well as concerning the vicious extremes which are inconsistent with this praiseworthy and meritorious habit.^t

Chap. 2.

Magnificence, and its contraries.

We proceed next to treat of magnificence ; for that likewise seems to be a virtue respecting money ; but differs from liberality in this, that it relates to money in one view only, namely, the spending of it ; and in this, it exceeds the measure which mere liberality would prescribe. The very name of magnificence indicates a certain magnitude, joined with propriety, in expence ; and the magnitude or splendour of our expence is estimated by the occasion on which it is employed ; for that might be great in a trierarch^u, which would be small in an ambassador^w to the public solemnities of Greece ; and the propriety depends both on the object of the

^t Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxiv. ; et Eudem. l. iii. c. iv.

^u The rich citizens of Athens were liable to the burden of equipping galleys for the public service ; in which they often vied with each other in displaying their patriotism to the ruin of their fortunes. Lys. Orat. passim.

^w ἀρχιθαυρος. He headed the sacred deputations to Olympia, &c. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vi.

expence,

expenditure, and on the character and situation of the person who incurs it. He is not called magnificent who spends his money with propriety on small or ordinary occasions, like him

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“ Who often gave the hungry beggar bread :”

For magnificence is not simply liberality, but something more; the former implying the latter, though the latter does not imply the former. Magnificence holds the middle place between two blameable extremes, of which the one, in matters of expenditure, falls short of what is suitable to our circumstances or to the occasion, and the other ostentatiously exceeds them. To be truly magnificent requires no small degree of judgment; since it infers a graceful theory of moral propriety, and a skilful harmony in great expenditure; for, as we said in the beginning, habits are characterised by the acts and energies from which they spring, and which, in a man of real magnificence, must be great and decorous; the work worthy the expenditure, and the expenditure suiting and rather exceeding the work. A man truly magnificent, is actuated by the love of moral beauty, which is the principle of all the virtues. His generosity is large and liberal, without strictness of accounts; his consideration being, not how much any thing will cost him, but how it may be done most handsomely. For the magnificence is not in the expenditure, but in the manner of employing it; which must be such, not merely as propriety would dictate, for this belongs to liberality, but such as will strike the

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the spectators with wonder. It is most conspicuous in temples, dedications, sacrifices, and whatever concerns the gods; and in those honourable benefactions which generous patriots confer on the community; the equipment of galleys, public entertainments, and dramatic exhibitions. As magnificence must be consistent with propriety, it can never be the virtue of a poor man, in whom every attempt towards exercising it must be egregious folly. It becomes those only who possess great hereditary wealth, or who have enriched themselves by great and splendid exploits; and it is most honourably displayed on the public occasions above mentioned. It may be shown also in matters of private concern, when they are such as occur but once in our lives, as a marriage; or such as interest the whole community, or at least the members of the government; as the reception and entertainment of strangers, and the honours and presents bestowed on them at their departure: for the expences of a magnificent man are public, not personal; and presents to strangers somewhat resemble dedications to the gods. To build a house suitable to a great fortune, is a work of magnificence, for it is a public ornament; and works are magnificent in proportion to their durability, provided propriety always be observed, for the same monuments will not suit gods and men, nor the same ornaments become tombs and temples. Magnificence, we have said, is not measured simply by expence, but by the expence in reference to the object on which it is bestowed.

bestowed. The magnificence, doubtless, rises BOOK
IV. in proportion to the magnitude of that object; but a beautiful bauble, of little or no value, may be a magnificent present to a child; because, though trifling in itself, yet being considerable with respect to the occasion, it attests the noble liberality of the donor. True magnificence is far remote from unseasonable ostentation, which makes a parade of wealth on ordinary and mean occasions; the ostentatious man receives his guest at a friendly dinner, as if he were celebrating a marriage festival; and when he exhibits dramatic entertainments, decks, after the awkward fashion of the Magareans, his comic actors in the purple trappings of tragedy; catching popular admiration by unseasonable and absurd extravagance; while, on the other hand, he is meanly parsimonious at times when true magnificence might properly be displayed. The vice opposite to magnificence betrays niggardliness throughout, even in the midst of the most profuse expence; for, in some minute particular, an attention to a pitiful saving will be discovered, which ruins the beauty and gracefulness of the whole, as it proves that whatever has been done, was done sparingly and painfully; and that the performance, if great, far surpassed the mind of the performer. These two contrary habits are both of them vices, but not very reproachful ones, since they neither do harm to others, nor evince gross turpitude in the mind which harbours them.*

* Eudem. l. iii. c. vi.

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Chap. 3.

Magnanimity.

Magnanimity, as the name imports, is conversant about great things: what these are let us first consider; contemplating not the habit itself, but the person actuated by it, which will bring us to precisely the same conclusions. A magnanimous man is he, whose character being of great worth, is estimated by himself at its full value. He who forms a grossly false estimate of himself is a fool; and none of the virtues are consistent with folly: while the man who, conscious of his defects, appreciates his small merits by a fair and just standard, may be praised for his good sense and modesty, but cannot pass for magnanimous; which epithet always implies dignity and excellence; this beauty of the mind requiring, like that of the body, elevation and magnitude; for persons of a diminutive stature are not called beautiful, but neat and elegant. A mean-spirited⁷ man under-rates his own merits; and the vain-glorious boaster arrogates to himself merits, of which he is by no means possessed; but the more solid merit he possesses, his vain-glory is the less; whereas mean-spiritedness is the greater, in proportion to the excellence of the worth which is so unfairly appreciated by its possessor; for how contemptible would he be, even to himself, were his real character of little or no value! The magnanimous man estimates himself at the highest rate, yet no higher than he ought; and conscious of his inward worth, thinks himself entitled to whatever is held most precious; to what the most ex-

⁷ Aristotle says "little-minded."

alted

alted of men claim as the highest of all rewards; and to what all men confer on the gods as their acknowledged due; in a word, to honour, the greatest and most invaluable of external goods. Magnanimity, therefore, is peculiarly conversant about honour, and its contrary, ignominy; holding the middle place between vain-glory that unfairly courts undue honours, and mean-spirit-
edness that improperly rejects even those that are due. But though, in point of propriety, magnanimity holds the middle place, yet, in excellence and dignity, it rises to the summit; for it heightens and enlarges every virtue; and the most boastful vain-glory never proudly arrogated more than true magnanimity has most warrantably claimed. This illustrious habit of the mind cannot bear an alliance with any kind of vice. It is most opposite to cowardice or injustice; for, from what motive can he, who thinks of nothing so highly as of his own character, exhibit himself under such deformities? And if we apply to particular instances, or survey individual characters, we shall find that those who affect magnanimity without real worth, infallibly expose themselves to ridicule. For, honour, which is the meed of virtue, cannot belong to the worthless; and magnanimity forms, as it were, the ornament of the virtues, since it cannot subsist without them, yet heightens, extends, and magnifies them, wherever they are found. True magnanimity, then, is a thing most difficult, since it implies the perfection of moral rectitude. It delights, moderately, in great honours

BOOK honours bestowed by the deserving, as meeting
IV. with its due, or less: for with perfect virtue no
 honour can be fully commensurate. It accepts
 however such honours, because nothing better
 can be bestowed; but of vulgar honours, or
 from vulgar men, it is altogether disdainful;
 and is as insensible to their reproach, as careless
 of their applause. Wealth, power, good or bad
 fortune, it will meet and sustain with the same
 dignified composure, neither elated with pro-
 sperity nor dejected by adversity; for to a mag-
 nanimous man, those things are desirable chiefly
 as the signs of honour; and, if he bears honour
 itself with moderation, much more must he thus
 bear those things which are only its signs, and
 desired merely on its account; since to him who
 thinks not too highly of honour, nothing besides
 can possibly appear great. Magnanimity, there-
 fore, sometimes passes for superciliousness; espe-
 cially since great external prosperity seems to
 heighten and increase it; for nobility is honoured;
 and men of wealth or power, being distinguished
 by great superiority of advantages, will always
 find persons ready to do them honour: and
 though honour belongs properly to virtue alone,
 yet virtue, adorned with great external prosperity,
 will shine still more brightly. But, in reality,
 the most prosperous fortune, when destitute of
 virtue, affords not any just ground for self-ap-
 plause; it gives to us neither a high opinion of
 ourselves, nor a fair claim to be highly thought
 of by others; and, as it is incapable of inspiring
 true magnanimity, it too frequently begets
 insolence

insolence and superciliousness; since worthless men cannot bear gracefully the gifts of fortune, but abuse their fancied superiority by treating others contumeliously and unjustly; whereas the contempt shown by the truly magnanimous, is just; their opinions being formed on reflection, as those of the multitude are taken up at random. A man of magnanimity neither courts dangers, nor willingly encounters them on slight occasions. But when a worthy occasion requires it, he is unsparing of his life, thinking that to live is not, under all conditions, eligible. He is eager to confer favours, and ashamed of receiving them; because the former is a mark of superiority, the latter the reverse; he therefore repays every kindness with interest, that the person who first obliged him, may become his debtor. He hears with more pleasure a recital of the good offices he has performed, than that of the favours which he has received. Wherefore Thetis does not expatiate on her benefits to Jupiter¹, nor the Lacedæmonians on those which they had conferred on the Athenians²; but rather on the kindness which they themselves had received at their hands; for magnanimity, having few wants, seldom needs that assistance which it is always disposed to afford; it is lofty towards the great and prosperous, but behaves modestly towards men in moderate circumstances: to rise above the former, has difficulty and dignity; but to magnify ourselves in com-

¹ Homer. *Ilias*, l. i. v. 503, & seq.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. vi. p. 609—613. Edit. Leunclav.

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pany with the latter, betrays a lowness and littleness of mind, not less ungenerous and vulgar, than making a parade of our strength or courage amidst weakness and cowardice. Magnanimity contemns trivial honours; and disdains, even in great things, to act a second part. It is slow in action, and averse to exertion, except when great honour may be obtained, or great actions are to be performed: not busied about many things, but confined to those which are great and splendid. A magnanimous man is as open in his hatred as in his friendship; for concealment is the part of fear; he regards truth more than opinion, and shows himself manifestly in his words and actions, declaring his mind with full freedom; which indicates both his own love of truth and his contempt for the opinions of others: but this openness of character is liable to one exception, for he is much given to *irony*, dissembling his merits before the vulgar, who are unworthy to appreciate them. He can show undue complaisance for no one's humours, except those of his friends; for flattery is a low and servile vice. He is not prone to admire, for he deems nothing great. He is not mindful of injuries, which his magnanimity teaches him to despise. He is no man's panegyrist or slanderer; he talks not of himself, nor does he blame others; not speaking ill even of his enemies, except when their insolence excites his indignation. As to things of small import, or even daily use, he is no petitioner or complainer: for that would shew too much concern about them. His possessions are distinguished for their beauty

and

and elegance rather than for their fruitfulness and utility; because the former qualities are more nearly allied to that independence and all-sufficiency to which he aspires. The gait of a magnanimous man is slow; his tone of voice grave, his pronounciation firm. Haste and rapidity betoken an ungraceful anxiety. *He* therefore is seldom in haste, who deems few things worthy of his pursuit; nor is he often eager, who thinks few things deserving his solicitude: quickness and sharpness of voice proceeding from earnestness and eagerness. Such then are the characteristics of magnanimity; of which, mean-spiritedness is the defect, and vain-glory the excess; qualities which, though not very hurtful to others, yet show much imperfection in the minds which harbour them. The little-minded man deprives himself of those advantages to which he is entitled. He is ignorant of himself and of his own worth, otherwise he would aspire to those advantages which he really deserves. His fault, however, consists rather in sluggishness than folly; he draws back from noble actions and illustrious enterprises, as things much above him; and even excludes himself from that external prosperity which fortune throws in his way. But the vain-glorious man is ignorant of himself still more egregiously; and even to folly. He engages in undertakings the most honourable, but far above his abilities; and in which his signal failure manifestly convicts him of unworthiness. He delights in the ornaments of dress, and all other showy externals. He makes a

B O O K IV. { parade of his prosperity, and boasts of it in the vain hope of being honoured on its account. Yet mean-spiritedness is more contrary than vain-glory to true magnanimity; because the former vice is more frequently met with, and is also attended with worse consequences. Such then is the nature of magnanimity, or that virtue which is conversant about great and extraordinary honours.*

Chap. 4.

Of the propriety of affection and conduct with regard to honour.

There seems to be another virtue also conversant about honour, and bearing the same proportion to magnanimity, which liberality bears to magnificence. This virtue, as well as liberality, relates, not to what is great and extraordinary, but to what is ordinary and moderate: and as liberality teaches us to behave with propriety in the pursuit of ordinary and moderate profits, so this nameless virtue teaches us to behave with propriety in the pursuit of ordinary and moderate honours. A man may either be more or less desirous, than he ought, of glory as well as of gain; he may seek both these objects on improper occasions, and by undue means. An ambitious man is more fond of honour than he ought; an unambitious man, less than he ought; not caring to reap the natural reward even of praiseworthy exploits: the former recommends himself by his spirited manliness and emulation of excellence; the latter, by his moderation and modesty; and from the imperfection of language in not assigning distinct names to the different degrees of our affections, the

* Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxvi.; Eudem. l. iii. c. v.

same

same word excites either praise or blame, according to the sense in which it is taken: ambition is a subject of commendation, when it denotes a more than vulgar love of honour; it is a term of reproach, when it denotes the same affection in an immoderate and unwarrantable degree; and as a term is wanting to denote that middle state of the affection, which is alone consistent with propriety, the contrary extremes contend with each other for the vacant place of pre-eminence. Whatever things admit of excess or defect, admit also of this middle state, which is alone praiseworthy. This is the case with the desire of honour, which may be too strong, too weak, or in a moderate and proper degree; a degree not marked by any distinct term, and which, by the ambitious, is called low-mindedness; and by the low-minded, ambition; thus appearing to either extreme the vice opposite to itself. This happens with regard to some other virtues; each of the extremes usurping the middle place, because the middle itself is not distinguished by a name.

Meekness is propriety of affection with regard to the causes and circumstances which naturally provoke anger; or rather, as names are wanting to denote either a mediocrity or the opposite extremes of this affection, meekness, though verging towards the anonymous extreme, consisting in defect, is thrust into the middle place. The extreme consisting in excess, may be called irascibility; and, anger being a passion excited by a variety of different causes, and under a variety

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Chap. 5.
Meekness,
with its
contraries.

BOOK IV. variety of different circumstances, it can only be commendable when it results from a proper cause, is directed towards proper objects, is seasonable in its commencement, moderate in its degree, and limited in its duration. If meekness be a praiseworthy quality, even the meek man must be affected with anger under the conditions above specified. For meekness denotes freedom from unreasonable perturbation, and a due resistance to passion, in compliance with the higher powers of our nature; inclining, indeed, to the defective extreme; since a meek man is not resentful of injuries, but always prone to pardon them. The incapacity of feeling just provocation is certainly a fault; which, when it proceeds beyond a certain pitch, borders on folly; it denotes a stupid insensibility of character; and he who does not feel wrongs as he ought, cannot be well qualified to repel them; he will submit, with the meanness of a slave, to insults offered either to himself or to his friends. An excessive propensity to anger displays itself in a great variety of ways; it is excited by improper causes, and is determined towards improper objects; it appears in immoderate or excessive degrees; in some men it bursts forth suddenly into intemperate rage; in others, it settles into unjustifiable and permanent resentment. All those extravagancies of passion do not take place at once; for multiplied excesses of vice are destructive of each other; and should they fall with their full weight on one individual, their burden would be intolerable. Irascible men,

men, though moved to passion too suddenly, in immoderate degrees, and on improper occasions, are yet easily pacified; if they be soon angry, they are also soon pleased, which is the best circumstance attending them; and which happens from this, that they do not restrain their passion, but give free vent to it; their quickness of temper plainly showing their affections and intentions, which they have no sooner made manifest, than they are ready to be appeased. The excess of this disposition, which takes offence against every person, and on every the slightest occasion, receives its name, in Greek, from two words denoting the sharpest asperity of choler^a. The resentful and implacable temper retains anger long, because it does not give free vent to it; for, to vent anger in vengeance naturally appeases it, by substituting pleasure in the stead of pain; but passion restrained, gathers strength by compression; and as it remains hid within the breast, the gentle power of persuasion cannot be applied for its alleviation; it must be digested by the internal vigour of the constitution, which is a work of time. A fell and savage temper directs its immediate anger against improper objects, and is implacable in its resentment, until it is fully satiated with vengeance. The excesses of anger are more opposite than its defects to the virtue of meekness; because they occur more frequently; because human nature is too prone to be immoderate in its resentment; and because persons of irascible and

^a ἀκροχολοί.

querulous

BOOK querulous tempers are the most troublesome to live with. From what was above observed, it is plain that words cannot accurately express all the conditions, as to time, place, person, cause, and degree, which render anger praiseworthy or blameable. He who deviates a little on either side from the exact point of propriety, escapes blame, because his slight error escapes observation. The incapacity of feeling or resenting an injury is sometimes praised as meekness; too strong a propensity to anger is sometimes extolled as manhood, and regarded as indicating a disposition fit for command. The precise middle point, in which alone propriety consists, cannot be accurately ascertained in words, because it is determined only by a perception of sense; and the senses do not perceive minute variations. This however is plain, that the middle habit is laudable, and the extremes blameable, more or less, in exact proportion to their greater or lesser deviations, in point of all, or any, of the conditions above specified. This laudable mediocrity, therefore, ought to be our constant aim: and let this much suffice concerning the dispositions and habits that have a reference to the causes and circumstances that naturally provoke anger.^b

Chap. 6.

Courtesy,
with its
contraries.

In the intercourse of life and society, there are men of a fawning disposition, ever prone to praise, totally averse to contention, and who think it incumbent on them to give pleasure to all with whom they converse. There are others

^b Vid. Eudem. l. iii. c. iii.

of

of so peevish a temper, that they are continually contradicting and crossing all those with whom they have to do; and who feel not the smallest concern for the pain occasioned to others by their churlish asperity. That both these habits are blameable, is manifest; and also that there is an intermediate habit between fawning flattery and savage severity, which is truly laudable, because it distributes its approbation and disapprobation in due measure, according to the circumstances of the case. This intermediate habit is not distinguished by a name; it most resembles friendship, for, should affection be added to the companionable qualities of a man endowed with this habit, he would be a most delightful friend: but it differs from friendship in this, that it does not include any peculiar affection towards those with whom we converse; and the person adorned with this laudable habit, does not approve from love, nor disapprove from hatred, but because it is his nature and character to bestow his approbation and disapprobation agreeably to those rules which moral propriety prescribes; whether he has to do with acquaintances or strangers; with familiar friends, or with persons altogether unknown to him; except, that his behaviour to each of those classes of persons will be marked with such distinctions as circumstances require; for we ought not to testify as much pleasure at the merit of mere strangers as at that of our friends; nor to be equally complaisant to the follies of the latter, as to those of the former. The man of courtesy and civility (for these are the

B O O K the words by which the habit in question may
 { **IV.** most nearly be expressed) will, in the inter-
 course of society, behave himself invariably as he ought: his aim will be, never needlessly to offend; but to gratify and please those with whom he lives, on all occasions on which it possibly can be done, consistently with utility and propriety. But the courteous man will not betray his own interest or honour, or even those of the persons with whom he converses, for the sake of affording a small and unseasonable pleasure. He will resist their opinions, when to resist them gives small pain; whereas to approve them would be injurious or disgraceful either to others or to himself. His behaviour will vary with the rank and dignity, with the degree of his familiarity or connexion, and with a variety of other circumstances belonging to the persons with whom he converses, but will be always regulated by propriety. Pleasure, we have said, will be his aim; but without sacrificing interest or honour to pleasure, or a greater pleasure to a lesser. Such then is this intermediate habit, which is nameless in Greek; and of which the extremes are, on one hand, universal and indiscriminate complaisance, which, when it proceeds from motives of interest, is called flattery; and, on the other, merciless asperity and contentious peevishness. As there is no term to express the intermediate and laudable habit, the extremes only seem to stand in opposition to each other, and alternately arrogate the praise of virtue, though in fact they are both vices; and as such,
 in

in direct opposition to the praiseworthy habit **BOOK**
above described. **IV.**

The virtue which lies between the extremes of
dissembling concealment and arrogant ostenta- **Chap. 7.**
tion is conversant about nearly the same objects **Plain-deal-**
with courtesy ; except that this has a reference **ing, and its**
to the pleasure of those with whom we live, **contraries.**
whereas that has a reference to truth in our words
and actions. It is worth while to consider also
this praiseworthy, though anonymous, habit ;
because by thus shewing that each particular
virtue consists in mediocrity, we shall best explain
the nature of virtue in general, and most clearly
establish the truth of our moral theory. The
characteristics of those who give pleasure or pain
in the intercourse of society, have already been
described ; we proceed to speak of those who
are adorned by truth and frankness, or degraded
by falsehood and dissimulation. There are men
who arrogate to themselves good qualities, of
which they are entirely destitute, and who am-
plify the good qualities of which they are pos-
sessed, far beyond their real measure and natural
worth. The ironical dissembler, on the other
hand, either conceals his advantages ; or, if he
cannot conceal, endeavours to depreciate their
value ; whereas the man of frankness and plain-
dealing shews his character in its natural size :
truth appears in all his words and actions ; which
represent him exactly as he is, without addition
and without diminution. Each of these three
habits display themselves either from the spon-
taneous impulse of our character, or from motives
of

BOOK of interest; and when men have not any reason
IV. for acting otherwise, they indulge the bent of
 their characters, either to plain-dealing on the one hand, or to the opposite kinds of deceit above specified. There is a deformity in falsehood, which renders it odious in itself; whereas truth is beautiful and praiseworthy: and plain-dealing is the intermediate habit or virtue between the opposite extremes or vices of him who would pass himself for more than he is worth, and of him who conceals, or dissembles, his advantages. Of those two kinds of deceit, the former is the most blameable; we shall treat of both, after having first spoken of plain-dealing. By this word we do not mean the faithful performance of contracts or engagements, nor any of those things which have a reference to justice or injustice in our transactions; for such matters as these belong to another branch of virtue: but we mean the undisguised truth and downright honesty which are apparent in some men's behaviour, when no interest whatever is at stake, merely because such plain-dealing is most agreeable to their character. Such men will naturally be just in their transactions, since they who avoid deceit which is harmless, will still more avoid fraud which is injurious to others and disgraceful to themselves. This habit is praiseworthy, even when it inclines to the defective extreme of disavowing or concealing advantages that really belong to us; it derives a comeliness from avoiding to make a parade of invidious distinctions, and of our own superiority, which is always mortify-

mortifying to others. The vice of ostentatious vanity, and false arrogation of merit, when it proceeds not from any interested motive, shews great weakness and levity; but its folly is more conspicuous than its turpitude; when it springs from a love of honour or praise, which we must be conscious that we do not deserve, it is indeed highly contemptible, but in this case is less odious than when it has its source in the love of money or of any thing by which money may be gained. The virtues and vices just mentioned depend like all others not on our natural powers or propensities, but on election and habit: it is from habit that some delight in plain-dealing, others in deceit; and that some take a pleasure in practising deceit for the purposes of glory, and others for those of gain. The former assume the semblance of qualities, of which the reality would entitle them to congratulation and praise: the latter arrogate to themselves qualities, which, if they really possessed them, might be successfully employed in promoting the pleasure or alleviating the pain of others; and to which qualities it is not easy to prove that they are only vain pretenders: to this class of deceivers belong physicians, sophists, and soothsayers. The ironical dissembler has more of the grace of propriety, because he conceals or depreciates his real advantages, in order to avoid the swelling pomp of ostentatious arrogance. Such men cannot appear to be actuated by motives of interest: they are sometimes inclined to dissemble even the most honourable advantages; as happened in

BOOK the case of Socrates. But there is a littleness
IV. and affectation in dissembling advantages inconsiderable in themselves, and too manifest to be concealed; such dissemblers are contemptible, and that sometimes in point of vanity and ostentation; witness the Lacedæmonians with their short beggarly dress; for an assumed poverty is frequently as ostentatious as the parade of riches. Diffimulation, therefore, to be graceful, must be used with respect to things not too open and visible: but the arrogation of advantages which do not belong to us is the vice commonly opposed to the virtue of plain-dealing; because it is the worst of the two extremes.

Chap. 8.

Facetiousness, and its contraries.

As life requires repose from serious employment, and this repose may be enlivened by amusement, there seems to be a virtue relative to the intercourse of men in their hours of relaxation and merriment, regulating both the matter and the manner of their conversation. The strain of this conversation may be more austere or more ludicrous than it ought, or may flow in that happy medium which is alone consistent with propriety. He who seeks to raise laughter on all occasions indiscriminately, without regard to decency, or to the pain inflicted on the object of his ridicule, is a low and contemptible buffoon: he who is himself totally incapable of exciting mirth, and who is so far from relishing, that he is highly offended with the innocent jests of others, indicates a roughness and savageness of character, unbending hardness, and unsocial austerity; whereas true

facetiousness consists in graceful flexibility of mind and manners, which can assume all shapes, and which becomes all; for as the habits of the body are known by its motions, so are those of the mind. An immoderate propensity to ridicule being a more prominent and more conspicuous quality than the contrary extreme of sullen and rustic gravity, and the greater part of mankind being inclined to delight in merriment, without anxiously examining whether it originates in a pure and proper source, buffoonery often passes for facetiousness, although there be the greatest difference between the coarseness of the one, and the elegance of the other; for in facetiousness, which is the middle and proper habit, an easy pliance of humour is adorned with a graceful dexterity which skilfully avoids whatever is indecent and illiberal; never debasing the delicate gaiety congenial to the character of well-educated citizens, by the smallest approximation to the wanton raillery of profligates and slaves. The progress of letters and civility has a powerful influence on the refinement of wit and humour; witness the difference between the ancient and modern comedy. In the former, the most shameful reproaches, expressed in the coarsest language, formed a principal source of the public entertainment; in the latter, the audience are taught chiefly to relish the faint insinuation, and the delicate hint: with respect to beauty and gracefulness, the two styles of writing are marked by the strongest differences. But by what circumstance is true facetiousness

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characterised? Whether does it consist in saying that only which becomes a well-educated citizen? or, may it be characterised by the avoiding of offence? or, thirdly, by the communication of pleasure? Or rather, is not such a habit in its nature indefinite, since things pleasing to one audience, may be highly offensive to another: for things which we are pleased to do, we will not be much offended to hear; and those which we are pleased to hear, we in some measure seem to do: but persons well-educated prescribe just limits both to their words and actions. The laws prohibit certain reproaches, when made seriously; they should perhaps also prohibit malicious raillery. A man endowed with urbanity and facetiousness is a law unto himself. Such then is this intermediate habit; whereas the extreme of buffoonery renders the mind in which it subsists a slave to low humour; for the buffoon neither spares others nor himself; and provided he can excite laughter, condescends to say what no man of an elegant turn of mind would venture to repeat, or even endure to hear. But the austere and solemn character is, on the other hand, totally unfit for the intercourse of society in hours of relaxation; to the entertainment of which he not only does not contribute any thing himself, but glooms by his unseasonable severity the merriment of others. There are then three laudable habits which have a reference to our behaviour in society; the first consists in a fair exhibition of our own characters; the other two relate to the pleasure of those

those with whom we live; and of these two, the one consists in heightening that pleasure in hours of relaxation; the other, in promoting it amidst the ordinary employments of life.^c

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Chap. 9.

Of shame.

Shame can scarcely be numbered among the virtues; for it seems to be rather a passion than a habit. It is defined, the fear of disgrace; and, like another kind of fear, it appears on the countenance; for men, when ashamed, blush; and when afraid of death, grow pale: both seem to be affections of the body, and therefore more properly to be classed with passions than with habits. Shame is not graceful in every period of life; it only becomes youth. Young persons, we think, ought to be extremely sensible to shame; because as they are chiefly actuated by passion, they would naturally be seduced into many disgraceful excesses, were they not restrained by a sense of shame. We praise the blushing modesty of youth, but nobody would think shamefacedness in old age a fit subject of commendation: for persons of mature years ought to be incapable of any action, on account of which shame can be felt; for, as shame can be felt only for things base or blameable, it cannot belong to men of confirmed virtue, who will avoid all such actions, whether they be really blameable in themselves, or only of evil report. Bad men alone can be guilty of bad actions; and it is the wildest absurdity to flatter ourselves, that though we do what is wrong, yet we may

^c Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxviii.; Eudem. l. iii. c. vii.

BOOK escape the guilt thereof by being heartily
IV. ashamed of our conduct. Shame is caused only
by such actions as are voluntary; and base
actions a good man will never voluntarily com-
mit. Shame then can at best be considered
only as a conditional virtue; that is, it may be-
long to a good man particularly circumstanced;
for on the supposition, that he should have per-
formed a bad action, he certainly would be
ashamed of it. But the virtues, properly so
called, are things desirable and graceful on their
own account, simply and absolutely, independ-
ently of any suppositions or conditions whatever.
Impudence indeed is a vice; but it does not
therefore follow, that its contrary is a virtue;
for there is not any room for shame, where
nothing shameful is either done or intended.
For a similar reason, self-command, which is
often so highly commended, is only a con-
ditional virtue, as shall be proved hereafter.
We now proceed to speak of justice.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK V.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Fifth Book is entirely dedicated to the **BOOK**
important subject of justice. Aristotle ex- **V.**
plains the different acceptations of the word,
and distinguishes the different kinds of justice,
strictly so called. Political justice, again, is
either distributive or commutative; which latter,
for a reason given in the text, is called by him
corrective. He shews wherein these kinds of
justice differ; the one being regulated by pro-
portion, and the other by equality. The diffe-
rence is pointed out between what our lawyers
call the *mala in se*, and the *mala prohibita*; and
the distinction clearly explained between *doing*,
harm and *committing injury*. Aristotle con-
cludes with examining the nature of equity in
contradistinction to that of justice; and illus-
trates his doctrine concerning the latter, by
considering the question whether a man can be
guilty of injury towards himself. As the author
introduces not any thing superfluous, (for his
account

B O O K account of the origin and use of money is essentially connected with the subject,) he comprises within a narrow compass a distinct and satisfactory analysis of those great commanding principles which uphold civil society; an analysis exempt from those ambiguities and contradictions, which too often occur in the innumerable volumes in which his opinions have been unfaithfully reported, or unskilfully commented. Yet had succeeding writers improved and enriched his doctrines, the present Book would have the fairest claim to attention, as containing the first attempt towards a full and clear explanation of the most important subject on which the pen of any author can possibly be employed.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Difference between intellectual and moral habits. — Different acceptations of the word injustice. — Justice strictly so called. — Distributive justice. — Corrective justice. — Retaliation. — Natural justice independent of positive institution. — Misfortunes. — Errors. — Crimes. — Equity.

IN examining justice and injustice, we must explain to what kind of actions they relate; what kind of virtue justice is, and what are the extremes or vices between which this virtue may be found. We shall thus follow the same method which has been pursued in the preceding parts of this discourse. All describe justice as that habit which qualifies men to practise just actions with inclination and pleasure; injustice is the reverse; and this general description may suffice for our present purpose. Justice, we have said, is the habit which qualifies men to practise just actions with pleasure; because the moral habits differ essentially from the intellectual in this, that the latter, as well as mere powers and capacities, may be subservient to quite contrary purposes; and those endowed with the intellectual habits, or sciences, may exercise them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation: thus

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Justice.

Difference
between
intellectual
and moral
habits.

BOOK thus a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the same manner the habits of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately. Yet habits of all kinds are often known by their contraries; thus, if a good habit of body consists in density and firmness of flesh, a bad habit must consist in its softness and rarity. When the word denoting any habit is taken in different senses, the word denoting its contrary is likewise, for the most part, employed with equal latitude: thus the different meanings of injustice correspond with those of justice; both those words having respectively various significations, which, on account of their near affinity to each other, are seldom accurately distinguished; for when a word denotes two things totally unlike, its separate meanings are manifest; as, for instance, in the Greek word^a which is applied equally to denote the collar-bone, and the key of a door. Let us examine then in how many acceptations the word injustice is used. A man who violates law is called unjust, as well as he who aspires to any undue advantage, and is not contented with equality: since what is unlawful or unequal is unjust, and justice must be conformable to the principles of law and of equality. Injustice consists in desiring more than our share, not of all things indiscriminately which fall under the denomination of good, but

In how many acceptations the word injustice is taken.

^a κλεις.

of

of those only which it is supposed to be good fortune to obtain; and which, though universally deemed good in themselves, are often evils to those who obtain them. Such goods, mankind in general wish for and pursue; though, in fact, they ought rather to pray that things absolutely good may be good in relation to themselves; and always to prefer and choose those only which are likely to be so. An unjust man does not necessarily choose the greater share: sometimes he prefers the lesser; and that always, when the things in his option are evils. But as the lesser of two evils is in some measure a good, he seems always to desire the greater share, and is thence called in Greek an usurper of more than his due^b; though, in reality, according to circumstances, he chooses sometimes the greater, and sometimes the lesser share, but always an unequal one; so that his real turpitude consists in acting contrary to equality or to law; an opposition to both of which, is common to every species of injustice. Since, then, whatever is unlawful is unjust, justice may be said to consist in acting agreeably to the laws of our country. But laws regulate the transactions of life, either with a view to the benefit of the public at large, or with a view to the benefit of that portion of the state which is invested with sovereignty, whether this has been acquired by pre-eminence in virtue, or attained by any of those other means through which sovereign authority is established. In one sense, therefore,

^b πλεονεκτης.

justice

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justice comprehends every thing that has a tendency either to produce or to maintain the happiness of men in political society. The law prescribes to citizens who are soldiers, not to leave their ranks, not to fly, not to throw down their arms; that is, it commands them to behave themselves with bravery. The law also prohibits all those subject to its authority from adultery, and every species of debauchery which is injurious to others; which is nothing else than to command its subjects to be temperate. It also prescribes meekness, in the injunctions, "thou shalt not strike," "thou shalt not revile:" and in the same manner, partly by precepts, and partly by prohibitions, the law more or less accurately defines the rules and practice of the other virtues; so that justice, taken in the sense of conformity to law, comprehends the whole of virtue, not indeed simply and absolutely, but in reference to those with whom we are connected; being another name for the strict performance of all those relative duties which are essential to the happiness of social life^c. Viewed in this light, justice is the first and brightest of all the virtues; more worthy of admiration than either Hesperus or Lucifer; since, according to the proverb,

"Justice alone comprises every virtue."

It is indeed the perfection of virtue, since it is not only the best constitution of our internal

^c The author takes "law" in that extensive sense in which it was regarded by the Greek legislators. See *History of Ancient Greece*, vol. ii. c. xiii.

frame,

frame, but the external exercise of whatever is praise-worthy in behaviour towards others; and even the whole community, however extensive, of which we are members^d. There are many capable of acting uprightly within a limited domestic sphere, whose imperfections become manifest on a wider and more exalted theatre. Wherefore Bias well observed, "that government shows the man;" for he who is entrusted with the exercise of power, is placed in multiplied relations with respect to others, and the whole commonwealth. Justice, therefore, seems to contribute to the benefit rather of those towards whom it is exercised, than of those who are endowed with this virtuous habit; because it is the nature of this habit always to bear a reference to our transactions with the world. The worst of men are those whose vices injure themselves and their friends; the best are those, whose virtues benefit not only themselves and their friends, but the community at large, and the whole society of mankind. This, indeed, is

^d This passage is expanded and adorned by Cicero in language the most glowing and impressive; "Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, neque improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; ac hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

a noble,

BOOK a noble, because a difficult task. Justice, then, **V.** considered in this view, is not a part, but the whole of virtue; and its contrary, injustice, is not a part, but the whole of vice. Wherein virtue and justice differ, is evident from the observations above made. They are precisely the same thing viewed under two different aspects; and denominated virtue when considered in relation to the mind adorned by this praiseworthy habit; but called justice when considered in relation to those towards whom it is exercised.

Chap. 2.

Justice properly so called.

But our present inquiry is concerning justice taken in a more limited sense, and denoting one virtue in particular; and also concerning injustice as signifying one particular vice, distinct from every other. That such a specific injustice, as well as justice, exists, appears from the following consideration; that he who commits any other baseness, is indeed guilty of wrong, but does not thereby benefit his fortune; which is plain, from the examples of him who throws away his shield through cowardice, who reviles his neighbour through ungovernable asperity of temper, or who refuses, through illiberality, any pecuniary aid to those who have claims on his bounty. But a man may benefit his fortune by usurping more than his due share of worldly goods, without incurring the blame of all, or any of these vices. His conduct, however, is culpable, and we arraign his injustice. There is then a particular kind of injustice differing from that above mentioned, and bearing the relation to it, of a part to the whole: in the first sense, unjust is synonymous with unlawful; in the

the second, it implies the breach of a particular class of laws, namely, that which prohibits any man from benefiting himself at the expence of his neighbour. One man commits adultery for the sake of gain, another pays dearly for his criminal pleasure; the vice of the former, is aggravated injustice; that of the latter, is profligate intemperance. All other wrongs may always be referred to some particular species of vice; the commission of adultery, to intemperance; the desertion of our companions in war, to cowardice; an assault, to unbridled violence of anger: but that wrong which is committed for the sake merely of gain, is referred to no other vice but that of injustice; not that injustice above described, which is synonymous with wrong in general, but a specific vice, bearing the same relation to the former, which the species does to the class under which it is included; for injustice, both in its large and in its limited sense, has always a reference to our transactions with others; its very essence consists in our behaving amiss in those transactions: but injustice, strictly so called, implies that our misconduct results from the desire of promoting our own profit or honour, or whatever we think gainful to ourselves; whereas injustice, largely taken, comprehends all those improprieties in our behaviour towards others, which are incompatible with the character of a virtuous man. We proceed then to explain the nature and properties of justice

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* Aristotle says, "for the sake of honour, money, safety, or for that which would include all these in one word."

and

B O O K and injustice, strictly so called. This species of
 { **V.** injustice was said to consist, not in what is unlawful merely, but in what is also unequal; for whatever is unequal is unlawful; since laws, properly made, assure to each individual his equal share, that is his due, in his transactions with his fellow-citizens; but many things are unlawful which are not unequal, because laws relate to many other objects besides the distribution and adjustment of interests and honours; enforcing, by authority, the practice of every virtue, and upholding a system of education by which this practice may, through discipline and custom, be rendered easy and agreeable. Whether such an education properly falls under the science of politics, will afterwards be examined¹; for under all forms of government indiscriminately, perhaps the character of the good man will not be found compatible with that of a good citizen. The particular kind of justice now under consideration, is employed either in distributing to each citizen his due share of honour, wealth, and all other advantages, in the political partnership, or commonwealth, of which he is a member; or in regulating, by the rules of right, those transactions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which happen between fellow-citizens; and where wrong has on either side been committed, in correcting this wrong, by again setting the parties, as far as may be, on a foot of equality with each other. Voluntary transactions are those in

¹ Aristotle examines this question in his Politics, which work is merely a continuation of his Ethics to Nicomachus.

which

which both parties voluntarily concur ; such as BOOK
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 buying, selling, borrowing, lending, letting,
 hiring, pledging, depositing. Involuntary trans-
 actions are either secret or open ; the secret are,
 theft, adultery, poisoning, seduction of other
 men's slaves, prostitution for hire of others men's
 wives, premeditated murder, and the bearing of
 false witnesses. The open but involuntary trans-
 actions include all violent and manifest aggres-
 sions on the persons, property, or reputation of
 others ; such as assault, maiming, imprisonment,
 death, robbery, slander, insult.

Justice implies equality ; and this equality lies Chap. 3.
 in the middle between two extremes, the greater Distribu-
 and the lesser ; for whatever admits of division tive justice.
 into two unequal parts, may also be equally di-
 vided. But equality, being a relative term, al-
 ways supposes the comparison of two things at
 least. Distributive justice, therefore, always im-
 plies two things, and also two persons between
 whom those things are divided. If the persons
 are exactly equal, so ought to be their shares ;
 but if the persons are unequal, the shares ought
 also to be unequal in the same proportion : for
 complaints and strife always will arise, when
 either persons of unequal worth meet with pre-
 cisely the same treatment ; or when persons of
 nearly equal worth are distinguished from each
 other by too considerable differences. This is
 universally acknowledged ; but men's notions
 of worth vary with their political principles.
 In democracies, it is measured by liberty ; in
 oligarchies, by wealth or birth ; in aristocracies,

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BOOK by virtue. Justice, however, plainly consists in
 { **V.** proportion, which is the equality of ratios; and
 proportion, whether discrete or continuous, always implies four terms; since, when continuous, one of the terms must be taken twice. Distributive justice always requiring four terms at least, implies that the shares bear the same proportion to each other as do the persons among whom these shares are distributed; for proportion is applicable to all quantities, and not merely to numbers. If the first share, therefore, be to the first man, as the second share to the second; then alternately, the first share will be to the second share, as the first man to the second man; and as each of the antecedents is to its consequent, so will both the antecedents be to both the consequents. This is what is called by mathematicians geometrical proportion, consisting, as we have said, in equality of ratios; which equality is the middle between excess and defect; for if one of the ratios were greater or lesser than the other, the proportion, or, in other words, the justice of the distribution, would be destroyed. In distributive justice, the four terms are all of them distinct, the one from the other; consisting of two persons, and two shares, at least; none of which can be taken twice in the series. The proportion therefore is not continuous, but discrete; and when proportion is violated, injustice immediately follows. This evidently appears in actions: for the injurious person has more, the person injured has less, than their respective shares

shares of good; of evil, the reverse; for the lesser evil is considered as a good.^s

The remaining species of justice is properly distinguished by the epithet of corrective: it applies to the mutual transactions between men, whether voluntary or involuntary. It differs from distributive justice in this, that the latter consists in geometrical proportion, and requires that the shares should have the same ratio to each other as the persons among whom they are divided; so that each citizen may find himself treated according to his deserts, and those who contribute most to the public benefit may meet with proportionally higher remunerations. Corrective justice also implies equality, but an equality of a different kind, founded not on geometrical, but on arithmetical, proportion; for the law does not make any difference in its correction or punishment, whether a good man has injured a bad one, or a bad man a good. It contemplates merely the hurt done or the injury sustained; and endeavours to set the two parties, the one of whom is wronged by the other, on the same foot of equality on which they formerly stood. The words gain and loss are not indeed applicable in all cases where one man is injured by another; they can be properly used only when the injuries done may be estimated in money; but in all cases whatever, he who has

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Chap. 4.

Commuta-
tive and
corrective
justice.

^s I thought it unnecessary to subjoin with Aristotle, "that the lesser evil is considered as a good because it is to be preferred to the greater; that good is always desirable, and, of two goods, the more desirable is the greater."

BOOK V. committed an injury should be compelled, as far as may be, to make reparation, which, when complete, reduces the parties to that condition of equality from which they set out, by giving back to the loser, what had been taken from him, by the gainer. Corrective justice, then, holds the middle place between gain and loss. In their disputes with each other, men have recourse to a judge, as to a living fountain of justice; who, as it is his business to adjust differences, and mediate between contending parties, is often styled a mediator. This office he performs by finding the middle term between the unequal extremes of gain and loss; in the same manner as if, a line being divided into two unequal parts, he cut from the greater part its excess above half the line, and added it to the lesser. When the whole is divided equally, each party has his due, because the shares are alike; and this equality is the middle arithmetical term between the greater and the lesser extreme. It is the duty of a judge to find this middle term; from which function, he appears in Greek to have derived his appellation; for justice in this language means an equal division; and a judge, an equal divider^a. When, from two equal quantities, a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed by two parts: for it would exceed by one, were the part taken away destroyed; it ex-

^a δικαιοσύνη διχομαστική. This will appear philological, and what follows mathematical, trifling, to those careless about obtaining correct notions by remounting to their origin.

ceeds

ceeds the middle term therefore by one; and this term exceeds the quantity from which the part was taken away, by one. By this means we may learn, that in order to correct inequality, and thereby to do justice, we must take from the greater extreme that by which it exceeds the middle, and add this excess to the lesser. This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram; but the same thing holds in all other arts, which would speedily be subverted, and all human society overturned, unless equality and justice were tolerably well maintained in the actions and intercourse of life; and proper correctives applied where these bonds of society are materially violated. The words gain and loss are introduced by the voluntary transactions of men; in which, he who got more than he gave in exchange, was said to gain by the bargain; and he who got less, to lose; as in buying and selling and all other legal contracts. But when the bargain was equal, each party was said to have his due. Justice, then, even in such transactions as are involuntary, consists in a middle term between a certain kind of gain and loss, and requires that the parties should be reduced, as nearly as may be, to that condition of equality in which they stood with regard to each other, before any such transaction took place.

Retaliation seems to some to be the whole of justice. This opinion was held by the Pythagoreans; who defined justice to be "reciprocity of doing and suffering." But retaliation will not apply either to distributive or to corrective justice;

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Retaliation
does not
apply to
justice,
either dis-
tributive or
corrective.

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{

tice; although the law of Rhadamanthus says, "The completest justice consists in making a man suffer the same ills that he has committed." This rule, however, is liable to innumerable exceptions. Thus, if a general should strike a soldier, the blow must not be retorted; but to strike a general, or any other person invested with authority, requires that the offender should be punished more severely than by mere retaliation. The difference also is very great between voluntary and involuntary injuries; to the latter of which Rhadamanthus' rule is totally inapplicable. Yet the commercial intercourse of nations, and of individuals in the same nation, is maintained by a reciprocation, not indeed of the same, or similar, but of proportional benefits and injuries. When injuries are offered by one set of persons, and cannot be retorted by another, the latter class look on themselves as nothing better than slaves: when benefits, on the other hand, are conferred, but without any prospect of being returned, there is an end to that interchange of good offices, which is the main pillar of civil society; a truth acknowledged by those commonwealths who have erected temples on the most conspicuous situations to the Graces; that men might continually be reminded of the duty of gratitude, the favourite virtue of these divinities; and that those who had received and returned favours, might always be ready to renew the laudable contention among themselves, by mutually provoking each other to works of kindness.

The

The comfort of life requires an interchange of different works and exertions. The bricklayer, for example, must exchange the production of his labour with the shoemaker : and the bargain will be just, when the works exchanged bear the same proportion to each other, as do the exertions of the artisans by whom they were produced. If the exertions of the bricklayer be more valuable for their duration, or their difficulty, than those of the shoemaker, the works produced by the latter must, to render the bargain equal, bear the same proportion numerically to those produced by the former : thus, if the bricklayer has consumed a thousand times as much labour in making a house, as the shoemaker has done in making a pair of shoes, a thousand pair of shoes must be given for one house. The same thing happens with respect to all other arts, which derive their whole utility from the mutual exchange of different sorts of labour, and which could not long be maintained, unless the exertions of one artisan in one way, were nearly balanced and compensated by those of another artisan in another. A community could not subsist, composed wholly of physicians or wholly of husbandmen ; it must consist of physicians and husbandmen, and other classes of individuals employed in different trades and different professions. But that operations and works of such different kinds should be fairly exchanged for each other, it is necessary that they should be nearly commensurate ; that is, that all of them should be capable of being esti-

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The nature
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money.

BOOK V. { mated with tolerable accuracy by comparison with one common measure. Hence the introduction of money ; by means of which all those operations and works are compared in value with each other, and their relative excesses or deficiencies ascertained with sufficient correctness for all practical purposes. In reality, value depends on the mutual wants of men, which form the great bond of society ; for unless their wants were mutual, exchange could not be effected : but money is used by convention as the representative of all things wanted ; since it serves as a pledge and surety, that whenever those wants occur, they will be speedily gratified ; and its name is derived from the word signifying law, which indicates that it is founded, not on nature, but on convention ; and that human laws, which have thought fit to employ it as a measure of value, may, at pleasure, set this use of it aside, and employ some other measure in its stead. Money, which represents the value of all other things, varies in its own ; but its variations are less considerable than those of most other substances. It serves therefore to fix their price, and to render them commensurate with each other, thus performing a function essential to the existence of civil society : for communities could not subsist without exchange ; nor exchange without equality ; nor equality, without a common measure. The various kinds of labour, and the works thereby effected, cannot indeed be accurately compared, and exactly measured, either by each other or even by

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money ;

money; but they may, by means of the latter, be estimated with sufficient correctness for maintaining that commercial intercourse which is essential to the supply of our numerous exigencies.^b

From

^b Aristotle illustrates this subject by shewing how the exchangeable value of a house and a bed are compared with each other, by reducing both to the common measure of a certain number of minas. The text is corrupt, and the example superfluous; but it is of importance to observe how well our author explains the nature of traffic, money, labour, exchangeable value or price, from just notions of which all sound theories of political economy must result. In various parts of his works he makes the important distinction between labour consumed in use, and labour employed in production. That of a servant or domestic slave is of the first kind; that of a manufacturer or artisan, of the second. The labour of the artisan or manufacturer is concentrated and fixed in his work; the labour of a builder in a house built, of a weaver in the web. (*ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιῶμενῳ, ὡς ἡ οἰκοδομοῦσις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομῶμενῳ, καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαντῶμενῳ* &c. *Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.*) Having distinguished between productive and unproductive labour, he observes that every work or production may be employed in two different ways, either in the way of use or that of exchange. Thus a pair of shoes may either be worn or they may be sold (*ὡς ὑπόδηματος, ἢ τε ὑπόδησις, καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ*. *Politic. l. i. c. ix. p. 305.*). Every production or commodity has, therefore, in reference to the wants of human life, two different values, a value in use and a value in exchange. These different values ought to be distinguished, because things that have the greatest value in use, have often very little value in exchange, and things that have a great value in exchange have often very little value in use. The exchangeable value of commodities, according to Aristotle, is always relative to the labour requisite for procuring them; and the quantity of productive labour is exactly measured by the work or production in which this labour is fixed and embodied. (*Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.*) But commodities or productions are so complex in their nature, that they cannot be compared with each other without some common measure. The metals, in consequence of their usefulness and beauty, their facility of division without injury, and of transportation without much labour, above all, their extreme durability, have been adopted by very general consent as the fittest measures of the exchangeable value of all other commodities. But neither the metals in general, nor any one metal in particular, is an exact measure. At different times and places, their own values are found to vary; and therefore they cannot be an exact, that is, an invariable measure, of the value of other things. But though

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Chap. 6.

In what
sense justice
consists in
mediocrity.

From the explanation given of justice and injustice, it is manifest that a just action holds the intermediate place between doing and suffering an injury. The doer has more, the sufferer less, than he ought; and justice is mediocrity, not indeed in the same sense with the other virtues, which lie between two contrary and vicious extremes, but because it is productive of equality in our dealings, and gives to each individual that share which truly belongs to him; whereas injustice contains in it two opposite faults, giving to the one party more than is due, and robbing the other of his right. The virtue of justice, then, is that by which a man practises by preference and with pleasure fairness in his dealings, not arrogating to himself more than his due proportion of good, nor declining to bear his equal share of evil. He treats other men as he would wish to be treated by them, assigning to each his fair proportion, and following the same invariable rule, when his own interest is at stake, and when he is only adjusting the differences of others. Injustice is directly the reverse; it leads men in all their transactions to give an undue preference to themselves: and when

though the exchangeable value of the metals varies, Aristotle maintains that it is less variable than that of any other commodity (πασχουμεν εν και τωτο το αυτο, η γαρ αιε ισιν δυναται ομως δε βελιται μινυ μαλλον. De Moribus, l. v. c. viii. p. 65.). This opinion is controverted *inconsistently* (as will be proved hereafter) by Dr. Smith; although that learned and ingenious writer, by adopting Aristotle's principles on the subjects of exchangeable value, and of national wealth, has rescued the science of political œconomy from many false subtleties and many gross errors. See Wealth of Nations, b. i. c. 5.

they

they are entrusted with settling the concerns of **BOOK**
 others, always to do this unequally, by giving **V.**
 an undue advantage to one of the parties.
 This much may suffice concerning the nature
 of justice and injustice.

Since the commission of every unjust action **Chap. 7.**
 does not necessarily make an unjust man, it may
 be inquired whether, in this respect, there be
 any distinction between particular acts of in- **Justice ap-**
 justice, bearing the same name, such as theft, **plied to ac-**
 adultery, and robbery; or whether the differ- **tions in a**
 ence of the external acts is of little or no weight **sense differ-**
 in constituting the vice of injustice, even when **ent from**
 these acts are performed knowingly; for a man **that in**
 may know that the object of his passion is his **which it is**
 neighbour's wife; and yet, if he acts merely **applicable**
 from the blind impetuosity of appetite or desire, **to persons.**
 without deliberate intention, he is not an adul-
 terer. The same holds in all other cases in
 which wrong is done; the mere perpetration of
 the act does not infer the vicious state of mind
 from which such acts naturally flow. The dif-
 ference between retaliation and justice was
 formerly mentioned; but, in our inquiries re-
 specting the latter, it must be remembered, that
 we have in view chiefly that kind of justice
 which may be called political, since it is estab-
 lished for the comfort and all-sufficiency of so-
 ciety among freemen and equals; whether the
 government, being democratical, require that
 each citizen should be dealt by alike; or whether
 it admit of those distinctions of birth, wealth,
 and abilities, which are allowed their due weight
 under

BOOK under other forms of government. Where
 { **V.** such equality does not prevail, there is not any
 room for what is strictly called justice, but only
 for that virtue, which, on account of its resemblance,
 receives the same name. Justice takes
 place among those who being capable of injuring
 each other, are restrained by law from mutual
 encroachments; and those encroachments must
 be made, before injustice can be committed;
 though, as we formerly observed, the converse
 of the proposition does not hold, that injustice
 always is committed, when such encroachments
 are made, because injustice implies the deliberate
 purpose of wronging others for the sake of benefit
 to ourselves; a propensity so strong in human
 nature, that few men are capable of exercising
 power, without sometimes using it tyrannically:
 wherefore law and reason ought to bear
 sway, and rulers to be the guardians of equal
 justice; contented with those rewards and
 honours which have been assigned to them for
 upholding the public good by their impartial
 administration. Their power is of a different
 kind from that of fathers and despots, in the
 exercise of which there is not any room for the
 virtue of justice strictly so called, since no one
 can, in propriety of language, be said to commit
 injustice against himself, or what entirely belongs
 to himself; because no one ever deliberately
 proposed to do real harm to either, and could
 not possibly do such harm for the sake of
 benefiting himself: but slaves, who are a kind
 of property, and also children, until they have
 attained

attained a certain age, are so intimately connected with their masters and parents, that no such relations as those of political justice can subsist between them; for political justice implies laws; and laws suppose an equality, not indeed of ranks and persons, but of rights and obligations. Wherefore something more nearly resembling political justice takes place between husbands and wives; but this, which is called œconomical justice, is also different from the former.

BOOK
V.

Political justice is founded either on nature or on law. The natural, is that which has every where the same force and authority; the legal, is that which depends on human institution, rendering actions just or unjust, which are in themselves indifferent; as that no more than one mina should be required for the ransom of a prisoner; that a goat should be sacrificed rather than two sheep; regulations respecting individuals, as that Brasidas should be honoured with heroic worship; and those that come in the shape of decrees or resolutions. Some are of opinion that all justice whatever depends on positive institution; which they endeavour to prove by observing that the laws of nature remain every where unalterably the same: fire, for example, which burns and warms in Greece, has precisely the same powers in Persia; whereas the rules of justice are liable to perpetual variations. This, however, is true only in a certain sense; for though among the gods in heaven, what is natural is, perhaps, unalterable, yet, in this

Natural
justice independent
of positive
institution.

BOOK this lower world, many institutions of nature
 V. are capable of being changed and modified by
 circumstances. Yet the distinction between what is natural and conventional, is not thereby destroyed; unless we should infer that, because some men are capable of using both hands with equal dexterity, it is not natural for mankind in general to use one hand more dexterously than the other¹. Men's notions of justice are often warped by their interests; and this great measure of human actions varies like the measures of wine and corn, which the dealers in those articles have of different sizes; using the larger when they buy, and the smaller when they sell. Great variations result also from the different forms of government; although, as we shall shew hereafter, there is one form of government naturally the best. Justice is a general term; and differs from an act of injustice, as an universal does from a particular. That is unjust which is contrary to nature or to law; and the same thing, when done, is an unjust action. An unjust action is a wrong; and when we rectify a wrong, we are said to do justice. But the import of these terms will be afterwards more nicely discriminated.

¹ He gives the reason more generally in *Magna Moral.* l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 167. το γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ διαμεῖον, τὸτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές
 "That which is for the most part invariable and constant is manifestly natural justice." Political justice, on the other hand, varies with the arrangements and exigencies of men in society. He therefore concludes βελτίον ἐν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν "That natural injustice is the better of the two;" a conclusion agreeable to his observations in the *first Philosophy*. See *Analysis*, p. 92, & passim.

Injustice,

Injustice, as applicable to actions, consists in what we have now said: but it does not belong to persons, unless it be committed voluntarily; for when a man acts without intention, the quality of his action, as good or bad, just or unjust, is, in reference to the agent, merely an accessory, not springing essentially from himself, and neither entitling him to praise, nor subjecting him to blame. That, therefore, which is unjust, is not injustice in the agent, unless it be committed voluntarily; that is, as formerly explained, unless the action, with all its circumstances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed knowingly, with intention and without constraint. Thus, to make the act of striking parricide, we must know the person whom we strike, the nature of the instrument with which the stroke is inflicted, and the motive through which we are impelled to such a horrid crime. The action must also lie entirely within our own power; for in many natural events, we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily; witness old age and death^k. The same happens as to justice and injustice. When a man restores a deposit involuntarily through fear, he cannot be said to act justly, since the justice of the action is not caused by himself: it is a mere accessory or appendage, quite foreign to his design or purpose. In the same manner, he cannot be accused of injustice, who is constrained involuntarily not to restore a deposit. Voluntary

^k See Analysis, p. 126.

actions

B O O K ^V actions are performed with, or without election; deliberate actions are performed with election; and those that are without deliberation are without election. In the intercourse of life, one person may hurt another in three ways; either ignorantly, in which case the hurt done is called an error; as when we are mistaken either in the person or the instrument; or when the action turns out to be of quite a different nature from that which we intended: a man may be hurt by a blow meant merely for rousing him; a wound may be given casually; and one person may receive a blow which was intended for another. When the harm is not only done unintentionally, but happens altogether unexpectedly, it is called a misfortune; when the consequences of the action might have been foreseen and expected, the harm done, without any mischievous purpose, is properly termed a fault; for a fault is that evil which originates in ourselves; and a misfortune, that of which the cause is external. Harm done knowingly, but not deliberately, is an injustice; as those injuries which proceed from anger and other passions, that are either necessary, or at least natural. Yet the persons who have committed such injuries are not branded with the reproach of injustice or wickedness; which falls only on wrong proceeding from wilful pravity. The law, therefore, well distinguishes between premeditated crimes, and those committed through passion; for the source of the latter may be traced up rather to him who provoked the passion, than to him who yielded

yielded to its violence. In all such cases, the question is, not whether the deed was done, but whether it was done justly; for anger always proceeds from some real or supposed injury. But in all other disputes, the question turns on some fact, which one party affirms, and the other denies; and as to which, either the one or the other, unless his memory deceives him, must plainly be guilty; for every deliberate wrong is manifest injustice, whether it consist, as above explained, in violating the law of equality, or in violating that of proportion. The virtue of justice, on the other hand, is exercised only in such acts as are done voluntarily and deliberately. Involuntary acts are, or are not, entitled to pardon, according to circumstances. Those are pardonable, which proceed from complete and habitual ignorance; those are not, which proceed from a temporary ignorance, occasioned by the blind impetuosity of passion, either extravagantly excessive in its degree, or highly improper in its object.

Doubts may arise, whether the doing and the suffering of injustice have been defined with sufficient precision. First, shall we hearken to Euripides? One of his characters reasons thus:

Chap. 9.

Solution of
doubts re-
specting
justice.

I flew my mother; the defence is plain,
She *with* her will, or *'gainst* my will, was slain.

Can any person be injured willingly? or must every injury be unwillingly suffered as it is willingly inflicted? A man, it is said, may be injured willingly; since an intemperate man

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C C

willingly

BOOK willingly hurts himself. But this argument is
V. not conclusive, for the intemperate man does
 what he thinks he ought not to do; his passion makes him act against his deliberate will; for no one can deliberately will what he thinks mischievous to himself. To injure then, is not only to hurt knowingly, but to hurt against the will of the sufferer; for when his will consents, he may indeed be hurt, but is not injured. Glaucus was not injured by his disadvantageous exchange of armour with Diomed, because it was voluntary.

" Brave Glaucus then, each narrow thought resign'd
 (Jove warm'd his bosom, and enlarg'd his mind),
 For Diomed's brass arms of mean device,
 For which nine oxen paid (a vulgar price)
 He gave his own of gold divinely wrought,
 A hundred beeves the shining purchase bought."

ILIAD VI. v. 290, et seq.

Secondly, Whether is the injustice in him who makes an unfair distribution, or in him who receives more than his due? If the former is asserted, those persons distinguished by liberality and equity, who are inclined rather to refuse their full proportion than to arrogate more than their just share, will sometimes injure themselves. It may be answered, that these persons, liberal and equitable as they are as to things of a particular nature, will not decline their full share of goods in general; and of some kinds such as praise, glory, and whatever is honourable and laudable, will be inclined to arrogate fully as much as belongs to them. But the difficulty is
 solved

solved by the observation above made, that no one can be the willing victim of injustice; so that men cannot injure, although they may hurt themselves. Besides, the injustice is plainly in him who makes the unfair distribution; for by him the unjust action is begun and completed; whereas he who holds more than his due share, may often do it ignorantly and innocently. The word action is taken in different senses. It is applied to inanimate things. The sword, or any other warlike instrument, is said to strike or kill, as well as the hand of one man moved by that of another; or a slave, by the command of his master. None of these injure, although they are the instruments of injustice. Unjust judgments may proceed merely from ignorance; but that judge only is unjust, who passes unjust decrees, knowingly, from partiality to one party, or ill-will to the other. Between such a judge and one of the parties, the iniquity, as well as its fruits, are sometimes divided; the latter gets more land than he ought, and the other gets money to which he is not entitled. Injustice, however, in judgment, as well as every other species of injustice, always consists in arrogating to ourselves more than our due proportion of advantage, whether this consists in benefiting our fortune, indulging our partiality, or gratifying our resentment. Men think, because injustice seems to be always in their power, that therefore justice is easy. The thing, however, is far otherwise. To commit vicious actions is indeed always in our power, but to acquire Justice, a matter of more difficulty than either

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V.

commonly
imagined.

either virtuous or vicious habits is the work of time and custom ; and the vice is not in the act, but in the frame of mind and habit of the actor. They think also, that to distinguish between just and unjust transactions, requires but small discernment ; because it is easy to understand the laws promulgated on this subject. But the justice or injustice is not in those transactions themselves, except by way of appendage or accession, when, together with the simple performance of the act, certain dispositions and affections, and those uniform and habitual, concur in the agent. To know, therefore, what constitutes, or contributes to, justice, is still more difficult than to know what constitutes, and contributes to, health. The medicines of hellebore, honey, and wine, as well as the operations of cutting and burning, are indeed easily known ; but to understand when, how, and to whom, we ought to administer the one and to apply the other, is a thing of no less difficulty than to be a skilful physician. It is also a false opinion, that a good man is capable of acts of wickedness ; because, were he inclined to indulge guilty passions, he is more likely to do it with impunity than any other. But, as we above observed, the vice or wickedness is not in the act itself, but in the frame or habit of mind of him by whom that act is performed. The art of healing does not consist in performing operations and in administering medicines ; it consists in doing these things properly, that is, in the intellectual habit or skill of the physician. Justice takes place only

only among those who are sharers in that kind of goods, of which a certain proportion contributes to their happiness; but of which either the excess or the defect has a tendency to destroy it. The gods, perhaps, cannot have too much power and prosperity; and beings incurably wicked, cannot have too little of either; since, by them the means of good, will always be converted into sources of evil. But men are benefited by a due proportion, and by that only.

We proceed to speak of equity, and to consider what relation it bears to justice. It is not the same thing, nor yet is it different in kind; for it is a praiseworthy quality as well as justice, but is spoken of as something better than mere justice, and really is so, for it is the correction of strict, that is, of legal justice; which often needs to be modified by equity, because laws being in their nature general, cannot decide rightly in the indefinite variety of particular cases. The lawgiver is contented with making a rule, which fairly applies to the greater part of cases; well knowing that it will not include the whole: and the fault is neither in the law nor the lawgiver, but in the nature of things. When an exception to the rule occurs, which the lawgiver did not foresee, this exception is admitted in equity, which thus supplies the defect of law, as the lawgiver himself would do, were he present in court, and as he would have done by amending his law, had he been aware of the exception. Equity, then, is better than legal justice, being its amendment; and supplying that

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V.

Chap. 10.

Of the nature of equity in contradistinction to justice.

B O O K that defect of laws, which arises from their universality. The variety of human transactions cannot be comprised within general rules. Occasional decrees therefore become requisite; which vary with each variation of circumstances, for the measure of what is indefinite must be indefinite itself, like the leaden ruler in the Lesbian architecture, which changes its own shape according to that of the stones to which it is applied. It is manifest, therefore, that equity is a species of justice, and contrasted with another species, to which it is preferable. A man of equity is he who deliberately and habitually exercises this virtue; who prefers it in all his dealings to the rigour of justice; and who, even when the law is on his side, will not avail himself of this advantage to treat others injuriously or unhand somely.

Chap. xi.

That a man may hurt, but cannot be guilty of injury towards himself.

Whether justice be taken in its larger sense, of disobeying the laws; or in its stricter acceptation, of depriving others of their property, it is plain, from the observations already made, that no one can be guilty of injustice towards himself. A man may spontaneously and knowingly commit an unprovoked injury; he may even destroy his own life, in direct opposition both to the laws and to right reason^k. He thereby

^k The Oxford edition very properly supplies the word *λογος* of which *οφθελος* is the ordinary epithet, and of which it must here be the adjunct, to render the passage intelligible. Suicide is always spoken of by Aristotle as a base and cowardly crime, as a mean direliction of all personal dignity, and a gross violation of all social duty. Cicero sometimes (for on this subject he is not consistent) speaks otherwise.

^a Atque

thereby certainly does an injury ; but to whom ? BOOK
 Not to himself, because he suffers voluntarily. V.
 The injury is therefore done to the state ; which, }
 on this account, punishes self-murder with infamy. As to the other kind of injustice, which does not comprehend wickedness in general, but which consists, like cowardice, in one specific vice, we cannot, without a total confusion of thought, suppose that a man is guilty of it towards himself ; for in that case, the same thing would be both added to and taken from the same person, at the same time. Injustice, therefore, always implies two persons at least ; and if it did not, the distinctions formerly made concerning spontaneity, deliberation, retaliation, and aggression, would be totally destroyed. Retaliation cannot deserve the epithet of injurious ; but could a man injure himself, injury would be consistent with the most complete retaliation, namely, the doing and suffering precisely the same thing, under precisely the same circumstances ; besides a man might suffer injury voluntarily, which was formerly proved to be impossible. Still further, the commission of wrong always implies some specific act ; but by no such act can a man do wrong to himself. He cannot commit adultery with his own wife,

" Atque hæc differentia naturarum tantum habet vim, uti nonnumquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat." De Officiis, l. i. c. xxxi. Here he speaks of suicide as a duty ; probably out of deference for his admired Cato. But his language is very different elsewhere. Confer. Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. xxx. Somn. Scip. c. iii. Had Aristotle's Ethics been equally well known, Cicero's Offices, admirable as they are, would not have been regarded and cited as the best standard of heathen morality.

BOOK ^{V.} he cannot be guilty of housebreaking with regard to his own house, he cannot steal his own property: universally, therefore, he cannot do an injury to himself. It is an evil to suffer, as well as to do, wrong, but the latter is by far the worst evil of the two, because it is blameable and base. The former, however, may sometimes, by concurring with other circumstances not essentially connected with it, be attended with far more deplorable consequences; in the same manner as a fall, by stumbling, may sometimes have worse effects than a pleurisy, because it may occasion a man's capture by the enemy, and, in consequence thereof, his ignominious death. But the science of Ethics, no more than that of Physics, pays attention to consequences not essentially inherent in the subject, and connected with it merely by way of appendage or accession. It is said metaphorically, not indeed that a man can exercise justice towards himself, but that one part of his frame may exercise justice towards another. This justice, however, resembles, not the political justice above examined, but the justice of fathers and masters towards children and slaves; whose relation to each other bears a near similitude to that of the rational and irrational parts in the human constitution. The passions often rebel against reason, as slaves do against their masters; and as the latter seem guilty of injustice, so do the former. Thus much concerning justice, and the other moral virtues.¹

¹ The doctrine of justice is explained on the same principles delivered in this Book, *Magna Moral.* l. i. c. xxxiv. ; & *Eudem.* l. iv.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VI.

INTRODUCTION.

IF philosophy consist in explaining phænomena, **BOOK VI.** seemingly indefinite in number, by a few distinct principles of action, this Sixth Book affords one of the finest specimens of it ever exhibited. According to Aristotle, moral virtue is appetite or affection disciplined by reason and custom; which, enabling us to make a fair estimate of excellence, teaches us to prefer and pursue it*. To explain, therefore, the different acceptations of the word reason; or, in Aristotle's language, to describe the different powers of the understanding, must form an essential part of every complete treatise of Ethics. By modern philosophers indeed these powers are not accurately distinguished; although, according to our author, the powers of intellect differ as widely from each other as those of sensation. Colours, flavours, sounds, and odours,

* *Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii. p. 161.*

and

BOOK and other objects about which the senses are
VI. conversant, are not more distinguishable from
each other, than the different classes of speculative and practical truths, which are perceptible by what our author calls the demonstrative and deliberative faculties of the understanding^b. Reasoning on this principle, that powers must differ from each other, which exert themselves in different actions, and effectuate different ends, he treats separately of art, science, prudence, intellect, and wisdom: he explains the nature and functions of each of those habits; examines the difference between what are called natural virtues, and those which are acquired by exercise and custom; and proves that none of the acquired virtues can subsist without that intellectual habit which he calls prudence.

^b *Magna Moral.* l. i. c. xxiv. p. 169.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

*Sensation, intellect, and appetite.— Their different offices.
 — The five intellectual habits— Science— Art— Prudence— Common sense— Wisdom.— Quickness of apprehension.— Justness of sentiment.— Importance of the intellectual habits.— Virtue, natural and acquired.— Their difference.*

HAVING formerly said that, in moral matters, mediocrity only ought to be the object of our preference, as being alone consistent with right reason, it is proper that this subject should be more distinctly explained. Whoever exercises reason has, in all his habitual actions, a certain aim, according to which he regulates his behaviour; moderating his passions when too strong, invigorating them when too weak, and always bending them to propriety, as a bow is strung or relaxed by the archer in order to hit the mark. This observation is indeed true, but not sufficiently explicit to be practically useful; for, in all other matters in which science is concerned, we ought certainly to do what right reason prescribes, that is, neither too much nor too little. Thus the physician ought to act with regard to his patient; but by knowing that this is his duty, he will not be rendered much the wiser

BOOK VI.

Chap. I.

Transition to the intellectual virtues.

BOOK

VI.

wiser as to what operations ought to be performed, or what medicines ought to be administered. It is necessary, therefore, to speak more definitely concerning the habits of the mind, to explain what right reason is, and to point out what are the boundaries which it assigns to our passions and actions. The habits or virtues of the mind were formerly divided into the moral and intellectual: concerning the moral we have already treated; it remains to examine the intellectual, having previously spoken of the soul itself. In this, we formerly distinguished two parts, the rational and irrational; and the former may also be divided into two, namely, that faculty by which we understand those sciences whose principles are certain and necessary, and which cannot possibly be otherwise than they are, and that by which we comprehend other branches of knowledge; for if there be any resemblance or affinity between the truths recognised, and the powers which recognise them, it is natural to think that things, so extremely different as are the necessary and contingent, should be perceived and known by different faculties*. Knowledge, then, may be divided into that which is demonstrative and scientific, and that which is deliberative and probable; for no one deliberates about things which necessarily exist after one certain manner, and which cannot possibly exist after any other. Let us examine, then, what is the best habit of each of these faculties:

* See also *Magna Moralia*, l. i. c. xxxv. p. 169.

the

the best habit of any thing is, in other words, its virtue; and the virtue of each object is ascertained by its fitness for performing its peculiar function. BOOK VI.

There are three principles in man, which, either single or combined, are the sovereign judges of truth and conduct. These are, sensation, intellect, and appetite. Of these three, mere sensation cannot alone be the foundation of any judgment respecting conduct, that is, the propriety of action; for wild beasts have perception by sense, but are totally unacquainted with propriety. Affirming and denying are the operations of intellect, desire and aversion are those of appetite; and since moral virtue implies the habit of just election, and election or preference resolves itself into deliberation and appetite, every act of virtuous preference requires, that there should be accuracy and truth in the comparison, as well as correctness and propriety in the desire. Of that intellectual faculty which bears not any relation to life and practice, and which is employed, not in deliberation, but in demonstration, the simplicity of abstract truth is the proper and only object; but deliberative moral wisdom bears in all its operations a reference to human happiness; and terminates, not in the discoveries of speculation, but in the exertions of action^d. This latter faculty, then, only attains its end, when well-

Chap. 2.

Sensation, intellect, and appetite, their different offices.

^d In conformity with what is here said, Aristotle in his *Topics*, b. v. c. i. p. 226. distinguishes science from virtue, by saying that the former is in one part of the soul, and the latter in more than one.

ordered

B O O K VI. ordered appetite harmonises with sound practical reason; from the combination of which elements, results that moral election or preference, peculiar to man; which may be called either impassioned intelligence, or reflecting appetite; and which is the sole fountain of whatever is laudable and graceful in behaviour and manners*. This practical reason is superior to that conversant about production: for production, as we above observed, is imperfect in itself, and continually remains so, until the work, for the sake of which it operated, be produced. But the operation of practical reason terminates in nothing better than the pleasure of its own energies. It is not given to us for the gratification of appetite: but appetite itself is implanted in us for the sake of that virtuous moral action, which constitutes an essential part of human happiness. Such, then, is man, an intellectual but impassioned being, exercising his faculties concerning things contingent and future. The past cannot be an object of deliberation or preference. No one chooses that Troy should not be taken; and Agathon says rightly,

“ All things to God are possible, save one,
“ That to undo, which is already done.”

As truth, then, is the object of both our rational faculties, (the speculative and practical,) their excellencies must consist in those habits by which truth is most clearly discerned.

* ἡ δὲ προαιρετικὴ, κοινὴ διανοίας καὶ ἡσυχίας. De Animal. Motu. c. vi. p. 706.

Let

Let these habits be the five following; science, art, prudence, wisdom, intellect. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived; not so in matters of science. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, unless when they are actually perceived; the latter is conversant about things unalterable, necessary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty. All science may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, those truths which are previously known by experience or reason. The first principles are acquired by induction, that is, by intellect operating on experience*. Science, then, may be defined a demonstrative habit, distinguished by those properties which we have ascribed to it in our *Analytics*†. The principles of science must be perceived with the clearest evidence; for unless they be more evident than the conclusions drawn from them, these conclusions will not form science strictly so called; because their truth does not necessarily proceed from the truth of their premises; with which they are connected, not essentially, but only by way of accession or appendage.‡

Things in their nature variable, and which might either have never been, which may cease

BOOK

VI.

Chap. 3.

The five intellectual habits.
First, science.

Chap. 4.

Art.

* See *Analytics*, p. 65. Comp. p. 161.

† See *Analytics*, p. 89.

‡ See above, p. 75. Conf. p. 115.

BOOK to exist, or whose mode of existence is liable to
 { **VI.** perpetual alterations, are of two kinds; produc-
 tions or actions. These things are sufficiently distinguished from each other even in popular discourse; so that a rational habit of action must be different from a rational habit of production. Since building, which is a rational habit of production, is an art, and every other such habit is also an art, and every art is also the habit just mentioned, art may be defined the habit of making or producing a certain work agreeably to the rules of right reason. All art is employed in examining and contriving how it may best form and fashion those productions or works of which the efficient cause is in the maker, not in the materials. Things which exist necessarily, are not the subjects of art; nor those which are produced naturally; for the latter have their efficient cause in themselves^b. Art, then, is conversant after a certain manner about the same things as fortune. Wherefore Agathon says,

“ In friendly ties are art and fortune bound.”

Artlessness is the contrary of art; it is the producing of such works awkwardly; according to erroneous principles of reason.

Chap. 5.

Prudence.

In explaining the nature of prudence, let us consider first, who they are to whom this excellence is ascribed. It seems to be the part of a prudent man to deliberate wisely about his good

^b See Analysis, p. 126.

or advantage; not in particular points merely, as health or strength, but as to the general happiness of life. This is indicated by our calling those men prudent, who take proper means for attaining valuable ends which are not the proper objects of particular arts. Prudence then implies deliberation; and no one deliberates about things invariable in their nature, and which cannot be otherwise than they are; nor about things which are not in their own power. Prudence, then, is not science, because the objects of science are things invariable; it is not art, because the object of prudence is action, not production. It remains then, that prudence should be a rational and practical habit, bearing a reference to the happiness and misery of human life. The end of production consists always in the work produced; but action is often its own end; for happiness, which is a kind of action, is perfect in itself. Pericles, and other great statesmen, are called prudent on account of their singular ability in effecting the good of human kind; the great business of œconomy, both political and domestic. The word, in Greek, denoting the moral virtue of temperance, is compounded of two other words, which may be literally translated, "the preservative of prudence;" for temperance tends to preserve this intellectual excellence. Pleasure and pain do not destroy every exercise of the understanding; for instance, that which relates to mathematical truth; but that exercise only

^b σωφροσύνη.

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D D

which

B O O K which relates to the practical concerns of life.
VI. For the excessive love of pleasure, or the excessive fear of pain, substitutes new principles of action quite different from those by which wise and good men are actuated. Prudence, then, is a rational and practical habit, effective of human happiness. We speak of excellence in art, but prudence is itself excellence. In the arts, voluntary errors are the best ; but, in matters of prudence, they are the worst ; as in all the moral virtues. Prudence, then, is not an art but a virtue ; and the virtue of that faculty of the mind which is conversant about opinion and probability, discerning in such things truth from falsehood. As it relates to the practice of life, which, with all men, is a constant object of thought, prudence, when once acquired, is not, like other habits of the understanding, liable to be forgotten or lost.

Chap. 6.

Intellect.

Since the object of science, as above observed, is universal and demonstrable truth, and whatever is demonstrable must be founded on principles, it is manifest that there must be primary principles¹, which are not science, any more than they are art or prudence. They are not science, because all science is demonstrable ; they are not art or prudence, because these have for their subject things contingent and variable : neither are they wisdom, because, as we shall see hereafter, wisdom, and the highest wisdom, is conversant about truths capable of proof from reason. Since then none of the four habits just

¹ See *Analysis*, p. 104, & seq.

mentioned ;

mentioned; neither science, nor art, nor prudence, nor wisdom, can afford those primary principles; and since all the habits of the understanding are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, operating on experience^k, is the only source from which those great and primary truths can be supposed to flow.

BOOK
VI.

Wisdom is sometimes taken for skill in the arts; and applied, for instance, to Phidias, who was a skilful sculptor; or Polycleitus, the skilful statuary. But there is a wisdom of a far superior kind, which does not denote excellence in any of those operations or arts to which Homer alludes in speaking of Margites: "The Gods had not formed him for digging or ploughing, nor made him skilful in any other work;" but a wisdom absolute and universal, since it relates to the universe and its principles; contemplating, not merely, like other sciences, the qualities or properties of things, but the things themselves, or substances^l; and, therefore, of all sciences the most accurate as well as the most sublime; comprehending both the highest demonstrations and the vindication of those primary truths, on which all demonstration is built^m. To say that prudence is more valuable than wisdom, is to prefer man to all other beings in the universe. One thing may be salutary and good for human kind; and another for fishes: but abstract quali-

Chap. 7.

Wisdom.

^k See Analysis, p. 64. Comp. p. 161.

^l These are God and Intellect,—the best substances, *ἡ ἄριστά μιν*, *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ νοῦς*, &c. Moral. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. p. 201.

^m See above, Analysis, p. 98, & seq.

BOOK VI. ties remain perpetually the same; and in like manner wisdom is permanent and stable, but prudence must vary its maxims with each alteration in the subjects about which it is conversant. The business of prudence consists in providing for the good of those peculiarly recommended to its care; and whoever best understands how to promote the good of each tribe or of each individual, to him we should be most inclined to commit their direction and management. Wherefore some of the inferior animals seem to be endowed with a kind of prudence, in foreseeing and providing what is necessary for the preservation of their own lives. The unalterable stability of wisdom clearly distinguishes it from civil policy, which, if it would attain its end, the public good, must be guided by circumstances; and the different tribes of animals require, in health as well as in disease, different kinds of management, which are respectively most conducive to their well-being. It will not avail to say, that as man is the noblest of animals, therefore the virtue of prudence, which is conversant about human happiness, merits the preference to every other^m; for that there are many natures more divine

^m According to Aristotle, prudence is, as it were, wisdom's steward, holding a delegated authority in lesser concerns, that the master may have leisure for more important pursuits: ἡ φρονησις ὡς περ ἐπιτροπος τις ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταυτὴ σχολῇ, καὶ το ποιεῖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἔργον. Magn. Moral. l. i. c. xxxv. p. 172. These more important pursuits consist in speculations concerning God; in meditating on, and worshipping him: εἰ τις δὲ ἡ δὲ ἑνδομῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐπεὶ πολλὴν καλῶν τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπείαν καὶ θείαν, αὐτὴ δὲ φαύλη. Moral. Eudem. c. xv. p. 291. This employment is the chief end of man; the natural exercise of his noblest faculties; αἴτις τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ὅρος αἰτίας.

divine than man, is attested by those glorious luminaries, and that beautiful arrangement which adorns the universe. Wisdom, then, comprehends both intellect and science, applied to the highest purposes, the discovery of the most valuable truths. Wherefore we call Thales, Anaxagoras, and others of their character, wise, indeed, but surely not prudent, since they manifestly neglect their private concerns and personal advantage, and apply their thoughts to the investigation of subjects as lofty and difficult as they are completely useless for the ordinary purposes of human life. But the virtue of prudence is directed solely to these purposes; and he is justly deemed the most prudent, whose advice is most conducive to public prosperity. This great object is not to be attained by abstract speculations. Prudence must be conversant about particulars; for all practice relates to particulars only; wherefore many men, ignorant of theory, are more useful than those acquainted with it; for instance, empirics, than physicians^a. What avails it to know that light food is salutary, unless we also know, for instance, that the flesh of birds is light? Prudence, being a practical virtue, essentially includes the knowledge of

αἰσχος, τα ἥμισυ αισθανοῦνται τὴν ἄλλαν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τούτων. The less we are disturbed by bodily passions, or harassed by worldly cares, the more likely we are to approach to this ultimate term of mental enjoyment. Idem ibid. Religion cannot be eradicated from the mind, unless the understanding be destroyed: μὴδὲ τῆς θείας φροῦσθαι καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακοῦ. Magna Moral. c. v. p. 151.

^a That is, those guided in their practice by experience are more useful than those guided in it by the general rules of physical science.

B O O K particulars. Yet even here general and super-
VI. intending principles are not without their use.

Chap. 8.

Policy, ge-
 neral and
 particular.

Prudence and policy are the same habits, but applied to different subjects. Policy is general or particular: the general consists in legislation; the particular, in deliberations and decrees; for as decrees apply general principles to particular cases, they immediately precede execution; and therefore those who busy themselves about decrees, in proposing or procuring them, are peculiarly considered as workmen in the trade of politics. Prudence chiefly relates to the management of our private affairs, and while confined to this purpose preserves its proper name; but when our prudence extends to the affairs of others, it is called œconomics, legislation, politics; which last is either deliberative or judicial. Yet politics is sometimes contrasted with prudence; too much concern about other people's affairs seeming unfavourable to our own happiness. Wherefore Euripides says, in the person of Philoctetes,

“ How can the name of wise to me belong
 Who might have mingled in the martial throng,
 Unvex'd with business and exempt from care,
 Taking of spoils my honourable share;
 Yet chose by over anxious thoughts to move
 The direful hate of all commanding Jove?”

But a prudential regard to our own interest requires, perhaps, that we should not be regardless of politics, since our own good is involved in that of the Public; and many are extremely ill fitted to provide even for their own. Young persons

persons may become good geometers, and render themselves skilful in the arts depending on the mathematical sciences. But it is scarcely possible for a youth to have the virtue of prudence, because this virtue is conversant about particulars, the real knowledge of which requires repeated observation and long experience. He may rehearse wise maxims, but he will not feel their importance, or discern their truth. The mathematics, besides, are conversant merely about abstractions formed by ourselves; the notions of which are clear and precise. But the knowledge of nature, and of those causes through which nature subsists, is far more complicated, requiring continually the assistance of that experience in which it originates: and in reasoning on such subjects, errors may arise from mistaking either the general or the particular proposition; for example, that all heavy waters are bad, or that this water is heavy. Prudence is manifestly different from science; being the perception of those particular and practical truths which admit not of demonstration; whereas intellect is employed about those general and primary principles which require not any proof. In the chain of mental faculties, intellect and prudence then form the two extreme links; prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intellect that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common sense, since it is conversant about objects of sense; but in a manner specifically different from that in which the external senses are

B O O K respectively conversant about their particular objects.^o

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Chap. 9.

Prudence implies deliberation, which word has a less extensive meaning than investigation, because deliberation is that species of investigation which relates to the practical concerns of life. It is not science, nor opinion, nor conjecture; not science, because no one deliberates about that which admits of demonstrable proof: not conjecture or guessing, because these are quick and rapid, but deliberation is a work of time; and it is a common maxim, that we ought to be prompt in execution, but slow in deliberation. Deliberation is not presence of mind, any more than happiness of conjecture; it is not science, which cannot err; nor opinion, the rectitude of which consists in truth, whereas that of deliberation consists in utility; since wrong deliberations are hurtful. Besides, every opinion is a proposition either affirmative or negative; whereas deliberation neither affirms nor denies, but investigates and inquires. Good deliberation is rectitude of counsel; but, as rectitude is taken in different senses, it is not every kind of rectitude, particularly it is not that by which an intemperate or bad man may contrive right means for attaining his wicked ends. His right deliberations terminate in real mischief; whereas good deliberation naturally terminates

^o The obscurity of this passage derives not any illustration from comparing the perceptions of prudence with those of the geometer, who sees that all mathematical figures may be resolved into triangles; a comparison thrown into the text from an early Greek commentator.

in solid advantage. This, however, may sometimes be attained without good deliberation; since a right conclusion is sometimes inferred from wrong premises. Good deliberation also must be seasonable: its result must be drawn at a right time, must proceed from right premises, and must terminate in some valuable attainment, whether that be happiness in general, or something thereto conducive. *Good counsel*, then, consists in discovering proper means for attaining those ends which prudence approves as worthy objects of pursuit.

BOOK
VI.

There is a readiness of apprehension in some men, which makes them be distinguished as intelligent; while others are equally remarkable for their slowness and stupidity. This quickness of thought, or acuteness in decision, is something quite different from science or opinion, since all men are capable of learning sciences and forming opinions; nor does it belong to any science in particular, as physic, which is conversant about health, or geometry, which is conversant about magnitude; nor does its proper subject consist in things which happen casually, or in those which are unalterable and eternal; but it is most conspicuous in those things which are matters of deliberation and doubt. It is conversant, then, about the same subject with prudence, though not precisely in the same manner; for prudence speaks with a voice of authority, commanding one action and prohibiting another; but the intellectual excellence, now under consideration, is rather critical than

Chap. 10.

Quickness
of apprehension.

BOOK than commanding; it does not govern and regulate our actions, but enables us to understand the regulations which prudence prescribes; and follows the dictates of this sovereign virtue, as an intelligent youth easily goes along with and apprehends the lessons of his teacher.

Chap. II.

**Justice of
sentiment.**

That justness of sentiment by which some men render themselves so commendable, is nothing more than a nice discernment of the virtue which we called equity; in proof of which it may be observed, that those who are most equitable in their transactions, are also the most distinguished by their fellow-feeling with others, and the most inclinable to excuse their pardonable errors. Pardon is nothing more than an equitable decision; that is, indulgence flowing from right reason. The intellectual habits above described, readiness of apprehension, justness of sentiment, prudence, intelligence, or common sense, are all of them conversant about the same objects, and all of them conspire to the same great end of making men behave well in the practical concerns of life. These concerns are all of them particular, depending on time and circumstances; and the habits that have reference to them, must therefore be different from those which are conversant about general and abstract truth. In practical matters, prudence regulates and commands, sentiment criticises and approves, and intelligence, or common sense, operating on observation and experience, furnishes those first principles which are equally essential to the due selection of ends, and the proper

proper adjustment of means. As these first principles spring up in the mind, without teaching or reasoning, merely from observation and experience, they seem to be the gift of nature; and justness of sentiment, as well as the other virtues depending on them, seem also to be natural, and to belong to men at a certain period of life, who seem then naturally to attain understanding and sentiment; whereas art, science, or wisdom, (as above explained,) never seem to grow up naturally, but always to be the work of application and study. Common sense^w, then, that is, intellect operating on experience, being the ultimate judge of whatever is practically good, we ought to respect the opinions of old and prudent men, not less than demonstration itself; because they see with the eye of experience, which alone can discern right principles of conduct. Such, then, is the nature of prudence in contradistinction to that of wisdom; virtues which are conversant about different objects, and which respectively belong to different faculties of the soul.

Doubts may arise in what respect these intellectual virtues are useful; for wisdom, as above explained, has not any reference to mutable and material things, and therefore seems not to have any tendency to promote human happiness. Prudence, indeed, is conversant about worldly affairs; but wherein consists its utility, since it

Chap. 12.

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The value
of the in-
tellectual
virtues,
how to be
estimated.

^w The word *σοφία* is used familiarly in English in the same sense in which it is here employed by Aristotle.

only

BOOK only deliberates concerning honourable, just, and other actions conducive to happiness, which a virtuous man has learned to practise? If virtue be a habit, how is it to be improved by the reflections of prudence? Persons possessed of health or strength would not be more strong or more healthy, though endowed with the skill of physicians and masters of exercises. But prudence, it will be said, though not necessary for the practice, is useful to the acquisition, of virtue. Is skill in physic necessary or useful to the acquisition of health? If this were the case, we ought, when sick, to study physic, instead of calling a physician. Besides these doubts, it is not easy to determine the relative value of wisdom and prudence; and why the latter, which is inferior in dignity, should prescribe rules for the exercise of the former. Having proposed these difficulties, it is our duty, if possible, to solve them. First of all, wisdom and prudence, though they terminated not in any distinct and separate end, would be things highly desirable in themselves, since they are respectively the virtues of two mental faculties. But they are productive causes of human happiness, not indeed as physic is the cause of health, but as health itself is the cause of a healthy habit. The great business of human life is performed by the co-operation of prudence with moral virtue. The latter makes us pursue right ends; and the former makes us employ fit means for attaining them. To that power of the soul, which discovers itself in the growth and nutrition of

of the body, no such spontaneous function belongs; since its operations are carried on altogether independently of our own wills; and it is entirely beside our power to accelerate or retard them. As to the doubt whether prudence contributes to the practice of just and honourable actions, it will be best solved by tracing those actions to their real source. Acts of virtue, in general, may be performed by those who are not virtuous men, involuntarily, ignorantly, through fear of the law, or through any other motive which does not imply the habitual love of virtue, and the deliberate preference of it merely for its own sake. This habit, then, makes our ends right and good; but how to attain those ends, is the work, not of moral virtue, but of another principle. There is a power of the mind, call it cleverness, keenness, or sagacity, of which the nature consists in enabling us to accomplish our purposes; and which, when the purposes are good, is praiseworthy; when they are bad, this cleverness changes its name, being justly reproached as villainy. Prudence, though not the same thing, (since a villain cannot be called prudent,) yet requires for its foundation this natural dexterity, which is determined to the side of honour and propriety by habitual acts of virtue. For reasonings alone cannot supply correct principles of conduct. The ends best to be pursued, appear such to good men only. Vice distorts the judgment; and even in men of naturally keen minds, produces the greatest practical errors: wherefore

Their utility in practice.

B O O K fore it is impossible to be prudent without being
VI. morally virtuous.

Chap. 13.

Natural
 virtue dif-
 ferent from
 virtue pro-
 perly so
 called.

It is necessary to speak farther of virtue ; for, as natural sagacity, though similar, is not the same with prudence, so natural virtue, though similar, is not the same with virtue properly so called. Our capacities and dispositions are the work of nature ; and therefore, in some sort, our morals are so likewise ; men being born with propensities to justice, temperance, and fortitude. But this natural aptitude is not the virtue of which we are in quest. Strong natural propensities, and striking differences of manners, appear in children, and even in wild beasts ; and this native vigour, being unenlightened by reason, has a tendency to do much mischief, like the irregular motions of giants when deprived of their eye-sight. But when the intellectual eye opens, and affection is disciplined by reason, then that moral virtue displays itself, which bears the same relation to the natural, which prudence bears to that doubtful quality above mentioned, which, though somewhat resembling it, is yet specifically different. As virtue properly so called implies prudence, some have resolved all the virtues into modifications, of this intellectual excellence. Socrates did this ; saying, rightly, that none of the virtues could subsist without prudence ; which is nothing else but right reason, (which all philosophers now add to the definition of virtue,) applied to the subject of morals ; but he erred in thinking that the whole of moral rectitude depended solely on the

the understanding, and in calling the virtues sciences. Virtuous men, indeed, must act, not only according to right reason, but with right reason; that is, the right reason which regulates their conduct, must be a principle in themselves. The virtues, then, though not sciences, cannot subsist without that principle of reason from which all the sciences spring; in other words, prudence is requisite for constituting the character of the truly good man. The question therefore may be answered, whether the virtues can exist separately. It should seem that they may; because the same person not being born with equal aptitude to them all, he may possess some of them, though greatly deficient in others. This indeed is true with regard to the natural virtues; but with regard to those which constitute the character of the truly good man, it is impossible; for none such can be exercised without prudence, and with this single intellectual excellence, all the moral virtues necessarily co-exist; since prudence not only shews us how best to obtain our ends, but always implies that the ends themselves are good. Yet prudence, extensive and dignified as is its function, ought not to be preferred to wisdom, which is conversant about still higher subjects, and is the virtue of a nobler faculty^x. Physic is not better than health; though it prescribes rules by which health may be attained^y. To set prudence

^x See above, p. 393.

^y The art of physic does not make use of health, it only contrives how health may be preserved or restored. It is for the sake of health, and therefore less valuable. See above, p. 240, & seq.

above

BOOK above wisdom, is the same absurdity as to set
VI. policy above the Gods; because policy regulates
the national religion, as well as all other public
concerns.*

* The intellectual virtues are treated of more briefly in the last chapters of the first, and first chapters of the second Book of the work intituled *Magna Moralia*; and in the fifth Book of the *Ethica to Eudemus*.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VII.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING examined the virtues and vices, **BOOK**
strictly so called, the author proceeds to **VII.**
habits which, though often confounded with
them, are yet essentially different; namely,
self-command, and its opposite, incontinency;
heroic virtue, and its opposite, beastly depravity;
which sometimes shews itself in savageness
and ferocity, and sometimes in unnatural perversions
of the concupiscible appetites. There is not any system
of Ethics that accounts so fully and so clearly for the
important distinction between weakness and wickedness,
as is done in this Seventh Book.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Vice. — Weakness. — Ferocity. — Self-command, and its contrary. — Unnatural depravities, different from vices. — Voluptuousness more detestable than irascibility — Reasons of this. — Intemperance and incontinency — Their difference.

BOOK
VII.

Chap. I.

In morals
three
things to
be avoided.

WE now proceed, making a new division, to observe, that in morals three things ought to be avoided; vice, weakness, and ferocity: the opposites to the two first are manifest, namely, virtue and self-command; and to the third, we may set in opposition a virtue more than human, something heroic and divine, such as Homer makes Priam ascribe to Hector;

“ And last great Hector, more than man divine,
For sure he seemed not of terrestrial line.”^a

Ferocity,
and its op-
posites.

So that, should we believe what is said of the deification of illustrious men, their pre-eminent worth might be properly opposed to savageness and ferocity: for virtue belongs not to gods, any more than vice to beasts; the excellencies of gods are above virtue, and the depravities of beasts are specifically different from vice. The Lacedæmonians, when they admire any one exceedingly, say, “ you are a divine man ;”

^a Iliad, b. xxiv. v. 223, & seq.

but

but as such men are seldom to be met with, so BOOK
VII. beastly depravities are seldom to be found in the human race; they occur rarely, and chiefly among Barbarians. They are sometimes produced by diseases or wounds; and the excesses of human vice are reproached as beastly. But concerning such enormous depravities, we shall afterwards have occasion to speak; and we have already considered vice properly so called. It remains, therefore, that we now treat of incontinency, and its opposite, self-command; which seem not to be entirely the same with the habits of vice and virtue, nor yet altogether different from them. We shall first mention the prevailing opinions on this subject, and next state our own doubts: when difficulties are removed, and probabilities established, the theory will be sufficiently correct for all practical purposes. Firmness and self-command appear then to be respectable and praiseworthy habits; and their contraries, weakness and yielding softness, appear to be, in the same proportion, both blameable and contemptible. The man of self-command is steady to the decisions of his reason; the weak man is easily moved from them. The latter, knowing that his actions are bad, yet commits them through passion; the former, knowing that his appetites are bad, yet restrains them through reason. Some confound self-command with temperance, and the want of it with intemperance; others think that those habits are widely different from each other. Prudence appears to some to be totally incompatible

BOOK VII. patible with the want of self-command; others think, that men, highly distinguished by their prudence and abilities, are often extremely deficient in this particular. A man is said to lose the command of himself, and to be mastered, not only by pleasure, but by anger, honour, and gain. Such are the prevailing opinions on this subject.^b

Chap. 2. It seems difficult to explain how a man, who entertains just conceptions of things, should voluntarily resign his independence; and how he who, as Socrates observed, has science to direct him, should allow himself to be domineered over by inferior principles, and dragged in captivity like a slave. Socrates, indeed, maintained, that this could not happen to him who possessed real science, and that none acted amiss but through ignorance only. But this opinion is manifestly at variance with the phenomena; for if passion were caused by ignorance, the ignorance ought to precede the passion, which is plainly not the case; for the man who errs through want of self-command, only does so when stimulated by passion; well knowing, before his passion is excited, that the actions to which it moves him are wrong. Some philosophers maintain that none can err against demonstrative knowledge, but that many daily err against that which is only probable; and that the love of pleasure, though it cannot prevail

Concern-
ing self-
command,
and its con-
trary.

^b The subjects treated in this Book are explained nearly in the same words in the sixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

over

over science strictly so called, may yet be too strong for opinion. But if opinion merely, that is a faint and wavering impression of truth, is the only power that makes resistance to the strength of appetite, it is not wonderful that the latter should obtain the victory; nor ought those to be blamed, in whom the stronger principle prevails. But this does not really happen; for men are highly blamed for indulging their corrupt appetites. If neither science nor opinion can take part in this mental conflict, prudence remains as the only antagonist. But this is absurd; for to be wanting in self-command is incompatible with the possession of prudence; a prudent man will not voluntarily commit bad actions; and prudence, as we have above shewn, is a practical principle, implying the existence of all other virtues*. Self-command supposes the presence of strong passions, and those blameable either in their nature or in their degree: if they were not blameable, they ought not to be resisted; and if they were not strong, there would be little praise in resisting them. Temperance, as above explained, is inconsistent with the presence of any such passions. Temperance and self-command cannot therefore belong to the same character. If self-command implied an immoveable adherence to every conclusion of the understanding, it would, when this conclusion happened to be false, be nothing better than obstinacy; and if the imperfection opposite to

* See p. 414.

B O O K self-command consisted in easily departing from
 VII. certain opinions or resolutions, it would sometimes be a very respectable quality; as in the case of Neoptolemus, who is represented in Sophocles' tragedy as easily departing from the resolution which he had taken, by the advice of Ulysses, because he could not bear to tell a lie; and those who, having once yielded to the seductions of sophistry, continue pertinaciously to adhere to them, are surely not commendable on that account. Great weakness of resolution, when accompanied with great stupidity, might sometimes be a virtue; because through extreme irresolution, a man might be tempted to do directly the reverse of what he foolishly intended. Besides, he who led a life of voluptuousness through deliberate choice, and on conviction of its being the best kind of life that he could pursue, would not be in a condition so totally hopeless, as he who followed the same plan through want of self-command, in direct opposition to the dictates of his own reason. The former, having been corrupted by argument, might also by argument be reformed; but the latter, resisting the persuasion of his own mind, would be totally incurable; and obnoxious to the proverb,

“ Of drinking still, e'en when the water chok'd.”

Besides, wherein does self-command, and the weakness opposite to it, properly consist? Are the objects to which these habits relate, limited to a certain class? Such are the doubts of
 which

which we must endeavour to find the probable solution. BOOK VII.

We proceed first to examine whether a man gives up the command of himself knowingly; and, if so, how that can happen: we shall also inquire, whether self-command, and the inability to restrain our appetites, have a reference to all pleasures and pains indiscriminately, or to certain definite kinds of them; and whether it belongs to the same habit of mind to resist pleasure, and to encounter pain; with several other questions naturally connected with the present speculation. Does inability to restrain our appetites appear in the improper pleasures that we pursue, or in the improper manner in which we pursue them, or in both these united? Self-command, and its opposite, incontinency, when taken in the strictest acceptation, have a reference to the same things about which temperance and intemperance were formerly proved to be conversant^d; but the kind of relation which they bear to these things is exceedingly different. The intemperate man obeys his appetites knowingly and deliberately, thinking that he ought always to follow the impulse of present pleasure; the man, merely weak and incontinent, also obeys his appetites, but without thinking that he is thereby acting the part which becomes him. Whether the perceived impropriety of his conduct be the result of certain or only probable knowledge, makes not any material alteration;

Chap. 3.

Whether persons deficient in self-command err knowingly.

^d See above, p. 318, & seq.

BOOK

VII.

since some opinions, as Heraclitus proves, hold as firm possession of the mind, as if they were conclusions of science. But a man is said to understand, either when he actually exercises this faculty, or when he is barely possessed of it. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive how he should act against his understanding in the former case, though not at all extraordinary that he should do so in the latter. He may understand both the general precept, and the particular case to which it is applicable; but if he does not actually make the application, his knowledge will not avail him. In practical matters, there are general propositions which relate to the agent, and others which relate to the object of his action; and each of these have particular propositions which naturally fall under them. A man may be possessed of the knowledge of all the general propositions, and also of the knowledge of all the particular ones; and yet, if there be any one of the latter, concerning which his understanding does not, at the fit moment, exert its operation or energy, it is not wonderful that he should fall into the greatest practical errors. This operation or energy is manifestly suspended in the case of persons asleep, drunk, or mad; whose condition nearly resembles that of men under the influence of passion. Anger and lust plainly alter the bodily frame, and sometimes produce madness. Such is the state of those unable to restrain their appetites. It is no proof of the contrary, that such persons talk reasonably; for some madmen will repeat

repeat the verses and reasonings of Empedocles ; and boys may be taught to string together demonstrations, although they know not what they say ; for to appropriate truth to ourselves, it must be rendered congenial to the mind ; which is the work of time. Such persons no more understand the conclusions which they pronounce, than comedians feel the passions which they fictitiously exhibit. There is also a philosophical cause resulting from the physical nature of man, which may explain why he often through passion acts contrary to the dictates of his understanding. In all practical morality, there is to be considered, besides the general precept or proposition, also the particular one, which results from a perception of sense. When these two propositions coalesce, there is not merely an assent of the mind, but, in practical matters, action must immediately and necessarily ensue. Thus, if the general proposition be, "sweet things are pleasant ;" and the particular, "this before me is sweet ;" it is necessary that, unless restrained by some obstacle or argument, I should immediately taste what is before me. Although the mind, therefore, may have the knowledge of some general proposition which ought to prevent tasting, yet, if appetite conspires with the two propositions above mentioned, appetite will, in those destitute of self-command, be indulged, in opposition to right reason ; and these propositions will be alleged by them in excuse for their infirmity. They will appear therefore to act licentiously on argument ;

BOOK ment; but, in fact, argument is not in itself
VII. contrary to right reason, but only by way of ac-
 cession or appendage to appetite, which has the
 power of moving and changing the whole frame
 of the body, and thereby distorting the intel-
 lects. Beasts, therefore, cannot be blamed for
 this want of self-command, because they have
 not any perception of general precepts, their
 highest powers consisting in imagination and
 memory. How men enslaved by their appetites
 resume the exercise of their understandings,
 needs not here be explained; this change
 has nothing in it peculiar; since it entirely re-
 sembles what happens to all mankind when they
 awake from sleep, or to drunkards, when they
 recover from a fit of intoxication; - subjects
 which belong to the province of the physiologist.
 Socrates then said truly, that science, properly
 so called, could not be overcome by appetite,
 which only disturbs our perception of particular
 and practical truths.

Whether incontinency be a specific imper-
 fection, denoting, without any addition to it,
 infirmities of a peculiar kind, comes next to be
 inquired. It is manifestly conversant about
 pleasures and pains; and as pleasures are either
 necessary, namely, such as are essential to the
 health of the body and the preservation of the
 species; or though not necessary, yet in them-
 selves eligible, such as victory, honour, wealth,
 and such other external advantages, it is to be
 remarked that we do not call those incontinent
 who are too easily mastered by the latter plea-
 sures,

fures, and who are inclined to indulge them in a degree not warranted by right reason, without adding the particular cause or object which oversets them, such as gain, honour, anger. They are incontinent, that is, wanting in self-command, not simply and absolutely, but as to gain, honour, anger; and the definition of incontinency in general no more applies to them, than the general definition of a man to an Olympic victor. It is doubtless an imperfection in a man's character that he is actuated by too eager a desire of honour or of wealth; but incontinency taken absolutely, is blamed, not merely as an imperfection, but either as general depravity, or at least as a particular vice; which consists in pursuing with too much eagerness the pleasures of the taste and touch; or in avoiding, softly and weakly, the pains originating in those senses; cold and heat, hunger and thirst. Continency and incontinency, taken simply and strictly, are conversant therefore about precisely the same objects with temperance and intemperance; though the relation which they bear to those objects be extremely different. The intemperate man pursues pleasure wilfully and deliberately, thinking it always the proper object of his preference; wherefore his intemperance is more odious in proportion to the debility of his desires; for what excesses might he be expected to commit, were he stimulated by the warmth of youthful passions? Desires and pleasures, as we have already explained, are either natural, (of which some are even highly respec-

BOOK VII. respectable and honourable,) or unnatural; or thirdly, they hold an intermediate rank, being natural under certain conditions, and unnatural under others; in which last class we may place the desires of gain, glory, or victory. Desires of the first and last kind do not subject those who gratify them to blame, provided they do not indulge them to excess; so that those who delight in their own honours and advantages, or in the honour and advantage of their parents or children, and take proper means to promote objects naturally so dear to them, are justly respected on this account; although even here, extremes are dangerous; as was exemplified in the case of Niobé, whose pride in her children made her contend with the gods; and in that of Satyrus, surnamed Philopater, whose zeal for the honour of his father proceeded to the extravagance of folly. But such desires, being highly natural in themselves, have nothing in them of wickedness or turpitude, only their excesses being hurtful or useless, ought to be carefully avoided. In indulging such desires beyond the limits prescribed by right reason, we are indeed guilty of an error which ought to be shunned, but which is not culpable, like that want of self-command, properly called incontinence. These errors, bearing some analogy to each other, fall under the common denomination of weakness; but that word, when applied to the one, does not mean the same thing, as when it is applied to the other, any more than the epithet bad, applied to a player or a physician, means the same thing,

thing, as when it is applied to a man. Self-command then, and its opposite weakness, are conversant about the same subjects with temperance and intemperance. When the words are applied to other subjects, they are extended by way of simile beyond their strict acceptation, and therefore other words must be added to them in order clearly to express our meaning. To say simply that a man is wanting in self-command, denotes that he is liable to be overcome by the seductions of sensual pleasure, but does not immediately suggest to us that he is liable to be overcome by anger, honour, or gain.

Some things naturally please all animals; others are naturally pleasant only to certain tribes; and a third class, though not congenial to any species of animals in their sound and natural state, are yet agreeable to some individuals of the species, either through certain bodily defects, through perverse habits, or through perversity of nature. From this last kind result the fierce and beastly propensities incident to some individuals of the human species; witness that savage female who delighted in tearing to pieces women with child, and in devouring their young; and those Barbarians around Pontus, who feast, some of them on raw, others on human flesh, and who make mutual presents of their children to eke out their horrid entertainments; witness also the shocking stories told of the tyrant Phalaris. These are beastly depravities, and others, not less abominable, are sometimes

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Unnatural
depravities,
their
difference
from vices.

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times produced through diseases and madness, as was exemplified in that wretch who sacrificed and eat his mother; and in the slave who killed his companion that he might devour his liver. Some persons, through disease or custom, delight in plucking out their hair, in biting off their nails, in eating coals or earth. In nearly the same class, we may place pæderasty. Such depravities, whether originating in natural corruption, custom, or malady, exceed the limits of vice, and cannot be reproached with epithets characteristic of merely human pravity, except by way of metaphor or similitude. Thus he who should fear even the buzzing of a fly, would be degraded by cowardice more than human, and brutish. A man was afflicted with a malady which made him tremble at the sight of a cat; and there are some nations of distant barbarians who have so little use of their reason, and who are so completely guided by their sensations, that they are scarcely distinguishable from brutes. Madness, epilepsy, and other diseases also subject those afflicted by them to strange perversities of desire; and from the same source of rational nature vitiated and changed, either by malady or custom, we see spring those excesses of folly, cowardice, intemperance, and savageness, which transcend the boundaries of merely human wickedness. We may suppose a man stimulated by brutal appetites, and yet restraining them; Phalaris for instance, restraining his desire to eat a boy, or to abuse him as the instrument of an absurd venereal pleasure; and

and it may happen on the other hand, that a monster in a human shape may not only feel such propensities, but want self-command to restrain them. In speaking of men, such abominations cannot be called vices simply and properly; they are something worse: depravities originating in disease or brutishness, not springing from the improper indulgence of natural appetite. It is manifest then, that self-command and weakness, continency and incontinency, are conversant about the same subjects with temperance and intemperance, and that there is another species of continency, so called metaphorically, though conversant about different objects.

Incontinency of anger appears a lesser deformity than incontinency as to pleasure. The reasons of this are, that anger seems to listen to reason, though it does not hear it distinctly; like officious servants, who before they have received their orders fully, are in too great a hurry to execute them, and therefore often do it wrong; and dogs which bark at the least noise, before they know whether it proceeds from a friend or an enemy. In the same manner anger, without waiting for reason's last commands, is precipitated through the warmth and quickness of its nature, into over-hasty acts of inconsiderate vengeance; concluding, at every real or supposed insult, that the author of it is worthy of indignation and punishment. The conclusions of anger are indeed often erroneous; but sensuality, without stopping to draw any conclusions

at

BOOK
VII.

Chap. 6.

Reasons
why voluptuousness is
more detestable than
irascibility.

BOOK at all, at the first prospect of pleasure, rushes to
 { **VII.** enjoyment ; it is therefore the more degrading
 imperfection of the two, since the sensualist
 yields to mere appetite, whereas the angry man
 is led astray by the appearance at least of reason.
 Besides this, it is to be observed, that all our
 faults seem to be more or less entitled to indul-
 gence and pardon, in proportion as they are
 more or less natural, or more or less common.
 But transports of anger are far more natural
 than excesses in criminal pleasure : the former
 seem to be congenial to some races of men ; as
 in the family of him who apologized for beating
 his father by saying, that *he* beat my grand-
 father, and my grandfather, the father before
 him ; and this little boy, pointing to his son
 will beat me when he is able ; the fault runs in
 our blood. Another, when dragged by his son
 to the door, desired him to stop there, because
 he had only dragged his own father thither.
 Anger besides is open and undefigning ; but the
 passion of voluptuousness is artful, and therefore
 unjust. The cestus of Venus is pregnant with
 wiles.

“ In this was every art and every charm
 To win the wisest and the coldest warm ;
 Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay desire,
 The kind deceit, the still reviving fire,
 Persuasive speech and more persuasive sighs,
 Silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes.”*

The incontinency of voluptuousness is there-
 fore worse than that of anger ; since it more

* Iliad, xiv. v. 247, & seq.

nearly

nearly approaches to deliberate wickedness. It **BOOK**
 may be observed to the same purpose, that no **VII.**
 person while afflicted with pain is addicted to
 insolence; for to insult is attended with pleasure,
 but anger is always accompanied with pain;
 wherefore insolence, which is of all things the
 most provoking, is incompatible with anger.
 The different kinds of incontinency have now
 been sufficiently explained, the human, the
 brutish, and that originating in disease; the first
 kind only is conversant about the same objects
 with the vice of intemperance; a thing never
 ascribed to brutes, except metaphorically, or
 comparatively; when any class of animals is re-
 marked as peculiarly obnoxious for its lust, vo-
 raciousness, or mischief. For brutes, being incapable
 of deliberation and election, cannot be deformed
 by vice strictly so called; their ferocity, how
 formidable soever it may be, is a less evil than
 human vice; since they are destitute of that
 best principle of man, which, by corruption,
 becomes the worst; and bad effects flowing
 from a principle, are thereby rendered more
 dangerous. A bad man is capable of doing ten
 thousand times more mischief than a beast.

With respect to the pleasures and pains of the **Chap. 7.**
 touch and taste, which it falls within the pro-
 vince of temperance to regulate, we may be so
 constituted as either to conquer those by which
 the greater part of mankind are subdued, or to
 be conquered by those over which the greater
 part are victorious. The terms, self-command,
 or continency, and its opposite, incontinency,

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are

BOOK are most properly applied in speaking of pleasures; the terms, firmness and softness, are respectively most applicable to those who shew more than an ordinary strength of mind in resisting pain, or more than an ordinary weakness in yielding to this adversary. The greater proportion of mankind float between the opposite extremes of firmness and softness, continency and incontinency; verging, however, for the most part, rather to the imperfections of incontinency and softness. Since some pleasures are altogether unnecessary, and of these which are necessary, the excesses are carefully to be shunned, he who pursues unnecessary or immoderate pleasures, with deliberate election, and merely for their own sake, is guilty of intemperance; a vice the more incurable, because those who harbour it are not liable to repentance. The vice opposite to intemperance consists in rejecting, through insensibility, even necessary or commendable pleasures: the virtue of temperance lies in the middle between these blameable extremes. With regard to bodily pains, a man may fly from and avoid, even those which ought to be encountered, either through deliberate election, or through mere weakness and infirmity of nature; and as one person is led captive by pleasure, another may be overcome by the painful irritation of desire. Bad actions are aggravated, when they are committed without impulse from any violent passion. To strike in anger is an extenuation of the assault; and, in like manner, base actions, done without temptation,

tion, are rendered still baser; for, in what shameful excesses would he who commits them be likely to indulge, were he stimulated by fierce desires and headstrong appetites? Intemperance, then, properly so called, is more odious than that weakness which we have called incontinency; and continency, which enables us to conquer pleasures, is preferable to that resisting firmness, which merely prevents us from being subdued by pain. Softness, or effeminacy, consists in yielding to slight pains; and is illustrated in him who trails his flowing garments on the ground, rather than submit to the paltry exertion of tucking them up; thus exhibiting, without necessity, a picture of disease and infirmity, and thinking that there is no misery in resembling the miserable. That a man should be overcome by great pleasures or great pains, is not a matter of wonder; and his defeat is entitled to pardon, provided his resistance has been vigorous; as is exemplified in the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when bit by the snake, and in the character of Cercyon in Cercinus' play of Alopè. The bursts of agonising pain are as natural on such occasions as those of laughter, when long and earnestly suppressed; an instance of which was seen in Zenophantus. But a man is truly contemptible, when he softly yields to slight and inconsiderable sufferings, unless this happens through disease, or through some natural infirmity in his race. In the kings of Persia, effeminacy is hereditary; and manly firmness is not expected in women. A playful character is more allied to softness than to intemperance;

BOOK for playfulness is the repose and relaxation of
VII. the mind. The want of self-command originates, either in rashness or in debility. Weak men deliberate, but want strength of mind to persevere in their resolutions; rash men are hurried away by passion, without deliberating at all. Our own preparations and exertions have great power over even our bodily feelings; a man may accustom himself to bear tickling without suffering the uneasy sensation which it excites; and, in the same manner, by calling up pains and pleasures to the mind, by rendering them objects of perception and examination, and moderating by reason the affections which they naturally stir up in us, we may acquire the power of resisting and conquering these formidable enemies, whenever we are obliged actually to contend with them in real life. Men of quick tempers, and those disordered by melancholy, are peculiarly deficient in self-command; the former, through their mobility; and the latter, through that vehemence and impetuosity which renders them slaves to their fancies, how wild soever they may be.

Chap. 8. He that is properly intemperate, is not given to repentance; because, acting with deliberate election, he remains firm in his perverse purposes. He, on the other hand, who sees the right path, but, through weakness of character, does not pursue it, is liable to repent of his misconduct. His faults therefore are curable^f;

^f Aristotle says, "contrary to what was stated in our doubts;" he doubted how a man who knowingly erred, could ever be cured of his errors. See above, p. 422.

and

and the mental malady under which he labours, **B O O K** resembles rather the epilepsy, which comes by **VII.** fits, than the consumption or dropsy, which are unremitting and continual. His weakness, indeed, is specifically different from vice; for the latter can conceal itself, and even assume the mask of virtue; but the former is always undisguised and open. This infirmity of nature is the less inexcusable in proportion to the strength of passion, and the total absence of reflection; and the persons disgraced by it resemble those who are speedily intoxicated by such a small quantity of wine as would produce no perceptible effects on ordinary constitutions. Yet mere weakness of character is attended with as bad consequences as vice itself; and is chargeable with the reproach which Demodocus made to the Milesians, that though they were not a stupid people, yet they acted stupidly. In like manner, the weak man acts viciously; but does not, like the intemperate man, give a deliberate preference to vice. His mind, therefore, is still open to persuasion, and his life capable of reformation, since his character is not so totally depraved as to make vice his end and aim. In the affairs of life, this end and aim forms a practical principle, which cannot be taught any more than the axioms and postulates of geometry; and the perception of which results entirely from virtue, either natural or acquired. The temperate man pursues right ends, from which he feels no inclination to deviate; the character of the intemperate man is directly the reverse. Between these two, an interme-

BOOK VII.

mediate place is held by him, who is hurried into bad actions by the impetuous strength of passion; but whose mind is not so totally vitiated as to make the gratification of sensual appetites the deliberate object of his pursuit. Persons of this description do bad actions; but as the principle of action itself, which is the main thing, still remains sound, their condition is not hopeless. They are indeed better than those who are intemperate on principle; but still they are the objects of great disapprobation; whereas those who, though liable to be moved by corrupt desires, have yet sufficient strength of mind to restrain and curb them, are held praiseworthy; notwithstanding their characters fall far short of that perfect temperance, with which no improper desire is compatible.

Chap. 9.

Difference between incontinency and intemperance is that between weakness and wickedness.

That firmness of mind called continency, implies a resolute adherence to right opinions in opposition to the seductions of appetite: it is totally different from obstinacy, which often yields to passion, but perversely resists the dictates of reason. Obstinacy bears the same analogy to true firmness, that prodigality bears to liberality; and rashness to courage. It is inseparably connected with self-conceit, ignorance, and clownishness. An obstinate man takes pleasure in resisting conviction; victory, not truth, is his aim; and, as if his opinions were laws, he is mortified and provoked by their rejection or reversal. His character, therefore, so far from implying firmness and self-command, is rather a-kin to incontinency; since he is diverted from propriety of thought and action, by the

the allurements of false pleasure. A man may want steadfastness in his purposes, without being chargeable with incontinency or weakness. Of this we have an example in the character of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. Pleasure made that young hero change his resolution; but an honourable pleasure, the love of truth, after he had been persuaded by Ulysses to consent to be made an accomplice in falsehood; for incontinency and intemperance do not originate in pleasure simply and absolutely, but in that kind of sensual pleasure which is blameable and base. Men, as we have said before, may be diverted from propriety of conduct by being too little, as well as by being too much affected by bodily pleasures. Both extremes are bad; but as the former is observed in few persons, and on few occasions, it is not distinguished by a name; and the praiseworthy habit of continency is contrasted with that blameable disposition which consists in being too strongly affected with the desire of sensual gratifications. Temperance and self-command are in common discourse often confounded, from the resemblance which they bear to each other; but the man deserving the praise of true temperance is above self-command, because his character is such, that he could not derive any enjoyment from base or blameable pleasures. The man endowed with continency or self-command, resists, indeed, and overcomes such pleasures; but still to him they seem to be pleasures, and he occasionally feels an inclination to enjoy them. In like manner,

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B O O K intemperance and incontinency are often con-
VII. founded, for both lead to the same voluptuous
 kind of life; but the former prefers pleasure
 on principle; the latter pursues it against prin-
 ciple.

Chap. 10.

Additional
 proofs
 thereof.

Men deficient in self-command may have cleverness, but cannot have prudence; which latter is a practical principle, implying not only that we know, but that we do, what is right. In reference to the understanding, wit or cleverness are nearly the same with prudence; but in reference to the will they are very different from it, because prudence always implies a rectitude of moral election; it is therefore absolutely incompatible with the dominion of vicious passions. How such passions should be indulged knowingly, has been explained by shewing that the knowledge of those who indulge in them, is confined to mere speculations which are not applied; that it is knowledge not roused to energy, but lying in a sluggish state of mere capacity, like the knowledge of persons asleep or intoxicated. The incontinent man is only wicked by halves, because he is not wicked on principle; as he acts without design, he is not chargeable with injustice. He either does not deliberate at all; or if he deliberates, is like a state which has good laws, but does not obey them; as Anaxandrides reproached the Athenians,

“ The state consults how to make void the law.”

The real profligate, on the other hand, obeys laws, and those bad ones. A man is praised for his

his self-command, when he excels most others in this habit; he is blamed for incontinency, when he yields to temptations, to which most men are superior. The incontinency of those who deliberate rightly, but have not firmness to persist in their resolutions, is more curable than that originating in melancholy; which, through its quickness and vehemence, impels those affected by it to act without deliberation: and an incontinency depending on custom, is more curable than that which springs from nature. For custom is more moveable than nature; since the difficulty of changing the former depends on its resemblance to the latter.—As the poet Euenus says,

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“ Habits by long continued care imprest,
Are strong as nature in the human breast.”

Let this much suffice for a description of the habits of continency and firmness on the one hand; of incontinency and softness on the other; and on the relations which those habits bear to each other.^c

^c The four chapters which follow in the original of this work, are mere transcripts from the Sixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus; they treat of pleasure; a subject more fully and more philosophically explained in the Tenth Book of the Ethics to Nicomachus; of which the reader will find the translation in its proper place.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VIII.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS VIII. AND IX.

BOOK
VIII. **I**N these Books Aristotle treats of friendship, a subject, he observes, intimately connected with morals; "since friendship, if not specifically a virtue, at least shines most conspicuously in the virtuous." He explains the nature of friendship, and resolves the doubts concerning it. He divides it into different kinds, according to the principles in which it originates; and shows how the best kind of friendship may be acquired, maintained, and uninterruptedly enjoyed. Friendships differ, not only according to the sources from which they spring, but according to the condition of the persons by whom they are cultivated. Our author examines the friendships between equals, and the friendships of inferiors with the great; he explains the relations which friendship bears to justice, and how both are modified by political institutions. The rules of friendship are not precise like those of justice,

justice, because the subject to which they apply is highly indefinite; scarcely any two cases being exactly alike. The author explains what is meant by loving our friends as ourselves, and wherein true self-love consists, in opposition to blameable selfishness. He expatiates on the exquisite delight of virtuous friendship, like a man who (as appears from the history of his life) had warmly felt its charms. The whole treatise, indeed, comprised in the following two Books, is distinguished by just sentiment as much as by solid argument; it is equally full and perspicuous, rejecting paradox, disdaining declamation, and shewing, by an illustrious example, how an important moral subject may be unfolded with scientific accuracy, and impressed with practical energy.

BOOK
VIII.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Utility and beauty of friendship.—Qualities by which it is generated.—Three kinds of friendship.—These kinds compared.—Characters most susceptible of friendship.—Unequal friendships.—Their limits.—Friendships founded on propinquity.

BOOK
VIII.

Chap. I.

Utility and
beauty of
friendship.

WE proceed next to treat of friendship, which is either a particular virtue, or which at least shines most conspicuously in the virtuous. It is also most essential to the enjoyment of life, for without friends no one would choose to live, though possessed of all other advantages*. The rich and powerful stand most in need of friends, without whom their prosperity could neither be preserved nor enjoyed; for wherein consists the pre-eminence of power and wealth, but in the pleasures of beneficence,

* Si quis in cœlum adscendisset, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem, &c. "To ascend to heaven, and behold the nature of the universe and the beauty of the stars, would afford an admiration barren of delight, unless we had some one with whom we might talk of those wonders." Cicero de Amicitia, c. 23. Cicero's Treatise on Friendship abounds with sparkling passages: he has often expanded and embellished Aristotle's remarks; but, considered as a philosophical work, it neither shews that deep insight into human nature, nor takes that comprehensive view of the subject, which form the principal merit of the Greek original.

which

which is most laudably exercised towards friends? And how could this precarious pre-eminence be maintained without the steady assistance of friendly adherents? In poverty and other distresses, friendship seems our best, or rather our sole, refuge. It is necessary in youth as the preservative against irreparable errors; it is necessary in old age, as the consolation amidst unavoidable infirmities; it is necessary in the vigour of manhood, as the best auxiliary in the execution of illustrious enterprises, both sharpening our thoughts and animating our exertions.

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VIII.

“ By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done and great discoveries made:
The wise new prudence from the wise acquire,
And one brave hero fans another's fire.”^b

Friendship is implanted by nature in parents towards their children, as appears manifestly, not only in the human race, but in the various tribes of birds, and in most animals; it prevails also among those of the same class or family, but chiefly among men; whence philanthropy is so often the just subject of praise. During long and dreary journeys, the traveller, in every human countenance, beholds the face of a friend; such congenial sympathy subsists among the human race! Friendship holds mankind together in communities and cities; and law-givers study more earnestly how to promote friendship than how to maintain even justice

^b *Iliad*, X. v. 265, & seq.

itself;

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VIII.

Doubts
concerning
the nature
of friend-
ship.

itself; for concord, which is a-kin to friendship, is the perpetual aim of all wise legislation, which unceasingly strives to extirpate the seeds of dissension and sedition, as of all things the most hostile to its views. When concord ripens into friendship, the rules of justice are superfluous, but justice without friendship is insufficient for happiness; and the most perfect and most comprehensive justice is that which most resembles friendship in its operations and effects. Friendship unites beauty with utility, it is not only necessary but ornamental; we praise it as a virtue; we desire it as adding lustre to our characters; and to be a good friend seems to many synonymous with being a good man. Yet various doubts may be started concerning the nature of friendship. Some think that it results from similarity of character and pursuits, and cite the vulgar proverb, "that fowls of a feather flock together." Others maintain that this similarity more naturally begets emulation and hatred; quoting from Hesiod,

"Potters hate potters; bards quarrel with bards."

They seek the principles of friendship in the high philosophy of nature, saying either with Euripides,

"The parched earth longs for refreshing showers;
The skies, heavy with rain, seek to unload
Their weight of waters on the solid earth."

or with Heraclitus, "that each nature requires and seeks its counterpart:" thus the best harmony results from differences, and thus all things

things proceed from contrary elements. Other philosophers, particularly Empedocles, assert directly the reverse, "that like draws to like." The consideration of these physical difficulties we at present omit, because they are beside the purpose of this discourse, which is confined to the examination of such questions only as have a reference to life and manners; as whether friendship can subsist among all sorts of persons, or only among the virtuous; whether there are various kinds of friendship specifically different; for those who think there is but one kind, because friendship admits of different degrees of warmth and intensity, trust to a fallacious proof, since other general terms as well as friendship comprehend divisions of things specifically different from each other, and yet partaking more or less, in a stronger or weaker degree, of the characteristic quality which the general term denotes. But of this subject we have formerly treated.*

To illustrate the nature of friendship, we must examine what are the qualities by which it is excited or produced. Whatever is an object of our friendship, must promote either our good, our pleasure, or our utility; and as utility is desirable merely as the cause of what is either good or pleasant, the causes of friendship ultimately resolve themselves into goodness and pleasure; considered, not absolutely in themselves, but in reference to the person in whom the friendship

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Chap. 3.

The proper
objects of
friendship,
or the
qualities by
which it is
produced.

* See Analysis, p. 72, & seq.

is

B O O K is generated; whether that person has just
 VIII. notions of what is good and pleasant, or takes
 those for *real* goods, which are only *apparent*.
 The qualities by which friendship is excited are
 not, when abstractedly considered, able to pro-
 duce this amiable disposition; for that which is
 an object of friendship is loved on its own ac-
 count; and it is necessary that between friends
 there should subsist a reciprocity of affection.
 Things inanimate therefore cannot be the object
 of friendship. A drunkard indeed loves wine;
 but it would be ridiculous to say that he desires
 its good, although he indeed wishes for its safety,
 that he himself may drink it. Mere good-will
 may subsist on one side, without meeting a re-
 turn; and persons who have not any opportunity
 of being acquainted, may mutually bear to each
 other much good-will; but friendship not only
 implies a reciprocity of affection, but requires
 that this reciprocity should be known to both
 parties.

Chap. 3.

Three
 kinds of
 friendship.

Friendship may be distinguished into three
 kinds, according to the three qualities by which
 it is produced; and in each of the three there
 must be a known reciprocity of affection de-
 pending on the cause in which the friendship
 originates. When this cause is utility, men
 love each other as long as mutual advantage re-
 sults from their friendship: a similar observation
 is applicable, when their affection is founded on
 pleasure. Neither the utility nor the pleasure
 which any man affords, constitute an essential
 and unalterable part of his character; and when,
 on

on account of those circumstances, he himself becomes an object of friendship, he is so, merely by way of accession or appendage to qualities not inseparably connected with him, and which being actually removed, he himself ceases to be an object of friendship. Friendships founded on utility prevail most among persons advanced in years; for interest, not pleasure, is their aim. Manhood, and even youth, often imitate too faithfully the selfish manners of age; choosing their friends according to views of interest. Persons of this character delight but little in each other's society. Even their convivial hospitality has personal advantage for its object. Youthful friendships, however, for the most part, are founded on pleasure; for youth is the age of passion, which pursues and prefers present and immediate gratification. But as our pleasures change with our years, youthful friendships are as easily dissolved as they were speedily contracted. Besides, youth is much addicted to love, which is full of mutability, its principal ingredients being pleasure and passion, so that it varies many times in a day. Youthful attachments, while they last, produce close and habitual intimacy, because such friendships have no other foundation than the delight resulting from mutual intercourse. The only perfect friendship subsists among those who resemble each other in virtue, because those who love their friends for their virtue, love them for what is not a temporary appendage, but a permanent essential in their characters. The worth of a

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virtuous friend is not relative to circumstances, but universal and absolute, comprehending both pleasure and utility, and uniting all those qualities which either produce friendship or render it unalterable; but his inestimable value cannot be fairly appreciated, except by those who resemble him in moral or intellectual excellence; for men delight chiefly in those qualities which are congenial to their own. Such friendships are rare, because virtuous men are rare; and even *they* cannot perfectly know each other, until, according to the proverb, they have consumed many bushels of salt together. Time and familiarity are requisite for proving mutual affection, and for creating that steady confidence which cements friendship. Friendly acts produce rather an inclination to friendship than the thing itself, which must be the effect of time and habit operating on excellencies reciprocally exerted, and mutually experienced, in those who are respectively conscious of being the objects of love and affection the one to the other.

Chap. 4.

The different kinds of friendship compared with respect to their durability.

Friendships founded on utility and on pleasure bear a resemblance to that founded on virtue; for virtuous men afford both pleasure and utility to their friends. But friendships of the former kind are the more durable in proportion as they originate on both sides in nearly the same principle, that is, in nearly the same kind of pleasure or utility. Thus, they naturally last long between men recommended to each other by their companionable qualities, their wit and pleasantry; they are less durable among lovers, when, as for

the most part happens, the love on the one side arises from an admiration of beauty, and on the other from the attentions bestowed by the lover. When beauty is impaired by years, the admiration ceases, the attentions are withheld, and the friendship founded on this kind of love is often at an end; but many times also it lasts, when cemented by congenial manners, strengthened and confirmed by long habits of familiar intercourse. Friendships founded on the love of gain are of all the most unstable; for persons governed by this principle are not friends to each other, but both to their respective interests. All persons promiscuously, the good, the bad, and those of an intermediate character, may feel towards each other that kind of friendship which originates in pleasure or utility; but good men only can be the objects of friendship properly so called, independent of circumstances, and resulting from what is most essential and most unalterable in the character itself. The friendships of the virtuous are not to be destroyed by fortune, nor shaken by calumny. What accident or event can change or disturb confirmed habits of virtue? What calumny can prevail against known and approved worth? The friendship formed from interest, therefore, like alliances between states, and those formed from pleasure, like the friendships of our boyish years, are called friendships only by way of similitude or metaphor; and those metaphorical friendships resemble other metaphors in this, that they do not naturally mingle, or easily blend and unite; for how seldom

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Chap. 5.

The characters
most susceptible of
friendship.

feldom do we see the same persons friends to each other on the combined principles of profit and of pleasure? Such then are the different kinds of friendship. That formed by the virtuous, alone deserves the name, the others are so called merely by a figure of speech.

Men procure the denomination of friendly as they do that of virtuous, either from their actions or from their habits. Friendly actions can take place only among those who are members of the same society; but the habit of friendship may subsist among persons widely separated from each other, though when their separation continues long, their friendship is apt to languish; whence it is said,

“ Long absence often is the bane of friendship.”

Old persons, and those of austere characters, are, from this principle, but little disposed to friendship; because in them both the love of pleasure, and the power of communicating it, is commonly so much weakened, that they have not any great inducement to keep company with each other; for as pleasure is the great aim of nature, the society of those who are capable neither of affording nor relishing it, cannot possibly be desired; and if they occasion real and positive uneasiness, will not long be endured. Those who, without delighting in each other's society, are however respectively the objects of mutual approbation, may have great good-will towards each other with very little friendship; for nothing is so productive of friendship as the habitual

habitual intercourse of life. The wretched seek succour in society, but the happy seek society for itself, and can least of all men bear solitude; but the love of society itself is founded on the pleasure afforded by those with whom we live; which pleasure implies that their characters be agreeable, and much of the same stamp with our own. Friendship, therefore, as has been often said, prevails chiefly among the virtuous, to whom only that is good and pleasant, which is good and pleasant absolutely and essentially, independently of any circumstances that may concur, or of any consequences that may follow; and to whom the mutual enjoyment of their correspondent excellencies is of all things the most delightful.

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Aged persons and those of austere characters are unfit for friendship in proportion to their austerity, and to their aversion to society. Young people, therefore, sooner form friendships than the old and austere; who, though they may often bear great good-will to each other, and shew much readiness in mutually conferring the most essential services, are yet slow and cold in sentimental attachment, because they are averse to that social intercourse in which chiefly it originates. Friendship, in its highest perfection, cannot extend to many; and for a similar reason that it is impossible for us to feel the passion of love for many persons at once. There is an intensity in friendship as well as in love, which naturally confines it to one object. Men have different tastes, each of which has

Chap. 6.

Friendship
cannot at
once com-
prehend
many ob-
jects.

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something in it too peculiar to be alike pleased with many; and it is right that it should be so. Friendship, besides, requires long and intimate knowledge, which is not easily obtained of many characters by one person, who cannot live in equal and close familiarity with them all. Friendships of interest or pleasure are indeed speedily contracted, because their offices may be speedily performed, and many are able to fulfil them. Of the two, those of pleasure most resemble true friendship, especially when the pleasure is mutual, and resulting from the same objects and pursuits. Such are the friendships of youth, which are of a warmer and more liberal kind than those formed among money-getting men on the cold principle of interest. Men prosperous in their circumstances prefer pleasure to utility; they choose the society of agreeable friends, since worth itself, joined with harshness and austerity, soon becomes offensive and irksome; but if they loved and preferred, as right reason would direct, agreeable qualities only when ennobled by virtue, they would find in their friends all advantages united. Men invested with power have two distinct classes of friends; the one chosen from taste, the other from interest. The friends calculated to please, are not qualified to benefit them; for as they seek pleasure distinct from virtue, and pursue interest distinct from honour, merry buffoons are best qualified for the first purpose, and dextrous knaves best adapted to the second; the man of virtue alone answering the double end of pleasure

The great
have two
distinct
classes of
friends.

fure and utility. But a virtuous man cannot live in friendship with the great, unless *they* be as much disposed to respect his superiority of virtue, as he is disposed to honour their superiority of fortune, because the law of equality, which is the soul of friendship, would otherwise be violated; and as men in power are generally too much intoxicated with their prosperity^c to make this just sacrifice, they seldom enjoy the inestimable benefit of virtuous friendship. Such then are those kinds of friendship in which men interchange either pleasures or utilities on both sides, or exchange pleasure on the one side for utility on the other. They resemble true friendship in this, that they are productive of pleasure or profit; but they differ from it in many other respects, and particularly in being easily shaken by calumny, and easily subverted by a change in the external circumstances of those between whom they prevailed.

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Friendship, strictly so called, requires, as we observed, equality; but there is also a species of friendship which subsists between persons of extremely unequal conditions; namely, that, between fathers (or those who hold the place of fathers) and children; husbands and wives; rulers and those subject to their authority. This species of friendship admits of many subdivisions: the friendship of a father towards his son differs

Chap. 7.

Unequal
 friend-
 ships: their
 limits.

^c Non enim solum ipsa fortuna cæca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa est. "Fortune is not only herself blind, but she, for the most part, renders those also blind whom she embraces." Cicero de Amicitia, c. xv.

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from that of a husband towards his wife, and that of a king towards his people; it differs also from that of a son towards his father; for the parties standing in this and other relations, have each of them their respective offices and their respective duties; the habitual performance of which can alone give stability to their friendship. When the pre-eminence is greatly on one side, whether in the power of bestowing profit or pleasure, the friendship ought to be greater on the other, in nearly the same proportion, that the rules of equal justice may thus be maintained. But equality in point of justice consists primarily in this, that each man should have his due: that the shares should be nearly equal in quantity, is only a consequence that sometimes follows from this rule; for when the persons are equal in worth, then only their shares should be equal in value. But in point of friendship, equality in quantity or worth is a primary consideration; for between persons extremely unequal as to virtue, power, wealth, and other causes productive of distinction, friendship cannot easily subsist. The gods are the great benefactors of mankind, but they are far too exalted for our friendship. Kings do not choose their friends among the lowest classes of their people: nor do men eminently distinguished by virtue and wisdom, associate with persons of no consideration or merit. It is impossible accurately to ascertain the precise limits beyond which the elevation of the one party becomes too great to admit of friendship with his inferior. The

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friend-

friendship may still subsist, after many advantages are taken from the one and accumulated on the other. But with the exaltation of the latter to divinity, the relation of friendship would unquestionably cease^d; wherefore it is doubted whether a man can wish for the deification of his friend, since this would be to wish for the destruction of their friendship. Perhaps he does not even wish for him all human advantages; for a man desires that every good thing may happen to his friend, provided only what is a good to his friend be not an evil to himself; and it would be a great evil to himself to lose a good friend.

Most people, through vanity, wish rather to be beloved than to love. They are therefore fond of flatterers; who are, or rather pretend to be, a kind of unequal friends, that love more than they are loved. Love is near akin to honour, which most men desire, not indeed for its own sake, but for the advantages which accrue from it. They delight in marks of distinction from the great, which they regard as pledges of future and more solid bounties. Those who are ambitious of honour from persons well acquainted with them, and noted for discernment and equity, wish thereby to confirm their good opinion of themselves. They delight in thinking favourably of their own characters, in consequence of this impartial verdict in their favour; and the pleasure which they take in being the

Chap. 8.

The ordinary foundations of unequal friendships.

^d Does this bear any reference to the friendship between Aristotle and his pupil Alexander?

objects

B O O K objects of love and approbation, is the cause for
VIII. which they desire external marks of honour and respect. To be loved, therefore, is better than to be honoured; and friendship is, still more than honour, ultimately desirable. The former however consists more in loving than in being loved; in proof of which we may allege the behaviour of mothers who give out their children to nurse, pleased with loving them and knowing that they are well, without expecting or desiring any return of affection. To love one's friends is a common topic of praise; and the *virtue* of friendship depends on the strength and propriety of our affection, which can alone render it permanent, levelling all those inequalities, and removing all those obstacles which might interrupt its duration. Such is the friendship of virtuous men, who, being stable in themselves, remain stable in their relations to each other; neither requiring nor admitting any association with the worthless. These last are inconstant in all their ways, maintaining no stability in their relations to each other, since none of them acts uniformly or consistently, nor remains long like unto himself. Their friendship is but a league in villainy, which for the most part ends when it ceases to be profitable: when pleasure conspires with profit, it is naturally more durable. The friendships resulting from contraries resolve themselves into the principle of utility; as those between the poor and rich, the learned and ignorant; for a man is always ready to give something in exchange for that of which he stands in need.

In

In the same class we may place, without much violence, the handsome and the ugly, the lover and the object of his affection. Wherefore some lovers justly incur ridicule when they expect to meet with a return of love similar to their own. Were their persons calculated to inspire a mutual passion, their expectation would be reasonable; but being totally the reverse, their pretensions are ridiculous. Perhaps contraries do not primarily affect each other, but both of them are fond of that intermediate condition which is preferable to either. Thus what is dry loves moisture, only that it may attain an intermediate state; and that which is warm, affects cold, only that it may be reduced to a due temperature*. But such questions may be omitted, as beside the purpose of the present discourse.

Justice and friendship, as we already observed, seem to belong to the same persons, and to be conversant about the same objects. They are both found in every partnership or community, even among those who sail in the same vessel, and those who fight under the same standard; and in proportion to the closeness of the partnership or community, the more closely and intimately is the friendship cemented. The proverb says rightly, "that all things are common among friends;" for friendship results from the community of goods, advantages, and pleasures; it is most perfect among brothers and companions; and in the same proportion as the ties of the

Chap. 9.

Of the relation which friendship bears to justice.

* See Analysis, p. 127, & seq.

partner-

BOOK partnership or connection are loosened, and
VIII. fewer things are common, the friendship becomes less intimate, and even the rules of justice seem less binding. It is a more heinous crime to rob our friends than our fellow-citizens, and our fellow-citizens than strangers. Not to succour a brother in distress, is more odious than to refuse similar assistance to a stranger; and to strike a father is the most enormous of crimes. Friendship and justice thus march hand in hand, and the vigour of the one is followed by equal intensity in the other. But all other connexions and partnerships are but parts of the great partnerships of political society, which utility first collected and still holds together. Public utility therefore is that chief and ultimate aim of which wise legislators never lose sight. To promote particular branches of this utility, all inferior associations are formed; fleets sail, armies march; their aim is wealth or victory; to invade, conquer, and plunder; to subdue provinces and storm cities. Even the peaceful communities of tribes and wards, and those mirthful assemblies which meet to feast, to drink, and to dance, depend on the same principle; for legislators have not merely present and temporary advantage in view; they look farther, to the permanent comfort and sure enjoyment of life, and therefore establish solemnities during which human industry may repose from past labours, and prepare for future exertions, by which the gods are honoured, and the heart of man is gladdened. The ancient
solem-

solemnities of this kind were held towards the end of autumn, the season of greatest leisure, when men having gathered in the earth's productions, might offer the first fruits to the gods. Political society, then, comprehends all other partnerships or associations; from the varieties of which the different kinds of friendship result.

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There are three just models of government, each of which is liable to deviate into a corrupt form, bearing only a counterfeit resemblance to it. The just forms are royalty, aristocracy, and what may be called timocracy, because all men enjoying a certain income are entitled to a share in the government. This last, most writers distinguish by the general name of polity, or a republic. It is the worst of all legal governments, as royalty is the best. Tyranny is the corrupt resemblance of royalty, for both forms are monarchical; but they differ most widely, a tyrant consulting only his own advantage, a king only that of his people; for the latter does not deserve the name, if he be not in all things pre-eminent, independent, and all-sufficient in himself; so that with him personal considerations being superfluous, he can have no other reasonable pursuit but that of the public good. If kings are not of this description, they might as well be chosen by lot. Tyrants, on the other hand, pursue only their own interest, and their government is the worst of all, since it stands in direct opposition to royalty, which is of all the best. As kings may be corrupted into tyrants,

so

Chap. 10.

Of the
different
forms of
government.

BOOK **VIII.** so aristocracies degenerate into oligarchies, through the corruption of the magistrates, who make an unjust distribution of honours and emoluments, of which they usurp and retain the greater part for themselves, accumulating enormous wealth as the instrument of exorbitant power, and continually narrowing, through selfishness, the basis of the government. Timocracy naturally degenerates into democracy, which is nearly akin to it; since whenever men of limited fortunes are entitled to share the government, power will have a natural tendency to fall into the hands of the people. Democracy therefore is a less deviation from what is called a republic, than tyranny is from royalty, or oligarchy from aristocracy; and in this particular circumstance, it is less depraved and odious than the other two vicious forms of government. Of political revolutions, we find the resemblances and, as it were, the patterns in what passes in families. The paternal authority is the model for that of kings, for children are their fathers' dearest concern. Whence Homer addresses Jupiter by the appellation of father, denoting the near affinity between royal and paternal power. But in Persia fathers are tyrants, treating their sons as slaves; and slaves are treated merely as best suits the interest of their masters. This may be agreeable to the nature and principles of servitude: but the Persian system, in extending these principles to children, is vicious in the extreme; for different descriptions of persons require different modes of governance.

vernance. Domestic authority is the best model for aristocracy, being the authority of a husband founded on the superiority of his abilities and his virtues. He exercises those functions which this superiority enables him best to perform, leaving to female care those offices which women are best qualified to fulfil; since if he usurped all management to himself, his equitable aristocracy would degenerate into an unlawful and rigid oligarchy. When women, being rich heiresses, acquire thereby more than their due share of power, their authority also originates in an unjust oligarchical principle, since, in their preposterous pre-eminence, wealth is preferred to worth: the gifts of fortune, to the distinctions of nature. Timocracy resembles the equal commonwealth of brothers, among whom there is no other distinction than that made by a slight difference of age; for when this difference is very great, brotherly friendship cannot easily subsist. Democracy resembles those families which are without a head; or in which all avail themselves of the master's weakness, to assert equality, and to defy controul.

Friendship, as well as justice, varies with the different forms of polity; since both ultimately depend on the different relations in which men stand to each other in society. The relation of a king to his subjects, is that of a benefactor to those benefited by his care. He provides for the welfare of his people, as a shepherd does for that of his flock: whence Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people. Of a similar

Chap. II.

Of the variations thereby occasioned in the nature and intensity of friendship.

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similar kind is the relation of a father to his children, but pre-eminent in the magnitude of benefits, since he is the cause of their existence itself, which seems of the utmost moment, as well as of their education and nurture. A father is naturally a king in his own family; and the same holds with regard to more remote ancestors and their descendants, the former of whom are entitled to honour from the latter, and therefore the friendship between them is not that of equals, but is modified by the natural and indelible superiority on the side of the aged. The relation of husband to wife is similar to that which prevails in aristocracies between the magistrates and citizens. The honours and advantages belonging to the former, result from the superiority of their abilities and virtues. The husband's honour is pre-eminent, not absolute; he has his duties as well as his rights; both parties have their allotted functions, namely, those which are best adapted to their respective characters. The relation of brothers is that of equal companions, resulting from the near similitude of their strength and stature, their common education, and similar manners. They resemble a republic, strictly so called, in which the citizens are treated justly, when they are all treated alike; and as they cannot all rule at once, the government is managed by rotation. Their justice consists in equality, and their friendship is that of equals. In corrupt governments there is little justice, and therefore but little friendship. Tyranny, which

which is the greatest corruption of all, scarcely admits of any friendship at all. Since there is nothing common between the sovereign and subject, there is not any room for justice, nor therefore for friendship. The relation of a tyrant to his subjects is that of an artist to an instrument, of the soul to the body, of a master to a slave. The interest and safety of all these subservient things are consulted by those who make use of them; but there cannot be any friendship nor any justice between living and inanimate objects, because they cannot enjoy any thing in common. Neither can men have friendships with horses, cattle, or slaves, considered merely as such; for a slave is a living instrument, and an instrument a lifeless slave. Yet considered as a man, a slave may be an object of friendship; for certain rights seem to belong to all those capable of participating in law and engagement. A slave then, considered as a man, may be treated justly or unjustly, and therefore may be a friend or an enemy. There is little friendship and little justice in tyrannies; but most of both in republics, because, among equals there are most common rights, and most common enjoyments.

Friendship, then, results from the community of rights and enjoyments among persons living in the same commonwealth, belonging to the same tribe or district, sailing in the same vessel; in which, and all similar cases, the parties seem mutually engaged to each other to maintain and uphold their reciprocal advantages. The friend-

Chap. 12.

Of friendships
founded on
propinquity of
blood.

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H H

ship

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ship arising from hospitality is of the same nature; but that depending on propinquity in blood, or congeniality of character, may perhaps be referred to a different principle. Friendships between relations, though they branch out into many kinds, may be all traced to one source, namely, the affection between parents and children. Parents love their children as parts of themselves, and children love their parents as the source from which they spring. The love of the former is the strongest, because they better know their children for their own, than the children can know them for their parents; because the production more belongs to its author, than the author to his work; and because parents know and love their children for a longer time; that is, immediately from their birth; whereas children cannot begin to love their parents till they become capable of perception and intelligence. The love of parents for their children is merely an expansion of self-love, for they still regard their children as parts of themselves; but children have, in their own minds, a separate and independent personality, distinct from that of their parents, which they are inclined, however, to revere as the fountain of their blood. From the common relationship of brothers to the same father, they become mutually related to each other; wherefore they are said to come from the same blood, which flows in different streams, or from the same stock, which spreads into different branches. Their friend-

friendship is confirmed by nearness of age, sameness of education, and similarity of pursuits. BOOK
VIII. They are companions as well as brothers, and therefore warmed with all that affection for each other, which comfort and society is calculated to inspire. The connexion between other relations originates in the same principle, and is more or less intimate in proportion to their proximity to the common source. Children should love their parents as men do the gods, since they are to them the authors of the greatest benefits; their life, nurture, and education; and the friendship between them, from their continual intercourse of life, contains far more than any other, whatever is sweetest and most salutary. Brothers, we have said, are companions, whose fellowship will be the more intimate, in proportion to the similarity of their virtuous characters and honourable pursuits, and to the confirmation which the affection of their early years derives from confidence approved by time and experience. The friendship between more distant kinsmen depends on the same circumstances, according to which it will either invigorate or decay. That between husband and wife is most strongly prompted and enforced by nature itself; for domestic society is more natural than even the political; since it is prior and more necessary, being essential to the preservation of the species, and common to all kinds of animals. But with the inferior tribes, this society is limited by the sole end of re-production; in man it extends to all the offices of life,

Between
husband
and wife.

BOOK which naturally divide themselves between husband and wife, each supplying what their respective qualities best enable them to furnish for the accommodation and comfort of the other. The industry and excellencies of each are thus brought into the common stock of domestic happiness, which their distinctive virtues are calculated wonderfully to augment, so that this kind of friendship is recommended and strengthened by every circumstance of pleasure as well as of utility. Their children too form a new and powerful tie, being a common good, in which they mutually share; and which has the strongest effect in binding them indissolubly together. The varieties of friendship thus depend on the various kinds of justice, which themselves result from the multiplied relations of men in civil society. For very different rights and very different duties have place between friends, strictly so called, and those who are partners in the same concern, companions in the same studies, or who are mere strangers the one to the other.

Chap. 13.

Disputes
between
friends,
how they
ought to be
adjusted.

There are then three kinds of friendship, each of which depends on a different principle, and in each of which the friendship may subsist either between equals, or between persons extremely unequal, not only as to their respective worth and dignity, but as to the relative importance of their friendship to each other. When the friendship subsists between equals, equal attentions and an equal degree of affection ought, as much as possible, to be aimed at; but when the

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the pre-eminence is greatly on one side, the affection and attentions of the inferior ought to rise in the same proportion. The friendship founded on utility is that which is by far the most likely to produce between the parties mutual altercation, and often mutual reproach. When the connecting principle is virtue, friends are eager to benefit each other; the only rivalry between them is, who shall do to the other most good, and he who gains the victory in this amicable contest, is so far from creating ill-will in his friend, that he only provokes him to new works of kindness. Nor are mutual accusations frequent, where the sole end of the friendship is pleasure. While this purpose is attained, the parties keep company with each other; and when it is not, a mutual separation is so easy, that complaint would be ridiculous. But when utility is the principle, refusals on one side must be as frequent as exactions on the other, and both parties will think themselves ill-treated, because each expects more than his due. As law is either written or unwritten, so friendship founded on utility is either legal or moral; the first is where exact returns are specified, as if you give to me that, I will give to you this; or where the agreement is more liberal than merely from hand to hand, and allowing a space of time to be interposed before the service performed on the one side is requited by an equal service on the other. When friendly confidence is reposed by one party in the other, an action at law is not granted by some nations, for the fulfilling even

BOOK of conditions, the reality of which admits not of
VIII. any uncertainty; for to them it seems equitable, that he who has imprudently trusted to the good faith of another, should not be entitled to correct by law the error of his own credulity. The moral friendship founded on utility takes place, where something is given or some service is rendered, without the specification of any thing, or of any service to be given or done in return. Yet, by the party who has conferred the benefit, an equal, or even more than equal return is on many occasions expected; and when this is not made, he complains of ill-treatment. His complaint is occasioned by what occasions almost all other complaints of breach of friendship, his unsteadiness of principle, giving liberally, but craving like a niggard: affecting the praise of generosity in the first part of the transaction, but shewing in the last that he is guided merely by interest; for most men, though they love what is honourable, prefer what is useful. It is honourable to do good without expecting a return; it is useful to have every good action repaid with interest. Yet those who have received favours ought to requite them according to their ability, when such requital is desired by their benefactors, for no man's friendship can be obtained against his will; so that when we have met with an act of generous friendship, from one who afterwards appears not to entertain for us any friendly disposition, we ought doubtless, when able, to make a suitable return; when this return is not in our power, even the

interested benefactor himself would not be so unreasonable as either to require or expect it. BOOK
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When favours are conferred, we must consider, therefore, both the man and his motives, in order to determine whether they ought to be returned, and in what manner the return should be made. It is sometimes a matter of doubt by what standard this return should be measured, whether by the benefactor's good will, or by the advantage therefrom resulting to the person benefited. The latter is often inclined to extenuate his obligations, and to think the favours he has received both slight in themselves, and such as many others would have been ready to bestow on him. The benefactor, on the other hand, represents them as the greatest favours that could possibly have been done, such as none other would have conferred, and enhanced too by being bestowed in a moment of danger, or some other exigency. Since utility is the sole basis of such friendships, and of the actions proceeding from them, ought not the advantage accruing to the person obliged to be regarded as the just standard of the obligation incurred, and of the return to be made? For *his* exigency required relief; a relief afforded to him in expectation of an equal return; and the assistance bestowed on the one hand is exactly measured by the benefit received on the other. His return therefore ought to be equal to this benefit, or greater, which will make his conduct laudable and honourable. In virtuous friendships there is not any room for such complaints.

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VIII.



Chap. 14.

The same
subject
continued.

In them intentions, not consequences, form the standard of obligation; for, as we have often observed, the deliberate election of the will is the principle by which all questions concerning virtue and morals must be determined.

Unequal friendships are extremely productive of altercations and differences, each party desiring to have more than his due, which has a tendency to disturb, and finally dissolve concord. He who is pre-eminent in virtue and ability, claims a proportional share of regard and affection; thinking that men should always be considered suitably to their characters. In the same manner, he who is most useful, expects to be loved and regarded in proportion to his utility; saying, that friendship would be a burden if it were not returned on the one side proportionally to the benefits conferred on the other. They think that the same rule is applicable to friendship which holds in a partnership in trade, where he who employs most stock also receives most profit. The needy man holds a very different language, saying, that it is the duty of a friend to assist his friend in distress; and asking what benefit could otherwise result from the so much envied friendship of the good and great. Both parties are partly in the right, since both ought to have the advantage; the good and great in point of honour, the inferior and indigent in point of gain; for honour is the meed of beneficent virtue, and gain is the cure of distressing poverty. This rule obtains in states. Those who benefit the public, are honoured by the public,

public, for honour is a public reward ; but to expect from the public both great honours and great gains, is highly unreasonable ; since the public would thereby submit to an inferiority of advantage in both points at once ; a disgraceful inferiority which every individual would spurn. For reciprocal and proportional favours equalise and preserve friendship, the good and great benefiting their friends as to their characters or their fortunes, the needy inferior giving in return the only thing he can give, honour, and even of this not always a full proportion ; since it is impossible sufficiently to honour the gods and our parents : but those are commended who do it to the best of their power ; for the returns of friendship must be limited by possibility. Wherefore it is not allowable for a son to renounce his father, though the latter may renounce the former. For the son has to pay obligations, which are too great for him ever to discharge ; he must always therefore remain a debtor. But the father, on the other hand, to whom the debt is due, may discard and abandon a worthless son, though he will seldom do it, but for excess of wickedness ; since both paternal affection and natural humanity strongly oppose so cruel a measure.*

* The subject of this and the following Book is less fully treated in the seven last chapters of the second book of the *Magna Moralia* ; and in the thirteen first chapters of the seventh book of the *Ethics* to Eudemus.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK IX.

ARGUMENT.

Friendship does not admit of precise rules.—Dissolution of friendship, when justifiable.—Analogy between our duties to ourselves, and those to our friends.—Happiness of virtue.—Wretchedness of vice.—Good-will.—Concord.—Exquisite delight of virtuous friendship.

BOOK IX.

Chap. I.

According to what rules the returns of friendship may be best estimated.

WHERE friends possess qualities totally dissimilar, and extremely different in value, their friendship, as we have said, must be equalised and maintained by a due observance of those rules of proportion which obtain in the commercial intercourse of society; where the shoemaker and weaver, and other artizans, exchange the productions of their several manufactures according to their respective values. That this might be done conveniently, the use of money was established, which served as a common measure, with which all other things were compared, and by which their relative worth was estimated. Lovers often accuse the objects of their affection, that they do not meet their warmth of love with equal

equal ardour, when perhaps there is nothing in themselves that is at all lovely. The persons beloved, on the other hand, often accuse their admirers, that they once made to them the most magnificent promises, but now totally deceive them. The origin of these complaints is, that the friendship of the one party is founded on pleasure; that of the other on utility: on delight which the one has no longer the power to afford, and benefit which the other has no longer the will to confer; so that as the causes of such friendships are variable and inconstant, the friendships themselves must be destitute of stability; which is the case with all others, except those subsisting between virtuous men in consequence of their congeniality of characters. Those who are friends through interest, are likely to disagree, when either of them ceases to meet with a return, or when the return is not such as might reasonably have been expected; for an improper return is considered as none at all. We have an example of this in him who promised a musician to pay him according to his performance, and being asked next day for the reward which he had promised, said that it had already been bestowed, since he had given one pleasure in return for another. But profit, not pleasure, was the return which the musician expected; for, in order to obtain what they want, men willingly part with that which is either superfluous, or which they can most easily spare; which is the basis of all commercial intercourse. It is asked, who ought to ascertain the measure of

B O O K of the return, he who has performed the service,
IX. or he who has received it? The former seems
 to commit his interest to the discretion of the
 latter: as Protagoras is said to have done, for
 he desired his disciples to estimate the value of
 what they had learned, and to pay him accord-
 ingly. In such cases, some approve the rule,
 "clear bargains make sure friends." Those
 who receive payment in advance, and then per-
 form nothing worthy of the magnificence of their
 promises, are liable to the reproach of injustice;
 a reproach which perhaps the sophists necessarily
 incur, since, unless they received their payment
 in advance, nobody would think their labours
 worthy of pecuniary remuneration. In virtuous
 friendships, there is not any room for complaint,
 because each party desires only the heart and
 affections of his friend; and the only contention
 between them is, which shall be productive of
 most good to the other. Such is the friendship
 that ought to subsist between those who teach
 and those who study philosophy, the value of
 which cannot be appreciated in money; and to
 the teachers of which no adequate honours can
 be assigned. Their scholars must honour them
 as they do their parents and the gods; not suf-
 ficiently, for that is impossible; but in propor-
 tion to the extent of their ability; shewing to
 them all the respect that is possible, since they
 can never shew to them enough. In those
 friendships where certain and full returns are
 expected, it is desirable that they should prove
 satisfactory to both parties; but when this can-
 not

not take place, it seems just as well as necessary, **B O O K IX.** that he who has received the favour should determine the return most proper to be made; because he is the best judge of the value of the advantage which he has received, and of the value of the pleasure which he has enjoyed. It is thus in those bargains where confidence is reposed by the one party in the other; for the fulfilment of which, the party disappointed is not entitled in some countries to any legal redress; his cause must stand or fall according to the good faith or dishonesty of him in whom he voluntarily confided. This rule is founded on the principle, that he who has received a favour is better qualified to ascertain its value, than he who conferred it: for men estimate too highly the favours which they bestow, as they are apt to do all good things proceeding from themselves. The person first benefited decides therefore what return he should make, because he best knows the value of the benefit which he has received; but this benefit is perhaps more justly estimated by the value which he set on it, while it was still an object of his desire, than by that which he continues to set on it after it has been put into his possession.

A doubt may be started as to filial friendship, whether fathers ought in all things to be obeyed? In matters respecting health, ought a son to follow the advice of his father or his physician? In electing a general, ought he to prefer to him a person skilled in war? In the same manner it may be doubted, whether favours are best bestowed

Chap. 2.

That it is impossible to assign precise rules for the proper exercise of friendship.

BOOK flowed on friends, or on men of merit; and
IX. whether we ought to be grateful to our benefactors or liberal to our friends, when we have not the means of exercising both gratitude and liberality. All these questions are too indefinite to admit of such general solutions as may be practically useful; because there is not any one case exactly similar to another, but each is marked by circumstances peculiar to itself, and distinguishable in their degrees of magnitude, as well as of propriety or necessity. It is manifest in general, that all advantages ought not to be accumulated on any one individual, and that before we are liberal to our friends, our debts of gratitude ought to be discharged towards our benefactors. Yet this rule will not always hold, as in the case of a man ransomed from robbers, and whose ransomer, perhaps a person of no value, should afterwards stand in need of the same favour, or, at least, should demand back his money. In both cases, the man ransomed, if his own father happens also to be in captivity, will prefer ransoming his father, if his fortune does not enable him to acquit both obligations at once. Though it is said in general, therefore, that every kindness ought to meet with its due return, yet cases may be proposed in which generosity is, in point of propriety or necessity, a paramount duty even to gratitude itself. Sometimes the same favours, done by different persons, are of very different values; and the benefactor therefore has not always a right to expect a precisely similar return. When a bad
 man

man obliges a good one, or a knave lends money to a man of property and probity, the persons obliged may, with propriety, decline to return exactly similar favours; since those favours are, in different circumstances, of very different values. The knave, by lending, runs no risk of losing his money, but the honest man would run this risk by lending to a knave; nay, should he only suspect him of being either a knave or a spendthrift, he will not act absurdly in refusing to return his favour in kind. It is evident therefore, as we have often observed, that all rules concerning the passions and actions of men are precise, only in proportion as the subjects to which they relate are definite. We ought not (to answer the question first started) to have deference, in all particulars, even to our fathers, since all kinds of sacrifices are not offered to Jupiter. Our parents, brethren, companions, and benefactors, are severally entitled to their respective marks of kindness and regard. This is sufficiently indicated by general practice; for relations, most commonly, are invited to assist at marriages and funerals, as things essentially interesting to the whole family, and all its branches. To provide for the subsistence of our parents, who are the causes of our being, is a duty as indispensable, and still more honourable, than even that of providing for our own. We ought to honour them too, as we honour the gods; but each parent is entitled to distinctive marks of our respect, a respect different in kind from that bestowed on persons unrelated to us,

but

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B O O K but eminently conspicuous for their abilities or virtues. Our seniors, in proportion to their years, ought to be treated with more or less deference. With companions, familiarity and full freedom of speech is allowable; with kinsmen, neighbours; fellow-citizens, in a word, with every description of persons with whom we are connected, it is incumbent on us to behave suitably to the relations of affinity or utility in which those persons stand to ourselves, as well as to their own personal merit and inherent virtues. When the relations between others and ourselves are strong and intimate, the rules of our behaviour towards them are more easily defined; the strict limits of our duty are with more difficulty ascertained towards persons remotely and faintly connected with us. Yet we must not be deterred by this difficulty from investigating those rules of conduct which will enable us to behave towards all men with propriety.

Chap. 3.

Justifiable
grounds for
the dissolution
of
friendships.

Doubts are started concerning the dissolution of friendship between persons whose characters no longer remain the same, or at least no longer continue to bear the same relation to each other. Where friendships are contracted for the sake of pleasure or utility, it is not wonderful that when neither utility accrues to the one party, nor pleasure to the other, such friendships should of course be subverted; for the foundations are destroyed on which only they stood. But a man may justly complain of bad faith in him who affected to cherish his character and his virtues, while interest or pleasure were at bottom the sole

sole grounds of his regard; for differences between friends chiefly proceed from this, that they think their friendship founded on one principle, when it is really founded on another. When therefore a man is deceived, and thinks without reason that he is loved for his character and his virtues, he has himself only to complain of; but he may complain of the duplicity of his pretended friend, when the hypocrisy of the latter is the source of his own mistake; and he may complain of him more justly than men do of coiners and clippers, since he is defrauded by him in an object more valuable than money. But when our friend changes his manners, and contracts by evil communication a depravity of character, ought we still to regard him with affection? Or, is it impossible to love that which ceases to be amiable? "Like," we have said, "draws to like;" and a good man neither can nor ought to love a bad one. Are we then instantly to renounce and forsake him? Not unless he has unalterably renounced and forsaken his character; for while he is not totally incorrigible, it is our duty to endeavour to reform his morals, a thing incomparably more important than alleviating his pecuniary distress, and also more peculiarly the work of friendship. To detach ourselves entirely from a friend who becomes worthless, has nothing in it unreasonable; since he is not in fact the same man with whom we contracted the friendship; and when we find that there is not any hope of his ever again becoming such, we naturally wish to have done

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with him. But what shall we say when one of the friends remains what he was, and the other changes for the better. Can their friendship continue to subsist? Or is this also impossible? The question will be best answered by proposing a case where the difference is great in the extreme. Of two persons who are friends in their early years, the one may remain a child in understanding through life, and the other may become a man of the most distinguished abilities. What friendship can subsist between such different characters, who can neither take any pleasure in each other's society, nor have any occupations and pursuits in common? As all congeniality of mind is at an end between them, their friendship, it should seem, must cease. Yet will the superior, if he is a man of humanity, treat the friend of his youth very differently from what he would do an absolute stranger. The remembrance of his early affection will still cling to his heart; and he will never entirely abandon an ancient attachment, unless on account of extreme worthlessness in him who was its object.

Chap. 4.

The analogy between the duties which we owe to ourselves, and those which we owe to our friends.

The duties which we owe to our friends, seem to be deduced from those which each individual willingly performs towards himself. We ought, it is said, to wish their good, or what appears to us to be such, and to promote it to our best ability, merely on their own account. With this kind of disinterested affection, mothers are animated towards their children, and those friends towards each other, between whom some disgust has

has arisen which, though it interrupts their intercourse, does not destroy their mutual kindness. Others say, that friends must spend much of their time together, have the same inclinations and pursuits, and sympathize with each other in their joy as well as in their sorrow. On whichever or how manysoever of these conditions friendship principally depends, we shall find that all of them are analogous to the affections by which a good man is animated towards himself; and by which all men are animated in proportion as they either approximate, or only think they approximate, to an honourable and praiseworthy character; which, in questions concerning human nature, is justly considered as the sole unerring standard. The virtuous man only is at peace within himself, since, all the powers of his mind are actuated by the same motives, and conspire to the same end: always aiming at good, real and intrinsic, the good of his intellectual part. To him existence is a benefit, which he earnestly wishes may be preserved, especially the existence of the thinking principle within him, which is peculiarly himself; for every individual strives after its own good, real or apparent; which, only in virtuous men, coincide: but could an individual love its change into something quite different from itself, the good of the latter would be to the former a matter of slight concern. In Deity all goods are accumulated, because he is ever and invariably that which he is; and in man the thinking principle is the part that is properly

The happiness of virtue.

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The
wretched-
ness of
vice.

and permanently himself. He who pursues the good of his mind, is pleased in his own company, being gratified with the recollection of the past, and delighted with the prospect of the future; and having ever at command innumerable speculations, in which he exercises himself with the most exquisite pleasure. Both his joys and his sorrows are respectively consistent with themselves, since they invariably proceed from fixed uniform causes; for he does not delight at one time in what will excite his repentance at another; and thus harmonized within his own breast, he is similarly affected towards his friend, whom he considers as a second self; and his sympathy for whom, when it reaches the highest perfection, resembles that internal concord which is experienced in his own mind, when the various principles of his nature coalesce into one regular movement, and flow in the same homogeneous stream of virtuous energy. Yet many men of very irregular lives seem to be highly satisfied with themselves. Is this because they mistake their own characters? It should seem so, since the complete villain is always visibly at variance with himself; and all others are similarly affected in proportion to their progress in wickedness, willing one thing, yet desiring and preferring another; as those who allow themselves to be subdued by vicious pleasure, and who may be said, with their eyes open, to rush into voluntary destruction. In the same manner others, through laziness or cowardice, avoid that conduct which they know most likely to promote their happiness.

When

When men proceed to the last stage of depravity, they become as odious to themselves as they are detestable to others, and therefore often destroy their own lives; and even before they arrive at this deplorable condition, they fly from and avoid themselves; preferring any kind of society to that of their own reflections; the past crimes which haunt their memory, and the meditated guilt which is continually occurring to their fancy. As they have nothing in them that is amiable, they cannot be the objects of their own love. Neither their joys nor their sorrows are consistent. Their whole soul is in sedition, distracted between contending principles, the pleasure of one giving pain to another; and when the worst principle prevails, a foundation is laid for the bitterest remorse. If such be the wretchedness of wickedness, how strenuously ought we to exert ourselves to become good men, that we may live in friendship with ourselves, and deserve the friendship of others!

Good-will resembles friendship, but is not the same thing. Good-will we may entertain for those not personally known to us, and without being ourselves conscious of it. This cannot happen with regard to friendship, as we formerly observed. Besides, every act of friendship implies an affection and expansion of the soul, it is also much connected with custom; whereas mere good-will arises suddenly, as towards the combatants in the public games, to one or other of whom we immediately wish well, though we would not make any great exertion in order to promote

Chap. 5.
Of good-will.

BOOK IX. his victory. Good-will, then, is but a sudden and superficial emotion; and at best but an element of friendship, as the first element or beginning of love is the pleasure received by the eye; without which, though the passion of love cannot commence, yet that pleasure does not by any means constitute this passion, to which it is necessary that we should not only delight in the object when present, but exceedingly long for it when absent. Speaking metaphorically, we may call good-will an incipient and indolent friendship; which, through time and custom, naturally improves into friendship strictly so called; not that founded on pleasure or utility, which have but little to do with good-will, since he who has received a favour ought in justice to return it; and he who does a kindness in expectation of meeting with a greater, has good-will only to himself. Good-will, in one word, is always excited by some laudable quality, such as generosity, or courage: witness the manner in which we are affected by the prize-fighters, abovementioned.

Chap. 6.

Of that
kind of
concord
which
friendship
implies.

Friendship implies concord, which is not merely agreement in opinion. This latter may prevail among persons totally unknown to each other; and what connection has friendship with sameness of opinion concerning the heavenly motions, and other such subjects? Concord prevails among cities and commonwealths, when they conceive the same designs to be conducive to the common interest, and agree in the same measures for promoting them. It relates therefore

fore to practical subjects only, and those of a certain magnitude in themselves, and bearing an important relation to the parties concerned; for example, that the magistracies should be elective; that an alliance should be made with the Lacedæmonians; that Pittacus should be archon, when he himself is willing to discharge that honourable office^s. When each party wishes the same thing for himself, then dissension ensues, because the factions in the state, though they agree in the object, yet differ as to the person. But genuine concord requires that each party and each individual should obtain his wish; as when both the people and the better sort agree in choosing virtuous men for their magistrates. This concord is, as we have said, the basis of political friendship. It is conversant about matters essentially useful to the comfortable subsistence of men in society; and can only be found among men of virtue, who being firm in their purposes, and not variable like the Euripus, are alone qualified to maintain the relations of concord and amity with themselves and others. As justice and utility have long regulated their private behaviour, they carry the same principles along with them into their public administration. But neither concord nor friendship can durably subsist among dishonest men, who will be continually striving to engross every advantage, and to shift off every burden;

^s Diogenes Laertius, l. i. sect. 75. tells us, that Pittacus laid down the archonship after he had held it ten years; to which transaction Aristotle seems here to allude.

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and who must soon fall into sedition by their endeavours to compel others to comply with those rules of justice which they themselves disdain to practise.

Chap. 7.

Why there is more love in those who confer benefits than in those who receive them.

How comes it that men love those to whom they have done good, better than these love their benefactors? Most are of opinion that this happens because creditors are more concerned about the safety of their debtors than the debtors are about theirs, and that merely from motives of interest; which Epicharmus^b, perhaps, would say, is judging of mankind by the worst examples among them. The accusation, however, is certainly too just, for with regard to the services which they have received, the greater part are of weak memories, and more willing to receive benefits than inclined either to confer or to return them. Yet the question just started must be solved on deeper principles than those of debtor and creditor, which imply nothing of love or friendship, but depend entirely on dull considerations of interest. Those to whom we have done good, are objects of our love and affection, though they neither return, nor should ever be expected to return, the obligation: for we are naturally disposed towards them as artists are towards their works; and particularly poets towards their poems; which they love as parents do their children; that is, much more than their

^b A disciple of Pythagoras, who seems to have had juster notions of morality, than he is said to have entertained of religion. Vid. Cicer. de Natur. Deorum, l. i. and Menag. ad Diogen. Laert. l. iii. sect. 9, & seq.

productions, were they endowed with life and perception, would love them. For each individual loves every excellence proceeding from himself in proportion as he desires and loves his own existence, the energies of which are concentrated and preserved in his works. Besides, our own good actions are more pleasing subjects of reflection, than any past benefits that we may have received; for the first are honourable, and the second only useful; and utility, however delightful in prospect, is often forgotten with the occasion which required it; whereas honour is permanent and unalterable; and every praiseworthy deed is not only pleasing in prospect, but delightful on remembrance, above all most transporting when actually exercised; giving to us a consciousness of that kind of existence which is most peculiarly agreeable to our nature, the happiness of which results not from passive sensations, but from active exertions. Besides, whatever is obtained with much labour, is naturally rewarded with much affection. Those who have acquired their fortunes, delight in them far more than those who succeed to hereditary wealth; and for a similar reason, maternal tenderness often rises to the highest pitch. On such principles we may explain why the affection of those who confer benefits, which is commonly a work of some exertion, should be stronger than that of those who receive them, which requires no exertion at all.

It is doubted which we ought to love most, ourselves or our friends. Selfishness is branded

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Of the
as different

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senses in
which a
man is said
to love
himself.

as a vice of the blackest die, and thought to sink deeper into each individual, in exact proportion to the worthlessness of his character. A bad man has in view nothing but himself; while a good one loses sight of himself, and aims chiefly at friendly or honourable actions; and this the more in proportion to his progress in virtue. Yet these observations ill accord with what is commonly said, that a friend wishes to promote our good for our own sakes, and though we should ever remain ignorant of his good offices; which is surely the disposition of each individual towards himself, and conformable to this disposition are all the other circumstances, and all the proverbial expressions by which friendship is indicated and ascertained; as, that friends have but one soul, that all things are common between them, that friendship is equality, and that the knee is nearer than the foot. But a man stands in all those relations to himself, and being most his own friend, ought most to love himself. These contradictions cannot be reconciled but by distinguishing the different senses in which a man is said to love himself. Those who reproach self-love as a vice, consider it only as it appears in worldlings and voluptuaries, who arrogate to themselves more than their due share of wealth, power, or pleasure. Such things are to the multitude, the objects of earnest concern and eager contention, because the multitude regards them as prizes of the highest value; and in endeavouring to attain them, strives to gratify its passion at the expence

expence of its reason. This kind of self-love, which belongs to the contemptible multitude, is doubtless obnoxious to blame; and in this acceptance, the word is usually taken. But should a man assume a pre-eminence in exercising justice, temperance, and other virtues, though such a man has really more true self-love than the multitude, he would not be held culpable for this pretension. Yet he takes to himself the fairest and greatest of all goods, and those the most acceptable to the ruling principle in his nature, which is properly himself, in the same manner as the sovereignty in every community is that which most properly constitutes the state. He is said, also, to have, or not to have, the command of himself, just as this principle bears sway, or as it is obnoxious to controul; and those acts are considered as most voluntary which proceed from this legislative and sovereign power. Whoever cherishes and gratifies this ruling part of his nature, is strictly and peculiarly a lover of himself, but in a quite different sense from that in which self-love is regarded as a matter of reproach; for all men approve and praise an affection calculated to produce the greatest private and the greatest public happiness; whereas they disapprove and blame the vulgar kind of self-love as often hurtful to others, and always ruinous to those who indulge it. A bad man, we have said, is really at variance with himself; pursuing a conduct directly opposite to what his own duty and his own interest most powerfully

B O O K
 IX.
 Self-love,
 well under-
 stood,
 wherein it
 consists.

B O O K IX. powerfully recommend. But the man of ~~moral~~ obeys and follows the dictates of his intellect; and every intellect, when free and uncircumscribed, necessarily prefers and pursues its own individual good. The virtuous man indeed strenuously exerts himself in the cause of his friends and his country; and readily lays down his life for their sake. He willingly resigns honours and emoluments; but firmly defends the first share of generosity and probity. The transports of one glorious day, he would not exchange for a whole life of listless sloth; one year spent in honourable exertion, he prefers to ages vulgarly and casually consumed; nay, a single effort of splendid virtue is more valuable in his eyes than an indefinite series of small and ordinary actions; and, on such principles, he is ready to lay down his life in the cause of his friends or country. He is ready also to employ his fortune in their service; so that, while they are enriched at his expence, he may acquire an unrivalled share of well-merited applause. As to offices and honours, he is similarly affected, easily relinquishing them all; nay, even the fame of illustrious actions, when it appears to him more praise-worthy, to give an opportunity to others of performing them, than to effect them by his own agency. Thus, amidst all his liberalities, he is still more selfish, since he still claims for himself what is incomparably most valuable, that internal delight arising from the consciousness of merit.

It

It is disputed whether or not happy men need friends. Happiness seems all-sufficient in itself without such auxiliaries; whence they say,

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Chap. 9.

“ When Fortune's goods abound, what boots a friend ?”

Whether
friendship
be the
greatest
good in
prosperity
or in ad-
versity.

Yet, on the other hand, it appears absurd, if happiness includes all good things, to deprive it of friendship, which of external goods is the greatest. Besides, if friendship, as we above proved, consists rather in conferring favours, than in receiving them, and it is honourable to do good to those who are peculiarly recommended to our love in preference to all others, prosperous and happy men must stand in need of fit objects, towards whom they may exercise their beneficence. It is disputed, therefore, in which of the two states men require friends the most, the state of prosperity, or that of adversity; the former needing favourites as much as the latter does benefactors. It is also absurd to think that happiness can be enjoyed in solitude; man being a social and political animal by the constitution of his nature itself; without conforming to which, human happiness cannot be attained; nor so completely attained in casual or indifferent society, as in that of amiable and virtuous friends. What is the meaning then of the observation first made, or by what arguments can it be justified? The many regard only those as their friends who promote their utility, and friends of this kind a prosperous man does not need; nor does he seem greatly to need those who may administer to

BOOK to his pleasure, since, his life being delightful
 IX. in itself, he is not in much want of adventitious
 enjoyment. These two classes of friends being
 excluded as unnecessary, it is too hastily in-
 ferred that he needs not any friends at all.
 For we said in the beginning, that happiness
 is energy, that is, a thing consisting in our own
 exertions, not resulting from our acquirements
 or possessions; and the life of a good man con-
 sists in a series of virtuous and delightful ener-
 gies, which will be far more unbroken and un-
 interrupted, if he contemplates them not only
 in himself, but in those who are around him;
 whose behaviour he is able to view more atten-
 tively and more steadily than he can possibly do
 his own¹. Friends of this description, there-
 fore, he requires, that he may sympathize with
 their sentiments, and participate in their ac-
 tions; for a good man is charmed with good
 actions more than a skilful musician with the
 finest melody; and as the latter is provoked
 by dissonance, so is the former grieved by de-
 pravity. Besides, as Theognis^k says, virtuous
 friends exercise, improve, and perfect each
 other. But if we examine the matter more
 deeply, we shall find that one good man is na-

The exqui-
 site plea-
 sure of
 virtuous
 friendship.

¹ ὥσπερ ἐν ὅταν θέλωμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺ προσωποῖς ἰδεῖν, εἰς τοὺς κατοπτρῶν ἐμβλεῖσθαι ἰδόμεν, ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ αὐτῶς θελήσωμεν γινώσκειν, εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἰδόντες, γινώσκωμεν αὐτοὺς, &c. "As, when we wish to see our own countenance, we must view it in a looking-glass; in the same manner, when we wish to know our own characters and virtues, we must contemplate those of our friend; for a friend, as we say, is another self." *Magn. Moral* l. ii. c. xv. p. 194.

^k The gnomic poet of Megara, some of whose sententious verses are still preserved.

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turally an object ultimately desirable to another ; for a good man delights in what is naturally delightful, and values what is really and absolutely valuable ; and as the life of animals consists barely in sensation, but that of man both in sensation and intellect, and that not merely in the capacities, but principally in the exercise of those powers, for the sake of which the capacities are given to us, it is plain that the more widely we extend the sphere of our energies, our happiness will be the more complete ; provided these energies be, like every thing that is good, definite in their nature, not variable and undetermined, like the lives of bad men, which appear under innumerable forms of wretchedness. But neither such lives, nor those overwhelmed by an accumulation of pains and sorrows, (of which we shall speak hereafter,) are calculated to make us rightly appreciate the value of existence, which to wise and good men is an object so truly desirable. For when we see or hear, we are conscious of these perceptions ; and when we think and theorize, we are conscious of these intellects ; and the higher and nobler our thoughts are, the more pleasure we derive from the consciousness of entertaining them. This consciousness makes us feel the pleasure of existence ; for the energy of life itself, which is of all things most delightful, consists in nothing else but perceiving and thinking. But a good man, being affected towards his friend nearly as towards himself, derives therefore the highest gratification from communicating

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communicating his thoughts and reflections with others like himself, and living with them in a perpetual participation of intellectual and moral enjoyments; since he thereby attains nearly as clear a perception of their pleasurable existence as he has of his own. This indeed is human society properly so called, in contradistinction to that of cattle, which consists in feeding at the same stall. Since then his own life is, to a good man, a thing naturally sweet and ultimately desirable; for a similar reason, is the life of his friend agreeable to him, and delightful merely on its own account, and without reference to any object beyond it; and to live without friends is to be destitute of a good, unconditional, absolute, and ultimately desirable; and therefore to be deprived of one of the most solid and most substantial of all human enjoyments.

Chap. 10.

Different kinds of friendship require different limitations as to number.

Ought this reasoning to make us desirous of multiplying the number of our friends? Or ought we to adopt as to friendship what seems to be well said with regard to hospitality,

“Be not a churl, nor have too many guests.”

In the same manner ought the number of our friends to be limited? Of friends chosen from motives of utility or convenience, it undoubtedly ought; for more than serve our purpose, are only obstacles and hindrances; and it is impossible for us to return the services or civilities of too numerous a list. Neither need those chosen from motives of pleasure to be many; for too much seasoning is pernicious in diet.

But as to friendships strictly so called, originating in sympathy of minds and congeniality of characters, ought there to be defined limits, beyond which their number must not be augmented; any more than the populousness of a city, which, for the supply of mutual wants, requires more than ten, but, for the sake of wise regulation and good morals, ought not perhaps to exceed ten myriads of inhabitants? The number of friends, even virtuous friends, must be limited by the extent of human activity, which is incapable of cultivating beyond a certain proportion, who must all likewise be friends to each other, on the supposition (which is necessary) that they should spend their time together in amicable concord. This cannot easily happen to a great multitude, especially such being the instability of human affairs, that we cannot cordially sympathize with many persons at once, for if we have cause to rejoice with one, it will too often happen that we ought to grieve with another. Many friends, therefore, are neither to be desired nor expected, and their number will be the smaller in proportion to the closeness of the intimacy; for intimate friendship is almost as exclusive as love, which admits but one only object. Experience justifies this observation, for the friendships most celebrated have subsisted between two only. In political life we see popular men, who seem to have innumerable friends. They are often flatterers of the multitude. But a public character without flattery, may, by his real worth, recommend himself to

BOOK IX. the gratitude of many who are his friends politically. But friends, strictly so called, cannot be numerous. Happy is the man who finds only a few such !

Chap. II.

Whether the company of our friends is most desirable in our prosperity or in our adversity.

Whether are friends most desirable in prosperity or in adversity? Both conditions of life peculiarly require them; the prosperous, that they may have objects towards whom to exercise their beneficence; the unfortunate, that they may have sources from which to derive consolation. The necessity for friends is greatest in the latter, who therefore seek persons who may be useful to them; but the lustre of friendship shines most conspicuous in the former, who seek persons with whom they may spend their time agreeably, and whom it is a real pleasure to benefit. The company of friends is delightful both in prosperity and adversity. In the latter, our grief is alleviated by their sympathy; whether it be that they disburden us of part of our sufferings, or that their sympathy is itself delightful. Both causes seem to concur; for in misfortune the presence of a friend affords a mixed pleasure. The very sight of him cheers our minds; and if he has any dexterity, he knows how to administer to us that kind of comfort of which our tempers and characters are most susceptible. Besides, we ourselves, in his presence, endeavour to moderate our sorrow, that we may not cause suffering to our friend; and persons of firm minds are careful how they impart their secret misfortunes, and reject all excess of commiseration as unsuitable to the dignity

nity of their characters; whereas women, and womanish men, delight in re-echoed groans and sympathetic lamentations. In all things the best characters are the fit models for imitation; and as amidst prosperity the best men delight in the presence and congratulation of their friends, which is agreeable to the benevolence of their nature, we ought therefore to be forward in calling those who love us to participate in our joy, but very backward in calling them to participate in our sorrow; remembering,

“ Their own misfortunes are enough to bear.”

Above all, we must summon their presence when, without giving much trouble to ourselves, we may greatly benefit *them*. But, on the other hand, to act with laudable propriety, we must go readily and uninvited to the house of mourning; for it is as honourable as delightful to assist our friends in distress, especially without any solicitation on their part, which might lessen them in our esteem. It is our duty strenuously to co-operate with fortune in promoting the prosperity of our friend; but to be slow and modest in craving his assistance; yet without too fastidiously rejecting his beneficence; which has sometimes made a breach in very solid friendships.

As love enters first by the eye, so friendship is produced by the habitual intercourse of life; and as the sense of sight is that which lovers would be most unwilling to lose, so habitual intercourse is the advantage which friends would be most unwilling to resign. Friendship is a

Chap. 12.

Conclusion.

BOOK community of enjoyments; and as a man de-
IX. lights in the energies of his own existence, so he
 also does in those of his friend; wherefore, in
 whatever those energies principally consist, their
 chief enjoyment results from exerting them in
 company; some drinking and playing dice to-
 gether, while others make parties of hunting,
 practise their exercises, or cultivate philosophy.
 The friendship of bad men is as corrupt and un-
 stable as themselves; and is so far from being
 advantageous to either party, that it tends only
 to plunge them both still deeper in depravity
 and wretchedness: whereas virtuous friendships
 grow continually more firm and more intimate,
 the example and admonitions of good men mu-
 tually improving and perfecting each other¹.
 Thus much concerning friendship. It remains
 that we should next treat of pleasure.

¹ Aristotle quotes a few words from Theognis which have this meaning.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK X.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book treats of pleasure and happiness. **BOOK**
It is too concise to admit of abridgement, ^{**X.**}
and sufficiently perspicuous not to require elucidation. In the concluding chapter, Aristotle shews the inseparable connection between Ethics and Politics; and prepares the reader for an easy transition from the former to the latter. By way of conclusion to these short introductions, I shall observe, that Aristotle's Moral Philosophy is, perhaps, of all others the least liable to the following objection, which has been often made by thinking men to the too fashionable philosophy of the times: "A professed sceptic can be guided by nothing but his present passions; and to be masters of his philosophy, we need not his books or advice, for every child is capable of the same thing without any study at all."—GRAY.

BOOK X.

ARGUMENT.

Pleasure—Its ambiguous nature—Defined.—Happiness—Intellectual—Moral—Compared.—Education.—Laws.—Transition to the subject of Politics.

BOOK
X.

Chap. I.

The love of
pleasure.

WE proceed to treat of pleasure, a thing most congenial to our nature; and by which, therefore, and its opposite, pain, the motions of the minds of children are guided as by a rudder. In morals the main point is attained, when our love and hatred, our grief and joy are respectively excited by natural and worthy causes; since these affections are as extensive as the multiplied affairs of life itself, and their proper regulation is of the utmost importance to virtue and happiness. For we are all prompted by nature to pursue pleasure, and to avoid pain; the consideration of which ought not to be omitted in a treatise of this kind, especially as the opinions concerning them are perplexed by much contradiction; some regarding pleasure as the highest good, others calling it a thing contemptible in the extreme, whether from the real conviction of their minds, (which perhaps may be the case with some,) or because they think it best to speak of pleasure in terms of reproach, since

since most men are tempted to disgrace themselves by indulging in it immoderately. Severe moralists, therefore, think that they cannot too much stigmatise pleasure, that those whom they wish to benefit by their discourses may be deterred from excess, and confined within the bounds of propriety. They should take care, however, lest this proceeding be not attended with effects contrary to their expectation; for in practical matters, men pay less attention to what is said than to what is done; and when opinions, just and reasonable within certain limits, are carried to a length manifestly inconsistent with experience, they are rejected disdainfully and completely; even the truth which they contain being overwhelmed and lost in the surrounding falsehood. Thus, those detractors of pleasure, when they are observed on any occasion to pursue it with much eagerness, appear to the bulk of mankind no better than hypocritical voluptuaries; for the people at large are not capable of making distinctions; they consider things in the gross, and therefore continually confound them. The truth, therefore, best serves not only to enlighten our understandings, but to improve our morals. For when our doctrines are true, our lives will more naturally be conformable to them; and our precepts being confirmed by examples, will produce conviction, and excite emulation of our virtues, in those with whom we live. But enough on this subject: we proceed to enumerate the opinions held concerning pleasure.

B O O K
X.

Not to be
too severely
condem-
ned.

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Chap. 2.

Different
opinions
concerning
it.

Eudoxus^a thought pleasure the chief good, because he perceived it to be universally desired by all animals, rational and irrational; that every thing is good in the same proportion as it is desirable: that animals find out, each tribe, what is best for themselves, as they do their proper food; and that therefore the supreme good must consist in that which is universally and most eagerly desired by them all. The regularity of his life added great weight to his arguments, for he was a man of singular temperance; so that his commendation of pleasure did not appear to proceed from any prejudice in its favour, but rather to be extorted from him by the force of truth. His argument he confirmed, by considering pain; which, being the contrary to pleasure, all animals endeavoured to shun and escape. That is chiefly desirable, he remarked, which is desirable ultimately, and on its own account. This description peculiarly applies to pleasure, which no one desires for the sake of any thing beyond itself, nor finds the necessity of assigning any reason why he should enjoy it; pleasure always carrying its own recommendation along with it, and rendering every object, however valuable, to which it is joined, still more desirable, not excepting virtue itself. As pleasure improves every other good with which it is combined, it is manifestly a good in itself; a good not inferior to that which it heightens. Yet

^a Eudoxus of Cnidus τῶτον αὐτὸ Εὐδοξὸν Εὐδοξὸν ἐκαλεῖται διὰ τῆς λαμπρότητος τῆς φήμης. See his life in Laertius, b. viii. sect. 86, &c. By a pun on his name, he was called "Illustrious."

Plato employed a similar argument to prove that pleasure was not the supreme good ; since pleasure, joined with virtue, is better than alone and separate ; which cannot happen to the supreme good, a thing incapable of augmentation, and disdaining admixture. But what is that good or happiness which mankind, by the constitution of their nature, are best qualified for enjoying ? This only is the question with which we are concerned in the present treatise. Those who deny that which all desire, to be a part of this happiness, should take care lest they fall into an absurdity. For *that* we say is truth, which to all appears such ; and he who is dissatisfied with this kind of proof will not easily meet with a better. If only creatures void of understanding pursued pleasure, much might be plausibly urged against it : but what shall we say, when we find it an object of desire with the best and wisest of the human race ? Nay even irrational animals may afford perhaps a strong argument in favour of it ; since in pursuit of what is best for their nature, they are actuated by a wisdom far superior to their own^b. The argument drawn from pain, which is the opposite to pleasure, seems not liable to the objection made to it. The objectors say, that though pain be an evil, this is not any proof that pleasure, its contrary, is a good ; because both contraries are often bad, and the good is often something intermediate between them. But this observation, though true in

^b See Analysis, p. 132. and Conf. p. 134. & seq.

many

B O O K many cases, is not applicable to the present.
X. For if both were evils, both would be objects of
 averſion; but the one, we ſee, is univerſally
 purſued as a good, and the other univerſally
 ſhunned as an evil.

Chap. 3. It forms not any objection to pleaſure, that it
 is not one of thoſe indelible qualities by which
 things are characteriſed and diſtinguiſhed; for
 neither to this claſs of qualities can the energies
 and operations of virtue itſelf, which are ſo
 highly and ſo juſtly praiſed, in ſtrict philoſophi-
 cal language, be aſcribed: no, nor happineſs
 itſelf, which is of all things moſt valuable. It is
 farther objected, that pleaſure is of a vague in-
 definite nature, admitting of various degrees of
 intenſity; whereas whatever is truly good, ought
 to be uniformly perceived, and accurately de-
 fined^c. But juſtice, fortitude, and the other
 virtues, admit of various degrees, when con-
 ſidered as attributes of the perſons in whom
 thoſe habits exiſt: the ſame is true of health;
 yet the health of the mind, as well as that of the
 body, conſidered abſtractedly in themſelves, are
 things ſufficiently definite, though they do not,
 in each individual, reach that ſtate of perfection
 which properly conſtitutes their nature^d. The
 ſame thing may poſſibly hold with regard to
 pleaſure. It is further objected, that pleaſure is
 motion; and that all motions are imperfect,
 ſince they are only tendencies to certain ends^e;
 whereas whatever is abſolutely good, ought to be

^c See *Analysis*, p. 129.

^d *Ibid.* p. 135.

^e *Ibid.* p. 137.

complete

complete and perfect in itself, independently of **BOOK**
 any separate purpose for which it may serve. **X.**
 But, that pleasure is motion, is not likely to be true; for all motion admits of slowness and celerity; since the motion of the universe itself, though it cannot be called swift or slow, abstractedly considered, yet deserves the former of those epithets when compared with the peculiar motions which belong respectively to its parts^f. But pleasure is not characterised by either of these qualities. We may indeed be speedily pleased, as we are speedily made angry; and as walking, growing, or any other motion, is performed with celerity, in the same manner, we may rapidly change from a state of indifference or pain, to a state of pleasure; but to the energy of pleasure itself, that is, to pleasure actually enjoyed, the epithets of swift or slow do not apply. This energy is complete in itself in every instant; and is not perfected by the accomplishment of any distinct and separate end, in which it terminates. It is therefore a thing totally different from generation or production, or motion of any kind; since all of these are mere changes of material substances, passing from one place, or one state, to another; not indeed at random, but according to certain and fixed laws of motion and rest, generation and corruption; so that from the same materials out of which any compound is generated, into the same, that compound is, by corruption, dis-

^f *Analysis*, p. 138, & seq.

solved.

BOOK X. solved^s. If pleasure then be generation, pain must be corruption; and that which is generated by pleasure, must by pain be dissolved into the same materials from which it was produced. But to speak thus of pleasure and pain is to talk unintelligibly; and to confound immaterial with material things. It is said also, that pain consists in natural deficiencies or wants, and that pleasure is nothing else but the supplying of these wants. But deficiency and fulness are plainly affections of body; and if pleasure is the supply of corporeal deficiencies, that which receives the supply ought to feel the pleasure, which therefore resides in the body; a conclusion resulting from the premises, but highly unreasonable. Pleasure, therefore, is not the supply of bodily wants, though it accompanies this supply; as pain, on the contrary, accompanies the laceration or maiming of the body. The opinion seems to have arisen from considering the pain of hunger, and the pleasure of feeding; the latter of which must always be preceded by the former. But all pleasures are not preceded by pain; those, for instance, of the intellectual kind; and even those of the senses of smelling, hearing, and seeing; besides innumerable enjoyments, resulting from pleasing recollections, as well as from agreeable and animating hopes. Of what deficiencies can such pleasures be the supply, since previously to their existence in us, there was not any thing de-

^s Analys., p. 124, & seq.

fective?

fective? With regard to gross and reproachable pleasures, which our adversaries may cite in proof of their erroneous theory, the very name of pleasures may with propriety be denied to them; since they are acknowledged as such, only by men of corrupt minds and perverse sentiments. Persons diseased are not fit judges of the relish of wholesome food; nor is that white, which appears such to those afflicted with an ophthalmy. It may be observed also, that pleasure is not desirable, unless it proceed from an honourable, at least an innocent source; any more than wealth is a good, when too dearly purchased by dishonesty. Different pleasures are adapted to different characters. Just men, only, know the pleasure of justice; as those only who have an ear for music, enjoy the pleasure of melody; the same differences are observable in other particulars. The very dissimilar gratifications which we derive from friends and flatterers show, that either pleasure is not in itself desirable, or that there must be pleasures specifically different from each other. A friend aims at promoting our good, a flatterer aims only at giving us pleasure; and the behaviour of the one is as universally and as justly praised, as that of the other is universally and justly condemned. None worthy of the name of a man, would choose to have the understanding of a child, that he might spend his life happily in childish amusements; nor would he submit to do base actions, whatever pleasure he might derive from them, and though assured that they should never afterwards be followed

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BOOK followed by pain or punishment. But, on the
 { **X.** } other hand, he would desire most earnestly to
 have the use of his eye-sight, of his memory,
 and of his understanding, as well as to be en-
 dowed and adorned with virtuous habits, although
 no pleasure whatever resulted from the exercise
 of those capacities or powers. That this exer-
 cise is necessarily accompanied with pleasure,
 makes not any difference, since it is an object
 of desire on its own account, and independently
 of the delight which necessarily attends it. It
 seems plain, therefore, that pleasure is not the
 supreme good, nor that all kinds of pleasures are
 desirable; and that whether or no pleasures are
 desirable ultimately, and on their own account,
 depends on the source from whence they spring.
 Such are the opinions held concerning pleasure
 and pain.

Chap. 4.

Pleasure
 consists in
 exercising
 the proper
 energies of
 our nature,
 which it
 improves
 and per-
 fects.

But what pleasure is in reality, and under
 what class of things it ought to be arranged,
 will more fully appear from the following induc-
 tion. The act of seeing is perfect in every in-
 stant of time, needing nothing to give to it the
 specific completion and fulness of which its na-
 ture is susceptible. Such also is pleasure, a whole,
 perfect in each instant, and not more perfect
 than at the first instant, how long soever it may
 be enjoyed. Pleasure therefore is not motion,
 because all motion co-exists with a certain por-
 tion of time; and tends to a certain end, in which
 it terminates, being, from its very nature, im-
 perfect; because, as soon as the end is effected,
 the motion by which it was attained ceases to
 exist.

exist'. Thus of the art of building, the end is a house; and until the house is made, the building is imperfect: but when the house is built, the action or motion by which it was produced ceases to exist: and the parts of that action or motion are, until the whole is finished, each different from another, and each imperfect in itself; as rearing the walls, chamfering the pillars, building the dome; all of which, as well as laying the foundation and adding the ornaments, are but parts of one action, which, taken together, constitute a whole, when the work is completed. The same holds with regard to that kind of motion which consists in change of place, and its various modes, namely, walking, jumping, flying, and others of that sort; each of which consists of imperfect parts, specifically different from each other, and from the whole collectively. Thus, in the Olympic race, a different part of the stadium is run over in each particle of time, till the goal is attained; and as each part is different from another, so must the motions performed in them be all different; nay, though the same part be run over, yet if the racer proceed, in the one case, from the starting-post to the goal, and in the other, from the goal to the starting-post, a difference in the motions must arise from the difference in their directions. But concerning motion, we have treated accurately in another work^f. Pleasure is manifestly a thing quite different; since it is complete in each in-

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X.

^f *Analysia*, p. 135, & seq.

^g *Ibid.* p. 137, & seq.

divisible

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X.

divisible now, that is, in each instant; not requiring for its perfection any the smallest portion of time: but motion, as we have elsewhere proved, cannot exist without time or succession. In the same manner, the act of vision, a point, and an unit, are things which have not any connection with generation, nor any kind of motion; every modification of which must belong to things not essentially wholes, but partible; and to them only. Of this kind is pleasure, essentially a whole, since essentially perfect; accompanying the operation of each percipient with regard to the perceptible object, when both the perceiving power is properly constituted, and the perceptible object the fairest and the best on which that specific act of perception can possibly be exercised^a. To say that the perceiving power exercises its energies, or the substance in which that power resides, makes not any difference as to the present subject. Pleasure accompanies every act of perception by sense in a higher or lower degree, in proportion to the prevalence of the conditions above stated; and also every act of reasoning or intelligence. But as the physician and the medicines which he prescribes, are in different senses the causes of health, so our percipient powers are enlivened and perfected in a different manner by the proper objects of those powers, and by the pleasure attending our perception of them. Each sense has its appropriate pleasure: the eye is delighted

^a Analysis, p. 58, & seq.

by sights; the ear by sounds; and in proportion to the soundness and vigour of the sense itself, as well as the beauty and excellence of the object on which it is exercised, the pleasure will be the greater; but pleasure there always must be, wherever the agent and the object are naturally adapted to each other. Pleasure does not perfect our energising powers as a pre-acquired habit, but rather as a supervenient end; in the same manner, as beauty accompanies the flower of youth. The powers of man are not capable of unceasing activity, and therefore our pleasures cannot be continuous, for they are inseparably connected with our energies. Things which delight when new, often cease to give pleasure, and that because our attention is no longer roused by their presence, nor the energies of our mind called forth in contemplating them. They are disregarded as an old and familiar show; and in proportion to the weakness of our exertions, our pleasure is blunted. It may be suspected that all love pleasure, because all are fond of life, which consists in exercising the energies of our nature. Life then is energy, which each individual exercises on those subjects in which he most delights; the musician, on melodies; the mathematician, on theorems; and others, on other subjects. Pleasure therefore is naturally desirable, because it perfects our energies, that is, our life, in the continuance of which all delight. But whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life, needs not at present be examined; since these

BOOK two seem so intimately combined as not to admit of separation. **X.** Pleasure, then, cannot exist without energy; and our energies are strengthened and perfected by the pleasures accompanying them.

Chap. 5. It seems to follow from these observations, that as energies or actions widely differ from each other, so must also the pleasures by which they are perfected. This holds in the several operations both of nature and of art, the different kinds of which respectively terminate in different and appropriate ends; namely, animals, plants, pictures, statues, houses, and furniture. The action of the senses, or what is called perception by sense, manifestly differs from the action of the understanding; and the pleasures respectively accompanying those operations, bear a near affinity to the operations which they respectively accompany; for each operation or energy is increased, improved, and perfected by a pleasure that is akin to it. Thus the exertions of the geometer, the musician, and the architect, are enlivened and invigorated by the delight which they take in their respective pursuits; and the cultivators of those sciences thereby improve themselves gradually, until they attain the most consummate skill, and most decided pre-eminence. But pleasures, on the other hand, which are not akin to the operations which they accompany, are so far from improving and perfecting them, that, on the contrary, they weaken and obstruct them. Thus, those who are agreeably employed in reading or study,

study, cannot, if they are lovers of music, persevere in applying to their books and meditations, should they happen to hear at a distance an agreeable melody; for the two pleasures not being akin, the stronger overpowers the weaker. Wherefore, when we are much delighted with one thing, we cannot attend to any other. At a well-acted play, the mind is fixed in delightful transport; but when the stage players are bad, many spectators amuse themselves with sweetmeats¹. Pleasures not akin to the operations which they accompany, have the same effect (though they produce it differently) with congenial pains; for these also have a tendency to weaken and destroy our energies. Thus, those to whom it is painful to write or to reason, have little inclination to do either, and commonly do them incorrectly. Of operations and the pleasures accompanying them, some are laudable and respectable; others are blameable and contemptible. The former are to be pursued, and the latter to be avoided. Pleasures are more akin to energies, than even the desires which precede them; for these desires are easily distinguishable from the energies which they prompt, both in their own nature and in point of time; whereas pleasures and energies are so difficultly separated even in thought, that many suppose them to be one and the same thing. They are indeed intimately connected; but as energies both of sense and intellect are often not only

¹ Aristotle says, "they do so most when the players are bad."

B O O K ^{X.} unpleasant but painful, it is absurd to think that pleasure and energy are the same, though the former cannot subsist without the latter. But it is of more importance to observe, that the nature and qualities of our pleasures depend entirely on the nature and qualities of our energies. In this manner, the pleasures of the sight differ in purity from those of the touch; and the pleasures of the ear from those of the palate; while the intellect affords pleasures totally dissimilar to any resulting from the senses. As each animal is endowed with peculiar energies, each having his appropriate work to effect, and his assigned task to perform, so each species is destined for the enjoyment of congenial and kindred pleasures; those of a man differing specifically from the pleasures of the horse or the dog, the animals with which he is most familiar. As Heraclitus says, an ass would prefer straw to gold, loving food more than money. But among individuals of the same species it might be expected that the same effects should follow from the same causes; and that there should be a complete community of pleasures as well as of pains. Yet, in the human race, we find the thing far otherwise; one loving what another most detests; and that giving pain to one, which affords the most exquisite pleasure to another. This however need not appear extraordinary, if we consider that the same food has a very different relish to a man in health, and to another in disease; and that the warmth agreeable to persons of weak constitutions, is unpleasant to those

those of a firmer temperament. Innumerable **BOOK**
 other examples to the same purpose will occur; **X.**
 with regard to all which, we affirm *that* only to
 be right, which appears so to persons rightly
 formed and properly constituted. Virtue there-
 fore, and the man of virtue as such, is the only
 natural and correct standard; and those only
 are true enjoyments, with which he is delighted.
 That the pursuits which *he* rejects and spurns,
 should to others afford gratification, is not to be
 wondered at, since human nature is liable to
 corruptions and depravities of many kinds; and
 each corrupt individual will delight in pleasures
 akin to the specific depravity under which he
 labours¹; which are pleasures indeed to him,
 but to none besides. But the question is, what
 are the pleasures of a man in his natural and
 most perfect state? That they are inseparably
 connected with his energies, we have above
 proved; so that if there be peculiar works to be
 performed by a man, and peculiar tasks assigned
 to him, his proper and natural pleasures must
 consist in the operations by which his work is
 done and his task accomplished. Other plea-
 sures are only secondary, and separated by a
 wide interval.

Having examined the nature of virtue, friend-
 ship, and pleasure, it remains to speak of happi-
 ness, the end, as we observed, of all human pur-
 suits. Our discourse will be rendered more con-
 cise by resuming some conclusions already stated.

Chap. 6.

Of happi-
 ness;

¹ — Mala mentis
 Gaudia.

VIRG. vi. 78.

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X.

Happiness, we said, consists, not in mere capacity unroused, or in mere habit unexercised; for, were that the case, it might belong to a man who should remain for ever asleep, living the life of a plant, or involved in the greatest calamities; since a man thus circumstanced might be endowed with the noblest capacities, and most excellent and most honourable habits. Happiness, then, must be classed with operations or energies, some of which, as we already remarked, are necessary for the attainment of farther and distinct ends, and others are desirable merely on their own account; with which last, happiness is manifestly to be numbered. Energies terminating in themselves, and desirable merely on their own account, include all the amiable and laudable actions which proceed from confirmed habits of virtue: they appear also to include those innocent amusements which are sought so entirely for their own sake, that men often pursue them to the prejudice of their health or fortune. In such amusements it is common for the wealthy and powerful to place the principal enjoyment of life, and persons most dexterous in promoting them are not unfrequently the highest in esteem with princes; since they are the best qualified for supplying them with those gratifications, of which they have the strongest relish. In such amusements the vulgar, too, are apt to place happiness, because they see them pursued as such by those who, in the gifts of fortune, are greatly their superiors. But neither the vulgar nor the great ought

ought to serve for models. Virtue, intellect, ardent feelings of the heart, and exalted energies of the mind, are not appendages of greatness; and though men invested with power, but incapable of tasting genuine and liberal pleasure, often seek delight in gross gratifications of sense, this affords not any proof that such delusive pursuits are entitled to a just preference. Children think all things inferior in value to their own childish amusements; and as different objects please men and children, so good and bad men might be expected to have very different delights; but, as we have often said, those things only are truly valuable and truly delightful, which are recognised as such by men of virtuous habits; for, as our habits are, such will be our pleasures and our pursuits. Happiness, then, cannot consist in mere recreative pastime; for it is absurd to think that all our serious exertions and strenuous labours should terminate in so frivolous an end*. We do not labour that we may be idle; but, as Anacharsis justly said, we are idle that we may labour with more effect; that is, we have recourse to sports and amusements as refreshing cordials after contentious exertions, that, having reposed in such diversions for a while, we may awake to our labours with increased vigour¹. The weakness of human nature requires frequent remissions of energy; but

* Neque enim ita generati à natura sumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti esse videamur. Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. 29.

¹ Ludo autem et joco, uti illo quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus cæteris. Ibid.

B O O K these rests and pauses are only the better to prepare us for enjoying the pleasures of activity. **X.** The amusements of life therefore are but preludes to its business, the place of which they cannot possibly supply; and its happiness, because its business, consists in the exercise of those virtuous energies, which constitute the worth and dignity of our nature. Inferior pleasures may be enjoyed by the fool and the slave, as completely as by the hero or the sage. But who will ascribe the happiness of a man to him, who, by his character and condition, is disqualified for manly pursuits?

Chap. 7.

intellectual;

If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man; which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity. The greatest human happiness, then, is theoretic and intellectual; which well accords with the properties which we formerly found, by investigation, to be essentially inherent in that most coveted object. The intellect is the best principle in man; its energies are the strongest, and the objects about which it is conversant are far the most sublime. The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in theorising and thinking much longer than in performing any

any external action whatever. Pleasure, it was **BOOK**
 observed, must be an ingredient in happiness; **X.**
 but contemplative wisdom offers pleasures the
 most admirable in purity and stability, and the
 pleasures of knowledge continually increase in
 proportion to our improvement in it; certainty
 concerning the sublimest truths affording still
 higher delight in proportion to the intense efforts
 of intellect by which they were discovered.
 That all-sufficiency, which we remarked as a
 property of happiness, belongs to intellectual
 energies more than to any other; for though
 the sage, as well as the moralist or the patriot,
 stands in need of bodily accommodations, yet in
 exerting his highest excellencies, he is not like
 them dependent on fortune, both for his objects
 and his instruments; for objects towards whom
 he may exercise his virtues, and instruments
 which may enable him to effectuate his ends.
 Even unassisted and alone, though perhaps
 better with assistants, he can still think and
 theorize; possessing in the energies of his own
 mind, the purest and most independent enjoy-
 ments. These enjoyments are valuable pecu-
 liarly on their own account, since they termi-
 nate completely in themselves; whereas all prac-
 tical virtue has, beside the practice itself, some
 distinct and separate end in view. The tran-
 quillity of leisure is naturally more agreeable
 than the bustle of business; we toil for the
 sake of quiet, and make war for the sake of
 peace. But the practical virtues are most con-
 spicuously exercised in political and military
 functions,

B O O K functions, the latter of which none but the most
 { **X.** savage and sanguinary minds would exercise
 from choice, converting friends into enemies
 for the mere pleasure of fighting with them.
 Politics, too, forms an operose and troublesome
 occupation, which would not be undertaken
 from the sole love of performing political func-
 tions, independently of distinct and separate
 ends; power, wealth, and honour; in one
 word, prosperity to ourselves, friends, or fellow-
 citizens. But intellectual energies are com-
 plete and perfect in themselves, supplying an
 exhaustless stream of pure and perennial plea-
 sure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens
 the energies, and thus increases and refines the
 source from which it unceasingly springs; all-
 sufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is
 compatible with the condition of humanity.
 Were unalterable permanency added to such a
 life, its happiness would be more than human;
 but even within a limited term, its inestimable
 delights may be enjoyed by those who attain
 the perfection of their age and faculties; living
 not merely as partners with a frail and com-
 pound nature, but according to the simple and
 divine principle within them, whose energies
 and virtues as far transcend all others, as the
 intellectual substance in which they reside ex-
 cels all other substances of which our frame is
 composed^m. We ought not, therefore, accord-
 ing to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal,

^m *Analysis*, p. 57, and seq.

to regard only mortal things; but, as far as possible, to put on immortality, exerting ourselves to taste the joys of the intellectual life. This is living according to the best part of what we call ourselves, which, though seemingly small in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things besides^a. The intellect indeed is the best and sovereign part of our constitution, and therefore strictly and properly ourselves. It is absurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. What was above observed will apply here. The pleasure and good of each individual must consist in that which is most congenial to his nature^o. The intellectual life, therefore, must be the best and happiest for man; since the intellect is that which is peculiarly himself.

The moral life follows next, both in fitness and in dignity; for justice, fortitude, and other virtues, are highly suitable to the nature of man, and essentially requisite in social intercourse, that mutual wants may be supplied, and mutual duties may be performed; that individual passions may be moulded into propriety, and rendered as ornamental to those affected by them, as

Chap. 2.
—
and moral.

^a Analysis, p. 57, & seq.

^o In the third chapter of the third book of the *Topics*, p. 209, there is an excellent practical rule for distinguishing real goods from those merely of opinion, *και ει το μιν δι' αυτο, το δε, δια την δοξαν, αιρετον ον υγιεια καλλυς, ορος δε τα, προς δοξαν, το, μηδενος συνιδος, μη αν σπουδασαι υπαρχειν*. Things desirable in themselves are to be preferred to those which are desired merely on account of the opinion entertained of them, as health to beauty: but we may know what those things are that are good merely in opinion, by the following test: "they are those about which we would not give ourselves much trouble, if no person were to know that we possessed them."

bene-

BOOK beneficial to the public. Moral virtue, then,
X. is intimately connected with the passions and affections, many of which have their origin in the body; and, on the other hand, it is equally connected with the intellectual virtue of prudence; since the first principles of this practical wisdom originate in good moral habits; and those habits only are good which prudence justifies and approves. The moral virtues, therefore, are essential to the well-being of our compound nature; but the virtues and happiness of the intellect are, like the intellect itself, separate and independent: thus much only I shall say concerning it; for to treat more accurately of our intellectual part, belongs not to the subject of the present discourse. The happiness resulting from its energies, requires but few external advantages; fewer by far than are requisite for the exercise of political or moral virtues. The sage indeed, as well as the patriot, must be furnished with the necessaries of life; and although the labours of the latter have more connection with the body and its wants, yet this circumstance need not make any great difference in their personal accommodations; but it will make a difference of the greatest magnitude as to the exercise of their respective energies. For the man of liberality must be furnished with the means of beneficence; and the man of probity or equity, with the means of making, for received favours, fair and reasonable returns; mere intentions are obscure and doubtful; and being often pretended, can only be clearly ascer-

Pre-eminence of the former proved.

ascertained when carried into effect. In the **BOOK**
 same manner, fortitude shines most conspicuously **X.**
 when armed with power to repel dangers; and
 temperance displays its brightest charms, amidst
 temptations to voluptuousness. The vulgar con-
 troversy, whether virtue consists principally in
 action or intention, proves that both are requi-
 site to its completion. But actions are depend-
 ent on external circumstances; and in pro-
 portion to their greatness and brilliancy, they
 require for their performance, the greater
 number of instruments and auxiliaries. Specu-
 lation, on the other hand, is far less operose; it
 would be rather obstructed than benefited by a
 cumbersome apparatus of externals; which,
 how useful soever they may be for the display
 of practical virtue, are not at all essential to the
 exercise of intellectual energy. That the latter
 composes the best and firmest portion of human
 felicity may appear also from this, that it is
 difficult to conceive in what operation or energy
 besides, the felicity of the gods, whom universal
 consent acknowledges most happy, can possibly
 consist. In the exercise of justice? It would
 be ridiculous to suppose those celestial beings
 employed in making bargains, restoring deposits,
 or in performing any other actions about which
 the virtue of justice is conversant. There is, if
 possible, still less room among them for courage.
 Can it redound to their glory, that they en-
 counter dangers manfully? Liberality cannot
 be ascribed to them, unless we suppose, absurdly,
 that they make use of money, or something
 equiva-

The exer-
 cise of in-
 tellectual
 energy, the
 best and
 firmest por-
 tion of
 human
 happiness.

BOOK equivalent. The praise of temperance is beneath those who have not any unruly appetites to restrain. Were we to go through the whole catalogue of the moral virtues, we should find that they are conversant about actions totally unworthy of the grandeur and sublimity of the gods. Yet we all believe those glorious beings to live exercising the energies of their nature, not sleeping like Endymion. After what manner, then, can they be employed? Not in practical virtue, far less in productive industry. It remains therefore that they live an intellectual life; which, as essentially belonging to the gods, must be pre-eminent in happiness; a happiness pure and permanent, to which the life of man, in proportion as it is intellectual, will more nearly approximate; and of which inferior animals, as they are destitute of the divine principle of intellect, can never in any degree partake. Happiness is not an accessory to the energy of thought. It is connected with it substantially and indivisibly; a rich stream unceasingly flowing from an exhaustless spring. The sage indeed requires bodily health and bodily accommodations; but the measure of his external advantages needs not be large; for superfluity will neither assist his own exertions, nor sharpen his judgment concerning the performances of others. To display the beauty and gracefulness even of moral virtue, it is not necessary for him to be master of the sea and of the land. A mediocrity of circumstances is sufficient for the exhibition of moral excellencies;

cies; which is evident from this, that they appear more frequently in private persons than in those invested with power. This mediocrity, therefore, as it contributes most to virtue, is most conducive to happiness. Solon well delineated the condition of those whose happiness he admired; saying, "that they had enjoyed a moderate proportion of the goods of fortune, performed most illustrious actions, and lived correctly and soberly^o." Anaxagoras seems not to have thought happiness an attribute of wealth or power, when he said^p, that it would not surprise him, should he be deemed a very absurd personage by the multitude; who judge, and who are capable of judging, only by externals. The opinions of wise men are likely to be conformable to reason; but in practical matters, experience alone can afford conviction; and those opinions only are to be approved, which the lives of those who hold them, confirm. There is still a farther reason why those who most cultivate their intellectual powers, should also be most happy; for such persons not only attain the best temper of mind, and the highest

^o See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii. p. 305 and 306.

^p In the Ethics to Eudemus, l. i. c. iv. p. 197. the circumstance here alluded to is more fully explained. "Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, being asked who most deserved the epithet of happy? answered, not such men as you would imagine, but, on the contrary, such persons as to you would appear egregious fools. He probably answered thus, because he perceived him with whom he was conversing incapable of appreciating happiness by any other standard than that of mere externals, power, wealth, beauty, &c. whereas he himself thought *that* man the happiest who lived exempt from pain or perturbation, practicing justice, and cultivating his understanding."

per-

B O O K perfection of their own nature, but they are
 X. also the most pleasing in the sight of the Divinity.
 If the gods (as they appear to do) concern themselves about human affairs, it is reasonable to conclude that they should most delight in the energies of intellect, which are the best, and brightest, and most congenial to their own; and that they should remunerate and reward those who love and honour those exercises and occupations which they themselves hold dear; and who, in preferring and adorning the intellectual part, act rightly and honourably.¹

Chap. 9. Having thus delineated virtue, friendship, and pleasure, ought we to consider our undertaking as now finished? Or ought we rather to consider, as has been already said, that in practical matters, practice, and not theory, is the main object; and that, independently of good actions, the mere speculative knowledge of virtue is not of any avail. The important question then is, How men may be rendered virtuous? If moral discourses sufficed for this purpose, they could not be purchased, as Theognis says, at too high a price. But the influence of such lessons extends only over the liberal minds of ingenuous and well-disciplined youths, who may thereby be retained within the paths of honour and duty: they are too feeble to

The efficacy of education.

¹ The highest energy of intellect consists in contemplating the Divinity; and when any inferior principle in man, through its rebellion and irregularity, restrains him from thus meditating on and worshipping God, that principle is destructive of human happiness. Eudem. l. vii. c. ult.

controul

controul the multitude, whose wickedness is to be restrained, not through the dread of shame, but through the fear of punishment; since the many, being enslaved by their appetites, make it the business of their lives to pursue sensual pleasures, and to avoid bodily pains; having no taste nor perception of refined and laudable enjoyments. What eloquence can persuade, what words can transform men thus brutified? It is impossible, at least hardly possible, for reasoning to extract the evils which custom has riveted; and when all favourable circumstances concur, the felicity of those is still worthy of envy, who, through the combined energy of conspiring causes, are retained and confirmed in the practice of virtue. This inestimable possession, some ascribe to the bounty of nature; others think that it is to be acquired only by custom; and a third class acknowledge themselves indebted for it to instruction. The virtue bestowed by nature evidently depends not on our own exertions; it is given by a certain divine disposal, to those whose lot is surely beyond that of all other men most fortunate. Instruction and reasoning will not succeed, unless the mind is previously wrought on by custom, as a field is ploughed and prepared for receiving and nourishing the good seed: for those who are not habituated to love what is amiable, and to detest what is odious, would neither listen to, nor understand, exhortations to virtue; because their affections lead them not beyond the pursuit of coarse animal gratifications, the

VOL. I.

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inordi-

BOOK X inordinate appetite for which is of too stubborn a nature to yield to mere reason; and which, when no contrary passion intervenes, can be checked only by force. Before virtue, therefore, can be acquired, affections congenial to it must be implanted; the love of beauty and excellence, the hatred of baseness and deformity; which preparatory discipline cannot take place, except in those states which are governed by good laws; for a life of soberness and self-command is irksome to the multitude, and peculiarly displeasing to the headstrong impetuosity of youthful passions, which must therefore be bridled by the authority of law; that what is painful by nature, may become pleasant through custom. The superintending aid of discipline ought not to be confined to children, but must extend to adolescence and manhood; the greater portion of human kind remaining through life rather slaves to necessity, than subjects of reason, and more susceptible of the fear of punishment, than sensible to the charms of moral excellence. Legislators, therefore, it is said, ought to employ admonitions and chastisements, as well as punishments that are final; admonitions, for those whose character and morals render them open to conviction; chastisements, for those whose immoderate and beastly passion for selfish pleasures must be subdued and corrected by coarse bodily pains; (the pains inflicted on them standing as nearly as possible in direct opposition to the pleasures which they unlawfully pursued;) and total extermination, or perpetual banishment,

ment, for the extreme evils of incurable profligacy and incorrigible villany. Since then the condition of the greater proportion of mankind is such, that to be kept within the bounds of propriety and virtue, they require not only the benefits of early institution, but the watchfulness of perpetual discipline through life, good laws become essentially necessary for upholding this discipline by their coercive authority. The influence of fathers over their children is too feeble for this purpose; or indeed the influence of any individuals not invested with public authority. Law has a compulsive and necessary force, since it is acknowledged as the commanding voice of prudence and reason; and its power is not invidious, like that of men, who are apt to offend us, when they oppose, even most justly, our favourite propensities. In Lacedæmon, the legislator, with the assistance of a few friends, established a regular plan of public education and moral discipline; things neglected in the greater part of states, where men, in these particulars, live like the Cyclops—

By whom no statutes and no rights are known,
No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
Heedless of others, to his own severe.

ILIAD, ix. v. 127, & seq.

A public education, when good, is doubtless preferable to a private one; but what is omitted by the public, individuals ought, as far as possible, to supply; instructing and benefiting their children

M M 2

children

B O O K children and friends; which task they will be
 { **X.** the better qualified to perform, if they are
 acquainted with those principles of legislation
 from which public happiness flows; for the same
 principles that operate conspicuously on nations;
 will also have their due weight within a narrow
 domestic sphere, especially since the ties of
 blood, and the remembrance of benefits, will
 recommend paternal examples, and enforce
 paternal admonitions. Private education en-
 joys this peculiar advantage, that it may be
 adapted to the disposition and character of each
 individual. Besides this, physicians who have
 few patients, and masters of exercises who
 have few pupils, are most likely to be attentive
 to those intrusted to their care. But their power
 of being useful to them depends on their skill in
 their respective professions; and although some,
 from experience merely, without science, may
 learn to be good physicians to themselves, while
 they are incapable of curing any besides, yet it
 is always most desirable, whether it be our
 business to benefit one or many, to instruct one
 or many, that we should understand those gene-
 ral theorems from which the particular rules of
 practice flow. A teacher of morality therefore
 ought to be acquainted with the science of
 legislation, that he may apply to the improve-
 ment of individuals the same maxims which
 have been found beneficial to communities.
 But how is this science to be acquired? It
 seems to be a branch of politics, and ought
 there-

The sci-
 ence of le-
 gislation,
 how to be
 acquired.

therefore to be learned from statesmen. Yet do not statesmen differ from physicians, painters, and all those employed in other liberal arts, or other learned professions, in this important particular, that all the rest not only exercise, but teach, their respective vocations? Whereas statesmen are never the teachers of politics, nor are the teachers of politics often employed in affairs of state. The sophists who profess politics, take not any share in the public administration; and the statesmen, who administer public affairs, do not profess politics; they neither give lectures on the subject, nor write treatises concerning it; although this employment would be more useful and more dignified than that of polishing their pleadings and embellishing their speeches. Neither do they transmit their political knowledge to their children and friends, which they certainly would, if they were able, since they could not bequeath to them a nobler present, nor one more beneficial to their country. It is plain, therefore, that the knowledge of statesmen is a matter, not of science (which always may be taught), but of experience merely; and this experience, which is sufficient to form politicians, must be essentially necessary to those who would understand politics as a science. The sophists who pretend to teach this science, deviate widely from the mark. They neither know what is the nature of politics, nor what are its objects; otherwise they could not regard it as a subordinate branch of rhetoric, nor think it an easy matter to copy

BOOK good laws from one state, that may be safely
X. adopted by another'; as if it were not a work
of the utmost delicacy, and requiring much
reach of thought, and much experience, to
adapt laws and institutions to occasions and
exigencies, and to change and vary them ac-
cording to each variation of circumstance. In
music and painting, the vulgar of mankind
are contented with perceiving the effect, which
is the only thing of which they are judges;
but persons skilled in these elegant arts must
understand how this effect is produced, what
colours kindly blend, and what sounds sweetly
harmonize. Laws are productions or works of
political art; an art which, being practical;
cannot, any more than the art of physic, be
learned merely from books; for though medical
books not only contain recipes or prescriptions,
but, accurately distinguishing different habits and
different maladies, distinctly point out how each
separately is to be treated and cured, yet all
these observations cannot be of the smallest use
to men totally destitute of experience in the
healing art. The same holds with regard to
treatises on the subject of politics, which can-
not be of much value to those who have not
learned by their own observation to appreciate
and apply them. An aptitude and readiness
for acquiring knowledge, books, doubtless,
may communicate and augment; but real prac-
tical knowledge cannot possibly be acquired

* How strongly applicable is this remark to the sophists of the
present day!

without

without the aid of experience. As our predecessors, therefore, have left the science of legislation unfinished, it may be proper here to examine it, as well as to treat the subject of politics in general, that the philosophy which bears a reference to the affairs of human life may be perfected to the best of our ability. We shall first collect what appears to us judiciously written by others on particular branches of the subject. We shall then, from a wide survey of commonwealths and governments, endeavour to explain the means through which those political edifices in general, and the different kinds of them in particular, are preserved or subverted; as well as to unfold the causes which render some constitutions worthy of applause, and others liable to censure. The result of our speculations will enable us to determine which is the best form of government, and what are the different regulations respectively best adapted to each particular constitution.*

* The method here laid down by Aristotle agrees not precisely, either with that followed by the editors of his *Politics* in Greek, or with the arrangement which, for the sake of perspicuity, I have thought fit to give to my translation.

In the act of finishing this first volume, I was much pleased to read the following passage in an excellent discourse lately delivered before the University of Cambridge: "Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* afford not only the most perfect specimen of scientific morality, but exhibit also the powers of the most compact and best constructed system which the human intellect ever produced upon any subject; enlivening occasionally great severity of method, and strict precision of terms, by the sublimest, though soberest, splendour of diction. If moral philosophy, I mean specifically and properly so called, is to be studied as a science, in such sources it is to be sought. Thence will be formed a manly intellectual vigour, an ingenuous modesty and dignity of habit, an energy of thought and diction, and a reach of

BOOK comprehensive knowledge, which distinguishes the true English scholar. On the contrary, it is to be feared that the feeble speculation which almost all modern systems of morality encourage, and the superficial information they afford, superseding the necessity of all active and real employment of the faculties, have operated more fatally upon the mental habits of the rising generation than total ignorance could possibly have done." See "Benevolence exclusively an Evangelical Virtue," p. 19, & seq. by Thomas Rennell, D.D., late fellow of King's College, Cambridge; now Master of the Temple, and Dean of Winchester.

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
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
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
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ARISTOTLE'S
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK :

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY

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HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

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THE THIRD EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

**PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES,
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1813.

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ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book embraces three subjects, the noblest and most interesting that civil science can boast; the origin of society and government, the distinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and a comparison of the best plans of political economy. On each of these topics I shall offer a few remarks, not with the presumption of interposing my own judgment, but with the hope of justifying or illustrating the decisions of my Author.

BOOK
I.

In explaining the origin of political society, Aristotle writes neither the satire nor the panegyric of human nature; which, by writers of less wisdom than fancy, have been alternately substituted for plain history. In this, as in all other inquiries, his first question is, what are the

VOL. II.

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phæno-

B O O K ^{I.} **phænomena?** His second, what is the analogy of nature? Building on these foundations, he concludes, that both society and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to scatter its seeds. Neither the cunning cowardly principles asserted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections espoused by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, ought, according to our author's notions, to be involved in the solution of the present question; since the first political societies are as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of moral determination^a, as the instinctive actions of plants and insects, tending to the preservation of their respective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own^b, even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the most consummate wisdom.

Government, then, is coëval with society, and society with men. Both are the works of nature; and in explaining their origin, there is not the smallest ground for the fanciful supposition of engagements and contracts, independently of which the great modern antagonist of Aristotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding: "The original compact, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen

^a See vol. i. p. 126. & seq.; and p. 396. & seq.

^b Ibid.
capable

capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world^c." From this maxim, perpetually inculcated in Locke's two treatises on government, is fairly deducible the unalienable right of mankind to be *self-governed*; that is, to be their own legislators, and their own directors; or, if they find it inconvenient to assume the administration of affairs in their own persons, to appoint representatives who may exercise a delegated sovereignty, essentially and unalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence results the new unalienable right of all mankind to be fairly represented, — a right with which each individual was invested from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the least notion of the thing^d. From this right to fair representation, there follows, by necessary consequence, the right of universal suffrage, universal eligibility, and the universal and just

^c Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185. Edit. of 1714.

^d According to the system of Locke and his followers, representatives are appointed by the people to exercise, in their stead, political functions which the people have a right to exercise in their own persons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the people; and to the people, their constituents, they always are responsible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the first or principal author. But representatives, in the usual and legal acceptance of the word in the English constitution, meant, and still means, persons in virtue of their election exercising political functions, which the people had not a right to exercise in their own persons, and so little responsible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their instructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with representation in the usual and only practical sense of the word, will be shewn hereafter.

B O O K preponderancy of majorities in all cases what-
 I. ever.

Such is the boasted and specious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux^c, continued in those of our Price^f and our Priestley^g, and carried to the utmost extravagance in those of (I wish not to say our) Rousseau^h, Paineⁱ, and the innumerable pamphleteers whose writings occasioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions.

Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumstances of the times, have produced, and are still producing, the most extraordinary and most pestilent effects^k; by arming the passions of the multitude with principle, fortifying them by argument, and thereby stirring into action those discordant elements which naturally lurk in the bosom of every community. It is not consistent with my design, in defending the tenets of my author, to answer his political adversaries with declamation and obloquy, (a rash and dangerous attempt! since the voice of the many will always be the loudest and the strongest,) but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great master Locke be itself founded in truth. To

^c See his Case of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113. and again p. 169. "I have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not consent."

^f Observations on Civil Liberty, &c.

^g Essay on the first Principles of Government.

^h Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique.

ⁱ Rights of Man, &c.

^k These effects have terminated, as was predicted in the first edition of this book, in the usurpation and military tyranny of a single despot.

prove

prove that government is merely a matter of consent, he assumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy; what he calls a state of nature, which he defines to be "men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them¹." But he himself seems aware that this supposed natural state of man is a state in which man never yet was found; and in which, if by violence thrust, he could not for a single day remain. Locke, I say, saw the difficulty, which, instead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. "Where are there," he asks, "or ever were there, any men in such a state of nature?" He answers, "that since all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in a state of nature, 'tis plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state²." But this, I affirm, is not to answer the proposed question; for princes and rulers of independent states do not live together, nor associate and "herd," as he himself expresses it, in the same society. If they did so, they could not subsist without government: for government and society are things absolutely inseparable; they commence together; they grow up together; they are both of them equally natural; and so indissolubly united, that the destruction of the one is necessarily accompanied by the destruction of the other. This is the true sense of Aristotle as understood and

¹ Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164.

² Ibid. p. 162.

^a Ibid.

B O O K expressed by an illustrious defender of just government and genuine liberty. "As we use and exercise our bodily members, before we understand the ends and purposes of this exercise, so it is by Nature herself, that we are united and associated into political society^o."

Locke, who so severely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, so unjustly arraigns what is called Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, appears to have equally mistaken his *Politics*. Had he understood^p that invaluable work, this idol of modern philosophers, and especially of modern politicians, would not, probably, (since he was a man of great worth as well as of great wisdom,) have produced a theory of government totally impossible in practice; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and sedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all history, no political fabric ever yet was reared; or, if it were to be reared, could ever possibly be preserved^q. The neglect

* Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priusquam didicimus cuius ea utilitatis causâ habeamus; sic inter nos naturâ ad civilem communitatem conjuncti & consociati sumus. De Fin. Bon. & Mal. l. iii. c. xx. Conf. de Officiis, l. i. c. xvi. & seq. Cicero does not say "communitatem" simply, but "civilem communitatem," which agrees with Aristotle's definition of man, ζῷον πολιτικόν not merely a herding, but a political animal. See the same doctrine in Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh.

^p Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had asked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. "To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke observes, "the foundation should be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the several species of it. Aristotle is allowed a master in this science, and few enter into this consideration of government without reading his *Politics*." How honourable a testimony!

^q Aristot. Polit. passim,

or misapprehension of some of the most important parts of the Stagirite's writings is indeed most deeply to be lamented. Of the many thousand authors who have copied or commented his logic, the far greater number omit his interesting chapters on language; deeming the consideration of words below the dignity of philosophers. His profound observations concerning the nature and constitution of a family have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analysis of language has been proved in the present work to be the sole foundation of logic, so his analysis of a family, and his explanation of the causes through which its elements naturally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to discern the analogous principles (principles continually insisted on by himself) which have raised and upheld the great edifice of civil society; "which is not a mass but a system, and which, like every system, implies a distinction of parts; with many moral as well as physical differences, relative and reciprocal; the powers and perfections of one part supplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dignity, is an attempt not less absurd than that of composing a piece of music from one and the same note".

A difficult question follows, how far social inequality, whether civil or domestic, may be allowed to extend? It is with a trembling hand

^r *Aristot. Polit. passim.*

BOOK that I touch the delicate subject of slavery ; an
I.
 I. undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmost confidence in the humanity as well as in the judgment of my author. First of all, Aristotle expressly condemns the cruel practice, prevalent in his own days, of enslaving prisoners of war^{*} : secondly, he declares, in the most explicit terms, all slaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are fitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he observes, must in all cases be limited by their capacities for receiving them ; and these capacities are themselves limited by the exigencies and necessities of our present imperfect condition. The helplessness of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and the urgencies attending mankind in every stage of their existence on earth, render it indispensably necessary that a great proportion of the species should be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the strenuous exertions of productive industry, and the petty tasks of domestic drudgery. Nature, therefore, in whose plan and intention the system of society precedes and takes place of the parts of which

^{*} Locke says on this subject, " There is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who, being captives taken in a just war, are by the rights of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in a state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 181. — We should imagine that the *liberal* Locke and the *slavish* Aristotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and principles.

it is composed, has variously organised and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without setting other bounds to this variety, than are imposed by the good of the whole system, of which individuals are not independent units, but constituent elements. According to this plan or intention, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the widest of all discriminations, and the lowest of all occupations, domestic servitude, "a species of labour not employed in production, but totally consumed in use;" because solely, but not unprofitably, spent in promoting the ease and accommodation of life. In the relation of master and servant, the good of the master may indeed be the primary object; but the benefit of the servant or slave is also a necessary result; since he only is naturally and justly a slave, whose powers are competent to mere bodily labour; who is capable of listening to reason, but incapable of exercising that sovereign faculty; and whose weakness and short-sightedness are so great, that it is safer for him to be guided or governed through life by the prudence and judgment of another. But, let it always be remembered, — "that one class of men ought to have the qualifications requisite for masters, before another can either fitly or usefully be employed as slaves." Government, then, not only civil but domestic, is a most serious duty, a most sacred trust; a trust, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the supposed unalienable rights of all

BOOK
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B O O K all men to be self-governed^c. Those rights, and those only, are unalienable, which it is impossible for one person to exercise for another: and to maintain those to be natural and unalienable rights, which the persons, supposed to be invested with them, can never possibly exercise, consistently either with their own safety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature^d; of which it is the primary and unalter-

I.

^c Politics would not be a science, unless it contained truths, absolute, universal, and unalterable. One of these is that in the text; because essentially springing from the nature of society and of man. Another universal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From these two premises, it necessarily follows, that the main object of political society never can be effectuated on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without supposing all sovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to participate) may, under many given circumstances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large a controul in the government. This controul in all large communities can only be conveniently exercised either by particular magistrates, or by representative assemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any necessary connection with the origin of government (so far from being its *only just principle*) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be shewn hereafter that assemblies elected by the people to provide for their interests, and thence called their representatives, are not so new in the world as is commonly imagined. In some republics we shall see a double row of delegates, representatives of representatives; in others, we shall find representation and taxation regarded as correlatives; and even in some democracies, we shall meet with persons elected by the people, and representing them in the most useful sense of the word, "that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wise and good, would act for themselves."

^d Stat ratio contra, & secretam garrir in aurem,
Ne liceat facere id, quod quis vitabit agendo.
Publica lex hominum, naturaque continet hoc fas,
Ut teneat vetitos inscitia debilis actus.

Perfius, Satyr. v. 96.

able

able law, that forecast should direct im-
 providence, reason controul passion, wisdom
 command folly*. I now proceed to examine
 Aristotle's reflections on political economy,
 which are not less adverse than his long mis-
 understood and often mistated vindication of
 slavery itself, both to the theories formerly pre-
 valent, and to others which have begun recently
 to prevail among the civilized nations of modern
 Europe.

The Northern conquerors, who invaded and
 desolated the Roman empire, disdained to pro-
 duce, by slow industry, what they gloried in
 ravishing by sudden violence. War was their
 delight and their trade. They subsisted by
 rapine; and therefore cared not how far they
 were excelled by others in peaceful and pro-
 ductive arts, while gold, and all that it can pur-
 chase, might be conquered by iron. But the
 spoils of rapacity having supplied them with the
 instruments of luxury, they began to relish the
 pleasures of repose; and instead of courting
 new dangers abroad, to imitate at home those
 objects and conveniencies which, though they
 had not the genius to invent, they gradually
 acquired the taste to approve, the vanity to dis-
 play, and the desire to accumulate. Manufac-
 tures then were established; navigation was
 exercised for the purpose not only of war but
 of traffic: an extensive commerce was intro-

* Αμυνει ουκ ὑπο φρονιμην αγωσθαι, μαλιστα μὲν ἔχοντες ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ δι-
 μή, ἐξωθεν κεραισιν. Plato in Repub. x. p. 741.

duced;

B O O K I. ^{I.}duced ; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpose of all these operations was, to augment in each country the quantity of gold and silver ; since, with these precious metals, all other coveted objects might usually be procured. The business of each individual merchant is to get money ; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reasonably have any other end in view. This false principle was regarded as the basis of all sound political arithmetic ; and the most conclusive reasoning of Aristotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have sufficed to prove, that national wealth consisted not in gold and silver, had not the ruined state of Spain confirmed experimentally the same important truth.

For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations consists in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknowledge also, with him, that the precious metals, in contradistinction to other useful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of serving as the fittest instruments of exchange, and the most accurate measures of value ; but that the quantity or number in which they ought to be desired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other measures or instruments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and operations which they are employed to answer or effect¹. Yet while they reason thus justly

¹ It is worthy of remark that Locke is one of the most strenuous asserters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he considers

justly respecting gold and silver, the same writers have wanted acuteness and enlargement of mind to generalise the theorem, and to perceive, with our author, that property itself is as much an instrument as money, though serving for a far more complicated purpose; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpose requires, the surplus will be at best useless, most commonly pernicious; will inflame desire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and produce that long train of disorders, which made our philosopher declare, "that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Isles, unless their virtue kept pace with their external prosperity, must inevitably become the most miserable of all mankind." In the fashionable systems of modern politicians, national wealth is considered as synonymous with national prosperity. To the increase of productive industry, and the augmentation of public revenue, health, education, and morals, are sacrificed without apology and without remorse; since that trade is universally held to be the best, which produces most money with the least labour. But according to Aristotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the statesman's care, but the effect

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considers "as the most solid and substantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy." See the passage quoted and refuted in Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, v. ii. p. 140. 8vo. edit. It is time that, with regard to subjects still more important, men should return from the school of Locke to that of Aristotle.

which

BOOK ^{I.} which the producing of that work naturally operates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praises of agriculture and a country life, our author's sentiments, and even expressions, have been faithfully and generally copied by the most judicious writers of antiquity; many of whom mark, with as much reprobation as Aristotle himself, that species of traffic cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain; since such a traffic, universally diffused among a people, has a tendency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their principles; to make them value as ends, things only useful as means; and to debase and corrupt every part of their character; because wherever wealth is the primary object of pursuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal source of enjoyment². In agriculture and pasturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the industry of man. They are of all occupations, the most beneficial and most necessary, as well as the most agreeable and most salutary; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmest and happiest temperament of the mind and body: and the property acquired by them is intrinsically more valuable, because essentially more useful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewise maintains, that those natural and primeval pursuits are of all the least likely to engender sloth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices; and that nations of husbandmen, in particular, afford ma-

² Πλάτων τιμῶν καὶ σοφροσύνην αἶμα κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἀδύνατον. Plato in Repub. viii. p. 718. edit. Ficin.

terials

terials susceptible of the best political form, and the least disposed to disturb, by sedition, any moderately good government under which it is their lot to live. In consideration of so many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the most favoured branch of national industry; an opinion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by false system, could venture to contradict. Yet, how far other methods of accumulating stock, beside those proposed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or discouraged and rejected, must depend on circumstances and events, the force of which the philosopher's experience could not supply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From the artifices and shifts which he explains, (and he is the only writer that explains them,) as practised by the republics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpose of raising money, it was impossible for him to conjecture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical government should attain such stability as rendered the public revenues a safe mortgage to creditors; that the immense debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by interesting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of constituted authorities, to augment that facility itself, and thereby still farther to accumulate the national debt; for discharging the interest of which, heavy taxes must necessarily, but not altogether unprofitably,

B O O K profitably, be levied, since they would, in some
 { **I.** measure, repay, in public security, the burdens
 which they impose on personal labour, or rather
 the sums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot possibly be raised, except in countries flourishing in such resources as agriculture and pasturage alone were never yet able to afford; resources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained, on the other, by the powers of national industry, assisted and multiplied by a nicely complicated machinery, and an endless subdivision of allotted tasks; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterously, because each has but one, and that a small part, to perform^a; while the diligence of all is perpetually stimulated by the bait of gain, supplied from the exhaustless fund of an enlightened commercial spirit, as extensive as the world, and as enterprising as those renowned adventurers who discovered and explored its remotest regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy proposed by Aristotle, be in itself preferable to that which some modern nations pursue. Nations, circumstanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but must principally depend for supplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better system is **now**

^a Πλεοντεί καὶ ἕκαστα γίνονται, καὶ καλλίον, καὶ ῥαόν, ὅταν εἰς ἓν, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁγῶν, πρᾶττη. Plato, *ibid.* ii. p. 599.

no longer in their power : the question of expediency has ceased : they must obey necessity^b. BOOK
I.

This seems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial system of economy ; a system which has often been defended by very inconclusive arguments. "Public wealth and prosperity," Mr. Hume observes, "is the end of all our wishes;" and this wealth or prosperity, both he and his follower, Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful industry ; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may produce as much food as will maintain

^b It is not difficult to explain why the doctrines of speculative politicians respecting the wealth and economy of nations, should also differ so materially from the theory proposed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who subdued the Roman empire, every thing most valuable and most interesting is connected with the improvement of arts, and consequent extension of commerce ; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engrossed whole provinces, dissipated the superfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle servants and worthless dependents, ever ready to gratify the wildest and wickedest of their passions ; to abet their insolence, to uphold their haughtiness, to encourage and second their violence and rapacity ; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed aristocracies, formed the worst species of oligarchy ; an oligarchy consisting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of each individual lord over his respective vassals and retainers. In such a condition of society the expensive allurements of luxury, produced by what Aristotle condemns as over-refinement in arts and manufactures, had the most direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themselves ; to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to bestow consideration on the many. This particular case has been, by a very usual fallacy in reasoning, converted into a general political theorem.

BOOK many^c. But this assertion is not true in the
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 I.
 } acceptance in which it must be taken, in order
 to recommend the commercial system above the
 agricultural. In agriculture, as we above ob-
 served, nature operates in concert with man ;
 and though one family co-operating with nature,
 may, in a given piece of ground, produce as
 much food as will serve six, yet six families
 labouring the same ground, will not reap a pro-
 portional increase ; and twenty families labour-
 ing the same ground, may find it barely suf-
 ficient to supply their own nourishment. The
 more that the land is laboured, it will be the
 more productive ; and the more fitly and fairly
 it is divided^d, it will (other circumstances re-
 maining the same) be the more laboured ; and
 the same country or island will thus maintain
 the greater proportion of inhabitants employed
 in that kind of work, which, according to
 Aristotle, is the most favourable to health, mo-
 rals, good government, the unfolding of intel-
 lectual as well as corporeal powers, and the
 attainment of that measure of happiness which
 the general mass of mankind can ever in this
 world hope to reach.

^c Hume's *Essays*, vol. i. *Refinement of Arts* ; and Smith's
Wealth of Nations, *passim*.

^d Does our author, therefore, propose an Agrarian law ? No ; he
 knew better. The second book of his politics is of all books ever
 written, the best adapted to prove to levellers themselves, that the
 measures from which they expect so much good, would, if carried
 into execution, infallibly terminate in their own ruin and that of the
 community.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Nature and end of a commonwealth. — Analysis thereof. — Monarchy the first form of government. — Domestic œconomy. — Slavery. — Accumulation of stock. — Riches, real and artificial. — Commerce. — Money. — Manufactures. — Monopolies. — Women. — Children. — Slaves. — Connection between domestic and political œconomy.

EVERY political society forms, it is plain, a sort of community or partnership, instituted for the benefit of the partners. Utility^d is the end and aim of every such institution; and the greatest and most extensive utility is the aim of

BOOK
I.
Chap. I.
Nature and
end of a
common-
wealth.

^d The first sentence of the Politics may be translated literally thus: "Since we see that every commonwealth is a partnership, and that every partnership is established for the sake of some good, (good, real or apparent, being the cause of all human action,) it is plain that all partnerships have good for their end and aim; and especially, that the sovereign good must be the aim of that sovereign partnership, which comprehends all the rest, and which is known by the name of a commonwealth, or of political society." The word utility in the text is therefore taken in its most extensive signification; utility, in the strict sense, constituting but one branch, and that the lowest of το αγαθον. See the Ethics, l. i. & x. passim. Plato uses the word utility nearly in the modern sense. καλλιστα γαρ δε τετο και λυγεται και λελεξεται, οτι το μιν οφελιμον καλον, το δε βλαβερον αισχυρον, Plato de Repub. l. v. p. 655. Edit. Ficini. "This is most excellently said, and will ever continue to be said, that whatever is useful is honourable, and whatever is hurtful is shameful." In the Gorgias, p. 324. το καλον is analysed into pleasure and utility; a system revived by Mr. Hume in his Inquiry into the Principles of Morals. In both these significations "utility" is different from το χρησιμον a word denoting what is good or desirable, not in itself, but as useful or subservient to some desirable purpose.

BOOK that great association, comprehending all the
 I. rest, and known by the name of a common-wealth^c.

A commonwealth is not to be confounded with a family, as if a large family were nothing different from a small commonwealth; nor ought we, as too many do, to confound the functions of kings and magistrates with those of superintendants^f or masters. Magistrates rule by an established rotation; kings reign for life^g; and

^c As I shall frequently have occasion to use the words republic and commonwealth, the signification of which has been of late years strangely altered, I cannot better explain Aristotle's meaning of those terms than in the words of Cicero. "Respublica res est populi, cum bene et iuste geritur," &c. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people, when it is well and rightly administered, whether by a single prince, by a small body of nobles, or by the people at large. But injustice converts the nobles into a faction; the prince, into a tyrant; the people into tyrants. In all these cases alike, the republic is not only corrupted but annihilated; since that cannot be called the wealth of the people which is administered by a faction or a tyrant; nor can that multitude be called the people, which is not associated on principles of justice and public utility." *Fragm. de Repub.* l. iii. Alluding to the sense above given to the word "commonwealth," James I. said to his Parliament in 1603, "I will ever prefer the wealth of the public and of the whole *commonwealth* to any particular and private ends of mine."

^f The *οικονομος* was a person appointed by rich men to manage their domestic concerns, and particularly to superintend and direct the labour of their slaves. When the *διοικητης*, or master, was a poor man, he performed the office of *οικονομος* himself; for this reason Aristotle says, *ὅσον, αν μιν ολιγων διοικηται αν δε πλειονων, οικονομον*. "As if there were no other distinction between a master and a superintendant, but that the former had the government of a few and the latter of more."

^g The original says, *ὅταν μιν αὐτος ἐφειγῃ, βασιλικόν ὅταν δὲ κατὰ λόγον τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης, κατὰ μέρος ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχομένων, πολιτικόν*. The Latin translators all mistake the passage, "Esse quidem regem, si ipse præsit," &c. But Aristotle says, "when the same person perpetually presides, the government is regal; it is, on the other hand, republican when power changes from one hand to another,"

and considered in reference to the number of **BOOK**
those subject to their authority, the jurisdic- **L**
tion of superintendants is commonly more ex-
tensive than that of masters or fathers, and al-
ways more limited than that of magistrates and
kings. These, however, are but accidental dis-
tinctions; others more invariable and more
scientific, will result from analysing (according
to our usual mode of investigation) that complex
object, a commonwealth, into its constituent
elements; those simple and ultimate principles,
that admit not of farther resolution.

In this analysis, we shall proceed most satis- **Analysis of**
factorily^a by viewing society in its growth. Those **political**
parts or elements, then, will naturally force them- **society.**
selves into union, which cannot continue sepa-
rately to exist. The necessity of perpetuating
the species, forms the combining principle be-

another, and the citizens rule by vicarious succession, according to the
established principles of social arrangement." What these principles
are, we shall afterwards see. It is sufficient at present to observe that
they are totally incompatible with the new-fangled doctrines concern-
ing universal suffrage and the right of majorities. The learned reader
will perceive that I have here changed the order of the words, the
better to express the sense. The significant brevity of the Greek
particles knit firmly together distant clauses and sentences. But
their force could only be expressed in other languages by tiresome
circumlocutions.

^a Aristotle says, "In this, as in other inquiries, we should spe-
culate most successfully, could we contemplate society in its formation
or genesis." This is that comprehensive and sublime analysis which
Aristotle has applied with such unremitting patience to the most im-
portant subjects of philosophy; and which is well illustrated in ma-
thematics by the learned Barrow, in his Geometrical Lectures; the
principles of which probably laid the foundation of Newton's great
discoveries.

B O O K I. ^{I.} tween males and females; a principle independent of choice or design, and alike incident to animals and to plants, which are all naturally¹ impelled to propagate their respective kinds. The same imperious necessity which compels association, naturally² produces government. Communities could not subsist without foresight to discern, as well as exertion to effectuate the measures requisite for their safety. Men capable of discerning those measures, are made for authority; and men merely capable of effectuating them by bodily labour, are made for obedience; but if safety be their common concern, the good of the governors must correspond with the good of the governed, and the interest of the servant must coincide with the interest of the master.

Why women and slaves are confounded by barbarians.

It is found by experience, that those instruments are the most perfect, which are each of them contrived for its specific use. Slaves and women, though confounded in one mass by barbarians, are therefore naturally different; for nature works not after the niggardly fashion of Delphic cutlers¹, who shape the same knife for various and often dissimilar offices; and if women are by barbarians reduced to the level of slaves, it is because barbarians themselves have never yet risen to the rank of men, that is, of

¹ See Analysis, p. 126.

² Ibid.

¹ Delphi, as the seat of the oracle, being continually frequented by strangers, exhibited a perpetual fair or market, where each customer might be supplied with wares agreeable to his taste, and suitable to his purse. History of Greece, vol. i. c. v.

men

men fit to govern; wherefore the poets say, BOOK
I.
 “ ’Tis right the Greeks should govern the barbarians.”

Of the affociations above mentioned, that of a family is the first in its origin. “ A house, a wife, and a labouring ox,” these, together with the husband or master, form the elements of the first community; for a poor man must be contented with a labouring ox instead of a slave. This primary affociation, founded on daily exigency, Charondas^m distinguishes by a word denoting those fed from the same board, and Epimenidesⁿ describes it by a word denoting those warmed at the same hearth.

Origin and
progress of
society.

Next in order follows the affociation of a canton or village, founded indeed on utility, but not on daily exigency, and most naturally formed by colonization from the first house or family. Such a community, therefore, is justly expressed by a word denoting those nourished from the same milk. It is the affociation of kinsmen un-

^m Commonly reputed the legislator of Thurii, anciently Sybaria. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 485. Edit. Wesseling. He is mentioned afterwards by Aristotle. The sublime preface to his laws is contained in Stobæus, Serm. 42. p. 289.

ⁿ Probably in that work of his mentioned by Laertius, and intitled Περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας. On the government of Crete. Apuleius says, he was Pythagoras's master, and Plato relates that he came to Athens ten years before the battle of Marathon, or five hundred years before Christ. (Plato de Legibus, l. i.) According to Plutarch (in Solon.), Cicero (de Divin. l. 18.), Pausanias (Attic.), Epimenides had made a journey from Crete to Athens near a century before that period, and had prepared the way by his expiations and predictions, for Solon's legislation. He is believed to have lived above 150 years (Corfin. Fast. Attic.). The Catalogue of the works ascribed to him, particularly of his theological and mystical poems, is given by Fabricius, t. i. p. 37. & seq.

BOOK

I.

Why monarchy was the first form of government.

der the authority of their common progenitor, whose jurisdiction slowly extends with the gradual multiplication of his family^o. Cities therefore were first subject to kings; and to some kind of monarchy, many nations have invariably adhered; for all of them have grown to their present magnitude from feeble colonies or scattered tribes, originally subsisting under patriarchal government, in which (according to the poet),

“ Each ruled his race, his neighbour not his care^p.”

That this is not a fiction, but an historical fact, is attested by that universal consent which has transferred monarchy from earth to heaven. All nations believe the gods to be governed by a king; for men, who have made the gods after their own image^q, are ever hasty in ascribing to these celestial beings, human manners and human institutions,

The

* The judicious Polybius agrees with Aristotle in maintaining that government is the work of nature, and that monarchy is the first kind of government, *πρῶτη μὲν ἀναταστικὴ καὶ φύσει συνίσταται μοναρχία*. “ First of all comes monarchy, which is established by the bare work of nature, independently of any preparation or design.” Polyb. l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh. It is worthy of remark, that in the age of Polybius, Aristotle’s opinions were only known by tradition; his works, as we have had occasion to relate, still remained unpublished. Polybius therefore was not acquainted with Aristotle’s Politics, the perusal of which would have enabled him to avoid several errors into which he has fallen in his sixth book.

^p Odyssey, ix. 115.

^q

Εὖ ἀνδρες, ἵθι θεῶν γένος

Ἐκ μίας δὲ προίμης μητρὸς ἀμφότεροι.

“ The same is the race of men and gods: both of us received animation from the same mother.” Pind. Nem. Ode i. v. 1. The doctrine

The union of various villages forms, at length, **B O O K**
 a city or commonwealth, that finished fabric of **I.**
 society reaching, as near as may be, the bound **Chap. 2.**
 of perfectness; self-sufficient and complete, con-
 stituted for safety, and productive of happiness. **A com-**
monwealth
 A commonwealth is not less congenial to human **congenial**
 nature, than the association of a family or vil- **to the so-**
 lage. It is the goal to which all preceding affo- **cial nature**
 ciations tend; their natural result, and their **of man;**
 highest maturity; and the perfection of civil
 society, being the matured state of man, is like
 the perfection of every other progressive ob-
 ject, that stage of his existence which peculiarly
 ascertains, characterizes, and essentiates his na-
 ture'. Whoever, therefore, is unfit to live in
 a commonwealth, is above or below humanity.

"Curfed is the man and void of law and right,
 "Unworthy property, unworthy light."

Such a wretch can only delight in carnage, a
 folitary and ravenous vulture; but man delights
 in society far more than do bees or herds';
 since

trine had prevailed, at least, from the time of Hesiod's Theogonia.
 Persius blames the Romans for acting on the same principle:

Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores,
 Et bona Dīs ex hac scelerata ducere pulpa?

Satyr. ii. 63.

'The word is sometimes used in the same sense by the Roman
 writers. Thus Tacitus alluding to the dark and livid colour of the
 British pearls, which rendered them a less tempting prize to the avarice
 of the Romans (Vid. Sueton. in Jul. Cæsar. c. xlvii.), says, "Ego
 facilius crediderim, naturam margaritis decesse quam nobis avariciam."
 Tacit. in Agricol. c. 12.

^a Iliad, ix. v. 64.

^b While translating this chapter I happened to look into an agree-
 able compendium, intitled, The Philosophy of Natural History, and read

BOOK

I.

and the
cause of his
virtues
and perfec-
tions.

since nature, which never works in vain, distinguishes him by the power of speech, not merely to signify his pains and pleasures, a purpose limiting the vocal communications of other animals, but to describe his advantages and inconveniences, to explain his rights and wrongs.

A participation in rights and advantages forms the bond of political society; an institution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from whom it is constituted". What members

read the following passage: "Some writers, as Aristotle and a few moderns, implicit followers of his opinions, deny that man is naturally a gregarious or associating animal. To render this notion consistent with the actual and universal state of human nature, these authors have recourse to puerile conceits and questionable facts, which it would be fruitless to relate." Smellie's *Philosophy of Natural History*, c. xvi. p. 415. Who those followers of Aristotle are, I know not: but if any such there be, how unworthily has that philosopher been treated by his disciples as well as by his detractors!

"Aristotle's words are: *ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡ πόλις φύσει προτερον ἢ ἐκαστος ἄνθρωπος* "εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐταρκὴς ἐκαστος χωρισθεὶς ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρει ἐξείη πρὸς τὸ ὅλον." "That a commonwealth is prior by nature to each individual citizen, is plain; for if each individual, when separated, is incapable of supplying his own wants, it is evident that he must bear the same relation to the community, as other parts bear to the whole or system to which they appertain." Nature, our author observes, has always some end in view, and always employs the best means for attaining it. "This end or purpose is the first thing in the intention of Nature, though she is often obliged to effect it by a long series of intermediate operations, each of which, except the last of all, is both means and end; means with regard to that which follows, and end with regard to that which precedes it. Thus Nature or rather the God of nature, willed the existence of such a creature as man, whose characteristic distinction should consist in his perfectibility, or his capacity of being disciplined from a mere animal or savage, into a moral and intellectual being. But man is only to be disciplined by civil society; and civil society requires, for its materials, the smaller associations of tribes and families. These last again resolve themselves into individuals, distinguished by the relative appellations of husband and wife, father and son, master and servant, and constituting

members are to the body, citizens are to the **BOOK**
 commonwealth. The hand or foot, when separated from the body, retains indeed its name, but totally changes its nature, because it is completely divested of its uses and of its powers. In the same manner a citizen is a constituent part of a whole or system^x, which invests him with powers and qualifies him for functions, for which, in his individual capacity, he is totally un-

tuting the elements of families." Aristotle here speaks as if civil society itself, considered as a whole or system, complete in all its parts or members, perfect, happy, and self-sufficient, formed the end for which man was created. But in the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, in the seven last chapters of the third book of his *Treatise De Anima*, and even in his *Ethics* to Nicomachus, l. x. c. viii. he intimates that man has a still higher destination than that of acting his part well in political society. Plato, in his *Theætetus*, had said, "That the main object of human pursuit ought to be *ὁμοιωσις τῷ Θεῷ* κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἡμῶσις δὲ, δίκαιον καὶ ἴσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γίνεσθαι" "a resembling God as much as possible; and to resemble God is to imitate his justice, his holiness, and wisdom." Aristotle holds the same doctrine in the passages above alluded to; maintaining, however, that the moral virtues may be ultimately resolved into the intellectual; or, in other words, that wisdom and goodness, though they do not keep pace in every step of their progress, yet finally coincide.

^x The maxim that citizens are parts of the community had long been considered as a practical principle, and had become a fruitful source of laws in the republics of Greece. The wretch guilty of suicide was punished with infamy, as robbing the state of a member¹. The state resented injuries done to individuals, as inflicted on itself. Insults offered to women, children, or even to slaves, might be resented, prosecuted, and punished by every citizen²: admirable institutions, Plutarch observes, for preventing wrongs; the whole community warmly sympathising with the indignant feelings of the sufferers³. Turpitude, or baseness, alone dissolved the connection between a citizen and his country. He who committed actions unworthy of a man, was divested of his political rights, and severed from the community, as a gangrened member which might infect and destroy the system⁴.

(1) Aristot. *Ethic.* passim.

(2) Demosthen. in *Mid.* p. 610.

(3) Plutarch. in *Solon.* p. 88.

(4) Idem, *ibid.*

fit;

BOOK fit; and independently of which system, he might
 I. subsist indeed as a solitary savage, but could never attain that improved and happy state to which his progressive nature invariably tends. He, therefore, who first collected societies, was the greatest benefactor to mankind. Perfected by the offices and duties of social life, man is the best, but, rude and undisciplined, he is the very worst of animals. For nothing is more detestable than armed improbity; and man is armed with craft and courage, which, untamed by justice, he will most wickedly pervert, and become at once the most impious and the fiercest of monsters; the most abominable in gluttony, the most shameless in venery. But justice is the fundamental virtue of political society, since the order of society cannot be maintained without law, and laws are instituted to declare what is just.

Chap. 3.

The nature
and
branches
of domestic
economy.

Cities or commonwealths are composed of families; and the management of a family is properly termed œconomy. A family, to be complete, must consist of freemen and slaves⁷; and as every complex object naturally resolves itself into simple elements, we must consider the elements of a family:—the master and servant, the husband and wife, the father and children; what all of these are in themselves, and what are the relations which they naturally and properly bear to each other⁸.

We

⁷ This sounds harsh; but hear him to the end.

⁸ The relations of authority and subjection subsisting between the master and servant were expressed in the Greek by the substantives
 δεσποτις

We shall then consider the acquisition of property and the accumulation of stock, which by some is treated as a branch, and by others as the most important branch, of œconomy. Let us begin, then, by examining the relation of master and servant; and by investigating the nature of servitude itself, endeavour to form more salutary and more correct notions on this subject than those which generally prevail. By some writers, that part of œconomy employed in the management of slaves has been dignified with the name of science; by others, slavery is considered as an institution altogether unnatural, resulting from the cruel maxims of war. Liberty, they assert, is the great law of nature^a, which acknowledges not any difference between the slave and the master; slavery therefore is unjust, being founded on violence.

BOOK
I.

It is the business, then, of œconomy to procure the comfortable subsistence of a family; and all arts and employments require proper instruments for effecting their respective ends.

The nature
of domestic
slavery.

διοικησις and δαίμων. But the analogous relations subsisting between the husband and wife, the father and children, had not in Greek, Aristotle observes, any appropriate names. He therefore denotes them by the adjectives ἡ γαμικὴ (conjugalis societas) and ἡ τεκογονητικὴ: which latter, in chapter twelfth of this book, he calls πατρικὴν, to which joining ἀρχή, we shall have the patria potestas of the Romans.

^a The Scholiast on Aristotle's Rhetoric has preserved a saying to this purpose of Alcidas, the scholar of Gorgias of Leontium (See History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 337.): Ἐλευθερὸς ἀφ' ἑκαστοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φύσις ἀνθρώπου. "All come free from the hands of God, Nature has made no man a slave."

Of

BOOK I. Of these instruments, some are inanimate, and others are endowed with life. The sailer, as well as the helm, are instruments of navigation; since they are moved and impelled by the will of the pilot, for effecting the purpose of his art. Under this aspect, any piece of property may be considered in relation to the art of œconomy. It is an instrument to be moved and employed for the purpose of comfortable subsistence. Property at large, therefore, is merely an accumulation of many such instruments; and even a slave is, in this view, a moveable instrument, endowed with life, which, impelled by the will of another, communicates motion to other instruments less excellent than himself. The statues of Dedalus, and the tripods of Vulcan, moved, we are told, spontaneously;

“ Wondrous to tell, instinct with spirit roll’d
From place to place around the blest abodes,
Self-moved, obedient to the beck of gods ^b.”

Did this usually happen, did the shuttle thus weave, and the strings of the harp thus play, the artist would not need the assistance of workmen, nor the master require the labour of slaves.

Among the various instruments subservient to the comfort of human life, there is this material distinction; that the work performed by one class, consists in production; and the work performed by another, is totally consumed in use. A shuttle produces a web; a couch, or a suit of

^b Iliad, viii.

clothes,

clothes, produce nothing ; they respectively afford, however, the convenience of wearing the one, and of reposing on the other. As use and production are things specifically different, the objects or instruments that are relative to the one must, with respect to their ends and purposes, be essentially different from those relative to the other. A domestic slave is relative to use; his labour is totally consumed in promoting the ease of his master. He is merely the possession and property, or, as it were, the separable part of that master ; and every part, whether separable or inseparable, is to be used and employed, not according to its own interest or caprice, but in subserviency to the general good, and suitably to reason. It is to be regarded merely in relation to that whole or system to which it appertains. A slave is simply the property of his master ; but the master stands in many other relations beside that of proprietor of his slave. Such is the nature and the function of servitude. We proceed to examine whether this institution be wise and just.

To determine this question, it will be sufficient to contemplate the ordinary course of nature, and to deduce from our observations clear inferences of reason. Government and subjection, then, are things useful and necessary ; they prevail every where, in animated as well as in brute matter ; from their first origin, some natures are formed to command, and others to obey ; the kinds of government and subjection varying with the differences of their objects, but all equally useful for their respective ends ; and those kinds

The analogy of nature evinces slavery to be just and useful.

BOOK ^{**L**} the best and most excellent, from which the best and most excellent consequences result. In every composition whose parts are harmonised into any regular whole, the necessity of government and subjection evidently appears, whether this whole or system be continuous or discrete; animated or lifeless; for even in music, there is a certain principle of rule and subordination: but such speculations are perhaps foreign to the present subject. In compositions endowed with life, it is the province of mind to command, and the province of matter to obey. Man consists of soul and body, and in all men rightly constituted, the soul commands the body; although some men are so grossly depraved, that in them the body seems to command the soul. But here the order of nature is perverted.

In the human constitution, therefore, mind governs matter absolutely and despotically; but reason governs appetite with a far more limited sway; still, however, it governs like a just and lawful prince, and the little community of man is thus held together and sustained; whereas, were the subordinate parts to usurp authority, or even to assert equality, all would speedily be undone, and the system would fall in ruins.

The same observations apply to the various tribes of animals, which rise above each other in excellence, in proportion to their tameness and docility; and which are all of them benefited by their subjection to man, because this is conducive to their safety. In the different sexes also, we see the male formed for government, and the female for submission; and a principle prevailing

prevailing thus universally in every region of nature, cannot but apply to an institution so natural as is that of political society.

Those men, therefore, whose powers are chiefly confined to the body, and whose principal excellence consists in affording bodily service; those, I say, are naturally slaves, because it is their interest to be so. They can obey reason, though they are unable to exercise it; and though different from tame animals, who are disciplined by means merely of their sensations and appetites, they perform nearly the same tasks, and become the property of other men, because their own safety requires it.

BOOK
I.
What are the requisites which fit men for servitude.

In conformity with these observations, Nature, we see, has variously moulded the human frame: some men are strongly built, and firmly compacted; others erect and graceful, unfit for toil and drudgery, but capable of sustaining honourably the offices of war and peace. This, however, holds not universally; for a servile mind is often lodged in a graceful person; and we have often found bodies formed for servitude, animated by the souls of freemen. Yet the distinction itself is not frivolous; for were part of the human race to be arrayed in that splendour of beauty which beams from the statues of the gods, universal consent would acknowledge the rest of mankind naturally formed to be their slaves. The difference of minds, though less obvious, is far more characteristic and more important; whence we may con-

VOL. II.

D

clude

B. O. O. K. clude that slavery is founded both on utility and justice^x.

I.

Chap. 4.

The mistakes on this subject caused by confounding the kinds of slavery.

This decision, however, has been arraigned with considerable plausibility: for slavery may be taken in two senses, in one of which he is a slave who submits to the law of war, commanding the vanquished to become the property of the victors^y. This is acknowledged to be law; but

^x Aristotle founds slavery on different principles from those assigned by Justinian, which have been universally followed by one party, and universally controverted by another; since the time of that Emperor, or rather since the Roman jurisprudence became a fashionable study. *Servi aut fiunt aut nascuntur; fiunt jure gentium aut jure civili; nascuntur ex ancillis nostris.* Inst. i. 3, 4. According to Justinian, therefore, there are three origins of the right of slavery: The law of nations; the civil law; and birth, that is, descent from servile parents. By the law of nations, a conqueror was thought entitled to kill his enemy, and having spared his life, might afterwards deal with him as he pleased, and therefore reduce him into slavery. This, indeed, was the practice of ancient nations; but the practice, how universal soever among them, was abusively termed a law, since irreconcilable with justice. In war the victor has not any right to kill his enemy but in cases of absolute necessity, for self-defence; and there is a clear proof that this necessity did not exist, when, instead of killing him, he made him prisoner. Even the right of killing would not infer the right of enslaving; since to many, slavery may be worse than death. Justinian says, secondly, that slavery may begin “*jure civili*,” when one man sells himself to another. But every sale implies a price, a *quid pro quo*; whereas, in the case of strict slavery, the seller gives every thing; life, liberty, property; and the buyer returns nothing. Of what validity then, says Judge Blackstone, can a sale be, which destroys the principles on which all sales are founded? Lastly, as to slaves by birth, it is plain that this foundation of slavery rests on the two former, and must fall with them. If neither captivity nor sale can enslave the parent, much less can they enslave the offspring. See Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. i. p. 424. Aristotle, as we shall see, might, consistently with his principles, have subscribed to the liberal conclusions of this excellent author.

^y Aristotle says, ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι. “That law is a certain agreement, according to which all belonging to the vanquished becomes the property

but the law itself is accused of iniquity, and impeached², like the orators of Athens when they have persuaded the assembly to pass unjust decrees. On this subject, wise men hold different opinions, proceeding from the different views which they take of the question. Some consider superiority as the proof of virtue, because its natural effect; and assert that, in justice, the victors should be masters of the vanquished, as being their superiors, and therefore their betters; while others deny the force of this argument, maintaining that nothing can be truly just, which is inconsistent with humanity³. Superiority in war, they say, cannot surely be a proof of justice, since wars are often unjustly undertaken, and successfully, though wickedly, carried on and concluded. It is harsh, besides, to assert that he ought to be a slave who is unfit for servitude; and that persons of illustrious birth or illustrious merit are rendered slaves by falling into the hands of an enemy. To avoid this consequence, the advocates for subjecting the vanquished to the victors, propose limiting this

BOOK

L

perty of the victors." This was universally the law of nations in Aristotle's time; a law which his humanity abhorred, and his courage arraigned. Instead of being accused of abetting the harsh law of slavery, he ought rather to be respected for destroying the false foundations on which this law was established.

² The orator, who had persuaded the Athenian assembly to pass an unjust or a bad law, was impeached by the *γραφῆ παρανομίας*. History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. 32.

³ The text is corrupt. The word is *ἐννομία*; and on the margin *ἐννομία*. I conjecture the true reading is *ἐννομία*, equity; that is, humanity moderating strict justice, the justice founded on law.

BOOK law to the case of Barbarians vanquished by
I. Greeks ; for the nobility of Barbarians is confined to their respective countries, but the nobility of Greece is as extensive as the world. But in this mode of reasoning, they abandon their own doctrine, and acknowledge the principle which we have above established, that slavery adheres to the character itself, is independent of accident, and that some are every where slaves, and others, like the Helen of Theodectes^b, are every where free ;

“ Sprung from the immortal gods, on either side,
 Who dares reproach me with the name of slave ?”

Such, indeed, seems to be the intention of Nature, who, as she produces man from man, and beast from beast, wishes likewise to generate illustrious descendants from illustrious ancestors ; but here Nature often fails in accomplishing her own purposes^c.

Differences
 of the two
 kinds of
 slavery.

There are, thus, two kinds of slavery, the one founded on nature, the other established by law, or rather produced by violence. The first kind can only take place when the master is as fit to command as the slave to obey. It is then profitable both to the slave and the master ; whose interests, rightly understood, become as inseparable as the interests of soul and body. This

^b A native of Phaselis in Lycia, the scholar of Plato and Isocrates, author of fifty tragedies, and of the Art of Rhetoric in verse. See Fabricius, l. ii. c. 19. & l. iii. c. 10. Cicero, Athenæus, and Suidas say, that he was a scholar of Aristotle's. His splendid compositions are now reduced to a few short fragments.

^c See Analysis, vol. i. p. 127.

commu-

communion of interests naturally engenders mutual good-will^d; but in the slavery contrary to nature, occasioned by war, and created by force, slaves and masters must always be hostile to each other.

The principles above established shew, that a diversity in the nature and relations of things necessarily occasions various kinds of subordination. According to the differences of those subjected to its authority, government, therefore, is found to vary, to be more or less absolute, and, as it were, to fluctuate between monarchy and liberty; monarchy, where one man rules always, and sometimes absolutely; liberty, where

Different kinds of subordination founded in nature.

^d The author advises masters to secure the fidelity of slaves by the pledges of wives and children, and to indulge them with the enjoyment of festivals and diversions, of which their condition stands more in need than that of freemen. *De Cura Rei Familiaris*, l. i. c. v. p. 494. In most countries of Greece, slaves, indeed, were merely the lowest class of inhabitants, a sort of servants for life, and not always for life, since they were entitled on many particular grounds to demand their freedom, and even to recover it by purchase, if frugal in the management of their peculium, or separate property. *Comp. Plato de Legibus*, l. vi. *Aristoph. in Ran.* v. 706. *Terent. Phorm.* act. i. sc. 1. *Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.* passim. The Athenian slaves, when harshly treated by their masters, found an asylum from cruelty in the temple of Theseus, and were allowed to pass into the service of another master less tyrannical. *Demosth. in Mid.* *Plutarch. de Superstit.* Demosthenes having cited a law which forbade the striking of a slave, proceeds thus: "You hear, Athenians, the humanity of the law, which prevents the offering insult even to a slave. What, in the name of the gods! do you think would be the sentiments of those nations, from whom slaves are purchased into Greece, should they be told that there were certain Greeks, men so gentle and humane, that notwithstanding the accumulated injuries received from Barbarians, and a natural and hereditary enmity to their race, yet did not allow these enemies to be ill-treated even in servitude, but had enacted a law expressly prohibiting insults to slaves, and had punished the violators of this law by death?" *Demosth. advers. Mideam*, p. 392.

B O O K different men hold the offices of magistracy by vicarious succession: but the management of a household must always be of the first kind, and entrusted to one only, if we wish it to be well regulated.

L
Peculiarity
of the rela-
tion be-
tween mas-
ter and
slave.

A master possesses a property in his slaves, and a right to employ their industry; yet it is not from his particular skill in directing this industry that he derives his authority. This authority is founded on the general superiority of his character; since it is their respective qualities and characters that class mankind under the different denominations of freemen or slaves. Did the government of a household consist, as some writers have imagined, in any particular skill or craft, this skill or craft must evidently be relative to the labour required, and the services exacted. At Syracuse there lived a man who exercised for hire the trade of teaching the various branches of domestic servitude; which are recommended by different degrees of necessity or utility, but which are all of them too mean and sordid to be understood by masters of families; whose proper function contains in it nothing very deep or mysterious, since its sole requisite is, that the master know how to command, what the slave knows how to perform. Masters unwilling to stoop to such petty cares employ a superintendent, who manages their household, while they themselves cultivate the liberal arts; plunge into politics, or pursue philosophy.

Chap. 5.

Of the ac-
cumulation

Slaves form the most valuable, indeed, but not the only kind of stock. Of the accumulation of

of stock in general, we proceed now to treat. **B O O K**
 First of all, is the art of accumulation the same ^{I.} thing with œconomics, or merely something sub- of stock in
 servient to this science; and if merely subservient, general.
 is it in the manner that the trade of shuttle-making is subservient to that of weaving, or as the art of casting brass is subservient to the art of sculpture? for shuttles are the *instruments* of weaving, but brass supplies the *materials* of sculpture. To accumulate stock, is to provide whatever is thought necessary for the purpose of comfortable subsistence; but œconomy consists in employing or managing the necessities thus provided, in the manner best adapted to the attainment of the end in view. As the arts of accumulation and of œconomy cannot therefore be the same, let us consider whether the former be a branch of the latter; and there being many kinds of stock or riches, let us begin with examining the stock supplied by agriculture, or, in general, the art of providing food, the great and principal want of all mankind. "

It is chiefly this want, and the various means employed for supplying it, that produces the wide variety of manners and modes of life, in men and animals. By the constitution of nature, different animals delight in different kinds of food; some delight in herbs, others in flesh, while a third class seek nourishment from both; and in subservience to the facility of acquiring such food as is agreeable to their respective natures, some animals are solitary, and others are gregarious. The life of man is wonderfully diversified by the same circumstance, and of all his

The different modes of procuring the necessities of life.

B O O K modes of life, the pastoral is the most simple, the most easy, and the most indolent. Possessing a sort of living farm spontaneously productive, the shepherd roams at large with his herds, which supply him with all the necessaries of subsistence, independently of any labour on his part, but the pleasing care of conducting them to fresh pastures. Another part of the human species resembles, in its mode of life, the various animals of prey, and subsists by hunting and fishing, by war and robbery; but far the greatest proportion of mankind derives subsistence from the earth, and its meliorated fruits. Such, then, are the different forms of human life, all resulting from the different contrivances for procuring or producing food. Commerce, indeed, produces nothing; but it exchanges and distributes, as conveniency requires, the objects and commodities already produced and accumulated. A commercial state of society, therefore, presupposes a superabundance of productive industry. It is founded on the primary modes of acquiring the necessaries of life, which we have above enumerated; and which, seldom existing apart, are variously combined and blended, hunting and war often supplying the deficiencies of pasturage and agriculture.

Distinction
between
real and
artificial
riches.
The right
of property
founded in
nature,

One kind of property, a property in the provisions necessary for life, is visibly established by Nature herself, who supplies all animals, at their birth, with necessary food, and afterwards furnishes them with the means of procuring it. When the young are separated from the parent in

in the form of eggs or worms, these organized germs contain in themselves the materials of their first nourishment; in viviparous animals, these materials are supplied by the teeming breasts of the mother. In their advancement to maturity, none of the living tribes are abandoned by the kind care of Nature. Herbs and plants are copiously furnished for the use of animals; and animals themselves for the various exigencies of man; almost all of them supplying him with food, while the tame serve him as instruments of industry, and the wild furnish him with useful articles of clothing, and innumerable other conveniences.

A property in things necessary for subsistence being established by Nature, the means of acquiring this property must be natural and just. Hunting, therefore, is entitled to these epithets; and war, which is a species of hunting, and which may be justly employed against wild animals, and savage men, who spurn servitude, though incapable of freedom. The arts of acquiring this property are essential to every community, whether civil or domestic. They supply that genuine wealth, the accumulation of which serves as the instrument productive of comfortable subsistence, not that factitious riches stigmatized by Solon —

“ No bounds to riches ever were assigned.”

To real and natural riches bounds have always been assigned; since, like all other instruments, they are limited, both in magnitude and number,
by

BOOK
I.

B O O K by the ends for which they serve, and the effects which they are intended to produce. But that factitious wealth which is often confounded with them, is indeed boundless, and will appear necessarily to be so, when we have investigated its nature.

Chap. 6.

The nature of commerce, its different kinds.

First of all, then, it is to be observed that every piece of property may be employed for two distinct purposes, the purpose of use, and the purpose of exchange. A pair of shoes may be worn, or they may be sold. This second purpose, though it is not the original and proper end for which shoes were made, is founded on a principle both natural and necessary, the disposition to truck and barter, by which men part with their superfluities, in order to supply their deficiencies. In the community of a family, there is not any room even for barter, because this community is so close and so intimate, that all kinds of property are considered as common stock. But when men separate, at a distance, in scattered families, the varieties of local situation, and innumerable other circumstances, must introduce that kind of exchange or barter, which we still see practised among primitive and simple nations, who truck wine for corn, and any one commodity of which they have too much, for another of which they are in want. This first and natural mode of exchange gave occasion to a second far more refined and more artificial. The goods necessary to man, as the instruments of comfortable subsistence, were found not to be (many of them at least)

The use of money, on what principles founded.

least) either of easy conveyance, or of constant use. The best, perhaps the only, markets, however, often lay at a distance. It became necessary, therefore, to think of certain commodities, easily manageable and safely transportable, and of which the uses are so general and so numerous, that they ensured the certainty of always obtaining for them the articles wanted in exchange. The metals, particularly iron and silver and several others, exactly correspond to this description. They were employed, therefore, by general agreement, as the ordinary standard of value^c, and the common measure of

^c The subject of money is treated above, vol. i. p. 374. & seq. In that passage compared with the *Magna Moralia*, l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 165. we find the fundamental principles of the modern economists. In both chapters the author is treating of commutative justice; which, as he clearly shews, always depends on the equality of ratios, and therefore implies four terms; namely, two persons and two things, or two works; in the exchange of which, "he who has laboured much, receives much; and he who has laboured little, receives but little:" *τοις μὲν πολλὰ πεινηκὸτα πολλὰ λαμβάνει, τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγα πεινηκὸτα, ὀλίγα λαμβάνει*. But different quantities of labour are, like other causes, best known and ascertained by their effects; that is, by the works which they produce; works so complex and so dissimilar that their relative values to each other can only be appreciated by the means of a common measure. The circumstances mentioned in the text as belonging exclusively to the precious metals, point them out as the fittest of all objects for supplying this function, and measuring the exchangeable value of all other commodities, which being all commensurable with money, are thus rendered commensurate with each other. But even the metals are not correct measures (*γινεται ἰσότης μετρεῖν*), since they themselves vary in value in proportion to their plenty or scarcity, the more or less labour requisite for procuring them, compared with that requisite for procuring other objects of desire, and a variety of other circumstances, all expressed by the word *χρεία*; the desire of possessing, and the difficulty of acquiring them. It is this varying relation which regulates the price or exchangeable value of things; and, beside this, no other standard can ever possibly be discovered. Had Montesquieu (*Esprit des Loix*, b. xxii. c. i. & seq.) and

BOOK of exchange; being themselves estimated, at
 L first, by their bulk and weight; and afterwards
 stamped,

and Hume (Essay on the Balance of Trade) paid due attention to our author's principles concerning money, they would not have fallen into the error of maintaining that the introduction of paper currency diminished the exchangeable value of gold and silver, exactly in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. Dr. Smith, who has ably refuted this doctrine (Wealth of Nations, v. i. b. ii. c. ii.), falls into the contrary error, when he asserts (p. 498.) that paper currency has not any effect in lowering the value of gold and silver: which value, he thinks, depends entirely "upon the proportion between the quantity of labour necessary to bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that necessary to bring thither a certain quantity of any other sort of commodities." Without noticing that here, as in some other places, Dr. Smith mistakes tendencies for results, it may be observed that the introduction of paper currency supplying, or at least diminishing one of the uses of gold and silver, namely, that of circulating commodities, renders those metals less requisite for that specific purpose, less objects of desire and therefore cheaper. In other words, it must diminish the exchangeable value of all the precious metals which have been accumulated by the labour of hundreds of ages. This, I say, it must do, other circumstances remaining the same, precisely for the same reason that the introduction of glass vessels and of pastes has diminished the exchangeable value of gems and diamonds. But as the precious metals have many and various uses, none of which, besides that of serving as a measure, can be supplied by paper currency, their exchangeable value will not be diminished in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. One use of an object may be totally destroyed; and, notwithstanding this, the other uses for which it serves, may still entitle it to great value in exchange. Paper currency, indeed, lowers the precious metals on the whole, but lowers them on the whole by diminishing one only of their uses. Were this adventitious use of them, as Aristotle observes, entirely set aside by that kind of tacit convention which established it, they would still bear a great price on account of their many useful and agreeable properties. These properties of the metals, their brilliancy, durability, divisibility, &c. which recommend them peculiarly as a *measure*, render them also a *pledge*; and their exchangeable value is, according to Aristotle, more invariable than that of any other commodity (see above, vol. i. p. 377.). Dr. Smith, b. i. c. v. p. 51. on the contrary, maintains "that the exchangeable value of corn varies less, from century to century, than that of gold and silver." *Ibid.* The discovery, indeed, of the New World lowered exceedingly the exchangeable value of the precious metals

stamped, in order to save the trouble of mea- B O O K
furing and weighing them. 1.

The

in much less than a century; but this particular case ought not to be converted into a general theorem. In pursuance of his notion of the greater stability in the exchangeable value of corn, than in that of gold and silver, Dr. Smith observes, "that every other commodity will at any particular time purchase a greater or smaller quantity of labour, in proportion to the quantity of subsistence which it can purchase at that time. A rent, therefore, reserved in corn, is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchase. But a rent reserved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchase, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchased by any particular quantity of that commodity." *Ibid.* p. 53. The variations in the quantity of corn that can be purchased by gold or silver, are occasioned by the plenty or scarcity of corn, or by the plenty or scarcity of the precious metals; but far more frequently by the former circumstances than by the latter. The plenty of corn, or the little labour with which corn may be brought to market, diminishes its exchangeable value with regard to all other commodities as well as with regard to gold and silver. When the rent is reserved in the precious metals, its exchangeable value, therefore, at different times, that is, the quantity of other commodities, or of the labour producing them, which this rent can at those different times purchase or command, will not be regulated by the variation in the money prices of corn; because this variation, resulting from the plenty or scarcity of corn, enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of all other commodities precisely in the same proportion as it enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of gold and silver. The money price of corn was higher in the last century than in the present; yet the money price of labour was lower in that century than in the present. The money price of corn is higher in England than in America; yet the money price of labour is lower in England than in America. The French economists, overlooking Aristotle's great principles concerning *labour* and *value*, frequently reason as if all things essential to human comfort consisted in food. In the passage above cited, Dr. S. reasons as if all those things consisted in corn.

Till the above note was printed in 1797, Dr. Smith's notions with regard to money, had, as far as I know, passed current, both on account of his complete refutation of Montequieu and Hume, and because his doctrine itself was, for obvious reasons, calculated to maintain popularity in this country. But since that time the same doctrine has been called in question by a variety of writers: particularly

BOOK

I.

Their
abuse in-
troduces
artificial
traffic; not
for accom-
modation,
but for
gain.

The metals thus stamped are called money; and the invention of money necessarily precedes that artificial traffic, of which the main object is not comfort but gain. To get money is the business of the merchant; with him wealth and

cularly by Mr. Thornton in his excellent treatise "on Paper Credit." Mr. Thornton says "that if we could suppose as large a substitution of paper in the place of coin to take place in other countries as we have lately experienced in our own, the diminution for the demand of bullion might be such as very materially to affect its general value, and to enhance the money price of articles over the world." Thornton on Paper Credit, p. 306. Mr. Wheatley, in a treatise on Commerce and Currency, maintains that "if the currency of the world consisted of two hundred millions of specie, and two hundred millions of paper circulated in the same manner as specie, the price of produce would be doubled by the addition of paper." Wheatley on Currency and Commerce, p. 183. But this remark runs into the error directly opposite to Smith's, and brings us back to the exploded doctrine of Montefquieu and Hume which Dr. Smith had very ably refuted. Mr. Thornton also, on some occasions, rejects the consequences of his own principles. He is fond of comparing "paper money to a cheaper instrument substituted for a dearer one," p. 171. 315, &c. Upon this comparison he maintains with too much deference for Dr. Smith, "that paper credit may be considered as tending in some respects to reduce the price of commodities, because," he says, "it is obvious, that in proportion as any instrument of manufactures or commerce is less expensive, the articles which it contributes to produce may be afforded at a cheaper rate." P. 315. Yet the cheaper in any country this instrument (meaning thereby money) is, the dearer will be commodities. When reduced, therefore, to precise terms, the observation of these eminent writers amounts to this contradiction "that the exchangeable value of money is to be enhanced by lowering it." Again, in his viiith chapter throughout, Mr. Thornton contends that country banks do not raise the price of subsistence nor depress the value of money. His argument is, "that the holders of country paper are under the necessity of changing it for London paper; and that this exchangeableness equalises their value by a tendency in the country paper to take *exactly the same high value with the London paper.*" Thornton, p. 219. He does not advert that, according to his own principles concerning the depreciation of coin by paper, the values of the country and London paper are *equalised*, by their approximation on both sides to each other, although the elevation in the small country pool is palpable, while the depression in the great London lake is scarcely discernible.

money

money are synonymous; and to heap up money is in his mind to acquire all worldly advantages. By several æconomical writers, this opinion of the merchant is treated with contempt, and considered as mere dotage. They deride the notion of that being the most substantial or only wealth which, to him who should accumulate it in the greatest quantity, would only realize the fable of Midas, and thereby expose him to the danger of perishing through hunger. Money, properly so called, they observe, is founded merely on convention; its currency and value depending on the mutable wills of men, which may with inconstancy abolish what they have capriciously established. Such reasoners, therefore, recommend the acquisition of a wealth more absolute and independent; and think the productive arts by which such wealth is accumulated^f, far more deserving of attention than exchange

^f On the subject of political æconomy, and particularly on this subject of money, Aristotle's opinions are totally different from those of Child, Mun, and particularly of Locke, who is by many regarded as his greatest metaphysical rival. Locke, as quoted by Dr. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, vol. ii. p. 140. remarks a distinction between money and other moveable goods. "All other moveable goods," he says, "are of so consumable a nature, that the wealth which consists in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year, may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wasted or consumed." Gold and silver are, therefore, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that account to be the great object of its political æconomy. The poverty and misery of Spain and Portugal notwithstanding all their gold and silver, and the riches and happiness

B O O K exchange or traffic, especially than that kind
L of traffic, of which money is the end and object
 Of traffic. as well as the element and principle; a traffic
 ultimately centering in the augmentation of
 factitious riches, applicable to no other use than
 that of indefinitely multiplying themselves.

Its abuse. Of such factitious riches, the desire, as Solon
 said, must necessarily be boundless; the blind-
 ness of avarice mistaking for an object agreeable
 in itself, and as such indefinitely desirable, that
 which is barely an instrument, and of which
 the desire ought to be strictly limited by the
 purposes which it is fitted to serve. There is a
 limit, therefore, to accumulation for provision,
 but none to accumulation for gain.

**The confu-
sion there-
by occa-
sioned.** Yet the providence of a good master of a fa-
 mily, as well as the avarice of a merchant, is
 often strenuously employed in the pursuit of
 getting money; and when their activity has ac-
 quired it, their similar exigencies frequently
 compel them to use and employ it exactly in the
 same manner. But the merchant, if faithful to
 his principles, always employs his money re-
 luctantly for any other purpose than that of
 augmenting itself. Yet, political writers, de-
 ceived by an agreement in accidental pursuit
 and occasional application, confound the endless

piners of England, a commercial country, without mines, as well as
 the riches and happiness of Switzerland, an agricultural and pastoral
 country, which disdains working its mines, more strongly fortify Aris-
 totle's conclusions, than a thousand fine spun arguments of the French
 economists. Written in 1792.

drudgery

drudgery of commerce with the salutary duties of œconomy, and regard the accumulation of wealth as the main business of both. At the name of money, they recall all those deceitful enjoyments of pride and voluptuousness which money is fitted to procure, and in which, wishing for ever immoderately to indulge, they cannot fail inordinately to desire that which promises to gratify their inordinate passions. If money is not to be obtained by traffic, the purpose for which it was first instituted, men thus minded will have recourse for obtaining it, to other arts and other contrivances; prostituting even skill and courage in this mean and mercenary service. Victory over the enemies of his country forms the proper ambition of a general; the health of his patients ought to be the main pursuit of a physician: yet how many of the military, and how many of the medical tribe, have no other end in view but that of gratifying their senseless, because unbounded, rapacity?

We thus see that there are two modes of accumulating stock; the one natural, productive, and strictly pertaining to œconomy, because essential to the purpose of comfortable subsistence; the other, neither natural nor productive, and nowise pertaining to œconomy; and as justly blameable as the other is highly laudable. When we speak, however, of any kind of human industry as productive, we mean not that in the strict sense of the word it really produces any thing, but only that it selects and arranges the gifts of Nature, suitably to the exigencies

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E

and

B O O K and demands of human life. The manufacturer makes not the wool, but the cloth ; and for the food of animals, Nature at their first formation, provides a superabundance of those elements from which they are constituted, and with the same bounty copiously furnishes the materials of their future subsistence.

I.
The function of the statesman respecting health.

A question here arises, why the art of procuring subsistence and accommodation, any more than the art of procuring health, should be regarded as a branch of œconomy? We say, that both of them appertain to œconomy, political as well as domestic. The statesman and the physician, however, do not exercise the same talents, the one in providing for the health of his fellow-citizens, the other in providing for the health of his patients. The business of the former consists in general superintendence ; that of the latter in minute and particular detail ; and, in the same manner, the function of the statesman respecting the provision for comfortable subsistence and accommodation, is totally different from the subservient offices of the labourer and manufacturer.

Usury.

We have reprobated that species of artificial traffic which adds nothing to the common stock, but only enriches one man or one nation at the expence of another ; and which, being subservient to no useful purpose, terminates in no definite end. But of all modes of accumulation, the worst, and most unnatural, is usury. This is the utmost corruption of artificial degeneracy, standing in the same relation to commerce, that
com-

commerce does to œconomy. By commerce, money is perverted from the purpose of exchange to that of gain; still, however, this gain is obtained by the mutual transfer of different objects; but usury, by transferring merely the same object from one hand to another, generates money from money; and the interest thus generated is therefore called "offspring^{*}," as being precisely of the same nature, and of the same specific substance, with that from which it proceeds.

BOOK
I.

Having thus explained the theory of œconomy, we now proceed to the practice; observing that, as the theory is a liberal study, the practice is a necessary occupation. Whoever, therefore, would surely and honourably augment his substance, must acquire an experimental knowledge, first, of the various kinds of cattle, particularly horses, oxen, and sheep; he must examine their many and excellent qualities and uses, all subservient to the purposes of human life; he must consider and compare their respective advantages in their relations to each other, as well as to the local circumstances in which he happens to be placed. Having provided himself with cattle, which are the living instruments of agriculture, he will next direct his attention to this most useful art; distributing the labour of his household as circumstances require, among the various branches of tillage and plantation; without neglecting those advantages which offer

The theory of œconomy applied to practice. The chief branches of husbandry.

* τὸκος.

E 2

them-

B O O K themselves spontaneously from bees, birds, and fishes.

I.
Other
modes of
accumulation.

Such are the first and most natural contrivances for augmenting our substance. Exchange or traffic follows next. Of this the most conspicuous kind is that carried on by means of ships or waggons, by adventurous navigators, or stationary storekeepers: whose employments differ greatly in this, that some yield most profit, and others afford most security. To commerce, strictly so called, we have already referred that mode of accumulation named usury; and under the same head may be classed the letting to hire that labour or that skill of which we have the command; from which, blended with that mode of accumulation first mentioned, result many mixed modes, as the various kinds of mining and quarrying; in all which, human labour is exchanged for things fruitless and lifeless, yet many of them highly useful. To enter into a more minute detail of the various modes of productive industry might indeed be useful, but certainly would be tiresome. It may be observed in general, that all such occupations partake the more of art, the less they are dependent on fortune. Those of them are vile and sordid, which hurt the health or deform the body; those are truly servile, which may be exercised by the corporeal powers alone; and those are the meanest and most contemptible, which require not any vigorous exertion of either mind or body. Chares of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have exhausted the subject of agriculture,

ture, having treated both of planting and tillage. **BOOK**
 Other arts have been explained by other au- **I.**
 thors, to whose writings those curious after such
 knowledge may have recourse.

Persons eager for wealth may collect likewise **Mono-**
 and imitate, with much advantage to themselves, **polies.**
 the dextrous contrivances by which other men
 have obtained great and sudden opulence¹.
 Such, for instance, is the honest artifice ascribed **Exempli-**
 to the invention of Thales the Milesian. The **fied by**
 poverty of this great philosopher was thought to **Thales of**
 upbraid his studies, as serving no gainful, and **Miletus.**
 therefore no useful purpose. But Thales, by
 his skill in meteorology, contrived to wipe off
 the reproach; for as this science enabled him to
 foresee that next season there would be an extra-
 ordinary crop of olives, he hired in the winter
 all the oil-presses in Chios and Miletus, employ-
 ing his little fortune in giving earnest to their

¹ In a copious, but corrupt and mutilated fragment of Aristotle's, entitled *οικονομικων το β'*, "the Second Book of Oeconomics," we find intermixed with the just principles of political œconomy, the greatest part of those financial tricks which have been revived, and so often repeated in modern times: the debasement of the coin; not paper indeed, but iron currency and credit; venality of justice; mortgaging the revenues; and innumerable contrivances, by which the republics and petty princes of Lower Asia impoverished and ruined their subjects. Aristotle does not explain these dangerous artifices with a view to recommend them (for he begins by declaring the only fair and certain means of augmenting domestic and national wealth, "produce much and consume little"); neither does he describe such unwarrantable political sleights (as has been suspected of Machiavel) with a design to satirize and disgrace those concerned in them. He treats the matter merely as an abstract question of political science. You wish to get wealth—Thus, and thus, may it be obtained: but take care; you will acquire it at too dear a rate (as I have proved in innumerable parts of my works) if you purchase it by any kind of dishonesty.

B O O K I. **I.** respective proprietors. When the gathering season approached, and the olives were seen loading the branches, all men wished to provide oil-presses at the same time, and suddenly. But Thales, being master of the whole number, let them separately at a high price, and thereby accumulating vast wealth, proved that philosophers might be rich if they pleased, but that riches were not the object of their pursuit.

The contrivance of Thales consisted in procuring for himself a monopoly; which, in general, is a gainful project, and as such has sometimes been employed by sovereign states, when distressed for want of money.

By a Syracusan banker.

In the time of Dionysius, a banker in Sicily bought up all the corn, and, without greatly raising the price of that article, sold it to foreign merchants at the profit of fifty talents. Dionysius, when apprised of this transaction, allowed the monopolist to retain his profit, but banished him from Syracuse, as employing a mode of accumulation inconsistent with the public interest. Yet the knowledge of this, and such like contrivances, may often prove useful both to families and to states, particularly to the latter; wherefore some statesmen consider the art of improving the public revenues as the only object worthy of their study.

Chap. 8.

Analogy between the three branches of œconomics

The three branches of œconomics, or domestic œconomy, may be illustrated by the three forms of government. A master commands his slaves like an absolute monarch; a father rules his children like a king; a husband governs his wife

wife like a republican magistrate. The principle on which the master's authority is founded has been explained above: that of the husband results from the natural pre-eminence of males; and that of the father, from the natural superiority of manly age to unripe youth. In republics, indeed, which aim at equality, the citizens govern by vicarious succession: yet those who happen to be in office wear a peculiar dress; the language used to them is respectful; they are distinguished by appropriate honours; honours paid, indeed, not to themselves, but (as happened to the laver of Amasis^m) to the situation which they hold, and to the functions which they perform. The authority of a husband, therefore, over his wife, is precisely that of a magistrate over his fellow-citizens, but of a magistrate always remaining in office. The authority of fathers, founded on seniority and cemented by affection, resembles that of kings; and Homer justly characterizes the regal dignity of Jupiter, in addressing him as the father of gods and men. For kings ought to differ

BOOK
I.

and the
three forms
of govern-
ment.

^m Amasis was a man of low extraction, but distinguished merit, who having gained the favour of Apries King of Egypt, found means to succeed to his master's throne. The meanness of his birth exposing him to the contempt of his subjects, he converted a golden basin in which he used to wash his feet, into the statue of a divinity, which he erected in one of the most conspicuous places of his capital. The superstitious Egyptians flocked to worship the image. Amasis told them that the object of their veneration had once been nothing better than a vile utensil. It is the same case with myself; I was once a plebeian, but am now your king; take care, therefore, to yield to me the respect due to the situation which I now hold. Comp. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. 68. Athen. Deipnosoph. l. xv. p. 680.

B O O K from their subjects, not in kind, but in perfection ; and this is precisely the difference between the father and his children.

I.
Relative
importance
of these
branches.

Difficulties
respecting
the virtues
and duties
of slaves,
children,
and wo-
men.

General so-
lution of
these dif-
ficulties.

It is manifest, from the observations already made, that the objects of political œconomy rise above each other in dignity ; that men are more important than mere property ; that the statesman ought to bestow more attention in exciting the virtues of the former, than in augmenting the mass of the latter ; but that the discipline and improvement of freemen chiefly merits his most serious regard. And here a doubt occurs, whether a slave can be said to partake of any other virtue than merely the power of performing bodily service. If he is endowed with temperance, courage, and justice, wherein does he differ from a freeman ? If he is entirely incapable of such excellencies, how can he be called a man ? The same difficulty presents itself respecting women and children, whether the several virtues can be fairly ascribed to them or not ? Can a woman be dignified with the epithets of temperate, courageous, or just ? Can such virtues, or their contrary vices, belong to a boy ? In one word, can that which is formed for subjection, exercise virtue in the same sense with that which is formed for government ; or if we admit the affirmative, why is the one entitled to command, and the other bound to obey ?

This difficulty cannot be solved by saying, that both of them partake of virtue, but partake of it in different measures ; for command and obedience,

obedience are things *specifically* different, not merely different in degree or in quantity. And yet it sounds harsh, to allow virtue to one class of mankind, and to deny it to another. If he, who is unadorned by wisdom and justice, cannot possibly be a good master, is it possible, for him, who is debased by profligacy and cowardice, to be a good servant? It is manifest, therefore, that certain virtues must be ascribed to both, but virtues as essentially different, as are the natures and perfections of those by whom they are respectively cultivated. Steadily to pursue a virtuous course of life, implies the habitual preference of this kind of life to every other. But every act of preference implies desire and comparison; and every act of virtuous preference implies propriety in the desire, and accuracy in the comparison^a. Both circumstances must concur to produce virtuous determinations; and this concurrence cannot uniformly or steadily take place but in minds duly exercised and highly perfected. In slaves, the faculties of deliberation and resolution may be considered as little better than null; in women they are weak and dependent; in children they are unripe and defective.

Of each class of mankind the virtues must be relative to their powers, and ought to be competent to their offices. The man fit to command may be compared with the architect, who adjusts the plan and directs its execution. *His* skill must extend to every part of the work; *that*

Respecting
women.

^a See vol. i. p. 397.

of

BOOK of his workmen is limited by their respective
 I. tasks. In the work of government, reason is
 the architect; it is the part of reason to command, and the duty of weakness and of passion to obey. Thus the various distinctions of mankind necessarily discriminate their virtues. Self-command in a woman is not the same thing with self-command in a man. The justice and courage of the two sexes do not, as Socrates^o thought, coincide; and were we to enumerate, after the example of Gorgias, each particular excellence, instead of contenting ourselves with vague definitions of virtue in general, we should clearly perceive that what the poet says concerning silence is universally applicable to all qualities whatever.

“ In woman, silence is an ornament,
 But the same silence adds no grace to man.”

There is not any quality ornamental in the one sex, which, if exhibited precisely in the same degree, would be graceful in the other.

Children. Children, we have observed, are unripe and imperfect; their virtues, therefore, are to be considered not merely as relative to their actual state, but principally in reference to that maturity and perfection to which nature has destined them. They are diligently and modestly to hearken to their teachers, and obsequiously to obey their directors; the premature affectation of manhood would disqualify them from ever acquiring manly virtues.

^o Apud Platon. in *Repub.*

From

From the description that we have given of **BOOK** slaves, it is plain that the catalogue of their ^{I.} personal excellencies is not extensive. Ex- _{Slaves.} treme timidity, or excessive profligacy, is totally incompatible with their duties. To these duties they must carefully be trained by the master himself, and not by the overseer who assigns to them their respective tasks, and who teaches them skilfully to perform their servile employments. It is false that slaves are to be governed merely by fear. They are capable of listening to reason, though naturally unable to exercise its energies. Our slaves, therefore, are to be admonished, instructed, and disciplined not less than our children. A doubt here occurs, whether the virtues of artisans ought to coincide with those of slaves? The same vices of idleness and intemperance often prove alike ruinous to both these classes of men. Yet there subsists between them this material difference. He who is properly a slave, is such habitually and permanently through the imbecility of his nature. His servitude is perpetual and complete. The mean mechanic, on the contrary, submits to the tiresome drudgery of distorting, painful, and unwholesome labour; but he encounters these hardships for the sake of performing a particular task, which is accomplished in a limited time. His virtues, therefore, ought to coincide with those of slaves, in as far only as he partakes of a servile condition.

Difference
between
mechanics
and slaves.

In every treatise of Politics, it is necessary ^{The con-} carefully to examine the relative duties of hus- _{nection be-} bands _{tween do-}

B O O K

I.

domestic and
political
economy.

bands and wives, fathers and children^p. These, we have said, are the elements of families, and families are the elements of states; and, as in every system, the parts ought to conspire by their respective excellencies to promote the perfection and harmony of the whole, so the principles and habits of women and children must be fashioned by the interest of that government, to the safety and happiness of which they are alike essential; women forming the one half of the present, and children affording the sole hope of the future generation. In conformity to the plan of the community, individuals, we say, are to be educated; and in subserviency to this great and general object, all their particular virtues must be moulded^q. The nature of political

^p There remain but imperfect fragments of Aristotle's First Book of Economics; in which he treats of women, children, and slaves. See Aristotle, edit. Du Vall. p. 492. & seq. The defect may be partly supplied by the remains of the Pythagoreans preserved in Stobæus, and by the fifth book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, intitled, De Administratione Domestica. Aristotle, doubtless, treated the subject more scientifically than his predecessors; since he made the rules of domestic economy depend on the nature and object of the national policy. Such were his just and extensive views, that, as Strabo observes (l. xiii. p. 608.), his works, even when imperfect, taught profound and practical knowledge, in opposition to shadowy embellishments and scholastic trifling.

^q Aristotle gives the reason, *τινι δὲ τῇ μέρει, πρὸς τὴν τῆ ὅλης δὲ ἑλπίην, ἀρίστην*. "The virtue of the part must always bear a reference to the virtue of the whole." The continual referring of particular truths to general maxims has an air of pedantry in modern languages. It certainly is useless, where the particular truth is as evident as the general one. But the dislike or disgust which it excites arises from this, that the schoolmen adopted many maxims that were false or obscure, and the pedantry of these scholastics has been long held in just contempt.

10

society

society and the forms of civil government must, **B O O K**
 therefore, be clearly understood, before we can **I.**
 explain and ascertain the fluctuating and de-
 pendent rules of domestic discipline^r. We now
 enter on this vast subject, beginning with the im-
 portant question, which form of government is
 the best.

^r The relation between government and education, and the subserviency of the latter to the former, were strongly expressed by Pythagoras. Being asked by a certain Xenophilus, How he might best educate his son, he replied, Send him to live in a well regulated state. Diogen. Laert. viii. 16.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK
II. **I**N this Second Book, we see the intellectual exertions of the deepest thinker of antiquity strenuously exerted in solving the most important political question that can possibly be agitated. With affectionate respect for his master Plato, but with still greater veneration for truth, our author examines and refutes his ingenious but fanciful opinions concerning the best form of government; and in detecting the errors of that admired philosopher, as well as in exposing the dangerous systems of polity recommended by Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus, he arraigns by anticipation the extravagancies that have been proposed, approved, and many of them, in our own days, carried into execution. From the speculations of mere theory, he passes to those plans of legislation which have actually been established in the world; collected from the description of upwards of two hundred commonwealths; and presenting, when his work was entire, the most valuable series of political experiments that ever was

was exhibited. But concerning the republics of Asia and Magna Græcia, as well as those of Africa and Gaul, we must now be contented to gather our information from mutilated or doubtful fragments. Yet let us rather congratulate ourselves on the riches which remain, than peevishly regret losses which cannot possibly be repaired ^a. In the Book before us, we have the result and general conclusion of all our author's comparisons and reflections; which is, that the institutions of Crete, Sparta, and Carthage, though far from being perfect in theory, were the best and wisest that ever were carried into practice. In these governments, therefore, we may contemplate the term and limit of the civil wisdom and antiquity. With them, each nation may compare its domestic polity; and each individual may be contented, if the constitution under which he lives, can stand in honourable competition with those boasted models ^b. To satisfy his mind completely, the reader must himself make the comparison: and the English reader will finish this useful task, cherishing his country, and blessing the memory of his ancestors.

^a Fabricius, vol. ii. p. 196. & seq. gives a copious list of the commonwealths described by Aristotle. Cicero says, that this indefatigable author "explained the institutions, manners, and discipline of almost all the republics of Greeks and Barbarians." *Omnium fere civitatum non Græciæ solum, sed etiam Barbariæ, mores, instituta, ac disciplinas exposuerat.* De Fin. l. v. c. 4.

^b The objection arising from the supposed ignorance of the ancients with respect to representative government, will be answered in the sequel. It will be shewn that the Greeks were acquainted with representation in the usual and practical sense of that word.

Aristotle

B O O K

II:



Aristotle is the only writer that describes with fulness and accuracy the commonwealth of Carthage. He does more; he predicts her melancholy fate, and points out the lurking seeds of her decay and ruin, even during the most vigorous period of her health and prosperity. But, besides the malignant poison which destroyed that republic, there was a deep and radical error in the constitution of all those denominated the *free states* of antiquity; an error which our author in some passages hints at, but which he no where completely explains. This evil consisted in the faulty construction of what is now called the executive power; which, instead of being sovereign, permanent, and indivisible, was exercised by assemblies and senates, or by them delegated to an almost indefinite number of mutually independent ministers and generals. The deplorable effects of this arrangement, with regard to liberty as well as justice, I endeavoured twenty years ago fully to illustrate from ancient history; and as the observations then made could not be influenced by the events which have since happened in Europe, and the actually subsisting state of public affairs, I think it better to transcribe a few passages from the work alluded to, than to repeat the same opinions in other words. "In considering the nature and tendency of any government, there are two principal questions to be resolved; how far it protects the lives, and liberties, and properties of individuals, and what duties it requires them to perform in return for this protection?

Both

Both questions are easily answered with regard to the states of Greece; they required every thing, and they performed almost nothing. Such a political arrangement gave extraordinary energy to their military enterprises; and this, if it may be considered as a good effect, was the principal advantage with which their plan of policy was attended. The state enjoyed an absolute command over the personal services and the property of its subjects; and could on every occasion call forth their most strenuous exertions. The authority exercised over the rich and the poor was equally unlimited; but the condition of the former seemed peculiarly unhappy, because their estates, as well as their personal services, might always be required of them; and, without danger of inevitable destruction to their owners, could not possibly be withheld. They not only supplied the whole expence of the navy, but furnished such extraordinary contributions as any sudden emergency demanded. In all the following pleadings, there is scarcely one example of a rich

BOOK
II.

^c "Such nations," Aristotle observes, "shine in war; in peace they rust with their swords." This truth strongly impressed the author's mind, while it was yet a question of political expediency, what means should be used for avoiding a desperate conflict with a people, whose ambition, under despotism, first subjected their neighbours to the necessity of keeping on foot mercenary standing armies; and whose more dangerous ambition, under democracy, was likely to subject them to the still harder necessity of becoming armed nations. The lively and profound sense which he thought it his duty to express of the military energy of democracy, was strangely mistaken and grossly misrepresented, by *some persons* or *person*, who, at the time alluded to, affected to treat all those as enemies to peace at home, who were anxiously zealous for peace abroad.

B O O K man venturing to appear at the bar of the public,
 { **II.** without being able to prove that he had expended the best part of his fortune in the service of the community. But this was a matter of necessity, not of choice. For the Greeks were tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another ; and that impervious line which ought to be drawn between the exercise of power in the sovereign, and the enjoyment of liberty in the people, was a secret, undiscovered in Greece, and is still practically unknown in every country but our own.”^d

“ But the Athenian institutions, distressing as they were to individuals, who loudly complained of their injustice, yet enabled the republic to exert itself with vigour against its foreign and domestic enemies. The exorbitant and uncontrolled jurisdiction, assumed by the Grecian states over their colonies and allies, tended still farther to promote the same end. The enormous exactions of the Athenians from their tributary isles, as well as the heavy taxes which they imposed on their Asiatic colonies, have been already described. Sparta exercised, in this respect, an authority equally tremendous. In the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, that republic demanded from her colonies in Italy and Sicily, five hundred ships, and large contributions in money ; and during the course of the same war, she made many similar applications, which were seldom ineffectual. But it is not

^d Introduction to the Orations of Lysias, &c. p. 17.

from

from particular acts of extreme rigour and severity, that we must appreciate the intolerable servitude of the countries which had the misfortune to become subject to those ambitious republics. While human nature continues the same, the right to exercise power will always be attended with a strong propensity to abuse it. Unless this dangerous prerogative, on the one hand, be balanced by the invaluable privilege of defending liberty on the other; unless the line of separation between these two be boldly marked and accurately defined; unless the interests of that part of the constitution which tends to corruption, be invariably resisted by those of the generous portion which sustains its political life; it is of little consequence, whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand. In both cases alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law^c. It shall be proved that the institutions of those ancient republics, as well as the manners resulting from them, both of which have been injudiciously extolled by many learned men, approach nearer to Oriental despotism and the manners resulting from it, than can well be ima-

^c To see clearly the cause of the peculiar evils inherent in all kinds of popular assemblies vested with government, we must have recourse to the trite proverb, "Set a beggar on horse-back," &c. Men not used to power are the most likely to abuse it; and when this power centers in one assembly, however constituted, it is found by universal experience, that the majority will for ever tyrannize over the minority; and will execute its unjust and wild resolutions more zealously and more ardently, exactly in proportion to the opposition which it has encountered. In its ungovernable career, the obstacles which could not check and resist, will wonderfully increase and accelerate its headlong impetuosity.

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II.

gined. The principal difference between the citizens of the one and the slaves of the other is, that a greater number of the former might expect, at some future time, to inflict the same calamities which they had previously suffered. But between the foreign dependencies of republican and despotic states, there is no distinction whatever. The most rapacious Turkish governor, armed with all the tremendous power of his master, never acted with more cruelty and injustice, than did the magistrates of the Athenian republic under the sanction of popular decrees^f."

These observations are confirmed by the just theory of political arrangements, and illustrated by the most extensive survey of those denominated free states, both ancient and modern. In every well-regulated community, the people ought to have a controul in the government, but ought not to administer it; for power vested in the people at large, or in an assembly delegated by them, must, in nations ordinarily circumstanced^g, necessarily degenerate into the tyranny of a faction. Discontent, sedition, conspiracy, and revolution, form the miserable train of consequences; portrayed in characters of blood in the melancholy annals of republican history.^h

The

^f Introduction to Lyfias, p. 18.

^g What the *extraordinary* circumstances are which alter the nature of republicanism, will appear in the progress of this work.

^h I attest not only the republics of Greece, but the Italian republics of the middle age, whose tumultuary transactions and sanguinary revolutions

The evil is not accidental, it springs from a BOOK
II.
perennial source. With the constituent elements of every commonwealth, naturally grow up two parties, distinguished by different names in different countries, but whose essential characteristics are uniform and unalterable. The nobles and the people, the rich and the poor, will always respectively entertain many particular views, and always allow themselves to be governed by many seemingly incompatible interests. When these jarring orders are united in one sovereign assembly, whichever party prevails, the majority will tyrannize over the minority, and tyrannize the more outrageously, because the same persons who have made unjust decrees, are invested with the awful power of carrying them cruelly into execution. Even in the wildest democracies, such a monstrous arrangement never was durable¹. But its continuance, however short, was long enough to be feared and detested; since, to whichever side

revolutions crowd the desultory pages of Machiavel, Guicchiardin, Nerli, Varqui, Malavolti, Ghirardacci, Fioravanti, Portenarli, &c. As a modern Italian writer observes, "These republics were all of them exposed to almost daily revolutions, and seldom did the system of administration continue a whole year the same." Denina's *Revolutions*, &c. c. v. sect. 10.

¹ It seldom happened, in the republics either of ancient Greece or of modern Italy, that the whole exercise of government was vested in one council, in one assembly, or in the committees of either; but as the legislative body, whether senate or people, itself governed by the capricious will of a tyrannical majority, directed and controlled the exercise of all executive and judiciary functions, the matter was not much mended; since all power proceeded from one centre, and flowed from one source, a power unbalanced and irresponsible, and therefore, as Aristotle observes, not made for man.

BOOK

II

the balance inclined, either the weight of authority degenerated into despotism^k, or the flame of liberty blazed into conflagration^l. As by universal consent, therefore, all legislators or reformers of free states divided the sovereignty between the two orders, convened in distinct chambers; the one forming a senate to deliberate and propose; the other, an assembly of the people to approve and confirm. This, doubtless, is one great point gained: the two sovereign chambers serve to check each other; the one divides, and the other chooses^m; and while each rests satisfied with its prescribed share of power, their measures will be harmonious, and their government will be happy. But the passions of men, as our author frequently observes, are indefinite and insatiable; and scarcely a single example occurs in history, of either a sovereign senate or a sovereign assembly, which did not frequently abuse its power, and continually endeavour to aggrandize it. How is this evil to be remedied? What authority is to be interposed between contending factions? What

^k The most prominent examples are the tyranny of the Four Hundred, and afterwards of the Thirty, at Athens. History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxi. & xxiv. Likewise the tyranny of the Decemvirs at Rome. T. Liv. l. iii. c. 32. & seq.

^l All republican histories abound with examples of this kind. Those of Athens and of Florence contain little else for near a century preceding what is called the extinction of their liberties:

^m In this, according to Harrington, consists the whole mystery of government; "a mystery brought unto light by two silly girls. For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them; Divide, says one unto the other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose." Oceana, p. 13. edit. 1656.

hand

hand is fit to hold the balance, and to render **BOOK**
 the energy of law superior to the violence of **II.**
 party-rage? Aristotle will tell us "that the
 middle ranks must be increased and magnified;
 that veneration for the constitutional laws must
 be inspired; in fine, that a king must be esta-
 blished, whose office is a pledge and security
 that the few shall not be plundered and op-
 pressed, nor the many insulted and enslaved."
 In proportion to the degree in which these ad-
 vices have been complied with, free states have
 flourished. Even the republican Machiavel will
 vouch, that the commonwealths of the middle
 age never enjoyed any tolerable measure of pro-
 sperity or tranquillity, when the factions of the
 nobles and the people were not restrained by
 the authority of some virtuous, prudent, and
 powerful citizen^a. Into this form, of two deli-

^a Lib. iv. sub. init. Machiavel has branded, with indelible im-
 pressions of indignation and contempt, the institutions and govern-
 ments of modern Italy. Their history is not, however, he ob-
 serves, without its use. "E se nel descrivere le cose seguite in questo
 guasto mondo, non si narrera, ò fortezza di soldato, ò virtù di capi-
 tano, ò amore verso la patria di cittadino, si vedra con quali inganni,
 con quali astutie et arti, i principi, i soldati, i capi delle repubbliche
 per mantenersi quella riputatione che non havevano meritata, si gover-
 navano. Il que fara forse non meno utile che si siano l'antiche cose
 a conoscere; perche se quelli i liberali animi a seguirle accendono,
 queste a fuggirle & spegnerle accenderanno." L. v. Delle Historie,
 sub init. "In describing the transactions of this degenerate country,
 I shall not have to speak of the bravery of soldiers, the skill of ge-
 nerals, the patriotism of citizens; but there will be frequent occasion
 to recount the slights and artifices by which those who were at the
 head of civil and military affairs, kept possession of that consideration
 to which they were by no means entitled. The exploits of antiquity
 fire noble minds with the desire of imitating them; the transactions
 of a recent date, will fire the noble-minded among posterity with a
 desire to avoid and spurn such ignominious examples."

B O O K berative assemblies with an executive magistrate
 II. at their head, all the most renowned republics,
 both of ancient and modern times, have shewn
 a continual tendency to throw themselves; and
 that independently of contrivance and theory,
 or rather in opposition to them; so true it is,
 that "government," to use the words of Aris-
 totle, "is the work of nature; and all good go-
 vernment, the result of time and experience."

But innumerable obstacles, both without and within, prevented free states from attaining the just perfection of political arrangement. The republics of antiquity were too jealous of liberty to entrust the executive magistracy with such a share in the legislature as is essential to its own defence. The archon, the consul, the suffetes, the king, or by whatever other name the first magistrate was distinguished, judged causes in person, and commanded armies in person; his power did not consist in appointing those by whom causes were judged or armies commanded. In consequence of these unfavourable arrangements, the wise and equitable administration of the laws depended on the instability of personal character, not on the soundness of the constitution; and discontent with the administration, naturally produced a revolution in the government. Among the modern nations which conquered and divided the western provinces of the Roman empire, the nature of the kingly office came to be better understood; but as their kings were entrusted with the uncontrolled command of armies continually augmented

mented through the fear or jealousy of ambitious, and often hostile neighbours, it was easy for successions of such kings to overawe both nobles and people by the right of the sword, and to unite, in their own persons, the supreme legislative with the executive power. In Great Britain alone, whose insular situation rendered the public safety dependent on that kind of national force which is most formidable to enemies abroad, but which can never be conveniently employed as an instrument of usurpation and tyranny at home, the progress towards the highest perfection of political arrangement was left free and unincumbered; unchecked by the timid jealousies of the people, unobstructed by the overwhelming power of the prince°. Two legislative assemblies, the one popular, the other aristocratical; the former entrusted with the controul of the national purse and the inquest of public grievances; the latter judges in matters of impeachment by the Commons; but both orders or assemblies totally deprived of all constitutional means of hurting each other, since

* In populous countries, the encroachments of power cannot be regularly resisted by the people collectively. The people, therefore, must act by their delegates. But these delegates will uniformly and heartily unite with the general mass of the community, in maintaining equal laws and public liberty, when they are thoroughly convinced that the power which they restrain can never become their own. Hence the singular advantage of an indivisible and sovereign executive, whose functions can be legally exercised only by responsible ministers; and hence the wonderful stability of the British constitution; a stability (humanly speaking) unalterable, because founded on the indelible and best understood interests of men, the clearest dictates of reason, and the warmest passions of the heart.

the

B O O K the exercise of government centers in one sovereign magistrate, defended by a negative on the passing of laws, and invested with the whole prerogative of naming those by whom they are carried into execution; this distribution of power, the result of experience operating on fortunate circumstances, is the noblest contrivance that ever was devised for killing those seeds of sedition which lurk in the bosom of every commonwealth; for insuring the continuance of equal and useful laws; and for rendering the just authority of those laws prevalent over the blind fury of contending factions. Other modes of polity have succeeded in countries peculiarly circumstanced; but this applies universally; and free states have flourished in peace and prosperity, exactly in proportion^p to their approximation to this perfect model.

It has been the fashion, however, of late years to maintain that the misfortunes of the Greek commonwealths did not originate in the source

^p *Other circumstances being the same; words which ought always to be understood in such general propositions. The nature of the country, exacting industry and frugality, conspired with the authority of the Stadtholder in giving prosperity to the Netherlands. The United States of America owe their happiness, under their present executive, not merely to the great personal weight of their president, but to their extensive possessions, offering the strongest incitements to agriculture, to the enjoyments and virtues of domestic life, and to the improvement of their private fortunes; all which circumstances have a tendency to render men easily governable. These republics, as well as the Swiss Cantons and their allies, present, doubtless, (I should speak of Holland in the past tense,) a picture of more tranquillity and stability than did most states of ancient Greece, or the Italian republics of the middle age; and that not merely in consequence of their political arrangements, but of many other causes, both moral and physical. Written in the year 1796.*

above

above explained, but in the general ignorance of all the free states of antiquity with regard to representative government, the highest improvement of republicanism. As this doctrine is very sedulously inculcated on both sides of the Atlantic, by those who, having overturned their own hereditary constitutions, are desirous of encouraging other nations to imitate their example, it may not be improper to examine how far such assertions are warranted by history; especially as the examination will serve to illustrate several of our author's remarks in the following Books of his Politics. That the Greeks were totally unacquainted with representative government, cannot be maintained by any who have the least tincture of learning. I need not mention the Amphiëtyonic council^a, and the Achæan league^r, both of which representative bodies I have described in another place. But I may observe, as a fact less generally attended to, that in the commonwealth of Mantinæa, persons chosen from the people at large^s were invested with the power of naming the magistrates. In this Arcadian republic, there was not only representation simply, but a double row of representatives; delegates of delegates; and it is not

^a Compare the History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. p. 107. & seq.; and vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 467.

^r Ibid. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 14.

^s Aristot. Polit. l. vi. c. iv. The author mentions other republics on the same plan, particularly that of Telecles the Milesian; and in his Fourth Book, where he treats of the sovereignty in a state, maintains that elective, as well as deliberative assemblies, should consist of only a part of the citizens, acting for the whole by an established rotation.

reason-

B O O K

II.

reasonable to conjecture than an arrangement so obvious should have remained undiscovered among a cluster of free states, where all sorts of propositions were made, and all kinds of experiments were tried ; where nothing was rejected which had not been previously refuted ; and where institutions, seemingly the most unpromising, were condemned or approved in proportion only to the mischief or benefit visibly manifest in their effects. This is so true, that the supposed modern maxims, respecting representation and taxation, were held and practised by the Lycians ; a people not obscure nor inconsiderable, but eminently illustrious both in war and peace, from the earliest to the latest period of their history. The Lycians inhabited the southern coast of the Asiatic peninsula, and were surrounded by the territories of Carian, Pamphylian, and Cilician pirates ; wretches who deformed those seas by their rapacity and cruelty, and whose cities were marts of booty and slavery, particularly of captives, born free, reduced into inextricable bondage¹. The Lycians alone disdained this abominable traffic ; and though they often commanded the sea even to the coast of Italy, yet they never were convicted or even accused of sacrificing honour to gain². Their equity and innocence protected them against the just vengeance which often fell on their neighbours from the Syrian

¹ Strabo, l. xiv. p. 664 & 665. from which this account of the Lycians is almost wholly translated.

² Idem, *ibid*.

and the Roman power. From the age of Homer BOOK
to that of Brutus * and Cassius, they continued IL
to flourish under their hereditary institutions
in domestic tranquillity and national independence. Within a circular peninsula, nearly an
hundred miles in diameter, and with upwards of
one hundred and seventy miles of sea-coast,
Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, with three equal, and
seventeen inferior cities, formed from time im-
memorial a federal and representative govern-
ment. The national convention or congress
consisted of deputies from the several members
of the union; the greatest cities having three
votes; the middling, two; and the smallest only
one vote in the election of magistrates and in all
public concerns. In the same proportion they
paid taxes and incurred other public burdens;
their taxation and representation being regarded
by them as correlatives¹. They had one com-
mon archon or stadtholder², whose office be-
came in later times elective, but which may be
conjectured, from the analogy of their history
with that of their European brethren, to have
been anciently hereditary.³

In

* See in Plutarch's life of Brutus, and in Appian (De Bell. Civil. l. iv. p. 633. & seq.), the memorable resistance of Xanthus and Patara to Brutus.

¹ αναλογον δε και τας νοφορας νοφεμισι, και τας αλλας λυτρυγιας. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 665.

² λυκιαρχης. Ibid.

³ The Lycians were a happy people. Did they owe their happiness to their representative government? History will shew us that they owed it to their virtuous manners, which could alone render that government either beneficial or permanent. In confirmation of this, the following statement of facts may be given:— Among the
Gothic

BOOK

II

In examining the other Greek republics, we shall find that power exercised by delegation formed a leading feature in every one of them. Athens itself, which became the most democratical of them all, was in its best times a government of representation as well as of rotation; and in reading its laws, we shall be often tempted to believe that we are perusing the code of a certain modern representative democracy. In the former commonwealth, which from the time of Theseus breathed a peculiar spirit of freedom, the comitia or ordinary assemblies of the people were not sum-

Gothic conquerors of the Roman empire, elective princes having gradually raised themselves to the rank of hereditary kings, their jealousy of the nobility naturally led them to protect, encourage, and insensibly to exalt to power, the industrious and peaceful inhabitants of towns and cities; of whose participation in the legislature, the first clear evidence that occurs in the history of France is the reign of Philip le Bel in 1301. In 1484, Charles VIII. summoned deputies from the country; from which time the States-General, consisting of three independent chambers, each of which had a negative on the proceedings of the other two, were appointed in the manner seemingly the best adapted to unite the whole wisdom and patriotism, as well as to collect the real sense of the nation. The inhabitants of each parish sent deputies to the jurisdictions; and these deputies again sent the persons deemed best qualified to represent them in the States-General. There were thus two orders of deputies; or deputies of deputies, an institution which Mr. Hume (Idea of a perfect Commonwealth) proposes as the highest improvement in representative government; and which, Dr. Price (see Appendix to his Sermon on the French Revolution) greatly extols the *French republic*, for being the *first state* to carry into execution. Notwithstanding all this, the States-General of France contributed nothing to the benefit of that country. The assembly of 1484 was disgraced by multiplied quarrels among the chambers. The five assemblies which followed, exhibited alternate scenes of civil discord and sanguinary superstition. The States were summoned for the last time in 1614; and this assembly, like most of the preceding ones, broke up as abruptly as it had deliberated uselessly. *Essais Historiques sur les Communes de Rome, les Etats Generaux de France, & le Parlement d'Angleterre*, v. ii. p. 189, & seq.

moned

moned as at Rome by a consul, nor by any analogous magistrate, as in many neighbouring Greek states. At Athens the political machine moved, as it were spontaneously, with the revolution of the seasons. The astronomer Meton, who reformed the calendar ten years before the Peloponnesian war, regulated the commencement of the Athenian year by the first new moon after the summer solstice^b. The year was divided into twelve months, consisting of twenty-nine, and of thirty days, alternately; and each month was divided into three decades^c. On the days immediately preceding the first decade of the first month, called Hecatombaion, in allusion to the numerous sacrifices by which it was distinguished, the Athenians, from the wards in the city, and the districts in the country, amounting collectively to one hundred and seventy-four in number^d, assembled in the public market-place of the capital, in order to elect the senate, the archons, and other annual magistrates. For the purpose of conducting these elections, as well as other public matters, with the greater regularity and expedition, the people voted by divisions, called tribes; which were four in the time of Solon, but raised to ten by Clisthenes^e, who restored the republic after the expulsion of

^b Conf. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 186. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 96. Liban. Argum. in Demosth. Orat. in Androt.

^c Julius Pollux, &c. apud Potter. Antiq. v. i. p. 26.

^d Strabo, l. ix. p. 396.

^e History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xiii.

Hippias.

B O O K Hippias. From persons properly qualified^f in point of age, character, and fortune, each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty senators, who formed collectively the senate of the five hundred for the succeeding year. To the senate thus constituted, another body was aggregated^g, to supply the place of those senators who might be removed by death, or dismissed for malversation in office. The whole senators, actual and supplemental, were divided into ten classes, representing the ten tribes; each of which enjoyed presidency in rotation^h. The order of this pre-eminence was also determined by lot. The fifty presiding senators were intitled the Prytanes; the hall in which they assembled and dined, the Prytaneum; and the period of thirty-five days, during which they held their dignity, was called a Prytanyⁱ. This period was divided into five weeks; and the fifty Prytanes into five companies, each consisting of ten persons, and each presiding in the senate during its respective week^k. From these presidents of presidents, a single person was chosen by lot to preside in the senate for a single day, during which he was entrusted with the command of the citadel, the key of the treasury, and the custody of the public seal of the commonwealth^l. The

^f Lyfias adverf. Philon.

^g Harpocrat. in *Επιλαχοντις*.

^h Suidas in *Πετραν*. Liban. Argument. in Androt.

ⁱ Pollux, l. viii. c. 15. Demosth. de Corona.

^k Liban. Argument. in Demosth. Androt.

^l Suidas in *Επιρωτ*.

nine other tribes attained the honour of the Prytany, each in the order which had been established by lot; and their presiding companies, as well as the president himself, were appointed precisely in the manner above described^m. With this representative body, Solon lodged the most important branches of sovereignty. The senate convened dailyⁿ: it prepared all matters of deliberation for the popular assembly^o; no measure could be lawfully enforced by the people which had not been previously approved by the senate^p; and the senate, independently of the people, made laws which had force for a year, that is, during the period of its own existence^q. The presidents of the senate also presided in the popular assembly; summoned its extraordinary meetings by their authority; put the question to a vote; collected the suffrages; and having declared the will of the majority, dissolved the assembly^r. The senate, therefore, enjoyed the principal share in the *legislative and executive* powers of government; but the judicature was merely a temporary commission, exercised by juries chosen by lot from the people at large^s. These juries were directed in their proceedings by the nine archons^t, who were annually ap-

^m Suidas & Harpocrat. in Περικλέος & Εμιστραται.

ⁿ Petit. Leg. Attic. 183.

^o Harpocrat. in Περικλέος. Demosth. in Leptin.

^p Idem, ibid. & Plutarch in Solon.

^q Plut. ibid. & Demosth. in Aristocrat.

^r Æschin. de Falsa, Legation. & Aristophan. Concionatic.

^s Plutarch. in Solon. Demosth. in Aristogeit.

^t Ulpian. in Demosth. adversus Midiam. Demosth. in Near. Polux, l. viii. c. ix.

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pointed at the same time with the senate, and from persons of the same description with those qualified to sit in that council^u. In the stated assemblies held at the end of every year, and commonly during the last four days of it, the people also appointed the military commanders, the surveyors of roads and buildings, the commissaries and controllers of accounts, and a variety of other officers; each department of office commonly containing ten citizens, that the ten tribes might be respectively represented, each by one of its own members.^x

Solon could not foresee the events which destroyed this political arrangement. He foresaw, however, that it was extremely liable to destruction. He was fully apprized of the danger of tyranny, by which the republic was first assailed^y, and of the danger of democracy, by which it was finally ruined^z. The regulations which he established were admirably calculated to prevent both those evils. I shall not here dwell on the judicious plan of public education which he prescribed and enforced^a, or on the admired authority of the Areopagus, which he extended or confirmed^b; institutions respectively adapted to maintain the equality of freedom on the one hand, and to uphold a fair and moderate aris-

^u Pollux, l. viii. c. vi. *Æschin. in Ctesiph. Pelit. de Leg. Attic.* p. 237.

^x Compar. *Æschin. in Ctesiph.* p. 429. p. 432. *Harpocrat. in Anaxim.* Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

^y *History of Ancient Greece*, vol. i. c. viii.

^z *Ibid.* vol. ii. c. xlii.

^a *Ibid.*

^b *Ibid.* & *Isocrat. Areopagit.*

toocracy

tocracy on the other. This aristocracy was still farther strengthened by the laws regulating the mode of proceeding in the popular assembly, which subjected to a rigorous perquisition the lives and characters and qualifications of the orators entitled to address the people^c, and which gave a legal precedency in every debate to those speakers who had passed their fiftieth year^d. But these wise regulations, all breathing the same spirit, were unable to resist the storms by which a republic enriched by commerce and elated by conquest, must ever necessarily be assailed. They could not prevent the multitude assembled in a large and luxurious city from yielding to the perfidious voice of demagogues, while they encouraged the people at large to become managers of their own affairs^e; to act on every occasion as their own ministers; and thereby to destroy that line of distinction between the sovereign and the subject, on the unalterable continuance of which the stability of good government will ever most firmly rest, under every fluctuation of external circumstances, of prosperity or adversity, simplicity or refinement.

^c Æschin. in Timarch. Suidas & Harpocrateon in Πρωτοῦ Γραφῆ.

^d Æschin. *ibid.*

^e Demosth. *passim*.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Plato's republic. — Community of wives, children, and goods. — Nature and necessity of separate property. — Plato's books of laws examined. — Schemes for equalizing property. — Their futility. — Hippodamus. — His ideal republic. — Arguments in favour of political innovation. — Stronger arguments against it. — The Spartan government. — The Cretan. — The Carthaginian. — The Athenian. — Zaleucus. — Charondas. — Philolaus. — Diocles. — Phaleas. — Pittacus. — Androgamas.

BOOK II.

Chap. I.

The subject, and the end or purpose of this inquiry.

IN order to discover and ascertain that form of society under which those would prefer to live, who were at liberty to choose a mode of civil existence completely agreeable to their wish, we must not only consider the most admired political institutions that have actually prevailed in the world, but likewise examine those imaginary plans of perfect governments, which fancy has devised, and which philosophy has highly approved. Such an examination will enable us to determine the hitherto undefined limits

limits of justice and utility, in matters of society and government; and will thus rescue the present work from the reproach of being undertaken for the unworthy purposes of ostentation or censure^a.

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Every commonwealth being, as we have said, a partnership, it follows, that in every commonwealth men must be partners in some things or in all^b. Some things they must possess in common, since the community could not otherwise subsist. The advantageous situation of the capital and of the territory is necessarily a part of the common stock; and all men who inhabit the same city and country must breathe the same air, and enjoy the same climate. A question therefore arises, how far this community ought to extend? Whether the partnership of a commonwealth has its defined limits? Or whether, as Socrates maintains in the republic of Plato, all things ought to be common; wives, children, and possessions?

To what
objects the
partnership
of a com-
mon wealth
ought to
extend.

^a σοφιστῶν βολομένη. I resolve the first word into the two motives by which the sophists were usually actuated.

^b Aristotle's division is threefold. He says, it is necessary that the citizens should enjoy all things in common; or nothing in common; or some things in common, and other things not. But he immediately adds, that the second branch of the division is impossible, since, if nothing were common, a republic would not be what he has defined it, a community or partnership. In compliance with the general rules which he lays down concerning division, he introduces a part or member, which the nature and definition of the particular subject of investigation obliges him immediately to reject. The inventor of method could scarcely be held guilty of pedantry in exemplifying his own rules: his scholastic imitators indeed are frequently liable to this reproach; but even the pedantry of method is seldom a very grievous fault when real instruction is the aim.

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This extraordinary innovation, which is so different from every thing that has hitherto prevailed in the world, is attended with innumerable difficulties. Were it reduced into practice, we deny that this novelty would answer the purpose which its author means it should serve; we deny likewise, that this purpose, which Socrates says should be the end and aim of every commonwealth, is in itself desirable.

Plato's opinion refuted.

According to this philosopher, the main object of legislation is to promote the union of the citizens, "to unite them as much as possible; and to reduce them, as nearly as may be, from many to one." Yet it is plain, that this project of uniting, when carried beyond certain limits, would totally destroy the community, reducing a commonwealth to a family, and a family to an individual^c. But a commonwealth must, from its nature, consist not only of many individuals, but of individuals differently en-

^c Vid. Platon. de Republic. l. v. passim. Aristotle's reasonings never seem to us less worthy of himself than when he combats the exceptionable doctrines of his master; not that he does not sufficiently refute them, but because he refutes, at too great length, extravagancies that neither merit nor require such patience of examination, and such perseverance of opposition. Yet, to the contemporaries and immediate successors of Aristotle, the passages which to us appear tiresome and frigid, probably ranked among the most interesting parts of his work. Such was the great fame of Plato, justly earned by the sublimity and truth of many of his doctrines; and even by his paradoxes themselves, so naturally introduced, so ingeniously supported, with such power of arrangement, and such charms of style, that under his plastic art, the most shapeless crudities received form, beauty, and brilliancy. That fanciful writer became a philosopher by choice, but always remained what he had been originally, a poet by nature; and like men of a similar stamp in modern times, often perplexed those sciences which he sought to adorn.

dowed,

dowed, and differently employed^d. It is not an alliance in war, operating by the mere strength of numbers; it is not a nation living in scattered families, remote, detached, and, in civil concerns, totally unimportant to each other. But it is a society of men united by their mutual exigencies, and their respective acquirements; so that the very circumstance itself which, in one sense, unites a city, that is, harmonises it into one body or system, necessarily infers a multiplicity of wants, a diversity of talents, and a distinction of property. The reciprocation of good offices, resulting from all these varieties, upholds states^e; and the more numerous are the varieties

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By the nature of political society.

^d This doctrine is beautifully illustrated by the greatest of all systems in the Treatise de Mundo. Aristot. p. 608, & seq.

^e Aristotle here refers to his Treatises on Ethics, in which he has explained with great accuracy the doctrine of justice, both moral and political. See vol. i. from p. 361 to p. 393. Comp. Ethic. Eudem. b. iv. from beginning to end. Magna Moral. b. i. c. 34. In pursuing his first comparison of government to a partnership in trade, he observes, that it is easy to regulate the shares of the profit by those of the capital. But when the greater skill or the greater labour of one partner is to be set in opposition to the greater capital of another, the distribution of profits then becomes more difficult; the matter, however, may, for the most part, be pretty accurately adjusted. But in the great partnership of civil society, how many intricate proportions are to be unravelled, before the jarring elements of birth, wealth, talents, industry, can be harmonised into any lasting system of equitable policy? This, however, must be done, not indeed with scientific accuracy, but according to those liberal principles of moral geometry, which are the only rules that the practice of civil life either requires or admits. When this great work is effected, and the interests of the many are thus reconciled with the fair pretensions of the few, distributive or political justice will then have performed its office; and room will be left for the impartial exercise of justice, commutative or corrective; which is to be regulated not by geometrical analogy, but by the simpler kind, called arithmetical: (κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν;) in which the terms of any numerical series increase or decrease by a

BOOK II. varieties that within certain limits prevail, the more completely will that purpose of comfortable subsistence be obtained, for which civil society was instituted^f.

Reason
why the
great prin-
ciple of
the division
of labour

In proportion as labour is divided, arts are perfected; and the various branches of industry are all of them best cultivated, when the same individual is strictly confined to the same branch

fixed and given difference. This, therefore, according to Aristotle, is the only kind of justice and the only kind of virtue which admits of precise and definite rules; for as in any series of terms in arithmetical proportion, the common difference always remains the same, whatever be the terms, so in commutative or corrective justice, whatever be the quality or the merits of the persons concerned, the contracts and the injuries defined by law are considered as things fixed and invariable, and having fixed and invariable equivalents. See vol. i. p. 370, & seq.

^f οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἑναι πῶς μίας, καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ ὡς παρῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἓκ ἑσται, προήμισα, πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑσται μὲν, ἑγγύς, δ' ὡς τὴν μὴ πόλιν ἑσται, ἑσται χιμερὴ πόλις. Literally, "Both a family and a commonwealth ought to be in *some* respects one! but not in all. For a commonwealth, when it attains perfect unity, ceases to be a commonwealth, and as it approximates this ultimate limit, it will continually become a worse commonwealth than it was." The thought is finely illustrated by Cicero, "Ut in fidibus ac tibis, atque cantu ipso ac vocibus, concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem immutatam ac discrepantem aures eruditæ ferre non possunt; isque concentus ex dissimillarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens: sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus, ut sonis, moderata ratione civitas consensu dissimillimorum concinit; & quæ harmonia à musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia." "Concord in states is like harmony in music. The one results from the differences and relations of distinct and most dissimilar sounds; the other, from the distinction of ranks among the citizens; the high, the low, and the middle order which is interpolated between them." We shall learn from Aristotle, that it is this middle order which binds and cements the political edifice. Men of this class understand better than any other, how to deal with the multitude. They have many interests in common with both of the extremes; their superiors, and their inferiors. Whence Aristotle maintains, that those states are the best and happiest, and most secure, where the middle ranks most abound.

of

of art. In matters of civil government, the same principle is applicable; but justice prohibits, that, in such matters, this principle should always be actually applied. In some communities the citizens are so nearly equal in merit², that it would be highly unjust that one portion of the state should be continually debarred from offices of magistracy; it would be equally unjust that another portion should exclusively appropriate them. Whether government be a good or a bad thing, it is fair that men of equal abilities and virtues should equally share in it; that they should receive the advantage of it as their right, or bear the burden of it as their duty. But as they cannot all of them exercise magistracy at once, it is necessary that they should govern by vicarious succession, each ruling and submitting in his turn, and thus assuming and laying down such important prerogatives, as render them, in their civil capacities, at different times, altogether different men.

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cannot be
applied to
government.

Should we allow the propriety of the end at which Socrates thinks that every legislation ought to aim, yet we could not admit the propriety of the means by which, he thinks, this end is likely to be attained. For this purpose,

Chap. 2.

Arguments
against the
communi-
ty of wives
and chil-
dren.

² This is here the force of the word *φωσις*. "They have so equally attained the perfections of their nature." See vol. i. p. 23. This equality among the citizens implies the sameness of education and pursuits, as our author afterwards explains; and, therefore, infers that the arts of productive industry should be exercised, and the exigencies of bodily accommodation should be supplied, by those who are not citizens,

he

BOOK II he proposes the abolition of the distinction "mine and thine," and maintains that the citizens of his supposed commonwealth would be perfectly unanimous, if all of them could apply the word "mine" in speaking of the same objects. In this remark there is an evident fallacy. The word "all" may be taken distributively, or collectively; if taken distributively, it is plain, that on the supposition of the community of goods, the word "mine" could not be applied by any body; no *one* of the citizens could justly say, this is my wife, my son, or my property; and though all collectively might, indeed, say so, yet their doing this would not be found conducive to concord.

Farther; that which is a common concern is very generally neglected. The energies of man are excited by that which depends on himself alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, it is with reluctance that he employs such a degree of attention and activity, as even his own interest requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care; and as other men prove equally negligent with himself, the common interest is universally abandoned. Those families, besides, are commonly the worst served, in which the domestics are the most numerous. In a commonwealth where each father had a thousand sons, and each son a thousand fathers, it is plain that neither fathers nor sons would be very zealous

ous in performing their relative duties ; and the condition of a nephew^b would be more eligible under an ordinary government, than that of a son in Plato's republic.

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In the interior parts of Africa, geographers tell us that women are common, but that each man appropriates the children which most resemble himself. Among quadrupeds, some females have been observed to bring forth young wonderfully resembling their fathers. The famous mare of Pharsalus was so remarkable for this property, that she was called "The Just." It will be impossible, therefore, to hinder men from forming conjectures, grounded on resemblance^c and other circumstances, that certain children are theirs; and these conjectures, though attended with the uneasiness of anxious doubt, will not prevent the partialities of parental affection. The uncertainty, also, will produce many evils in its turn; it will multiply and embitter crimes; raillery and reproach will be converted into irreverence and impiety; love will often degenerate into incest, and murder into parricide; and when such abominations happen, men who are ignorant of the enormity

^a The Greek word more commonly means a cousin-german. The Romans said, "ne sis mihi patruus;" using the word uncle metaphorically, for a severe reprovee, and a morose guardian.

ⁱ Nicolaus Damascenus apud Stobæum, serm. 42. p. 291, mentions a people called Limyræi, among whom wives were common; and children also, until their sixth year; at which age they were assigned, after a public examination, to those of the men whom they most resembled.

of

B O O K II. of their crimes, because ignorant that they were committed against their kindred, will often neglect performing the ceremonies appointed by religion for expiating their unnatural wickedness^k.

Concord, doubtless, forms the happiness of states; but this community of wives and children would totally destroy that affection on which concord is founded. As a drop of honey is dissipated and lost in a pail of water; so the sweet affection of love would totally vanish through too extensive a diffusion: for two circumstances are requisite to maintain and invigorate this affection;—that the objects of it be in themselves lovely, and that they be peculiarly recommended to our love. The community of wives and children, were it in any case to be adopted, might, therefore, be more advantageously established with regard to the peasants, whom Plato has appointed to labour and to obey, than with regard to the military class, whom he has appointed to legislate and to govern. By destroying all affection among the peasants, it would prevent their conspiring against their masters^l.

^k See Ethics, I. ix. c. 6.

^l Some sentences are omitted in this chapter, either as containing repetitions, or as relating to the subject of Greek love; a perversion of sentiment to which Aristotle, of all the philosophers of his age, shews himself the most decided and most zealous adversary. None of them, indeed, as has been erroneously supposed, patronize such an abominable degeneracy; but Aristotle alone, in his moral and political writings, uniformly treats the subject with that marked reprobation which became a philosopher superior to the prejudices and fashions of his own times.

The

The community of property, depending on different principles, merits a separate consideration. Among some barbarous nations, the lands are separately cultivated, but the fruits of them are promiscuously consumed. Among others, the lands are common, and cultivated by the conjunct labour of the community; but each family appropriates its share of their fruits. Where the peasants form a distinct but dependent class, the community of lands will be liberated from several of its inconveniences. The martial lords of the soil, as in that case none of them would have any labour to bestow, could not quarrel with each other about proportioning the fruits of their industry to the quantity of their respective exertions. But should the proprietors themselves cultivate with their own hands their common property, innumerable jealousies would immediately spring up, as fatal experience proves almost always to happen among those connected in too close a communion of life, the partners in a voyage or a journey, who dispute for straws with each other; and as a master is most quarrelsome with those servants who are most frequently in his way, being employed in attendance on his person.

The useful and practical community of goods, a community that will neither engender animosity nor check industry, must result from the salutary discipline of laws, and the skilful application of early and assiduous culture. According to the proverb, "all things are common among friends;" we must imitate, extend, and, if possible,

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Arguments
against the
communi-
ty of
goods.The useful
and practi-
cal com-
munity of
goods.

B O O K **II.** fible, carry to perfection, the plans of those legislators who have in any measure succeeded in producing this desirable effect. At Sparta, the establishment of property does not hinder the free communication of many of the benefits accruing from it. The slaves of the Lacedæmonians, their horses, their dogs, their carriages^m, are all at the service of any citizen who has occasion to employ them; goods are appropriated, but their uses are freely communicated; and this double advantage is the natural result of a wise legislation.

Contrasted
with the
fanciful
specula-
tions of
Plato.

Socrates's community of goods would destroy the delightful pleasure which arises from saying "this field is mine." This pleasure, indeed, proceeds from self-love, but a self-love that is natural and just; and as different from selfishness, as a virtuous and proper affection is different from a vicious and blameable excess. Deprived of separate property, we should be deprived of a pleasure belonging to it still more delightful; the pleasure of bestowing it on our friends, on our companions, and even on deserving strangersⁿ. Destroy wedlock, and what room will be left for the virtue of chastity? Destroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality?

The dis-
tinction of
property

Yet the system of Socrates carries with it at first sight a specious show of humanity, because

^m *σφοδια*, viatica, things necessary for a journey, which Aretinus translates vehicula, without authority indeed, as to the interpretation of the word, but consistently enough with the sense of the passage. Vid. Xenoph. &c. Republ. Laced. & Plutarch. in Lycurg.

ⁿ *ξένοι*, foreigners connected with us by the ties of hospitality.

our

our attention is withdrawn from its emptiness, and forcibly arrested by the evils actually existing in society; law-suits, perjury, clamorous reproach, and mean adulation, all of which are charged on the unequal distribution of property, but which are all more justly chargeable on human villany. The illusion is supported by a false comparison. We compare the disputes occasioned by separate property, which is of great amount, with those occasioned by common property, which is of little value; not reflecting that the quantities of both ought to be fairly estimated, and that, the proportion being thus rightly stated, we should find the evils resulting from common property to be the greater of the two. A false principle deceived Socrates; he took for granted that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate; whereas, in reality, this union, carried beyond certain limits, would prove the destruction of the commonwealth; and the nearer it approximates to its destruction, the commonwealth becomes the worse. Symphony is good, and metre is good; but symphony is destroyed when it changes into sameness of tone, and metre is destroyed when it changes into sameness of time°.

Amidst the innumerable experiments that have been made in matters of government, the system of Socrates would undoubtedly have been earlier invented, and submitted with other

BOOK
II.

infers its
unequal
distribu-
tion.

The neces-
sity of this
illustrated
by music.

The im-
practicabi-
lity of Pla-
to's com-
munity.

° This just comparison should have occurred to the fancy of a lively nation, when they were exhorted to embrace the wild design of forming a commonwealth from one element.

schemes

BOOK II. schemes of innovation to a fair trial, had it appeared to be in any degree practicable. If tried by the test of experiment, its insufficiency would manifestly shew itself. The uniting principles in states are, — laws, education, manners, and a congeniality of sentiments and affections produced by the intercourse of life, and cemented by mutual good offices ^p. But this intercourse and these offices imply the usual institutions of wards, districts, and common tables; to which, had Socrates confined himself, his plan of legislation would have wanted novelty; since, even in relieving his first class from the labour and cares of agriculture, he would only have proposed what the Lacedæmonians had previously enacted ^q.

Imperfectly explained by himself.

Difficulties respecting his peasants,

The remaining parts of his plan, Socrates does not clearly explain. We are not informed whether the community of wives and possessions is to extend to the peasants. If it does, wherein will they differ from the military? and how can they be kept in obedience, unless, like the Cretan slaves, they be prohibited the use of arms, and forbidden the gymnastic exercises? Yet, if the peasants are not comprehended in the new regulations, Socrates, who allows them the rank of citizens, will have two republics in the same territory, differing in laws and institutions,

^p See vol. i. p. 493 & seq.

^q ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι, which the Lacedæmonians are now attempting to do. Aristotle speaks as if they had never completely effected their purpose. The order of the sentences is, in this paragraph, somewhat altered; and the words sometimes paraphrased, the better to express the sense.

eternally

eternally at variance with each other, and in one of which all those disorders will prevail which are found in other states. The peasants, individually or collectively, are however to be masters of the soil, provided they pay to the military a due proportion of its fruits; a degree of independence that would engender insolence, and render them more formidable to the government than the Penefts of Theffaly and the Helots of Sparta^r. Again, if lands are property, but women common, will the women manage houses in which they have no separate interest, with the same attention that the men cultivate their own fields? The example of inferior animals does not prove that men and women ought to exercise the same employments, because no animal but man is acquainted with the benefits resulting from the mutual exchange of the fruits of labour^s; and the œconomy resulting from appropriate tasks is peculiar to the human race.

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and women.

Socrates divides his commonwealth into two orders, that of soldiers, and that of peasants; but whether the peasants are occasionally to bear arms, or whether they are ever to be entrusted with any share in the go-

His distribution of ranks,

^r The Penefts (so called from their poverty) were the descendants of the neighbouring nations conquered and enslaved by the Theffalians, and most commonly employed in cultivating the lands of their severe masters. In their employments, their numbers, and their continual disposition to revolt, they agreed with the Lacedæmonian Helots. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 157, & passim.

^s See above, p. 43.

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vernment, he does not determine. The wives of the foldiers, that is, the women who are common to this class, are to be trained to the gymnastic exercises as well as their husbands; they are not only to participate in the military games of their country, but to sustain the laborious duties and real dangers of the field. Though the military forms a privileged order, yet only a portion of this military is to be invested with the powers of deliberation and final resolution; in other words, a small body of men are to be the sovereigns of the state; and it should seem as if those sovereigns were to reign for life; for Socrates informs us, that the divinity infuses into some men, even at their birth, a portion of intellectual gold; into others, a portion of intellectual silver; but that the third class, the peasants and artificers, are composed of brass and iron. These golden men, therefore, are, according to Socrates, to be perpetual magistrates: but, under such an arrangement, can it be expected that a high-minded people, with arms in their hands, should be restrained from sedition?

unfit for attaining the end of political society.

Though exempted from this evil, even the governing part of the city, subjected to so many privations and bound to so many hard duties, would not deserve the epithet of happy; and if happiness does not belong to them, can we expect to find it among the peasants and mechanics? Socrates, indeed, says, that it is the business of a legislator to consult, not the good of any particular class of men, but that of the whole

whole state; he forgets that the happiness of a state is to be measured by the common standard of happiness of the individuals composing it; for happiness is not like an *even* number that may be composed of parts which are *odd*.

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In his books of laws, which were written afterwards, Plato intended to delineate a more practicable scheme of government. Yet even these laws he gradually bends to his favourite system; and, except in the articles of the community of wives and possessions, and of the public tables destined for the women, his two republics nearly agree in form, though they differ in magnitude; the first containing one thousand, and the second, five thousand men bearing arms. All the discourses of Socrates, doubtless, discover great freedom of thought, and much patience of investigation; they are distinguished by novelty, ingenuity, and elegance; but that all his observations should be just, is more than could be expected from man. Five thousand soldiers confined to the business of war, and cultivating no one kind of productive industry, would, with their due proportion of wives, children, and domestics, require for their comfortable subsistence the plains of Babylon, or some other country equally extensive^t. Suppositions, though arbitrary, ought not to be impossible.

Chap. 4.
Examina-
tion of Pla-
to's books
of laws.

Socrates

^t The purpose of comfortable subsistence for which commonwealths are instituted, requiring a minute subdivision of labour, Aristotle says, that in this particular view, the more populous is the community, its end will be the more completely attained. But the

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Socrates does not say that his soldiers are to subsist comfortably, but temperately; this is ill expressed, for men may subsist temperately, but wretchedly^u. He says, that laws ought to be relative to the country, and to the men of that country; he ought to have added, "and to the surrounding nations." The provisions for defensive war, at least^w, ought not to be omitted in any wise plan of legislation.

His equalization of landed property, imperfect without concomitant regulations.

In his second republic he equalizes estates, but leaves population unlimited; saying, that deaths and barrenness are found by experience to keep the populousness of most countries, at different periods, nearly on the same level. But under

conveniencies and accommodations, furnished by the mutual exchange of labour and its fruits, are not the only ingredients of comfortable subsistence; education, morals, and other elements, constituting national felicity, set bounds to that populousness which the mere traffic of conveniencies would leave unlimited. It is thus, in general, that the degree in which one political advantage can be attained, is limited by a regard to other advantages which must not be neglected; and to compare and reconcile them with each other, to compensate inequalities and to adjust contrarieties, is the great duty of the statesman. All things considered he declares, in favour of what would be now deemed a very small commonwealth, consisting of 15,000 or 20,000 citizens (which must provide for defence, by confederating with other states formed on a similar plan); and he says, that the third or fourth part of this community could not subsist in arms and idleness, unless the territory was very extensive. Experience justifies this remark. Political writers say, that scarcely one man in a hundred, and certainly not one in fifty, can in modern times be maintained as a soldier without the gradual depopulation of their respective communities. Yet how great is the disproportion between a fourth and a fiftieth? and how scantily are modern soldiers provided for, in comparison with the soldiers of antiquity?

^u The author adds, "liberally and luxuriously." The adjuncts, "liberally and soberly," must be united in order to express $\xi\pi\upsilon$ *ev*.

^w Aristotle, as we shall see hereafter, justifies even offensive war in certain cases.

ordinary

ordinary governments, increase of population would only occasion a greater subdivision of landed property; whereas in Plato's republic, the supernumeraries would be altogether destitute of estates; because the lands being already reduced to equal, and as it were, elementary parts, would be incapable of farther partition. In all countries the just proportion between wealth and populousness ought to be an object of the most serious attention. Neglect in this particular produces that poverty which is the mother of villainy and sedition. In the laws of Pheidon of Corinth, one of the most antient writers on the subject of politics, a regulation is introduced directly the reverse of Plato's; Pheidon limits population, but does not equalize possessions: the relative advantages of either plan we shall afterwards examine.

In Plato's second republic, the characters of men fit for office are very imperfectly described by saying, that in the composition of a commonwealth, the governors should be as different from the governed, as, in the composition of a web, the warp is from the woof. In point of wealth, his citizens are divided into four classes, of which the first is to be four times as rich as the last. Having thus permitted the unequal accumulation of personals, why does he so nicely limit the acquisition of landed property? To each family he assigns two houses, a present as inconvenient as it is expensive. The general scheme of his commonwealth is to be neither

Imperfection of his constitutional regulations.

BOOK

II.

democratical nor oligarchical, but a mixture of both forms; since all the citizens capable of purchasing heavy armour are to be entitled to a share in the government; a regulation which excludes only the meanest portion of the lowest class. This mixed form of policy is well adapted to common use, but if Plato meant it as the best possible system, next to that of his philosophical commonwealth, he probably rates it too highly; many will prefer to it the government of Sparta, and other systems of policy more strictly formed on the aristocratic model.

Judgment
in favour
of mixed
govern-
ment.

Some men are of opinion that the best government must be compounded of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. On this account they highly commend the institutions of Sparta, which admit of a king, of a senate, and of the democratical power of the Ephori, who are chosen by and from the people. Others regard the power of the Ephori as too arbitrary and tyrannical; and think that whatever is democratical at Sparta, results, not from its political constitution, but from its customs and manners; the common and frugal tables; the public and uniform education; the daily commerce of life, and the habitual interchange of good offices among persons of all ranks.

In Plato's second commonwealth, there is not any mixture of monarchy; it consists of democracy and oligarchy, but contains most of oligarchy; and yet he says, inconsistently enough, that the best government is composed of democracy

ARISTOTLE

crazy and tyranny ², which two corruptions can hardly be honoured with the name of governments, or, if so called, must surely be held the very worst of all.

BOOK
II.

That Plato's second commonwealth inclines most to oligarchy, is evident from the laws respecting the appointment of the magistrates. This appointment is partly by suffrage, partly by lot; the former of which is conformable to oligarchy, the latter to democracy. This mixed mode of appointment is, therefore, conformable to a mixture of those two forms. But that the

Particularly with regard to elections.

² Plato does not say tyranny, but monarchy. The passage alluded to is in the Sixth Book of his Laws, p. 858. edit. Ficini. I had often read it without considering it as liable to the objection stated in the text because I never doubted that there was an error of the press, viz. *μοναρχικῆς* instead of *αριστοκρατικῆς*. In the sense in which the passage is taken by Aristotle, it is not only inconsistent with the context, but with the whole tenor of Plato's political writings; decidedly and uniformly hostile to arbitrary power, whether monarchical or democratical. See his Republic, book i. p. 582. edit. Ficini. The difficulty may, however, be removed without correcting the text, if we suppose that Plato considers monarchy as the limit of aristocracy, as democracy is of republicanism. Absolute monarchy and perfect democracy are two extremes, and good government lies between them. When a republic expands into democracy, it ceases to be a republic; when an aristocracy contracts into a monarchy, it ceases to be an aristocracy. Republics and aristocracies, as both Plato and Aristotle shew, have respectively a tendency to this expansion and contraction, which may be considered as their ultimate limits; or two contrary extremes, by the due blending of which just government is produced. In conformity with this, see what is said of the twofold justice and twofold equality; the one consisting in sameness of measure, weight, and number, which is easily recognised; the other hardly discernible by man, though approved by the judgment of God himself; and, as far as it prevails in this lower world, the source of happiness to individuals and communities. The reason is given, *τῷ μὲν γὰρ μῆλλον πλεον, τῷ δ' ὀλιγότερον σμικρότερον ἡμῖν, μετρία δίδουσι πρὸς τῷ αὐτῷ φύσει ἑκάτερον*: "for it attributes to the greater more, and to the lesser less, assigning to each what is commensurate to its respective nature." De Legib. l. vi. p. 859.

B O O K

II.

{

rich should be compelled, under a forfeit, to attend the assemblies for electing magistrates, and for other public duties, while the attendance of the poor remains optional, is a regulation highly favourable to oligarchy. The lower classes will frequently neglect attendance, and the public affairs will thus devolve exclusively on the more wealthy portion of the community. In constituting the senate, candidates are to be named from the four classes of the citizens at large. But the two lower classes are not bound to attend at the naming of candidates from men of their own order. From candidates thus named the senate is, by a new election, to be constituted; but this succession of elections, in which the magistrates are chosen from candidates previously named, is always a dangerous expedient, since it exposes the government to be usurped by a combination of artful men, who need not be very numerous. Such is Plato's second republic, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, as will evidently appear when we have examined more accurately the polity compounded of those two forms⁷.

Chap. 5.

Concern-
ing other
schemes of
ideal com-
mon-
wealths.

Other schemes of ideal commonwealths have been delineated by philosophers and politicians, and also by men entitled to neither appellation; all of which schemes approach much nearer to such governments as have actually prevailed in the world, than do the two republics of Plato.

⁷ The text is confused and corrupt. I have given to it the order and the sense seemingly most consistent with other parts of the work.

In none of the political models proposed by other writers do we read any thing concerning the community of wives, the community of goods, or common tables destined for the women. They begin their codes of legislation by institutions more necessary and more practicable.

To some writers, nothing appears of so much consequence as the skilful regulation of property; because it is this much coveted object that gives birth to most disputes and most seditions. Phaleas of Chalcedon² was the first who proposed, as a most salutary institution, the equalizing of wealth among the citizens; a thing, he thinks, easily established in new settlements; and which, he says, might easily be introduced into old countries by one simple law, commanding the rich always to give marriage-portions with their daughters, but never to receive any; and the poor always to receive, but never to give them. Plato in his laws, on the contrary, allows the inequality of fortunes within certain limits; permitting, as we before observed, the citizens of the first class to be four times as rich as those of the last.

BOOK II.
Phaleas's plan for equalizing property.

² Neither of this Phaleas, nor of Pheidon mentioned above, have we any notices but those left by Aristotle. Christopher Hendreich (*De Repub. Carthagin.* p. 166, & p. 239.) makes Phaleas a Carthaginian: he was the lawgiver of Chalcedon, a city on the Thracian Bosphorus, opposite to Byzantium, or Constantinople, and built seventeen years before it. Chalcedon was called in derision "the city of the blind," because its founders, overlooking the noble situation on which Constantinople now stands, had chosen one greatly inferior to it. *Plin.* v. 32. *Tacitus*, xii. 62. A legislator, six centuries before Christ, equalizing fortunes on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus, — how strange a contrast with the laws now prevalent there!

Whoever

B O O K
II.Its incon-
veniencies.Other
schemes of
similar na-
ture.Their fu-
tility.

Whoever would regulate the extent of fortunes, must also regulate the increase of families. If children multiply beyond the means of supporting them, the intention of the law will be frustrated, and families will be suddenly reduced from opulence to beggary; a revolution always dangerous to public tranquillity.

That a certain degree of equalization of property tends to strengthen the bands of society, escaped not the sagacity of ancient legislators. In legislating for Athens, Solon acknowledged the influence of this principle^a. The early institutions of several republics both limit the acquisition, and prohibit, under certain circumstances, the sale, of lands. In Locris, a citizen cannot dispose of his estate, unless he can make it appear that he is reduced to this necessity by some unmerited and manifest calamity. The alienation of ancient inheritances in Leucas prepared the way for a revolution in the government; and offices of magistracy no longer requiring a fixed qualification in point of fortune, the mixed form of policy gradually degenerated into nearly a simple democracy. But equality itself is not a thing universally desirable; for shares may be all equal, and yet all

^a Solon allowed a brother to marry his sister on the father's side, but not his sister uterine; because by marrying the latter, he might have increased the estate which descended to him from his father, by that which came from the first husband of his mother; and thus in his own person have accumulated two inheritances. Com. Plutarch. in Themist. p. 128. Petit. Leg. Attic. p. 480.; and Montesquieu, *Esprit de Loix*, l. v. c. 5. Several other of Solon's laws breathe the same spirit. Conf. Plutarch. in Solon. p. 89. Demosth. in Macart. p. 1036. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 441—444.

too great if they foster sloth and luxury ; they may be all equal, and yet all too small if they engender wretchedness. Mediocrity, therefore, ought to be the aim of legislation ; but this object will be better attained by moderating passion than by levelling property. BOOK
II.

Phaleas, indeed, proposes not only to equalize possessions, but to render education uniform. He does not explain, however, wherein this uniform education is to consist. The citizens may be all educated alike, and all of them ill educated, if care be not taken early to subdue in them the miserable passions of avarice and ambition.

Discontents arise not merely from the inequality of possessions, but from the equality of honours. The multitude complain that property is unjustly, because unequally, distributed ; men of superior merit or superior pretensions complain that honours are unjustly, if equally, distributed ; and that The real
causes of
civil disorders.

“ The good and worthless find their meed the same ^b. ”

The bare necessities of life, food and fuel, clothes to cover our nakedness, and a home to shelter us from the storm, comforts which it is pretended the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injustice. The greatest crimes are committed for none of those things, but for obtaining or securing the objects of ill-regulated de-

^b *Iliad*, ix. Achilles speaks to Ulysses.

fires,

BOOK fires, and senseless, because insatiable, passions ;
 II. and sometimes for acquiring objects of taste and
 elegance, from which we expect to derive pleasure unmixed with pain ; pure, unfading, and independent enjoyment. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themselves with blood ; and states decree the most illustrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an usurper^c. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is useful, therefore, against the least and most inconsiderable only of the three evils which disturb society ; evils, for each of which there is an appropriate remedy ; subsistence insured by industry, for the first ; an education inspiring the habit of moderation and self-command, for the second ; and for the third, the attractive, rational, and uncloying charms of philosophy ; in the study and practice of which, men will find a delight, and the only delight not liable to contingencies, round and complete in itself, and as stable as it is independent.

Their remedies.

The proper limits of national wealth.

In delineating the scheme of his republic, Phaleas has confined his attention to matters of domestic policy. He has not inquired, though the inquiry was necessary, how the national force is to be raised or supported. Money, or its equivalents, are essential in war as well as in peace. Phaleas has not endeavoured to ascertain the extent of the national wealth. Yet

^c The word *τυραννος*, properly denotes him who has acquired the sovereignty of a state formerly free. With whatever moderation he might exercise his power, he was called *τυραννος* from the manner by which he obtained it. But Aristotle here means the tyrannical abuse of usurped power.

there

there are certain limits within which it ought to be confined; its immoderate magnitude might tempt the rapacity or provoke the invasion of greater powers; but it ought to be sufficiently considerable to enable us to meet our equals with confidence; and even to teach our superiors that they may probably lose more by contest than they are likely to gain by victory. When Autaphradates prepared to besiege Atarneus^d, Eubulus, the master of that city, desired him to calculate how much time would be wasted in the siege, and how much money would in that time be expended; observing, that for a less sum he would probably be willing to sell the place. Autaphradates calculated, reflected, and desisted from the siege.

The equalization of fortunes may have some slight tendency to stifle animosity and to prevent dissension. But its effect is always inconsiderable, and often doubtful; since those who think themselves entitled to superiority will not patiently brook equality. To stand on a level with the multitude is not their proper place; and to acquire their due elevation, they will conspire together and subvert the commonwealth. *The wickedness of man is boundless: it seems at first as if a trifle would content him, but his passions invigorate by gratification; always indulged, always craving, and continually

Inefficacy and imperfection of laws equalizing wealth.

^d See above, p. 8, & p. 17. and Pausanias, b. iv. c. 35. This place had fallen to decay in Pliny's time, though still renowned for precious stones as clear as crystal, "Cepionides in Æolidis Atarne quondam oppido, nunc pago, nascuntur." Plin. N. H. v. 30. Conf. xxxvii. 10.

preying

BOOK II. preying on him who feeds them. This evil cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables, of which last Phaleas has omitted to speak. It can be cured only by that salutary discipline which will make one part of the community delight in doing justice, and by that sound policy which will prevent the remaining part from committing with impunity any serious wrong; for the majority of mankind will always be the sport of their own headstrong passions; and though they ought to be treated with equity and humanity, must be habitually overawed by authority, and seasonably restrained by power. Phaleas's republic will be but a small one if mechanics and artificers be debarred from all share in the government. The institutions of Epidamnus^c respecting the lower ranks, and those established on the same subject by Diophantus at Athens, are worthy of imitation. Such are the merits and the defects of the republic of Phaleas.

Chap. 6.

The ideal
republic of
Hippodamus,
an architect of
Miletus.

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a Milesian, and by profession an architect, gained celebrity in his own art by constructing the Piræus at Athens, and by improving the method of distributing streets, and planning cities. His love of distinction exposed him to the reproach of vanity; and many ascribed to affectation,

^c See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 375. and vol. ii. p. 185. The lower classes in Epidamnus as well as in Athens, though not public slaves as in Laconia and Thessaly, were much employed in what Aristotle considers as servile tasks, because performed by the exertions of mere bodily labour; particularly in building, mining, and other public works.

his

his magnificent dress, his flowing locks, and the warm mantle which he wore, even during the heat of summer. Hippodamus was ambitious of reaching eminence in all kinds of knowledge, and is the first author who, without any practice in affairs, wrote a treatise concerning the best form of government. His republic consisted of ten thousand men, divided into the three classes of artificers, husbandmen, and soldiers. The territory he likewise divides into three portions; the sacred, destined for the various exigencies of the public worship; the common, to be cultivated for the common benefit of the soldiers; and the private, to be separately appropriated by the husbandmen. His laws also were divided into three kinds, because he thought there were only three sorts of injuries; insults, damages, and death. He instituted a court of appeal, composed of select senators. Sentence, he thought, ought not to be passed by votes or ballot; but that each judge should be furnished with a tablet, on which he should write guilty, if he simply condemned; and which he should leave unwritten, if he simply acquitted; but on which, if he found the defendant in some measure guilty, but not to the full extent of the indictment, he should mark this difference, stating how much the culprit should pay, or what punishment he should suffer. As the law formerly stood, Hippodamus observed, that in all cases requiring this distinction, the judge, who was bound by oath to observe justice in his decisions, must commit perjury whenever he either simply and

BOOK

II.

The new laws.

B O O K and positively condemned, or simply and positively acquitted. Hippodamus also established a law in favour of those whose inventions tended to improve the constitution of the commonwealth; they were to be distinguished by peculiar honours; and the children of those who fell in battle were to be maintained and educated at the public expence. This last regulation, first introduced by the architect of Miletus, has been adopted by Athens and other cities. According to his plan of policy, the magistrates were all of them to be elected by the free and impartial suffrages of their fellow-citizens, consisting of the three classes of men above mentioned: the concerns of the state, the affairs of strangers, the care and management of orphans, formed the three important objects entrusted to their administration.

Examina-
tion of his
republic.

Such are the leading features of the republic of Hippodamus. In examining this republic, the first difficulty that occurs respects his division of the citizens. The husbandmen, the artificers, and the soldiers, are all of them to be members of the state; but the husbandmen destitute of arms, the artificers destitute of both lands and arms, will maintain a very unequal conflict with the soldiers, if these last should be tempted to enslave them. An association of men, so unequally treated by the legislator, must continually tend to dissolution. The great executive magistracies, together with every office of military command, devolve of course on the soldiers. Can the two remaining classes

classes be expected to with the continuance of a **BOOK**
 government, from whose honours and emolu- **II**
 ments they are for ever to be excluded? A re-
 volution, therefore, must speedily take place,
 unless the military be more powerful than both
 the husbandmen and the artificers united; and
 if they actually be so, of what signification is it,
 that these degraded classes are summoned to
 give their votes at elections, and mocked with
 the appellation of citizens? Artificers, subsist-
 ing by the fruits of their own labour, are essen-
 tial to the existence of every city or commu-
 nity. But the class of husbandmen, as regu-
 lated by Hippodamus, by what tie of utility are
 they linked to the state? The common lands
 might be cultivated by the military themselves;
 which would destroy the distinction between the
 soldiers and the peasants. They might be cul-
 tivated by men destitute of private estates; and
 this would form a fourth class, distinct from the
 husbandmen of Hippodamus; who, by a most
 awkward regulation, are to labour one district,
 consisting of their private estates, for their
 own maintenance, and another, consisting of
 the common lands, for the maintenance of the
 military; a most useless distinction of property,
 and most absurd partition of employment, by
 which much valuable time would be lost, and
 much unnecessary expence incurred.

The judicial regulations of Hippodamus are Of his judi-
 not less blameable, since their direct tendency cial regu-
 is to convert judges into arbiters, and thereby lations.

VOL. II.

I

to

BOOK to arm them with an arbitrary power of decision, which can never be expedient to the parties, unless it be specially granted, and voluntarily entrusted. In matters submitted to arbitration, communication of sentiment and discussion of opinion are not only allowed but required. In courts of justice, most legislators have strictly prohibited both; commanding each judge simply to condemn or simply to acquit, as his own reason directs. By the innovations of Hippodamus, legal proceedings would be involved in inextricable confusion. The defendant might be ordered by one judge to pay twenty minæ; by another more; and by a third, less; each might differ from every other; and all from the plaintiff. The sentence would be thus split into such a multitude of parts as it would be difficult to collect, and impossible to unite; and all these difficulties would be created and encountered, in order to obviate an imaginary inconvenience; for it is false that the judge is perjured, who simply acquits a party sued for twenty minæ, although he may believe that he really owes half that sum. The judge would, on the contrary, be perjured, if he did not acquit him; and in all similar cases, the fault lies not in the law or in the judge, but in the libel and in the plaintiff, whose case is not correctly stated, and whose action is not fairly brought.

His law in
favour of
political
improvements.

The law in favour of those whose inventions tend to improve the constitution of the commonwealth, is more specious than solid. Bearing

ing beauty on its surface^c, it is fraught with persecution, innovation, and sedition. It is the opinion of many, that ancient laws, which are good, are preferable to new ones, though better; and that a moderately wise constitution of government ought never to be altered. Upon this delicate subject, the following observations may deserve attention. The advocates for alteration and improvement observe, that the gymnastic exercises and medicine, as well as all other arts and faculties, have been carried to their actual state of perfection by repeated trials and reiterated efforts. If legislation be a science or an art, must it not partake of the same nature, and follow the same progress with all other arts and sciences which, being founded on observation, have been reared, extended, and perfected by experiment and reflection? That it does partake of the same progress, civil history affords the most convincing proofs. What can be more rude, what more barbarous, than the ancient laws of the Greeks, when they frequented the public places with swords by their sides; and bought and sold their women like cattle in a market? In those states which have adhered too scrupulously to their hereditary usages, what grossness, iniquity, and cruelty every where prevail! At Cumæ, a man may be convicted and punished as a murderer, on the evidence of the

Arguments
in favour of
political in-
novation.

^c Aristotle's expression is remarkable; *νοφθαλμον ἀκαστον*: the first word, denoting what is pleasing to the eye, had come to denote what is agreeable in general; and thence, joined with *ακαστον*, "what is-pleasing to hear."

B O O K kindred of him who prosecutes for the murder—

II.

It is not for what is ancient, but for what is useful, that men of sense ought to contend; and whatever is distinguished by the former quality, cannot be expected to possess much of the latter. The ancient inhabitants of the world, whether produced by the genial power of the earth^d, or saved from the ruins of some dreadful catastrophe, must have been degraded by weakness of understanding, and disgraced by unruly strength of passion. The institutions ascribed to the earth-born giants are not, surely, worthy of being followed with respectful deference. But innovations, were it desirable to prevent them, are not, however, to be prevented: they are necessary and inevitable. Written laws, with whatever comprehensiveness and precision they may be penned, cannot express all that variety of cases to which, and which only, they may with justice be applied. Rights are to be maintained, wrongs to be prevented, and therefore laws are made. These laws are general; exceptions to them occur; new exceptions multiply; and the number and importance of the exceptions at length produce new laws far more equitable than those which had previously been established.

Stronger
arguments
against it.

Formidable as these arguments seem, they may be opposed by others of not less weight:

^d Aristotle is here speaking as an advocate; and, in stating the arguments in favour of innovation, does not, therefore, think it necessary to adhere to the established tenets of his philosophy. See *Analytics*, p. 135.

arguments

arguments which prove that even the rust of government is to be respected, and that its fabric is never to be touched but with a fearful and trembling hand. When the evil of persevering in hereditary institutions is small, it ought always to be endured, because the evil of departing from them is certainly very great. Slight imperfections, therefore, whether in the laws themselves, or in those who administer and execute the laws, ought always to be overlooked, because they cannot be corrected without occasioning a much greater mischief, and tending to weaken that reverence which the safety of all governments requires that the citizens at large should entertain, cultivate, and cherish for the hereditary institutions of their country. The comparison drawn from the improvement of arts, does not apply to the amendment of laws. To change or improve an art, and to alter or amend a law, are things as dissimilar in their operation as different in their tendency: for laws operate as practical principles of moral action^c; and, like all the rules of morality, derive

^c The Stagirate's argument against innovation does not apply to that kind of it proposed by Lord Bacon, namely, the imitating that great innovator Time, whose operations are so slow and skilful, that they elude the senses and escape observation, "Novator maximus, tempus; quid ni igitur tempus imitemur?" and again, "Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes ita insinuat, ut sensus fallant?" That great man concludes with Aristotle, "It is improper to try new experiments in the political body, unless the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident. Great care must be taken that the desire of reformation may occasion the change, and not the desire of the change plead for the reformation. Again, let all novelty, though it cannot, perhaps, be rejected, yet be held suspected. And lastly,

BOOK five their force and efficacy, as even the name
 II. imports, from the customary repetition of habitual acts, and the slow operation of time. Every alteration of the laws, therefore, tends to subvert that authority on which the persuasive energy of all laws is founded; to abridge, weaken, and destroy the power of law itself'.

Though

as the Scripture directs, let us stand upon the old paths, and see and ask for the good way, and walk therein." Political Essays, Essay xi. It is worthy of remark, that Bacon lived in the age of reformation in religion, and was himself a great reformer in philosophy. He combated successfully the pretended philosophy of Aristotle, which was certainly far worse than no philosophy at all; but his dislike to the distorted shadow made him think, at least speak, too disrespectfully of the substance. Whoever has read only the works of Bacon, is not a competent judge; but whoever has read the works both of Bacon and of Aristotle, will be ready to acknowledge that the former is wanting in gratitude to an author whom he is continually arraigning and continually copying. Yet Lord Bacon is not altogether without excuse: in his time, the pretended authority of Aristotle enthralled the human mind. In the present age, that illustrious modern knight, consistently with his *principles*, greatly vary his *conduct*; and exaggerate the merit of the Stagirite, in the same spirit, and with the same views, which made him formerly depreciate and defame it.

Notwithstanding this decision of Aristotle's, a learned modern writer observes; "As to the perpetuating their institutions and rendering them immutable, this entered not into the intention of the old Grecian legislation. A system of immutable and irrevocable laws might indeed be the barbarous project of Eastern policy: but the Grecian legislators were too well experienced in the nature of mankind, the genius of society, and the ceaseless vicissitude of human things, ever to dream of so ridiculous a design." Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses, b. ii. sect. 3. This is expressed too strongly and too absolutely. Not to mention the example of Lycurgus, (see History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. 3.) which Warburton indeed admits as an exception, but says that Lycurgus was single in the ridiculous attempt of making his laws perpetual; a whole volume might be written to prove Aristotle's decision conformable to the general voice of poets, orators, historians, and legislators. *Διὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς νόμους τῆς πατρίδος καθάπερ τινας δεύτερας θύρας συντηρεῖν.* "That we ought to maintain unaltered the laws of our country, and respect them

Though innovation in general should not be universally reprobated, yet various questions would arise, on what occasions it is warrantable.

BOOK
II.
The

them as certain secondary divinities." Stobæus, *serm.* xxxviii. p. 229. Such is the general corollary resulting from the political writings of Grecian antiquity*; a corollary adopted by Cicero†, their best interpreter, *De Legibus*; and such is the doctrine maintained by Demosthenes himself, when speaking to the Athenians, whose decrees, governed by wild demagogues, were as variable as the Euripus. See his *Oration* against Timocrates, particularly the last pages. In the same *Oration* (p. 480, ex edit. Wolf.) there is a passage worthy of remark. "I am inclined, citizen judges, to explain to you how the Locrians make laws. You will not suffer any detriment by hearing this example; an example of the mode of legislation in a well-regulated state. The Locrians are so firmly persuaded that it is their duty to uphold their ancient laws, and to defend them against the interest or caprice of innovators, that whoever proposes a new law, does it with a halter about his neck. Should the law be approved, the proposer departs unhurt; but should his law be rejected, he is strangled in his own halter. This salutary institution proves an effectual check to innovation; and the Locrians strictly observe their ancient laws; inasmuch, that in a great length of time, only one single law has been altered. The old law ordained, that whoever struck out the eye of another, should lose one of his own eyes; a punishment which did not admit of any pecuniary commutation, but was to be rigorously inflicted. A man with only one eye, being threatened by his adversary with the loss of the single eye he had, and thinking life insupportable under the calamity of blindness, ventured to propose this alteration of the law; 'That he who struck out the eye of a person who had but one, should be deprived of both his own eyes, so that the punishment might be equal to the crime.' The amendment was approved; and this is said to have been the only alteration in the Locrian law, in the space of more than two hundred years. But your demagogues, citizen judges, make new laws, solely for their own convenience, almost every month: if you do not punish them, the people at large will soon be enslaved by these wild beasts." *ἐκ ἐν φθάνοι το πλῆθος τῶν τοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δουλεύοντι.* As the law mentioned by Demosthenes is ascribed to Zaleucus (*Ζαλευκὸς ὁ ἐννομόθετος τοῦ καινοῦ νομοθετοῦ τοῖς τοῖς ἐξ ὅχου περικείμενον, &c.* Stobæus, p. 229.

* See the 2nd Book of Plato on Laws, and the 4th Book of his Republic throughout.

† *Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut æterna sit.* *Fragm. de Legibus*, l. iii.

BOOK II. The difference of manners, governments, and of men, by whom alterations are proposed, and by whom they are to be conducted, will produce very complicated and almost innumerable questions; the solution of which we shall defer to a more seasonable opportunity.

Chap. 7.

Observations preparatory to an examination of the Spartan, Cretan, and Cathaginian republics.

In examining the Spartan, the Cretan, or indeed any system of laws, two questions ought chiefly to fix our attention. The first question is, Whether these laws be calculated to promote the best interests of mankind? The second, Whether they be calculated to promote those interests which, under particular circumstances, the legislator takes to be the best: in other words, whether the institutions which we examine be consistent with the most desirable and most perfect model of civil polity; and whether they be consistent with what the lawgiver, all things considered, deems the government most

ferm. xxxviii.), the Locrians here spoken of must be the Locri Epizephyrii; so called from their territory near the promontory Zephyrium, at the southern extremity of Italy. Pindar calls them Zephyrian Locrians, in his short and pithy panegyric:

Νῆμι γὰρ ἀτρεκία πολὺν Λοκρῶν
Ζεφυρίων, μέλει δὲ τοῖσι, Καλλιόπῃ
Καὶ χαλκῷ; Ἀρης.

"Justice governs the republic of the Zephyrian Locrians; who cultivate, with equal success, arts and arms." The law concerning the halter, which Stobæus refers to Zeleucus, is numbered by Diodorus Siculus among the laws of Charondas. But the same writer tells us, that Charondas borrowed most of his laws from former codes. Diodor. xii. 79. p. 485. It is probable therefore that the principle of resisting innovation once prevailed at Thurii, as well as in the republic of the Locri Epizephyrii; though history indicates that it was far less rigidly adhered to in the former republic, which was disturbed by frequent revolutions. Ephor. apud Strabon. p. 260.

suitable

suitable to those for whom he legislates? In every well-regulated commonwealth, it is agreed that all those citizens who have any share in the public administration, should enjoy leisure for attending to this important concern. But how such leisure may best be obtained, is not easy to determine. The Penests have often with arms assailed the Thessalians; and the Helots, the Spartans; and those degraded orders of peasants live as it were in continual ambush, watching the moment to retaliate those injuries which they have indignantly suffered from men whose leisure results only from their own toil. The Cretan peasants have never discovered the same spirit of sedition; because, the cities of Crete being all of them supported by the labour of servile rustics, it could not be the interest of any one state to teach the slaves of its neighbours to rebel, since every neighbour, who happened to be hostile, would constantly enjoy an opportunity of retorting the injury. But the Argives, Arcadians, and Messenians, subsisting chiefly by their own labour, and waging eternal wars with Sparta, always endeavoured to divide and divert the enemy's force, by stirring the Helots to rebellion; and the Penests first revolted from the Thessalians, during the wars of the latter with the Achæans, Perræbians, and Magnesians. In the treatment of slaves and peasants, it is difficult to hit the middle point between the extremes of indulgence and harshness; indulgence that is productive of insolence, and harshness that will be repaid with hatred.

But

BOOK
II.

Difficulties
in regulat-
ing the
peasants.

Why they
are less se-
ditionary in
Crete than
in Thessaly,
&c.

BOOK
II

But either extreme is highly inconsistent with the proper management of those lower classes, who form as it were the arms of the community.

Lycurgus's
faulty in-
dulgence to
women.

Nothing proves more ruinous to a state than the defective education of the women; since wherever the institutions respecting one half of the community are faulty, the corruptions of that half will gradually taint the whole. The undisciplined manners of the Spartan women are inconsistent with every wise plan of legislation, and totally adverse to the principal aim of Lycurgus; who, exacting the most rigid temperance in his men, with a view to harden them to fortitude, has granted every indulgence to his women, and thereby corrupted them with licentiousness. In a nation of soldiers, the errors in female education, and the vicious passions resulting from that fatal source, are doubly prejudicial; for the poet had surveyed life and manners with discernment, who first coupled Mars and Venus; all martial nations being immoderately amorous, and therefore particularly obnoxious to the undue influence, or rather the dominion, of women; with the exception however of the Celts^s, and if there be any other people who openly prefer unnatural love. It is of little consequence whether women rule the state, or men, governed by women, rule it in subservience to female passions. During the invasion of the Thebans, the Spartan women^b,

^s Vid. Athenæum, l. xiii. c. 27.

^b See the History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 394.

instead

instead of rendering those services which women **BOOK**
 on similar occasions have often performed, **II.**
 caused more evil than even the arms of the
 enemy: and avarice must always domineer
 wherever women bear sway.

The incongruous regulations respecting the **Whence it**
 two sexes in Sparta proceeded from a natural **arose.**
 cause. The severe duties of the field had pre-
 pared the men for submission to civil discipline;
 but the women, untamed and turbulent, spurned
 the yoke of legislation. The fault, therefore, is
 chargeable on themselves, rather than on Ly-
 curgus. But we are not now inquiring who is
 to blame, but what is blameable?

The unequal distribution of property forms **Faulty re-**
 another material defect in the Spartan govern- **gulations**
 ment. Lycurgus prohibited the acquisition of **respecting**
 lands by purchase, but set no bounds to their **property.**
 transmission and accumulation by gifts and tes-
 taments. Landed property therefore has been
 engrossed by a few; and if the whole territory
 were divided into five equal portions, not less
 than two of these portions would be found vested
 in women; such is the improvidence of the laws
 respecting succession, the enormity of dowers,
 and the extravagance of marriage settlements!
 The natural effect of such faulty regulations is **Their ill-**
 to diminish the populousness of the country, **effects.**
 which scarcely contains the twentieth part of
 the inhabitants which it is capable of supply-
 ing with subsistence, or the twentieth part of
 the thirty thousand heavy-armed men, and fif-
 teen hundred cavalry, which it was thought
 able to send into the field. One great evil
 resulting

BOOK

II.

resulting from this diminution of people was fatally experienced when the single defeat at Leuctra reduced this ancient kingdom to the brink of ruin. It is reported that the kings preceding Lycurgus supplied the waste of the natives in war, by alluring foreigners into the country; and that the Spartans alone amounted to ten thousand men bearing arms. Without examining this report we may affirm, that the strength derived from numbers will be better and more safely promoted by levelling the excessive inequalities of property. Lycurgus, however, certainly wished to increase the strength of the state, when he enacted, that the man who had *three* sons should be exempted from the night-watch, and that he who had four should enjoy a complete immunity from all public burdens. But this regulation evidently clashes with the preceding, since, under a faulty distribution of property, an increase of populousness is only an augmentation of misery.

Advantages and inconveniences attending the Ephori.

The popular part of the constitution of Sparta, residing in the Ephori, is liable to many objections: though invested with the most awful powers, the Ephori or inspectors must all of them be chosen indiscriminately from the multitude, and often from those of the lowest and poorest class. The decisions of such men ought not to be arbitrary or final. Their corruption has been shamefully manifest on many former occasions¹; and in a very recent transaction, their venality, resulting from their poverty,

¹ History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 61.

had well nigh ruined the commonwealth. Their authority, too, is exorbitant and tyrannical; even the kings acknowledge the necessity of paying court to them; and their undue influence in the government has often exposed the aristocracy of Sparta to the 'evils flowing from the most turbulent democracy. Yet it must be acknowledged, that this magistracy of the Ephori, ill regulated as it is, tends to preserve the balance of the constitution, and has thereby perpetuated its duration. To give stability to any government, it is necessary that all orders of the state should feel their interest in its safety. Whether by accident or design, this salutary purpose has been effected at Sparta. The kings are inflexibly bound to a constitution which confers on them peculiar honours: the fidelity of the higher ranks of men is secured by the institution of the senate, an admission into which is the exclusive reward of their merit and services: the people at large remain content with their condition, when they contemplate the sovereign magistracy of the five Ephori promiscuously elected from the whole; and who ought certainly to be so elected, though not after the childish fashion that now prevails*.

The

* Aristotle applies the same epithet, a few sentences below, to the election of the senate; but omits telling us wherein this puerility consisted. The defect is supplied by Plutarch, in the life of Lycurgus; who relates, "That the assembly of the people having convened in the market-place, a certain number of select persons were confined in a neighbouring edifice; where, without the possibility of seeing or being seen by the assembly, they could only hear its shouts. The candidates for the senate then marched through the middle of the

BOOK
II.

The indulgences also permitted to the Ephori in their ordinary mode of life, are totally inconsistent with the spirit of Lycurgus's legislation. Severity of manners carried to the extremes of harshness and rigour is the prevailing feature of his policy; but while the rest of the citizens snatch only by stealth even the most lawful pleasures, the Ephori are absurdly indulged in the unbounded gratification of all their passions.

Imperfections of the senate.

The constitution of the Spartan senate labours under many defects; when the legislator enacted that the members of this council should hold their office for life, he did not consider that the understanding¹ grows old as well as the body. The great and uncontroverted powers vested in the senate might be safely entrusted to consummate wisdom and perfect virtue: but the Spartan senators have been seduced by partiality, and often corrupted by bribes. Their

the assembly, one after the other, in the order determined by lot. As each candidate passed in review, the people testified their favour by acclamation; while the imprisoned judges marked on tablets the loudness and frequency of the shouts, without knowing to which of the candidates they applied. He who was honoured by the most frequent repetitions of the loudest shouts was declared senator." Our author justly condemns this mode of election as childish, since the Lacedæmonians, like children unable to count, contented themselves with probability in a matter where, by telling the votes, absolute certainty might have been attained. This mode of election was also well calculated to gratify the fraudulent designs of the judges; for when they happened to have an undue partiality for any of the candidates, they might guess, from his general character, with what kind of shouts he was likely to be received; and, in opposition to truth, declare the acclamations in his favour the loudest and most frequent. Vid. Thucyd. l. i. p. 58. edit. Frankfort, 1594.

¹ See Analysis, p. 57, & seq.

malver-

malversations therefore ought to be restrained by the regular operation of a law, compelling them at stated times to give an account of their administration; as their undue exercise of power is but imperfectly checked by being occasionally obnoxious to the wild tyranny of the Ephori. Their mode of election is puerile^m; and that none should be admitted into the senate, but those who canvass for that honour, tends to excite and invigorate that impudence of selfish ambition which occasions half the wickedness of mankind, and which is imprudently inflamed by the institutions of Lycurgus.

B O O K
II.

Whether the office of king be at all useful in a republican government, shall be examined hereafter. In whatever manner that question may be determined, it is plain that this office ought to be the reward of tried and approved merit; since the institutions of Sparta have not been found capable of forming men, recommended by the accidental circumstance of birth, worthy of filling a throne. The legislator, indeed, visibly despaired of perfecting his fellow-citizens in virtue, since he condescended to derive assistance from their passions and their vices. Men at variance with each other are considered as the fittest persons to be joined in the same important commissions; and the safety of the state is thought to have no small dependence on the dissension of the kings.

Of the two
kings of
Sparta.

The Phiditia, or public tables, are ill instituted, for those only can frequent them who are

Of the Phi-
ditia, or
common
tables.

^m See note k.

capable

B O O K capable of bearing their fair proportion of the
II. expence. At Crete, the expence of the public
 tables is supplied by the state, and even the
 poorest citizens may enjoy them; but as ma-
 naged at Sparta, the Phiditia have weakened
 the democratical part of the constitution, which
 they were intended to strengthen and uphold.

Of the high The extraordinary powers granted to the high
admiral. admiral of the republic have been justly con-
 demned by several writers. The two kings are
 the perpetual and hereditary commanders of the
 army; but the high admiral is vested with such
 unbounded authority in naval affairs as renders
 him a sort of third king in the country, whose
 ambition has often shaken and almost rent asun-
 der the community.

Lycurgus's Plato's observation is just, that the laws of
undue pre- Lycurgus are well adapted to the affairs of war,
dilection but to them only; Sparta therefore has been
for war. saved by her wars, and ruined by her victories,
 which she knew not how to improve or to en-
 joy: her citizens thought rightly and wisely,
 that virtue was better fitted than vice for ac-
 quiring conquest and dominion; they thought
 erroneously and absurdly, that these effects of
 virtue were more valuable than the cause.

The irregu- At Sparta the state is poor, and the revenues
lar collec- ill levied, for the wide extent of territory ren-
tion of the ders the citizens negligent in mutually exacting
Spartan their reciprocal contributions. The poverty
revenue. and disinterestedness of the public thus forms
 a striking contrast with the wealth and avarice
 of individuals. But enough concerning the
 Spartan

Spartan government, of which we have now enumerated the most material defects. BOOK
II.

The civil polity of Crete nearly resembles that of Sparta, in some parts not inferior to it, but in general worse arranged and less polished; the Spartan government being later in its formation, and an improvement on the constitution of Crete, which Lycurgus took for his model. During the travels of that lawgiver, after he ceased to be guardian to king Charilaus, the island of Crete, recommended by its ancient connection with his mother country, chiefly attracted his regard, and long challenged his residence; for Lycos was a colony of Lacedæmon, and the settlers in that district conformed to the laws subsisting in other parts of the island, which have continued to prevail to this day as first established by the elder Minos. Chap. 8.
The government of Crete.

Crete, rising in the midst of the Mediterranean sea, projecting towards Peloponnesus on one side, and on the other advancing towards Rhodes and Triopium on the coast of Asia, is formed as it were by nature for holding the naval empire of Greece, which is every where a maritime country; Minos industriously availed himself of this advantageous situation, conquered some of the islands, colonized others, and died at Camicus in his unfortunate expedition against Sicily. Advantageous position of that island.

There is a striking analogy, we have said, between the Cretan and Spartan institutions: the territory of Laconia is cultivated for the benefit Agreement in the Spartan and Cretan institutions.

B O O K benefit of the public by the subordinate class of
 II. Helots; the territory of Crete is cultivated
 for the same purpose by servile rustics denominated Periaeci, because inhabiting the dependent villages scattered over the territory, and surrounding their respective capitals. The institution of common tables prevails in both countries: and these tables, at which the men only assemble, and which are now from their parsimony called Phiditia at Sparta, were anciently called in that country Andria, or tables appropriated to the male sex; a term by which they are still distinguished in Crete, in which island the custom took birth. The senate of Sparta corresponds to the senate in Crete, and the five Ephori in the one country bear a near affinity to the ten Cosmi of the other. The Cretan armies too were originally commanded by kings; but the power of the kings, which consisted, as at Sparta, in their being the hereditary generals of the commonwealth, has devolved on the Cosmi; who, together with the senate, have a negative before debate on the deliberations of the popular assembly, composed of the whole body of the citizens.

The clubs
 or public
 tables better regulated at
 Crete than
 in Sparta.

The public tables, we have said, are better constituted in Crete than in Sparta; in the latter country each messmate must provide his share of the entertainment, and when he ceases to make this provision, his right of commensality is immediately at an end. At Crete, on the other hand, the corn and cattle, the produce of the common lands, and the contributions

tions levied on the Periæci, or peasants, are divided into two great shares; the first of which is appropriated to temples, sacrifices, and other objects appertaining to religion and the public service; the second is destined for the supply of the *Andreia*, or common-tables, and for affording food to persons of either sex and of all ages in the country. The Cretan legislator has some fine speculations on the subject of spare diet and frugality; and employs for maintaining the due proportion of citizens and subsistence, some extraordinary regulations, the merits of which we shall take another opportunity to discuss.

The office of the Cosmî at Crete labours under all the inconveniences which were found to result from that of the Ephori at Sparta. There is not any standard of merit by which persons soliciting either of those high offices must, before their election, be examined and tried; and as the Cosmî can only be chosen from a certain number of families, the most illustrious in the island, the honours conferred on them are invidious and dangerous, and have a tendency to excite the greater discontent in the multitude, since those alone who have discharged the office of the Cosmî can be elected into the senate, in which they keep their seats for life, neither controllable in their decisions as judges, nor responsible for their administration as statesmen. That the people have hitherto endured this unequal distribution of power, affords not

BOOK

II.

The bad regulation of the Cosmî and senate.

The evils therefrom resulting.

B O O K

II.

{

The remedy applied, worse than the evil.

The turbulence of the Cretan nobles.

any argument by which its policy can be defended; for the insular situation of Crete cuts off communication with strangers, and prevents *their* interference by intrigue and bribery, which, whenever it finds room to operate, always proves dangerous to an unjust and partial government.

But the remedy employed against this evil is still worse than the evil itself; since it controls by violence what might be subjected to law. The offended citizens conspire against the obnoxious magistrate; and sometimes by themselves alone, sometimes with the assistance of his colleagues, drive him from the community; unless he avoids this disgraceful extremity by seasonably abdicating his office.

Crete, which is sometimes shaken by the mutinous spirit of the people, has been still more fatally convulsed by the turbulence of the nobles, who, disdaining the authority of government, assemble their partisans, levy war against the magistrates and against each other, and for a while rend asunder all those bands by which communities are upheld and cemented. Men, both willing and able to inflict such dreadful calamities, must long ere now have totally ruined their country, had not the safety of Crete, as we before said, been wonderfully protected by the inestimable advantages of its insular situation; which, by excluding the dangerous interference of strangers, long rendered the fidelity of the Periæci a striking contrast to the fickleness of the Helots. But foreign war
having

having recently invaded the island, exposes the nakedness of Crete, and evinces the debility of its government. BOOK
II.

The institutions of the Carthaginians have been the subject of much commendation ; and, when compared with the rudeness and coarseness visible in other states, the refinement of Carthaginian polity, doubtless, merits applause ; particularly those institutions which are analogous to the laws of Lycurgus ; for the three constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, bear much resemblance to each other ; they are extremely dissimilar to all other governments ; and all three have adopted many maxims that are wise, and many regulations that are salutary. The excellence of the Carthaginian government is evinced by one single reflection. Though its origin remounts to a very ancient date, and though for many centuries it has contained within its bosom a numerous and a free people ; yet Carthage has never, to the present day, experienced any one sedition worthy of record, nor has it ever endured for a moment the cruel yoke of a tyrant. The common-tables at Carthage are analogous to those of Crete and Sparta : the council of the Hundred and Four in the first mentioned country, resembles the magistracy of the Spartan Ephori, except that the Carthaginian Ephori, or inspectors, are chosen with nicer discrimination : both nations acknowledge the experienced wisdom of senates ; and both submit to the authority of kings, limited in peace, supreme in the field.

Chap. 9.

Excellence
of the Car-
thaginian
constitu-
tion.

BOOK II. But the strong claim of merit is preferred to all other considerations in ascertaining the title to the Carthaginian throne^m; for weak or worthless men, intrusted with much power, cannot fail to do much harm; a maxim often exemplified in the kings of Sparta.

The cor-
ruptions in-
troduced
into the
Carthagi-
nian go-
vernment.

The Carthaginian, as well as the Cretan and Spartan governments, whether by subsequent and unnecessary additions, or in virtue of the primary regulations by which they were respectively constituted, have all of them degenerated from that most perfect form of commonwealth, which we call by way of eminence the republic; in which, popular and aristocratic powers are harmoniously blended into one equitable system of polity, benefiting all, and doing injury to none. Of the corruptions thus introduced into the Carthaginian government, some have a tendency to relax the republic into a democracy; and others have a tendency to narrow the aristocracy into an oligarchy. To the former kind we may refer that institution which, when the kings and senators do not exactly coincide in opinion, submits every matter of debate to the discussion and final determination of the people; to the latter, we must refer the extraordinary powers of the Council of Five, a council self-

^m The author observes, that kings, meaning thereby such republican magistrates as the Suffetes of Carthage and the Kings of Sparta, ought not to be chosen from ordinary families, nor from ordinary individuals of those families; and that pre-eminence of personal merit should take place of seniority. What is said of ordinary families, *μὴτε τὸ τοῦ τυχοῦς*, bears a reference to the opinion of the Greeks concerning the pre-eminence of particular races. See the History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. & iii.

electd and immortal; and which also elects the Ephori, or supreme magistrates of the people. In the preference of suffrage to lot, and in serving the public without fee or reward, the Carthaginians seem to respect the aristocratic model. But the constitution of the judiciary power is highly oligarchical^a, the whole of that power being vested in one court, which tries all kinds of causes, and decides all of them without appeal. Yet that which has principally tended to convert the republic into an oligarchy is, an opinion strongly impressed on the nation at

BOOK
II.

Occasioned chiefly by the undue preponderance of wealth over greater political advantages.

^a Nothing can be more interesting than Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian government; since the misfortunes, which his sagacity foresaw, are described in history; his prophecies being exactly fulfilled. Two centuries after Aristotle's time, Livy observes; "Judicium ordo Carthagine eâ tempestate dominabatur; eò maximè quòd iidem perpetui iudices erant. Res, fama, vitæque omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum ejus ordinis, idem omnes adversos habebat." The judiciary order at that time were tyrants in Carthage; and chiefly because their jurisdiction was perpetual. The estate, the character, and the life of each individual were entirely in their hands. Whoever incurred the displeasure of a single judge, had the whole body for his enemies." Lib. xxxiii. c. xlv. It is here worthy of remark, that Livy's language tends to convey a false notion of the Carthaginian government. There was no judiciary order in Carthage, as in several of the Greek republics, and likewise in Rome, where the judges were appointed, in some ages of the commonwealth, from the senators, and in others from the knights. In Carthage, on the other hand, Aristotle expressly tells us that none but the actual magistrates were allowed to exercise the judiciary function. The political history of Carthage remains still to be written; for the Roman writers universally misrepresent the institutions of that country, through ignorance or prejudice; and, by bestowing Roman appellations on Carthaginian magistrates, lead the reader to suppose much greater analogy than really subsisted between two states, founded on the most dissimilar principles, and actuated by the most opposite views. But into this extensive and important subject it would be improper here to enter, because I shall have occasion fully to discuss it in my History of the World from Alexander to Augustus; of which I have written the first volume, and collected materials for the second.

BOOK large, that, in recommending to office, opulence ought to concur with merit; so that, as virtue or merit forms the principle of an aristocracy, and wealth of an oligarchy, the government of Carthage will constitute a third and mixed kind of civil polity, blending in equal proportions the principles of aristocracy and oligarchy, of which it is compounded.

Reflections
on this
subject.

Wealth must be possessed before leisure can be obtained; and until leisure is obtained, office ought not to be courted; since he who is oppressed by private concerns, cannot be expected to manage public affairs, either wisely or faithfully. But the legislator and constitution are in fault, if men eminent for abilities and virtues, whether in public or private stations, be ever disgraced by unseemly poverty, or ever prevented by meaner cares from exercising their powers, and benefiting their country. In the distribution of honours, to prefer wealth to virtue, is to vilify and debase those honours themselves; it is to corrupt and degrade those who wear them. The evil is deep and universal; for such as the heads of the community are, such must the people

* Aristotle says, that whatever seems estimable to the heads of the community, the same will be esteemed by the rest of the citizens. Cicero has admirably translated, generalised, and expanded the reflection. "*Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes (quanquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum), quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescunque summi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuisse; quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus exstiterit, eandem in populo secuturam. Idque haud paulo est verius, quàm quòd Platoni nostro placet, qui, musicorum cantibus, ait, mutatis, mutari civitatum status. Ego autem nobilium vitæ victuque*"

ple at large speedily become. No aristocracy can be safe, which does not prefer personal merit to all other distinctions; for he who by wealth obtains office, will endeavour by office to augment wealth; and if poverty intrusted with authority be liable, even in honest minds, to the suspicion of sacrificing duty to gain, it is absurd to expect that corruption, armed with power, will refuse to repair loss, and to compensate by rapacity the expences of bribery.^p

The Carthaginian government acts unwisely in accumulating too many offices in the same

The dangerous accumulation of office,

viſtque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo pernicioſius de republicâ merentur vitioſi principes, quod non ſolùm vitia concipiunt ipſi, ſed infundant in civitatem; neque ſolùm obſunt, quod ipſi corrumpuntur, pluſque exemplo quàm peccato nocent." De Legibus, l. iii. c. xiv. "The vices and crimes of the nobility, though great evils in themſelves, are rendered ſtill greater, becauſe they will always be the objects of general imitation. The experience of hiſtory teaches, that, in point of morals, ſuch as have been the leading men of a ſtate, ſuch alſo has been the ſtate itſelf; and that whatever alteration has taken place in the manners of the great, a ſimilar alteration has followed in thoſe of the people at large. This truth is far better aſcertained than the obſervation of Plato, that the character of a nation changes, by changing the ſtyle of its muſic. But I aſſert, that it changes by changing the lives and behaviour of the great. Wherefore profligate princes and profligate leaders are ſo much the more puniſhable than other men, becauſe they are not only vicious in themſelves, but infuſe their vices into the public; and becauſe whatever miſchief reſults from their crimes, ſtill greater reſults from their example.

^p Livy ſpeaks as if Ariſtotle's prophecy had been before his eyes, when he relates the facts by which it was accompliſhed. "*Vectigalia publica prædæ ac diviſui principum quibuſdam ac magiſtratibus erant.*" And again, "*Tum vero iſti, quos paverat per aliquot annos publicus peculatus, velut bonis ereptis, non furto eorum manibus extorto, inſenſi & irati, Romanos in Annibalem inſtigabant.*" Liv. l. xxxiii. c. xlv. & xlvii.

hands.

BOOK

II.

}

palliated in
Carthage
by a tem-
porary and
precarious
remedy.

hands. The example of well-organized armies shews the inestimable benefits resulting from the nice partition of duty, and the innumerable gradations of authority. The more minutely labour of every kind is subdivided, the more perfectly, and the more promptly, each man will perform his assigned task ; and that government only is firmly supported, which associates many deserving citizens to its functions and its honours. The conduct of the Carthaginians is precisely the reverse ; and this conduct has produced a deep and permanent disease in the constitution, which the magistrates have hitherto palliated by a temporary and precarious remedy. As the national prosperity of Carthage has long continued in an advancing state, the principal families have been enabled to maintain their odious monopoly of government, by employing those most inclined and most able to subvert it, in the numerous and increasing dependencies of their empire. But the success of this remedy requires the co-operation of fortune ; both its cause and effects are barely external. A good constitution should be found within^a. Such are the excellencies, and such the imperfections, of the governments of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage ; which, in comparison with most others, have been justly celebrated.

^a These observations are worthy of the most serious attention. When a nation is advancing in wealth and greatness, the most dangerous maladies, existing only in an indolent state, may long lie altogether concealed. The first shock of adversity reveals the fatal secret ; but then, perhaps, it is no longer time to attempt the radical cure.

Of

Of the writers on the subject of politics, some have confined themselves merely to theory; others have illustrated theory by practice, and assisted, in their own or in foreign countries, in the administration of those governments which they had devised and established, or of those laws which they had contrived and enacted. The principal doctrines of merely speculative politicians, we have already examined; we have likewise described the practical system of Lycurgus; and now proceed to explain the legislation of Solon, who is celebrated as the restorer of the hereditary freedom of Athens, and as the deliverer of the people from the yoke of an intemperate and cruel oligarchy. In the constitution established by Solon, his admirers observe, that the jarring interests of hostile orders are skilfully harmonised into one equitable system, justly formed, and nicely balanced, by the oligarchy of the Areopagus, which is perpetual; the aristocracy of the Archons, who are elective; and the democracy of the courts of judicature, whose members are appointed indiscriminately from all the citizens by lot. Solon, it is probable, did not first introduce, but simply receive and approve, the perpetuity of the Areopagus, and the election of the Archons: but he invented and established the popular constitution of the judiciary power; a constitution, which some writers have branded as introductory to the confusion and tyranny of a wild democracy. Masters of the courts

BOOK

II.

Chap. 10.

The constitution of Athens.

B O O K courts of justice, and consequently of the lives
 II. and fortunes of all ranks of men in the state, the
 people have drained and exhausted every source
 of authority, not flowing from themselves.

Causes of
 its degene-
 racy.

Pericles, with the assistance of Ephialtes, abridged the power of the Areopagus; the same Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jury-men, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, still farther debased the composition, and increased the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles left imperfect, succeeding demagogues supplied; and one democratical regulation still followed another, until the government assumed its present form, or rather exhibited its present deformity. Yet this fatal result is not imputable to Solon^r, but rather chargeable on fortune. The naval victories of Athens, in the Persian war, swelled the insolence of the populace, who, headed by orators more insolent than themselves, arrogated all authority to their own order, and usurped the government. Solon justly intrusted the multitude with the power of electing the magistrates, and with that of taking an account of their administration; powers which cannot easily be withheld from the people, without degrading them into slaves, or converting them into enemies. But all the executive offices of government were confined to men of the three first classes: the *Thetes*, consisting of labourers

^r See the History of Ancient Greece, passim.; particularly vol. ii. c. xiii.

and

and mechanics, and forming the most numerous portion of the community, were totally excluded from every employment requiring either coolness of temper or quickness of understanding.

BOOK
II.

Zaleucus legislated for the western Locrians; and Charondas, a native of Catana in Sicily, gave laws, not only to his own citizens, but to the other Ionic communities scattered over Sicily and Italy. Some writers trace up to Onomacritus the institutions of those legislators, relating that Onomacritus sailed to Crete to learn the art of divination; that he became famous as a lawgiver; that Thales was his companion, and Lycurgus the scholar of Thales, Zaleucus the scholar of Lycurgus, and Charondas the scholar of Zaleucus: but this order of succession is not justified by chronology.

The legislations of Zaleucus and Charondas.

Philolaus, a native of Corinth, and descended from the illustrious family of the Bacchiadæ, who long governed that city, gave laws to the Thebans. Philolaus was the friend of Diocles, likewise a Corinthian, who gained the Olympic prize, and who fled from his native city, as detesting the incestuous passion of his mother Halcyoné. Diocles fixed his residence in Thebes; the affectionate Philolaus soon followed him thither; in that city they lived and died; and there, the monuments of these two friends are still shewn to strangers, disposed in such situations as render them fully conspicuous to each other; that of Philolaus also enjoying a view of Corinth, but that of Diocles concealing from the

Of Philolaus, Phæleas, &c.

BOOK the fight both that city and its territory, as if
 { **II.** he wished to banish from his eyes objects only
 calculated to recal the sad memory of his domestic calamity. Philolaus, having thus fixed his abode in Thebes, proposed various laws for the benefit of that republic; particularly the law of adoption, contrived for perpetuating the ancient families, and for preserving a due proportion between the number of landholders, and the number of shares or lots, into which the territory was divided. Charondas instituted a new action* against the odious crimes of calumny and

* The name of this action, as Bentley proves, was *επισκηψις*, which took place when a man, cast in a trial by false testimony, entered his plea to have another trial to prove the witnesses perjured. It is mentioned by Demosthenes more than once, and by Lyfias contra Pandionem. See Dissertation upon Phalaris, p. 368. Bentley says, "that Diodorus tells us from his copy of Charondas's laws that he had *πολλα ιδια*, many things peculiar, and reckons up half a score of them; and yet the single thing observed by Aristotle does not appear among them." In this, Bentley is mistaken; for the peculiarity of Charondas's law against perjured calumniators appears in Diodorus, and makes a great figure there. — His words follow: *Της δ' ἐπὶ συκοφαντικῇ καταγνωσθέντας προστάζει περικρατῆν ἐστιφανομένους μυρικῇ, ὥπως ἐν πάσι τοῖς πολιταῖς πρωτίον τῆς πομπῆς περιπεποιημένοι διο καὶ τινας ἐπὶ τῷ τῷ ἐγκληματι καταδικασθέντας, το μέγιστος τῆς ὀφρῆς ἐκ ἐνδοκτοας, ἰκῶσις ἑαυτῆς ἐκ τῆ ζῆν μεταστῆναι. ἢ συντελεισθέντος, ἐφυγαγεῖν πᾶς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὁ συκοφαντῶν ἰσθῶς, καὶ το πολίτευμα μακαριον εἴη βίον τῆς τῶαυτῆς κακίας ἀπὸλλαντων.* Diodor. l. xii. p. 486. "He commanded those convicted of calumny to go about crowned with tamarisk, that they might appear to all the citizens to have attained the last stage of wickedness; therefore some of those convicted of this crime, incapable of supporting the weight of infamy, voluntarily destroyed themselves; in consequence of which examples, calumny totally disappeared, and the state thenceforth subsisted happily, being divorced from such a mischief." The word tamarisk is in the original *μυρικῇ*, myricé, of which Pliny says, "Myricen in Italia quam alii tamaricen vocant, cujus infelicia ligna appellamus. Solitaria circum saxa aquosa; quâ in domum illatâ, difficiles partus fieri produnt, mortefque miserâs." Plin. Nat. Hist. xii. 21. This unhappy

and perjury; and his laws surpass, in elegance and inaccuracy, even the juridical compositions of the present day. Phaleas distinguished himself by equalizing property; and Plato, by appointing common tables for women; and by proposing, among men, the community of wives, children, and goods. His less extravagant novelties are, that children should be taught to use both hands with equal dexterity, and that a person bound to the observance of perfect sobriety should preside in companies assembled for convivial merriment. The laws of Draco^c were remarkable for nothing but their excessive and undistinguishing severity. Pittacus^d did not delineate any new scheme of policy, but established several new laws; of which, one peculiar to himself is, that offences committed by persons intoxicated, should be punished with double rigour; a law founded rather on inflexible utility, which considers how evils may be prevented, than on merciful justice, which examines what offences ought to be pardoned^e.

unhappy and inauspicious plant, creeping solitary amidst watery rocks, was a fit decoration for an outcast of society, a wretch shunned and detested.—To how many expressive customs of antiquity do we still want a key?

^c History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 105.

^d Ibid. vol. ii. p. 235.

^e Both Plato and Aristotle are more indulgent in the article of wine, than the more ancient philosophers and legislators. A law of Zaleucus is preserved in Athenæus, l. x. p. 226. and commented in Ælian, Var. Hist. ii. 37. which treats the drinking of pure wine with Mohammedan severity, *ἢ τις ἀκρατος ἐπιτῆ, μὴ παρασάταξας ἰατρὸς θεράπειας ἰνικα, θάνατος τῇ ἡ ξημια*. — “Whoever drinks pure wine, except for the sake of health, and by the prescription of a physician, let him be punished by death.”

Andro-

B O O K Androgamas, a native of Rhegium, gave laws
II. to Chalcis in Thrace; his code is most ample
on the subject of heiresses and of murders; but
is not distinguished by any peculiarity worthy of
record. Let this much suffice concerning plans
of policy and laws, which either authority has
established, or speculation devised.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

APPENDIX TO BOOK II.

IN my endeavour to illustrate various subjects APPEND.
TO
BOOK II.
treated in this Book, I frequently had occasion to allude to the Italian republics of the middle age; which exhibited a faint and rude picture of the politics of ancient Greece. Of all these republics, there is one, and only one, still subsisting on the ancient model. This small but precious remain of former, and by some thought better times, I endeavoured, from careful observation, to delineate upwards of twenty years ago, in an article first made public in 1795, and since that time frequently reprinted. But the intimate connexion of that juvenile performance with the subject of the present Book of Aristotle's Politics, has suggested the propriety of giving here an enlarged edition of it, enriched and confirmed by original documents, extracted, through the interest of Sir John Cox Hippenley, from the secret archives of the republic, and most obligingly communicated to me by Sir John Macpherson.

At the distance of twelve miles from Rimini and the Hadriatic Sea, we beheld a cloud-capt

VOL. II.

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moun-

APPEND. ^{TO} mountain, steep, rugged, and inhospitable, yet
 BOOK-II. to Britons, whose affection for their own happy
 island cherished even the faintest image of congenial liberty, more attractive and more engaging than all the gay luxuriance of Tuscan^a plains. A black expansion of vapour partly concealed from our view the territory of what the Greeks would have called a nation, seldom visited by strangers, though assuredly most deserving of that honour. Liberty brightens and fertilizes the craggy rocks of St. Marino; and instead of paradises inhabited by devils, (for thus the recollection or supposition of better times indignantly characterizes the countries through which we had just travelled,) this little state, we were told, would exhibit rugged hills and savage precipices cultivated and adorned by the stubborn industry of free men, who labour with alacrity, because they reap with security. We panted at the thoughts of taking a nearer survey of this political wonder, and were impatient to leave Rimini; but the country adjacent to that city was deluged with rain; the rivers continued to overflow; horses could not safely clamber over rocks; and Rimini could not fur-

^a The epithet Tuscan is justified by the authority of Polybius, l. ii. c. 14. and c. 17. He describes that extensive plain bounded by the Alps, the Appennines, and the Adriatic, and also the plains about Nola and Capua, called the Phlegrean Fields, as anciently inhabited by the Tuscans. The territory of this people, he says, formed incomparably the finest portion of Europe. Before Polybius wrote his History, the dominion of the Tuscans had contracted to a narrow span; and according to the saying of the modern Italians, while the Pope possesses the marrow, the Great Duke of Tuscany has now only the bones, of Italy.

nish

nish us with mules. But they are delicate travellers whom such puny difficulties could restrain from visiting this illustrious mountain, where Liberty, herself a mountain goddess, has upwards of twelve centuries fixed her rural throne. Careless of mules, or horses, or carriages, to which last the republic of St. Marino is at all times inaccessible, we adopted a mode of travelling which, in a country where pomp is immoderately studied, because wealth is too indiscriminately prized, might possibly have excluded unknown wanderers from the proud mansions of nobles and princes, the palaces of bishops, and the vineas of cardinals, but which, we rightly conjectured, would recommend us as welcome guests to the citizens of St. Marino, whose own manliness of character must approve the congenial hardihood of humble pedestrians.

The distance from Rimini to the Borgo, or suburbs of St. Marino, for the città, or city, stands half a mile higher on the hill, is computed at only ten Italian miles. But the badness of the weather and of the roads would have increased the tediousness of our fatiguing journey, had not our fancies been amused by the appearance and conversation of several persons whom we occasionally met or overtook, and who, notwithstanding that hardness of features which characterizes mountaineers, displayed in their words and looks a certain candour and sincerity, with an undescribed mixture of humanity and firmness, which we had rarely seen portrayed on the face of an Italian. Such

APPEND. virtues, perhaps, many Italians may possess; such virtues Raphael and Guido probably discerned in their contemporaries; unless it be supposed that the *antique* not only ennobled and exalted, but originally inspired their conceptions. Yet whatever might be the pre-eminence of Transalpine beauty, during the splendour of the *cinque cento*, it must be confessed of the Italians of our days, that the expression indicating virtues of the mild or generous cast, seldom breaks through the dark gloom and fullen cares which contract their brows and cloud their countenances.

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BOOK II.

At the distance of five miles from Rimini, a small rivulet, decorated by a disproportionably large stone bridge, which, at another season of the year, would have exemplified the Spanish proverb of "bridges without water," separates the territories of St. Marino from those of the Pope. Proceeding forward, we found the road extremely narrow, much worn by the rain, alternately rough and slippery, and always so bad, that we congratulated each other on rejecting the use of the miserable rips that were offered to us at Rimini. In the midst of a heavy shower we clambered to the Borgo, situate on the side of the hill, and distant (as already said) half a mile from the città, on its summit. The former is destined for the habitation of peasants, artisans, and strangers; the honour of inhabiting the latter is reserved for the nobles, the citizens, and those who, in the language of antiquity, would be styled the public guests of the commonwealth.

monwealth. In the whole territory there is but one inn; and that of course in the Borgo; for lone houses are rare in all parts of the continent, the British dominions alone, by their native strength and the excellence of their government, being happily exempted from the terror of banditti in time of peace, and marauders in time of war. We discovered the inn at St. Marino, as is usual in Italy, by the crowd before the door. Having entered, we were civilly received by the landlord, seated by the fire-side in company with several other strangers, and speedily presented with a bottle of sparkling white wine, the best we had tasted in Italy, and resembling Champagne in the characteristic excellencies of that sprightly liquor.

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We had not remained long in this caravanfary, (for such is the proper name for the place of hospitality in which we were received,) when the dress, manners, and conversation of our fellow-travellers strongly excited our attention, and afforded scope for boundless speculation. They were the most savage-looking men that I had ever beheld; covered with thick capottas^c, of coarse dark brown woollen, lined with dark sheep's skin. Their hats, which they kept on their heads, were of an enormous size, swelling to the circumference of an ordinary umbrella. With their dress and appearance their words and gestures bore too faithful a correspondence. "*Schioppi*" and "*coltellate*" (gun shots and

^c Great coats.

APPEND. dagger-thrusts) were frequently in their mouths.
 TO As the wine went briskly round, the conversa-
 BOOK II. tion became still more animated, and took a
 turn more decidedly terrible. They now talked of nothing but fierce encounters, hair-breadth escapes, and hideous lurking-places. From their whole behaviour, there was reason to apprehend, that we had unwarily fallen into company with Rinaldo's party: but a few hints that dropped from him who was most intoxicated, finally undeceived us, and discovered to our satisfaction and shame, that instead of a band of robbers, we had only met with a party of smugglers. Their maffy capottas and broad-brimmed hats formed their defensive armour against custom-house officers and *birri*^d; and the narratives which they heard or related with such ardour or delight, contained the acts of prowess by which they had repelled the bravery of the Romans, and the arts of stratagem by which they had deceived the cunning of the Tuscans. From the intermediate situation of St. Marino between the dominions of Tuscany and those of the Pope, its territory is continually infested by visits from those unlicensed traffickers, who being enemies by trade to those who administer the laws and collect the revenues of their country, naturally degenerate into daring and disorderly ruffians, the terror of peaceful men, and both the disgrace and the bane of civilized society.

^d Those who execute the orders of civil magistrates.

“ From

From the company of the smugglers we ^{APPEND.} longed to separate, the more because they eagerly solicited our stay, promising to conduct us safely across the mountains, and to defend our persons and properties against robbers and assassins; but we thought it a piece of good fortune, that our most valuable property, as we shewed to them, consisted in our swords and pistols. Having called our St. Marino host, we paid him for his wine and his sausage (*prosciutto*); and were pleased to find, that, contrary to our universal experience of Italian landlords, he was uncommonly thankful for a very moderate gratification, a singularity which, though it probably proceeded from his being little conversant with English and other opulent travellers, we treasured with delight, as a conspicuous proof of republican^e virtue, that had escaped pure and unfulled from the contagion of those worthless guests, with whom his occupation in life condemned him often to associate.

About two o'clock in the afternoon we left the Borgo to climb up to the Città, carrying our swords in our right hands; a precaution which the company we had just left, warranted

^e According to Machiavelli and Montesquieu, and their master Aristotle, republics require more virtue than monarchies, because in republics the citizens make laws to govern themselves, whereas in monarchies the subjects are compelled to obey the laws made by the prince. In republican governments, therefore, the citizens ought, in the words of Aristotle, and of a still higher authority, 'to be a law unto themselves.' How few nations, therefore, are qualified, in modern times, for living quietly and happily under a republic; and least of all, that nation which has shewn itself the least virtuous of all.

APPEND. ^{TO}
BOOK II. } in this modern republic, but which, as Thucydides informs us in his proem, would have exposed us to be branded with the appellation of barbarians in the republics of Ancient Greece. Before we had reached the summit of the hill, the cloud had dispersed, the sun shone bright, we breathed a purer air, and the clear light, which displayed the city and territory of St. Marino, was heightened by contrast with the thick gloom which involved the circumjacent plains. Transported with the contemplation of a landscape which seemed so admirably to accord with the political state of the mountain, a bright gem of liberty amidst the darkness of Italian servitude, we clambered cheerfully over the precipices, never reflecting that, as there was not any place of reception for strangers in the Città, we might possibly be exposed to the alternative of sleeping in the streets, or returning to the caravanfary, crowded with smugglers, whose intoxication might exasperate their natural ferocity. From all our past remarks, we had concluded that the vice of drunkenness was abominated even by the lowest classes of the Italians. We dreaded their fury and their knives in this unusual state of mind; but amidst all our terrors could not forbear philosophizing^f on what we had seen, and conjecturing, from the tumultuous merriment and drunken de-

^f This word requires an apology; for the sacred name of philosophy has been as shamefully polluted in modern times, by sophists and sceptics, as the word republic by madmen and levellers. The present generation must perhaps pass away, before either of these terms shall resume its pristine and native honours.

bauchery

APPEND.
TO
BOOK II.

3 Af.

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APPEND. has dignified with the appellation of 'the fourth
 TO
 BOOK II. man in the state.' The stipendiary physician
 of St. Marino (for this was the person with
 whom we were conversing) told us, that we
 might be accommodated with good lodging in
 the convent of Capuchins; and as we were
 strangers, that he would return, shew us the
 house, and present us to Father Bonelli. We
 expressed our unwillingness to give him the trou-
 ble of again ascending the hill; but of this
 trouble the deeply wrinkled mountaineer made
 light, and we yielded to his proposal with only
 apparent reluctance; since, to the indelicacy of
 introducing ourselves, we preferred the intro-
 duction of a man whom we had even casually
 met with on the road. To the convent we
 were admitted by a *frate servente*, or lay friar,
 and conducted to the *Padre Maestro*, the Prior
 Bonelli, a man sixty years old, courteous and
 cheerful, and, as we were told by the physician,
 descended from one of the noblest families in the
 commonwealth. Having received and returned
 such compliments as are held indispensable in
 this ceremonious country, the prior conducted
 us above stairs, and shewed us two clean and
 comfortable chambers, which he said we might
 command, while we deigned to honour the re-
 public (such were his expressions) with the fa-
 vour of our residence. As to our entertain-
 ment, he said we might, as best pleased us,
 either sup apart by ourselves, or in company
 with him and his monks. We told him, our
 happiness would be complete, were we permitted

to enjoy the advantage of his company and conversation. My conversation! You shall soon enjoy better than mine; since within half an hour I shall have the honour of conducting you to the house of a charming young lady, (so I must call her, though my own kinswoman,) whose *conversazione* assembles this evening. During this dialogue a servant arrived, bringing our portmanteau from Rimini, and thereby enabling us with more decency of appearance to pay our respects to the lady, in company with the prior her uncle. The Signora P—— received us politely in an inner apartment, after we had passed through two outer rooms, in each of which there was a servant in waiting. Above a dozen gentlemen, well dressed and polite after the fashion of Italy, with six other ladies, formed this agreeable party. Coffee and forbettis being served, cards were introduced; and, in quality of strangers, we had the honour of losing a few sequins at ombre with the mistress of the house. The other ladies present took up, each of them, two gentlemen; for ombre is the universal game, because in Italian assemblies the number of men commonly triples that of women; the latter, when unmarried, seldom going abroad; and when married, being ambitious of appearing to receive company every evening at home. During the intervals of play, we endeavoured to turn the conversation on the history and present state of St. Marino, but found this subject to be too grave for the company. In this little state, as well as in other parts of Italy,

APPEND.
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APPEND. Italy, the social amusements of life, consisting chiefly in what are called *conversazioni*, have widely deviated from the *symposia* of the Greeks and the *convivia* of the Romans. Instead of philosophical dialogues and epideiktic orations; and instead of those animated rehearsals of approved works of history and poetry, which formed the entertainment and delight of antiquity, the modern Italian *conversazioni* exhibit a very different scene; a scene in which play is the business, gallantry the amusement; and of which, avarice, vanity, and mere sensual pleasure form the sole connecting principle and chief ultimate end. Such insipid and such mercenary assemblies are sometimes enlivened by the jokes of the buffoon; the *improvvisatore* sometimes displays in them the powers of his memory rather than the elegance of his fancy; and every entertainment in Italy, whether gay or serious, is always seasoned with music; but chiefly that soft voluptuous music which was banished by Lycurgus, proscribed by Plato, and prohibited by other legislators, under severe penalties, as unfriendly to virtue and destructive of manhood. The great amusements of life are commonly nothing more than images of its necessary occupations; and where the latter, therefore, are of any peculiar complexion, so also must be the former. Is it because the occupations of the ancients were less softened than those of the moderns, that women are found to have acted among different nations such different parts in society? And that the contrast is so striking between

tween the wife of a citizen of St. Marino, surrounded with her card-tables, her music, and her admirers, and the Roman Lucretia, *nocte ferá deditam lanæ inter lucubrantēs ancillas* (Tit. Liv. i. 57.), or the more copious descriptions of female modesty and industry given by Iscomachus in Xenophon's Treatise on Domestic Economy? In modern Italy this contrast of manners displays its greatest force. Though less beautiful and less accomplished than the English and French, the Italian women expect superior attention, and exact greater assiduities. To be well with the ladies, is the highest ambition of the men. Upon this principle their manners are formed; by this, their behaviour is regulated; and the art of conversation, in its utmost sprightliness and highest perfection, is reduced to that playful wantonness which, touching slightly on what is felt most sensibly, amuses with perpetual shadows of desired realities.

To the honour of St. Marino it must be observed, that neither the Prior Bonelli, nor two *counsellors* who were present, took any considerable part in this too sportive conversation; and the gentlemen at the Signora P——'s were chiefly Romans and Florentines; men, we were told, whom sometimes inclination, but more frequently extravagance and necessity, drive from their respective countries, and who, having relations or friends in St. Marino, establish themselves in that cheap city, where they subsist on the wreck of their fortunes, and elude the pursuit of their creditors.

Next

APPEND.

TO
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APPEND. Next morning, Bonelli having invited several
^{TO}
BOOK II. of his fellow-citizens to drink chocolate, we
 { learned from them, that the morality and piety
 which had long distinguished St. Marino, daily
 suffered decline through the contagious influ-
 ence of those profligate intruders, whom good
 policy ought never to have admitted within the
 territory, but whom the indulgence of humanity
 could not be prevailed on to expel.

After breakfast, our good-natured landlord kindly proposed a walk, that his English guests might view the city and adjacent country. The main street is well paved, but narrow and steep. The similarity of the houses indicates a happy mediocrity of fortune. There is a fine cistern of pure water; and we admired the coolness and dryness of the wine-cellars, ventilated by communications with caverns in the rock. To this circumstance, as much as to the quality of the soil and careful culture of the grape, the wine of St. Marino is indebted for its peculiar excellence.

The whole territory of the republic extends about thirty-five miles in circumference. It is of an irregular oval form, and its mean diameter may be estimated at nine English miles. The soil naturally craggy and barren, and hardly fit for goats, yet actually maintains (such are the attractions of liberty) upwards of seven thousand persons; and, being everywhere adorned by mulberry-trees, vines, and olives, supplies the mate-
 rials

rials of an advantageous trade, particularly in silk, with Rome, Florence, and other cities of Italy.

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In extent of territory, St. Marino, inconsiderable as it seems, equals many republics that have performed mighty achievements and purchased immortal renown. The independent states of Thespiæ and Plataea were respectively less extensive; and the boundaries of the modern republic exceed those of Ægina and Megara; the former of which was distinguished by its commerce and its colonies in Egypt and the East; and the latter, as Lyfias and Xenophon inform us, could bring into the field, besides proportionable bodies of light troops, 3000 hardy pikemen, who with the service of Mars united that of Ceres and of Bacchus; extracting from bleak hills and rugged mountains rich harvests and teeming vintages.

The remembrance of our beloved republics of Greece, ennobled by the inestimable gifts of taste and fancy, endeared to us St. Marino, even by its littleness. In this literary enthusiasm, we could willingly have traversed every inch of its diminutive territory: but politeness required that we should not subject Bonelli and his friends to such unnecessary fatigue; and the changeableness of the weather, a continual variation of sunshine and cloudiness, the solemnity of dark magnifying vapours, together with the velocity of drizzly or gleamy showers, produced such unusual accidents of light and shade in this mountain scene, as often suspended the motion of our limbs, and fixed our eyes in astonishment.

From

APPEND. From the highest top of St. Marino we beheld
 TO
 BOOK II. the bright fummit of another and far loftier
 mountain, towering above, and beyond a dark
 cloud, which by contrast threw the conical
 top of the hill to such a distance, that it
 seemed to rise from another world. The height
 of St. Marino (we were told) had been accu-
 rately measured by Father Boscowich, and found
 to be nearly half a mile above the level of the
 neighbouring sea.

Almost immediately after returning from our walk, dinner was served at the convent; for the politeness of Father Bonelli had prolonged his stay abroad far beyond his usual hour of repast. Speedily after dinner we were conducted by the good father to the *conversazione* of another lady, also his relation; where we had the honour of meeting the *capitaneos*, or consuls, the *commissareo*, or chief judge, and several distinguished members of the senate. Recommended only by our youth and curiosity, we spent the evening most agreeably with those respectable magistrates, who were as communicative in answering as inquisitive in asking questions. The company continually increasing, and Father Bonelli carefully addressing all newcomers by the titles of their respective offices, we were surprised toward the close of the evening, and the usual hour of retirement, that we had not yet seen *Il Signor Dottore* and *Il Pædagogico Publico*, the physician and school-master, represented by Mr. Addison as two of the most distinguished dignitaries in the commonwealth.

A short

A short acquaintance is sufficient to inspire confidence between congenial minds. We frankly testified our surprise to the father. He laughed heartily at our simplicity, and thought the joke too good not to be communicated to the company. When their vociferous mirth had subsided, an old gentleman, who had been repeatedly invested with the highest honours of his country, observed, that he well knew Mr. Addison's account of St. Marino, which had been translated more than once into the French and Italian languages. Remote and inconsiderable as they were, his ancestors were highly honoured by the notice of that illustrious traveller, who, he understood, was not only a classic author in English, but an author who had uniformly and most successfully employed his pen in the cause of virtue and liberty. Yet, as must often happen to travellers, Mr. Addison, he continued, has, in speaking of this little republic, been deceived by first appearances. Neither our schoolmaster nor physician enjoy any pre-eminence in the state. They are maintained indeed by public salaries, as in several other cities of Italy; and there is nothing peculiar in their condition here, except that the schoolmaster has more, and the physician less, to do, than in most other places, because our diseases are few, and our children are many. This sally having been received with approbation by the company, the veteran proceeded to explain the real distinction of ranks in St. Marino, consisting in the *nobili, cittadini, stipendiati*, nobles, citizens, and stipendiaries.

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APPEND. The nobles, he told us, exceeded not twenty families, of which several enjoyed estates without the territory, worth from three to eight hundred pounds sterling a year : that, from respect to the Holy See, under whose protection the republic had long subsisted quietly and happily, many persons of distinction in the Pope's territories had been admitted *cittadini honorati*, honorary citizens, of St. Marino, particularly several illustrious houses of Rimini, and the forty noble families of Bologna. Even of the Venetian nobles themselves, ancient as they certainly were, and invested as they still continued to be with the whole sovereignty of their country, many disdained not to be associated to the diminutive honours of St. Marino, and to increase the number of its citizens ; and that this aggregation of illustrious foreigners, far from being considered as dangerous to public liberty, was deemed essential, in so small a commonwealth, to national safety.

Left the conversation might take a less interesting turn, I drew from my pocket Mr. Addison's account of St. Marino, which, being exceedingly short, I begged leave to read, that his errors, if he had committed any, might be corrected, and the alterations noted which the country had undergone in the space of seventy years, from 1703 to 1773.

The proposal being obligingly accepted, I read in Mr. Addison, ' They have at St. Marino five churches, and reckon above five thousand souls in their community.' Instead of which I

was desired to say, 'They have in St. Marino ten parishes, ten churches, and reckon above seven thousand souls in their community.' Again Mr. Addison says, 'The Council of Sixty, notwithstanding its name, consists but of forty persons.' That was the case when this illustrious author visited the republic; but the council has since that time been augmented by twenty members, and the number now agrees with the name. These circumstances are important; for from them it appears that while the neighbouring territory of Rome is impoverished and gloomed by the dominion of ecclesiastics, of which, in the words of Dr. Robertson, 'to squeeze and to amass, not to meliorate, is the object^a;' and while the neighbouring cities of

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^a See Robertson's Charles V. vol. i. sect. iii. p. 157. He adds, 'The patrimony of St. Peter was worse governed than any other part of Europe; and though a generous pontiff might suspend for a little, or counteract the effect of those vices which are peculiar to the government of ecclesiastics, the disease not only remained incurable, but has gone on increasing from age to age, and the decline of the state has kept pace with its progress.' On reading over this passage, a doubt arises whether it ought not to be expunged, as unjustly severe. Considered in one view, the dominion of the popes was naturally prejudicial to society; but an evil becomes a good, which prevents evils greater than itself. The authority of popes restrained the alternate tyranny of paramount kings and feudal barons. Religion, in its least perfect form, was a check to headstrong passion, and a restraint on Russian violence: and should it be admitted, that the temporal government of ecclesiastics had tended to depress the industry and populousness of their immediate dominions, (a position which would require a very complex and elaborate investigation to substantiate,) yet this local depression would be compensated and over balanced by the distinguished merit of the popes, in the preservation, advancement, and diffusion of learning, civility, and elegant arts; to which Rome, in barbarous ages, offered the only, or the safest, asylum; and of which she still exhibits the most inestimable models.

APPEND. ^{TO} BOOK II. { Tuscany are accused of shamefully abandoning their privileges and their wealth to the Grand Duke, who, parsimonious in the extreme, as to his own person and government, is thought solicitous of seconding by his heavy purse the wild projects of his brother the Emperor Joseph; the little republic of St. Marino, on the contrary, has been increasing its populousness, confirming its strength, and extending the basis of its government. For these advantages it is indebted to its mountainous situation, virtuous manners, and total want of ambition; which last-mentioned qualities, as ancient history teaches us, are far from being characteristics of republican government; though a republic that is without them can neither subsist happily itself, nor allow happiness to its neighbours.

In the republics of Italy, (St. Marino alone excepted,) the people at large are excluded, by the circumstance of their birth, from any principal share in the sovereignty. Instead of one royal master, they are subjects of six hundred¹ petty princes; and their condition is far less eligible than that of the subjects of monarchies; because the latter cannot be collectively offended by the pomp of a monarch, which, excluding comparison, is superior to envy; and

¹ In the shop of an eminent bookseller and publisher of an ancient and celebrated republic of Italy, I was explaining to a young patrician the nature of an English circulating library. 'Why do not you, Pasquali,' said he, turning to the bookseller, 'introduce such an institution?' The other replied, '*Sono troppo principi!* — We have too many princes.' These princes, the noble Venetians, who deserved a better fate, are now enslaved with their country.

are

are individually entitled to aspire, by their talents and merits, to the exercise of every magistracy, and to the enjoyment of every preferment and every honour which their king and country can bestow. The republic of St. Marino, on the other hand, like several commonwealths of antiquity, and like some lesser Cantons of Switzerland, for the greater are universally moulded after the rigid Italian model, contains what is found by experience to be a due mixture of popular government among so simple a people, and in so small a state. The Council of Sixty is equally composed of *nobili* and *cittadini*, patricians and plebeians. This council, which may be called the senate, conducts the ordinary branches of public administration; but the *Arengo*, or assembly of the people, containing a representative from every house or family, may be summoned for the purpose of elections and on other important emergencies: it has long uniformly approved the decisions of the senate. In choosing senators and magistrates, the respect of the citizens for hereditary worth commonly raises the son to the dignity before held by his father. Indeed most professions and employments descend in lineal succession among this simple people; a circumstance which explains a very extraordinary fact mentioned by Mr. Addison, that in two purchases made respectively in the years 1100 and 1170, the names of the commissioners or agents, on the part of the republic, should be the same in both transactions,

APPEND. though the deeds were executed at the distance of seventy years from each other.

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Notwithstanding the natural and proper influence of wealth and birth and merit, the liberties and properties of individuals are incomparably more safe in St. Marino, than they could ever be rendered under the capricious tyranny of a levelling democracy; and the people at large have the firmest security that their superiors will not abuse their just pre-eminence, since all the plebeians of full age are trained to arms, and commanded by a sort of military tribune of their own choosing, whose employment is inferior in dignity to that of the *capitaneos*, or consuls, yet altogether distinct from the jurisdiction of those patrician magistrates. This important military officer is overlooked by Mr. Addison, who has also omitted to mention the treasurer of the republic. The business of the latter consists in collecting and administering the public contributions, and in paying the *stipendiati* or pensionaries, whose salaries, as may be imagined, are extremely moderate; that of the *commissareo*, or chief judge, amounting only to sixty pounds a year. His income is considerably augmented by the *sportulæ*, or fees paid by the litigant parties; so that his whole appointments fall little short of one hundred pounds *per annum*, a sum which in this primitive commonwealth is found sufficient to support the dignity of a chief justice.

The laws of St. Marino are contained in a thin folio, printed in 1599, at Rimini, intitled,
“ *Statuta*

“*Statuta Illustrissimæ Reipublicæ*,” and the whole history of this happy and truly illustrious, because virtuous and peaceful, community is comprised in the following pages, extracted from the secret archives of the state.

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Marino, and his companion Leon, came from Illyria to Rimini towards the commencement of the fourth century, and exhibited the new phænomenon of Anachorites in the western world. In order to practise their austerities undisturbed, Leon retired to Mount Feretro; and Marino, to Mount Titan; which mountains, distant seven Italian miles from each other, respectively assumed the names of San Leo and San Marino, about the beginning of the ninth century.*

But long before this æra, many Italian monks, emulating the austere superstition of the Illyrian strangers, had been allured by these romantic situations well according with the loftiness and solemnity of their own characters; while inha-

* The fame of these Saints appears to have been increased and confirmed by time. Marino, with whom we are concerned, is mentioned in martyrologies and calendars. He is said to have been a Dalmatian by birth, and an architect by profession; and to have come to Rimini, in his youth, towards the commencement of the fourth century. In the annals of Baronius, there is a letter of the year 511, which makes mention of an Anachorite who lived on Mount Titan. Marino, who afforded the first example of this austere mode of life in the West, must have left behind him a strong impression of his piety; since many churches were dedicated to his worship at wide intervals of time and place; among which may be mentioned, the Royal Monastery of Pavia, built or restored by Astolphus King of the Lombards; an ancient church with a rich monastery at Rimini; the great parish church in Bologna; as well as the cathedral in the city and island of Arbe in the Adriatic, opposite to the Venetian province of Morlaccia.

APPEND. bitants of the neighbouring plains, harassed by those barbarous irruptions which prevailed in the fifth and following centuries, occasionally sought refuge among rude and savage fastnesses, from more rude and more savage invaders. Amidst these ferocious incursions, which were finally repressed by Pepin and Charlemagne, the lay inhabitants of Mount Titan gradually united into a regular commonwealth ; and the Anachorites formed themselves into a religious society, under the direction of an abbot. The *republic* early endowed the *convent* with lands amply sufficient for its support ; the property of which lands, as appears by a rare manuscript of the year 884, preserved in the secret archives of the republic, was contested by Delton Bishop of Rimini against Stephen Abbot of Mount Titan. The cause was tried, according to the custom of those times, by the *judices datini* and *scabini* ; and decided in favour of the monastery. The same valuable monument which bears testimony to these facts, disproves the fictitious donation of the mountain by King Pepin ; of which grant the original has never been produced, but of which there are said to be two copies, one by the Librarian Anastasio, and the other by the Chamberlain Centio. In the former we read “Serram ¹ castrum St. Mariani,” and in the lat-

¹ In barbarous Latin and Italian, *ferra* means a craggy mountain — a word applicable enough, but never really, applied in ancient records to Mount Titan, afterwards called “Penne de St. Marino.” The name is said, in the manuscript above cited, to have arisen from the towers shaped like the feathers of an arrow, with which the mountain was crowned.

ter,

ter, "Serram castrum St. Martini;" instead of both which names, St. Marino has been as absurdly as arbitrarily substituted; since the place now bearing this name retained its original appellation of Mount Titan for more than a century after the date of King Pepin's pretended diploma.

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The first inhabitants of the mountain did not establish themselves on the rough and rocky summits on which one part of the city now stands, but occupied the gentle slope at a mile's distance in the direction of south-west, then embraced by deep woods, and still called *Il Luogo Vecchio*; words indicating that it was the ancient seat of the republic. In this sequestered wilderness the inhabitants of Mount Titan long enjoyed a peaceful obscurity, undisturbed by the great powers which swayed the politics of Italy; and almost unknown to them, until Otho the Great invaded that country in the year 962, to make war on King Berenger. The latter retreated to Mount Feretro, afterwards called San Leo. His fortresses there, were blocked up two years; he was at length compelled to surrender through famine; his queen and himself were carried prisoners into Franconia. During this warfare, the district of Mount Titan, conspicuous, by its vicinity and its loftiness, to the contending parties, was allowed to maintain its neutrality; an indulgence for which it was in part indebted to the jealousy subsisting between the Emperor Otho, and John XII. who then wore the papal crown. The latter laboured by repeated

APPEND. repeated embassies to moderate the ambition of the former, and to restrain the incursions of his troops. The Emperor, on the other hand, struck by the singular manners of a people, whose honest simplicity gained his esteem, and whose poverty could not tempt his avarice, frequently visited Mount Titan, while his army was employed in the siege of Feretro; and on one occasion of this sort, confirmed by his imperial grant the entire liberty and independence which the principal citizens of the republic swore that their ancestors had from time immemorial enjoyed.

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During the eleventh century, Italy began to be torn by the dissensions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines; the former, partisans of the Pope; the latter, of the Emperor. This intestine war, which pervaded the whole country, greatly multiplied the towers and bastions by which every province, every district, and the residence of almost every distinguished nobleman, long continued to be fortified. Men scarcely felt themselves secure in the most inaccessible situations; and the inhabitants of St. Titan, now denominated St. Marino, removed from the sloping lawn formerly mentioned, to the very summit of the mountain called Rocca di Girone, which natural fastness the jealous republicans farther secured by walls and castles.^m

^m In the principal church of the present city, there is a statue of the supposed founder of the republic, holding a mountain in his hand, crowned with three towers or castles; emblems fitly chosen for the arms of the community.

In

In the twelfth century, they strengthened their security by entering into an intimate connection with the counts of Felori, distinguished ornaments of the imperial party. This noble family, which afterwards gave dukes to Urbino, condescended to become citizens of the republic; and brought to it an accession of strength and wealth, which soon discovered itself in the purchase of some grounds on the south-west, and the extension of the city to situations more eligible than the Rocca di Girone, where the safety of the inhabitants was frequently endangered by the fury of the winds.

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During the greater part of the thirteenth century, St. Marino escaped molestation from the petty, but almost continual, hostilities which distressed the neighbouring territories. This happy exemption from the evils incident to war, the republic owed to the wisdom and moderation of its own councils, and to the friendly protection of the bishopric of Feretro, which was long hereditary in the family of the counts of Felori of Mount Capiolo. But when that bishopric fell into the possession of the Guelph faction, and especially after the new bishop treacherously seized, in 1281, the fortress of San Leo belonging to the counts of Felori, the republic had its full share of troubles. Its territories were repeatedly invaded, but the invaders were as often manfully repelled. The danger, however, increased when the crafty Malatesta de Verrucchio, who was also a warm partisan of the Guelphs, made himself master
of

APPEND. of Rimini towards the close of the thirteenth
 TO century; after having expelled from that city
 BOOK II. the Chevalier Percitaule, a powerful Ghibelline,
 who with much difficulty escaped to St. Marino to the house of his friend the celebrated Guido Felorio, a man who afterwards inflicted signal vengeance on the party of the Guelphs.

Yet with the fourteenth century the age of persecution commenced; and the republic was continually harassed by the bishops of Feretro, or by the lords of Rimini, for an hundred and sixty years; until, in the year 1462, the fierce Sigismond Malatesta, an execrated and excommunicated heretic, as odious by his vices, as eminent for his talents, was totally defeated by Pope Pius II. During this long period of warfare, the republic defended itself valiantly, under the counts of Felori and dukes of Urbino, its counsellors, protectors, and generals. About the middle of the fifteenth century, Duke Frederic of Felorio procured for it an alliance with Florence; an alliance faithfully maintained on both sides, while that republic continued to subsist. St. Marino also entered into a transaction with the King of the two Sicilies in 1459, in virtue of which it acquired the two southern districts of Fiorentino and Torricella, abounding in rich pastures, embowered in lofty forests of oak and chestnut trees. At the expence of its persecutor Sigismond, it also extended its dominions on the North and East, by gaining the districts Serravalle and Faettano, highly productive in vines and olives; as well as the fertile fields

fields of Mongiardino, which still forms the granary of the republic.

Thus did this little state continue to flourish amidst perpetual wars, upheld by the virtue of its citizens, and guided by the paternal care of the family of the Felori. The alliance procured for it with Florence by means of Frederico Felorio proved effectual for repelling the incursions of the Pope's armies, which in 1489 besieged Robert Malatesta, the son of Sigismond, in Rimini. The Florentines enabled Frederic Duke of Urbino to cover the dominions of its ally, and completely to defeat the invaders, who seemed to have aimed at nothing less than the subjection of the community. The letters written by the government of Florence in this season of danger, are still preserved in the secret archives of St. Marino. They bear testimony to that spirit of liberty which had prevailed in Italy from the æra of the famous peace of Constance in 1170, when many of the principal cities in that country assumed the republican form of government. The Florentines write to their distressed allies, whom they address by the appellation of—
 “Magnificent lords, our dearest friends,” that they were not more indignant at the insolence of the Pope's troops, in making inroads into the possessions of St. Marino, than if they had carried their incursions to the gates of Florence itself. They observe, that they had hastened to send troops and money, and also to dispatch letters to the Duke of Urbino, and to the governments of Naples and Milan; that assistance
 would

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APPEND. would speedily arrive; and the remedy, doubtless, prove more efficacious than even the greatness of the evil required. **TO BOOK II.** "Exhortations to you, to be of good comfort, are unnecessary, especially from us who know the greatness of your souls, which renders you so respectable a branch of our confederacy. Persevere in shewing your prudence, fidelity, and courage, which, besides that they will delight and gladden your own souls, (such being the nature of virtue,) will greatly oblige us and our allies, who will keep your meritorious exertions in eternal remembrance." Next day the Florentines wrote again, exhorting the citizens of St. Marino "to remain firm and resolute, to lose their lives rather than their liberties, since it was far better for men accustomed to freedom to be dead than enslaved. God, who favours the cause of freedom, will prosper your undertakings; and your interests will never be forsaken by us and our friends. You have heard of the supplies of men and money already raised for your assistance. More of both will continue to be provided, until you have enough."

From this time forward, until the year 1543, the republic, being unmolested by foreign enemies, flourished in peace and prosperity under the wise guidance of the dukes of Urbino, its counsellors and protectors. But in the year above mentioned, the exile Peter Strozzi, who commanded the French troops cantoned in Mirandola and its confines, where he was busily employed in raising recruits for the service of his

his master, Francis I., entered into a correspondence with some of the Pope's generals in that neighbourhood, for the surprise and conquest of St. Marino. The instrument chosen for effecting this design was Captain Fabiano of Mount San Savino. The Emperor Charles V. had landed at Genoa; and the Pope, Paul III., had proceeded as far as Bologna, eager to have an interview with the Emperor, who was equally solicitous to avoid all intercourse with his holiness. The movement thereby occasioned in that part of Italy, seemed to Strozzi and Fabiano the most favourable moment for executing their treacherous enterprize. Five hundred armed men were sent in small divisions across the ridges of Montagnaola. It was intended that, under the conduct of different guides, they should unite into one body, and assail in the night the unsuspecting republicans. But a thick fog baffled the local knowledge of the guides. The troops could not be in due time assembled: and the inhabitants of the place, being meanwhile apprized of their own imminent danger, immediately flew to arms, and compelled the invaders to retreat with the mortification of committing a fruitless crime, which had redounded as much to their own disgrace as to the honour of their adversaries.

The most memorable circumstance attending this event was the warm interest taken by the Italian powers in the safety of St. Marino. Cosmo di Medici, Duke of Florence, in a letter dated the 20th June 1543, mentions with how much

APPEND. much displeasure he had heard of Captain Fabiano's undertaking; he requests that he himself might be favoured with a full account of the whole enterprize; its authors, agents, and abettors; assuring the "respectable citizens of St. Marino, his dearest friends, that he will ever be ready to prove, by his utmost exertions, his unalterable attachment to whatever may concern their interest or honour." The Marquis of Graffales, then residing at Fano as ambassador from the Emperor to the Pope, immediately dispatched a courier to Genoa, to acquaint his imperial majesty with the transaction. This powerful and renowned prince, whose mind was equal to the greatest affairs, thought not the smallest below his notice. He was no sooner informed of the enterprize against St. Marino, than he sent Bastamenti di Herrera to confer in his name with its magistrates; to congratulate them on their safety, and to assure them that he would always consider their affairs as his own; since, besides his great concern for the tranquillity of Italy in general, he could not but view with the fondest partiality a commonwealth, whose government had ever been so wisely and so regularly administered. The Pope, Paul III., did not choose to be behind-hand with other princes in his professions of regard: and in order to ingratiate himself with the emperor, whose favour he then courted, thought fit to order the French troops to quit the neighbourhood of St. Marino, and to keep at an unsuspecting distance from its territory.

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This favourable disposition in his holiness towards them, was cultivated by the republicans with equal assiduity and success. In the year 1548, the Pope's treasurer and the officers of his revenue in Romagna endeavoured, indeed, to subject the commonwealth to the new tax on salt, which had been imposed on all the rest of that province. But Paul himself explicitly disavowed this proceeding; and issued his brief, dated 11th October 1548, declaring the complete independence of St. Marino in temporal affairs; and thus confirming its inhabitants in the enjoyment of their immemorial liberties. The same equitable conduct towards the republic was pursued by his successors Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; under the latter of whom, the duchy of Urbino, on the demise of its last duke in 1623, being united to the dominions of the holy see, the republic of St. Marino obtained the protection of the same power, upon many and well-defined conditions. This political connection with the pope was not thought greatly to encroach on the independence of the commonwealth. It had been usual with the Italian republics of the middle age to court the patronage of neighbouring princes; and, even in their constitutional concerns, to have recourse to noblemen of high rank and splendid fortune, who might alternately preside in their tribunals, and command their armies. St. Marino had

^a St. Marino was distinguished above the neighbouring republics, for the impartiality with which justice was administered; and was

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BOOK II. had long reposed unbounded, yet well-placed, confidence in the family of Felori; and what Machiavel says of Florence is in a great degree applicable to all the other free states of Italy, that their affairs were never prosperous, unless when conducted by the steady wisdom of some illustrious individual.


St. Marino respected the popes in their civil, and venerated them in their religious character. The warm expressions of those sentiments contented the vicars of St. Peter; but such empty acknowledgements could not satisfy the ambitious and intriguing Alberoni, who, when legate of Romagna in the year 1740, formed a plan for converting respect into allegiance, and the duty of protection into the right of dominion. A considerable party of the inhabitants, seduced by his promises, or gained by his bribes, had consented to betray into his hands the liberties of their country. When the appointed day arrived, Alberoni rode up the mountain, attended by a numerous suite. He was received by the principal inhabitants at the door of the great church, and conducted by the priests to a magnificent seat under a canopy. But unfortunately for the execution of his purpose, the mass began, as usual in that republic, with the word

later than most of them in adopting the "*Judice estero*," the jurisdiction of a foreigner, "*articolo troppo necessario per toglierli ogni suspicione nei giudici paesani*: an establishment found necessary in consequence of the too just suspicions against judges born in the country."

“*Libertas*.” This single word produced such an enthusiasm in the minds of those who understood his designs, as well as of those who only suspected them, that they rose with common consent, attacked the cardinal and his attendants, drove them precipitately from the church, and made them descend the mountain with a degree of disordered trepidation extremely unlike to the slow and pompous solemnity with which they had ascended it. This last memorable event in the history of St. Marino well corresponds with that firmness and courage with which it is supposed to have maintained its independence, amidst the hostile collisions of Imperial and Pontifical power; an independence, however, which appears to have been owing to the penurious circumstances of a people, which could not tempt rapacity, and their virtuous manners which always conciliated the affection of one party, more than they provoked the animosity of another.

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From the preceding narrative it is not very easy to ascertain what share Marino, the Dalmatian architect, had in the first institution of the state. On the supposition that he was its founder and lawgiver, Mr. Addison observes, “that the origin of St. Marino must be acknowledged to be far nobler than that of Rome, which was an asylum for robbers and murderers; whereas St. Marino was the resort of persons eminent for their piety and devotion.” This ob-

APPEND. ^{TO}
BOOK II.  servation appears to me to be erroneous in two respects, decorating with unfair honours the one republic, and heaping unmerited disgrace on the other. If piety founded St. Marino, with this piety much superstition was intermixed; a superstition unfriendly to the best principles of society, and hostile to the favourite ends of nature, preaching celibacy, and exacting mortification, the hideous offspring of ignorance and terror, detesting men as criminals, and trembling at God as a tyrant. But Rome, according to the only historian^c who has circumstantially and authentically described its early transactions, was an expansion of Alba Longa, itself a Grecian colony, which, according to the immemorial and sacred custom of its mother-country, diffused into new settlements the exuberance of a flourishing population, produced by the wisest and most liberal institutions. According to the same admirable historian, the manly discernment of Romulus offered an asylum not merely for robbers and murderers, but for those who were threatened with murder or robbery, who spurned subjection, or fled from oppression; for amidst the lawless turbulence of ancient Italy, the weak needed protectors against the strong, the few against the many; and Rome, at her earliest age, already systematically assisted the weakest party; thus adopting in her infancy that politic heroism, which was destined by firm and majestic steps to conduct her man-

^c Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

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hood and maturity to the fair sovereignty of APPEND.
consenting nations.

Both in their origin and in their progress, ^{TO} BOOK II.
Rome and St. Marino form the natural objects,
not indeed of a comparison, but of a striking
contrast; and compressed as is the latter repub-
lic between the dominions of the Pope and those
of the Grand Duke, to whose subjects St. Ma-
rino is now bound to allow a free passage through
its territory, its citizens would deserve ridicule
or pity, did they affect the character, or imitate
the maxims, of those magnanimous senators,
who, for the space of more than two centuries,
swayed the politics and controlled the revolu-
tions of the world. Convinced that their inde-
pendence results chiefly from their insignifi-
cancy, the senators of St. Marino smiled, when
we read in Mr. Addison, 'These republicans
would sell their liberties dear to any that attacked
them.' We had not the indelicacy to desire
them to interpret this smile; or to make our-
selves any comment upon it, being persuaded,
that, precarious and shadowy as their liberty is,
their rational knowledge and their virtues have
enabled them to extract from it both substantial
and permanent enjoyment, and make them live
happier here, amidst rocks and snows, than are
their Tuscan and Roman neighbours in rich
plains and warm valleys.

To the inhabitants of this little state, the se-
nate, the assembly, the different offices of ma-
gistracy, innocent rural labours, and military
exercises equally useful and innocent, supply a

APPEND. continual succession of manly engagements.
TO Hopes and fears respecting the safety of their
BOOK II. country awaken curiosity and excite inquiry.
 They read the gazettes of Europe with interest; they study history with improvement; in conversation their questions are pertinent, and their answers satisfactory. Contrary to what has been observed by travellers of other Italians, the citizens of St. Marino delight in literary conversation; and Mr. Addison remarks, that he hardly met with an unlettered man in their republic. In speaking of Beccaria's book on Style, then recently published, one of the senators said, that it was a treatise on style in a very bad style, abounding in false ornaments and epigrammatic gallicism. Another observed, he wished that fashionable writer, who had been commented on by Voltaire, an author still more fashionable and more pernicious than himself, would confine himself to such harmless topics as rhetoric and style; for his book on crimes and punishments was calculated to do much serious mischief, at least to prevent much positive good; because in that popular work he had declaimed very persuasively against capital punishments, in a country perpetually disgraced by capital crimes, which were scarcely ever capitally punished.

The love of letters which distinguishes the people of St. Marino makes them regret that they are seldom visited by literary travellers. Of our own countrymen belonging to this description, they mentioned with much respect Mr. Addison,

Addison, and Il Signor Giovanni Symonds, now APPEND.
 professor of history in the university of Cam-
 bridge. We were proud of being classed with ^{TO}
 such men by the honest simplicity of these vir- BOOK II.
 tuous mountaineers, whom we left with regret,
 most heartily wishing to them the continuance
 of their liberties; which, to men of their cha-
 racter, and theirs only, are real and solid
 blessings.

For let it never be forgotten, that the inesti-
 mable gift of civil liberty may often be provi-
 dentially withheld, because it cannot be safely
 bestowed, unless rational knowledge has been
 attained, and virtuous habits have been ac-
 quired. In the language of the wisest man of
 Pagan antiquity, a great length of time is re-
 quisite to the formation of any moderately good
 government; because that government is always
 the best, which is the best adapted to the genius
 and habits of its subjects^p. The institutions
 which suit the well-balanced frame of mind of
 the mountaineers of St. Marino, who, breathing
 a purer air, seem to have divested themselves of
 many of the grosser and more earthly affections,
 might ill accord with the softened tenants of the
 Capuan plains; since, according to the same
 penetrating searcher into the secrets of human
 nature, 'the inhabitants of the Fortunate
 Islands, if such islands really exist, must either
 be the most virtuous or the most wretched of
 men.' Aristotle hardly knew the inhabitants of

^p Aristot. Politics, b. ii. p. 6.

APPEND. the British Isles : but let us, who know ourselves
 TO and our good fortune, confide in the assurance,
 BOOK H. that this incomparable author would no longer
 entertain the above geographical doubt, were
 he to revive in the eighteenth century, and to
 visit the British dominions under the govern-
 ment of George III.⁹ As we have long been
 the happiest of nations, let us cherish the hope,
 that the causes of our happiness are, morally
 speaking, unalterable. The character of our
 ancestors, uniting, beyond all people on earth,
 firmness with humanity, gave to us our govern-
 ment ; and the preservation of our government,
 as it now stands, under a prince who is at once
 the patron and the model of those virtues on
 which alone national prosperity can rest, forms
 the surest pledge for the stability of that charac-
 ter, which has long adorned, and we trust will
 ever adorn, the envied name of BRITON.

⁹ About the time this was written, a letter from a foreign prelate, now high in office in a neighbouring country, contained the following memorable words: "Tout ici," meaning England, "est dans un état de prospérité vraiment révoltante."

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Third Book, the author, proceeding to **BOOK**
investigate the nature and characteristic qua- **III.**
lities of the different forms of government, be-
gins, according to his usual method, by analys-
ing that complex object, a commonwealth, into
its constituent elements, called citizens. His
first inquiry, therefore, is, What constitutes a
citizen? An inquiry that will appear very simple
to many of those simple men who are continu-
ally debating particular cases involved in the so-
lution of this general question.

It is worthy of remark that in opposition to
those ancient, as well as those modern theories,
which vainly endeavour to reduce practical mat-
ters to metaphysical precision, Aristotle main-
tains that the definition of a citizen which holds
good in one state, is often not at all applicable
in another. He even bestows that honourable
name on those who, in modern times, are more
usually denominated subjects; observing, "that
as government is properly an arrangement of
those

B O O K those who are partners in the benefits of political society, the fitness of government must, like that of every other arrangement, depend primarily and principally on the nature and differences of the objects that collectively compose the system. This arrangement, therefore, must vary with every variation of its parts, materials, or elements; which, in this case, are sentient and moral beings, liable to be affected and altered by a wide variety of actuating principles." In enumerating these principles, the author observes, that the distinctive characters of communities are greatly dependent on the means usually employed by them for acquiring the necessities and accommodations of life. Pastoral, agricultural, and commercial nations are, therefore, severally marked by strong lines of discrimination. Climate, also, has a conspicuous influence; and innumerable local causes concurring with the events of time and chance, and co-operating with education and nature, so variously mould mankind, that nothing but the blindness of ignorance and narrowness of prejudice could think of extending similar plans of policy to nations as differently circumstanced as they are unlike in the bent of their genius.

But though governments may and must vary in their form, they ought all to agree in their end, "the good of the governed." Aristotle strenuously maintains this doctrine, which will ever sound so harshly in the ears of political bigots of all descriptions; and which has ever been as insolently scorned in the practice of republican

publican demagogues, as it has been shame-
 lessly combated in the arguments of court flat-
 terers. By what arrangements the good of the
 governed is most likely to be promoted, must
 be learned from the experience of history ; but,
 in our author's opinion, that people ought to
 remain contented with its lot, which is not
 mocked with shadows instead of realities ; de-
 luded with tyranny under the semblance of roy-
 alty, oligarchy under that of aristocracy, and
 democracy under that of a republic. Regardless
 of personal danger from tyrants or a tyrannical
 populace, the philosopher boldly arraigns those
 base cheats and vile counterfeits ; those unnatu-
 ral perversions of lawful power, and wicked
 mimics of legitimate government. It is not
 easy to discover which of the parties that then
 divided and tore in pieces their common coun-
 try, he most heartily detested. In civil commo-
 tions, a man who is called to act, ought pub-
 licly to choose his side, though he may often
 have but a choice of difficulties ; but he whose
 business is speculation, will commonly best
 perform his duty, if, in proportion to the
 measure of his courage and abilities, he ven-
 tures to expose and condemn the excesses of
 contending factions, and to suggest those reflec-
 tions that have the most direct tendency to
 soothe their rage, and to moderate their fury.
 This task our philosopher skilfully performs, by
 proving with irresistible evidence that birth,
 wealth, education, and authority, as well as
 courage, strength, numbers, and liberty, are all
 of

BOOK
III.

B O O K of them essential ingredients in the composition
 { **III.** of a well-constituted commonwealth; but that
 the composition must fall in pieces, when any
 one of the elements is active beyond its sphere;
 whether government be engrossed by contemptu-
 ous opulence, or usurped by rapacious poverty;
 oppressed by the unfeeling pride of the few, or
 disgraced by the malignant passions of the mul-
 titude.

The Third Book of the Politics concludes with an enumeration and description of the different kinds of monarchy; a species of government which, according to our author, is not only legitimate, but in many countries necessary. The most extensive survey of history fully justifies the conclusions which the philosopher had drawn from the records of Egypt and the East. The Romans, who in the age of the Scipios had admired "the servile stupidity of the Cappadocians in declaring that they could not live without a king^a," acknowledged in the age of Augustus, that their own commonwealth could not happily subsist but under the dominion of one prince^b. The Emperor Julian^c represents all the great nations of his own times as governed by the same political principles, which had been so uniformly^d maintained by the
 the

^a θαυμαστος, ἡ τις μὴ ἔως ἀπίσκηται πρὸς τὴν ἀληθειαν. — Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

^b Seneca de Beneficiis, l. ii. c. 20.

^c Julian. advers. Christian.

^d They rejected the republican government when offered to them by their conquerors; and when their own royal line became extinct, called

the Cappadocians. If liberty had been offered to the Thracians, the Mysians, and the Getæ, those populous and warlike tribes would, according to Philostratus*, have spurned the unwelcome present. The historian Livy acknowledges that the cities subject to King Eumenes had not any reason to envy the boasted condition of republicans†; and the orator Isocrates congratulates in still warmer language, the felicity of the states of Cyprus, which had submitted to the dominion of Evagoras‡. But the strongest argument in favour of monarchy is deducible from the progressive prosperity of many countries of Europe, during the present and two preceding centuries; in which course of time the dismembered provinces of the western empire have enjoyed under kings a measure of national felicity unexampled in the history of the world.

As a considerable part of Aristotle's treatise on monarchy has perished, it would be presumptuous to assign limits to the improvement of which he thought that form of government susceptible. From a hint in the Sixth Book of his Politics, he appears to have been fully aware of the utility of a revision of sentences passed under the influence of popular delusion, or extorted

called Ariobarzanes to an hereditary throne; and after the extinction also of the line of Ariobarzanes in the third generation, cheerfully submitted to Archelaus, a stranger, recommended to them by Mark Antony. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

* Philostrat. in Vit. Apollon.

† Liv. l. xlii. c. 5.

‡ Isocrat. in Evagor.

through

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through the severity of legal forms ; maintaining that in every well-governed state, a discretionary power of grace and mercy should be lodged, not with the subordinate magistrate, but with the supreme executive authority. This doubtless, if not the most splendid distinction, is at least the most amiable prerogative of the throne. But there are other distinctions totally unknown to antiquity, yet calculated to produce both the most important immediate benefits, and to give to modern monarchy a degree of firmness and stability of which no other form of government can boast.

We read in Plutarch^b of the coronation-oath administered to the kings of Epirus. Xenophonⁱ mentions a similar institution in Lacedæmon. Both Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus^k describe the constitutional limitations of the kings of Persia. The last-mentioned writer also copiously expatiates on the singular restraints imposed on the kings of Egypt during their lives, and relates that those of them who had incurred public indignation, were publicly arraigned after their death, and publicly punished by the privation of a royal, or even a decent sepulture^l. Josephus informs us that this regulation also prevailed in Judæa^m. But all these expedients, as well as those employed by the Macedonians, the freest nationⁿ

^b Plut. in Pyrrho.ⁱ De Repub. Lacedæm.^k L. xvii.^l Diodor. l. i. sect. 72.^m Joseph. l. viii. c. 3.ⁿ See History of the World from Alexander to Augustus, p. 28, & passim.

of

of antiquity acknowledging the authority of **BOOK**
 kings, were coarse and uncertain contrivances **III**
 for limiting the regal power; contrivances always
 so doubtful, and often so ineffectual, that by the
 consenting voice of antiquity, the happiness of a
 people was held by the precarious tenure of per-
 sonal merit in the prince. In consequence of
 this opinion, the right of election appeared the
 most plausible title to a throne; and even
 in those countries where the royal pre-emi-
 nence of particular families was universally ac-
 knowledged, there was not any invariable rule
 for ascertaining among different pretenders the
 order of succession. This is fully illustrated
 in the history of the kingdoms formed from
 the dismemberment of the Macedonian em-
 pire, and deserves to be considered as one prin-
 cipal cause of their rapid decline and final ex-
 tinction. But when the salutary maxims are
 established "that kings can do no wrong, and
 that acts of government can be legalised only
 through the intervention of responsible minis-
 ters," the inequalities of personal character in
 princes become so harmless in practice, that the
 casual advantages of election totally disappear
 in comparison with the certain benefit of a fixed
 and definite rule to which nations may always
 have recourse for transmitting without blood-
 shed the inheritance of their crowns.

On this species of monarchy, limited and he-
 reditary, the fruits of genuine republicanism
 have been successfully engrafted; and are found
 by experience to flourish there, with a degree
 of

B O O K of vigour and of beauty which they had never exhibited on their parent plant. This form of government alone completely solves the problem proposed by our author, when he observes, that, "difficult as it is to adjust the true theory of political arrangements, it is still more difficult to keep the component parts in their fittest positions." This difficulty, I say, is surmounted by modern monarchy, and by it only; under which also, as will be proved hereafter, that distribution of political functions on which all kinds of good administration so greatly depend, may be most completely established, and most steadily upheld.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Citizen. — How constituted. — Virtues of the man and of the citizen. — Their difference. — Different forms of government. — Their distinctive characters. — Pretensions of democracy. — Of oligarchy. — Monarchy. — Its five kinds. — Arraigned — Defended.

IN explaining the nature and principle ^a of the different forms of government, which are nothing else than various arrangements of men in society, it is necessary clearly to ascertain what constitutes a state; an object not uniformly conceived, nor accurately defined; since one person often ascribes *that* to the state, which another holds to be an act merely of the king or of the senate, of the tyrant or the oligarchy. A state or commonwealth, then, is a complex object; its component elements are those called citizens; to know therefore what is a commonwealth, we must previously investigate what constitutes a citizen. In different governments, the term citizen denotes different descriptions of persons; in democracies, men in

BOOK
III.
Chap. I.

Analysis of
a common-
wealth.

^a τῆς ἰσότητος (scil. πολιτικῆς) καὶ ὅσα τῆς. "What each form of government is, and what are its qualities." Its qualities, as we shall see, result from its principle, and this again depends on the materials from which it is composed; for Aristotle did not agree with those audacious political speculatists, who think it allowable to treat men as artificers do wood or metal.

BOOK III. the lowest walks of life are often entitled to this respectable appellation; from which, persons of the same class are, in oligarchies, totally excluded. It is not, therefore, the rank in life that constitutes the rank in a commonwealth.*

What constitutes a citizen.

The term citizen is sometimes applied to illustrious foreigners who, for their merit or services, have been associated to the honours and adopted into the bosom of the republic. But such honorary citizens form not the subject of our present inquiry. It is plain likewise that the bare circumstance of place, or the habitual residence in the territory or city, does not constitute a citizen, since slaves, and the class of men called *inhabitants*^p, are not distinguished by this appellation. Nor are those to be considered as our fellow-citizens who merely enjoy the protection of our laws, and who are qualified in their own persons to appear under the characters of plaintiffs and defendants; for strangers with whose countries we have a treaty of commerce, or an intercourse of hospitality, are entitled to challenge as their due the protection of our courts of justice; although in many cities those who are simply inhabitants cannot

* For the sake of perspicuity, I have expanded this passage conformably to the author's words below, c. iii. and in various parts of his works.

^p *μετοικοι*, commonly but improperly translated sojourners, since these have a casual, merely, and unsettled residence; whereas the Grecian *μετοικοι* resided habitually and fixedly in their respective states, like the class called "habitans" in Geneva, and some Swiss Cantons: and were, as our author says in another passage, sharers in the same habitation, though not partners in the government.

prosecute

prosecute or defend in their own name, but in all their legal transactions must have recourse to their procurator or patron. Minors not yet enrolled at the register-office, and persons superannuated, who are honourably discharged from civil functions, fugitives, outlaws, and men branded by the note of infamy, can none of them be called properly or simply citizens, since whenever we apply to them this name, we must join with it some epithet or corrective, without which addition we do not accurately explain our meaning. Who then is simply or properly a citizen? He, and he only, who enjoys a due share in the government of that community of which he is a member.

Of the offices of government, some are limited in point of time; the man who has exercised them once, cannot exercise them again, or at least cannot resume them, till a certain interval has elapsed from the time when he laid them down. Other offices are not thus limited, but may be occasionally exercised by all the citizens, at all times, indifferently. Of this kind is the power of deciding as a judge or jurymen in the tribunals, and that of voting as a member in the national assembly. It is true, that jurymen^a

The share of the government, or magistracy, common to all the citizens not distinguished by a name.

^a The Grecian tribunals agreed more nearly with our notion of juries than the Roman. The former generally admitted of the citizens at large; whereas the Roman judicature was exercised on ordinary occasions, for near three centuries, by the Patricians exclusively. But that the Romans thought with Aristotle as to the supreme importance of the judicial power, appears from the perpetual struggles on this subject among the orders in the commonwealth; particularly during that most important period which elapsed from the seditions of the Gracchi, to the despotism of the Cæsars.

BOOK III and voters, as their office is common to all the citizens, are not distinguished by any appropriate appellation denoting their indefinite or perpetual powers; they are not even dignified by the name of magistrates; yet if magistracy be something more than an honorary title, it belongs in reality most peculiarly to those who are invested with the highest authority in the state; who direct the national deliberations, who govern the public resolves, and who are the ultimate umpires of reputation, life, and property.

Though anonymous, the most important of all magistracies.

Under what constitutions the strict definition of a citizen is applicable.

This definition of a citizen cannot, however, be applied in the greater part of governments actually existing in the world, many of which, as will appear hereafter, are nothing better than corruptions and tyrannies. Neither is it applicable in its full extent in those communities which, though governed with a view to the public good, have substituted the authority of kings or senates to the power of popular assemblies and popular tribunals. In Sparta and at Carthage, as we have before seen, the judiciary power is intrusted to certain magistrates; to the Ephori in civil, to the senate in criminal trials; and when such magistrates rule by vicarious succession, he may be called a citizen who has a right to govern in his turn. In democracies, this right is extended to the people at large. The definition of a citizen above given is therefore peculiarly applicable to popular governments; and a city or commonwealth is nothing more than a collection of citizens thus described, sufficiently

sufficiently numerous for attaining that purpose of comfortable subsistence, for which civil society was instituted. BOOK
III.

It is a coarse and unsatisfactory, but sometimes an useful, definition of a citizen, to say that he is one descended from citizens in the male and female line; or one whose ancestors were citizens for two or more generations. The question still recurs, what conferred this character on those ancestors who first founded the state? To them the circumstance of descent cannot possibly apply; and if ancestry alone were sufficient to make citizens, we might inquire, as Gorgias of Leontium, either in doubt or in irony, asked the Thessalians of Larissa, whether as potters make pots¹, there were certain artificers at Larissa for manufacturing Larissean citizens. It is inquired with better reason, whether those are citizens who have obtained this appellation in consequence of a revolution in the commonwealth? At Athens, Clisthenes, after the expulsion of the tyrants, aggregated many strangers and many slaves to this honourable class². In this case, the question is not whether these are citizens, but whether they became such *justly*. Some, indeed, hold that he who is unjustly a citizen, is a pseudo-citizen, a mere counterfeit. But this cannot be true, if we define a citizen, as above, by the power or magistracy with which he is

Coarse definitions of a citizen.

Difficulties occasioned thereby.

¹ The original says, "as mortar-makers make mortars."

² Aristotle says, "ἐφυλκτευσεν, distributed among the tribes, many strangers," &c. See above, p. 80.

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invested, and acknowledge that many magistrates, and even kings, who have obtained their offices unjustly, still continue nevertheless to govern and to reign. He is justly a citizen who is created such by the act of the commonwealth; but what is an act of the commonwealth may sometimes, as we before observed, be a matter of dispute. When an oligarchy or a tyranny is converted into a democracy, some people are of opinion that the contracts entered into by the magistrates or the tyrant ought not to be fulfilled, because those contracts were the acts, not of the commonwealth, but of the government; and of a government too, not founded on public utility, but established by injustice, and supported by force. Yet democracies themselves have often been so established and so supported, and *their* acts, at least, have nevertheless always been considered as the acts of the commonwealth.*

To

* Therefore, "If the acts of tyrannical democracies are considered as those of the state, in the same manner ought the acts of oligarchies and tyrannies." Hooker had studied Aristotle, and from this *arch philosopher*, as he calls him, (*Ecclesiastical Polity*, l. i. sect. 10.) he himself borrowed many important parts of his excellent, but often misapplied, work. In reference to the subject in the text, he observes, "that in many things assent is given, they that give it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute monarch commandeth his subjects that which seemeth good in his own discretion, hath not this edict the force of a law, whether they disapprove or dislike it? Again, that which hath been received long since, and is by custom now established, we keep as a law which we may not transgress . . . And to be commanded we consent, where that society, whereof we are part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed past

To determine what is the act of the body politic often depends on ascertaining the circumstances which constitute its sameness or identity; circumstances which are no sooner withdrawn, than its continuity of existence is dissolved, and the commonwealth or city "no longer remains the same identical city that it was before. That the sameness of local situation does not constitute this identity, will appear evident to the most superficial observer. A commonwealth may transport itself from one place to another, and some portion of its members may live at a remote distance from the rest. The Peloponnesus and its seven republics might be inclosed within one wall; but within this wall would be contained, not a city or commonwealth, but an aggregate of nations, less connected with each other than the inhabitants of Babylon, whose walls, it is said, were stormed and taken upwards of two days before every division of the immense multitude was apprised of the public disaster. Concerning the magnitude of states we shall have occasion afterwards to speak; and to examine whether they may be composed of many nations, or ought to consist of one only;

BOOK
III.

Chap. 2.

What constitutes the identity of a commonwealth.

is good as long as he himself continueth it, so the act of a public society of men done five hundred years since standeth theirs who presently are of the same society, because corporations are immortal: we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still." Eccles. Polit. p. 19. edit. 1723.

"A city, the author observes, is one of those words which are taken in different acceptations; in the sense here meant it is synonymous with commonwealth.

B O O K an enquiry not misbecoming a statesman. At
III. present let us enquire whether the sameness of
 inhabitants, or rather the continuance of the
 same race of inhabitants, constitutes the identity
 of a commonwealth, in the same manner as the
 identity of a fountain or river is ascertained by
 the flowing of the same kind of water from the
 same sources, though in perpetually varying
 streams. Agreeably to this comparison, ought
 we to say that the commonwealth, while com-
 posed of the same race of men, continues the
 same identical commonwealth? Or rather, ought
 we not to say that the identity, in this case, is
 to be ascribed merely to the people or the inha-
 bitants? Every commonwealth, as we have said,
 forms a sort of partnership or community; and
 in this community or partnership, each indivi-
 dual has his share. This share is determined by
 the form of the government, which is nothing
 else than the arrangement of the different indi-
 viduals in the community; and when this ar-
 rangement is altered, the commonwealth, though
 still composed of the same persons, cannot remain
 specifically the same. A tragic and a comic chorus
 may be executed by precisely the same perform-
 ers; precisely the same notes compose the bold-
 ness of the Doric, and the wildness of the Phry-
 gian music. In such cases, though the constituent
 parts be the same, a difference in their arrange-
 ment and disposition produces a totally different
 result. The identity of a commonwealth de-
 pends, therefore, on the continuance of the
 same form of government; but it is a distinct
 inquiry,

inquiry, whether, in consequence of a change in the form of government, contracts subsisting before the revolution ought, in justice, to be fulfilled? *

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A question naturally follows, whether a good citizen must of necessity be endowed with the virtues of a good man? This question can only be solved by considering what are the essential qualities of a citizen. A citizen then is, as it were, one of a ship's company, and a sharer with the rest in one common concern. Different sailors have different occupations. One steers the helm; another is boatswain; many ply the oars. The accurate and complete definition of each individual must, doubtless, express his particular employment and his appropriate duty. Yet one general definition is applicable to them all; since they are all alike concerned in promoting a prosperous navigation, and all alike interested in the safety of the common vessel. The republic is the vessel in which citizens are embarked; and the safety of the republic is, as we proved above, the safety of its form of government. To this, the virtues of good citizens must always be relative; and as civil constitutions widely differ,

Chap. 3.
Distinction
between
the virtues
of the man
and of the
citizen.

* The author does not examine this question, but it is easy to perceive that he would have decided it in a manner little conformable to the prevailing practice of his own times. The Athenians, indeed, gave one illustrious example of their respect for the sanctity of engagements contracted in the name of the public, when they burdened themselves with a loan which had been made to the thirty tyrants. Demosthen. advers. Leptin. & Isocrat. Areopagit. See also my Translation of Isocrates, p. 495. and History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 325. 7th edit.

the

B O O K the virtues necessary to preserve them must differ as widely. They are virtues not absolutely, but politically ; and bear a reference to an end or purpose, independently of which they would not deserve even the name of virtue. But the virtues of a good man are ultimately desirable on their own account, as constituting in themselves the perfection and happiness of his rational and moral nature.

Political
virtues re-
lative to
rank, age,
and sex.

In no country whatever have the greater part of mankind attained this consummate excellence ; but unless the majority in every country were politically virtuous, the commonwealth must soon perish, since its subsistence can only be maintained while each, or at least the greater part of its members perform their proper offices, or, in other words, exercise their respective virtues ; virtues as different from each other, as are the various exigencies of human life to which they are respectively adapted. Our comparison of the chorus is here strictly applicable. The office and the virtue of him who leads the band is altogether different from the office and the virtue of every other performer. But of the leader himself, of him who directs the chorus of state, what are the peculiar excellencies ? When he executes his office aright, wisdom and goodness are with propriety ascribed to him. There is an education too, that befits men born to command, and them only ; lessons of war and horsemanship are given to the sons of kings ; and Euripides says in the person of a young prince,

“ Teach me not frivolous arts,

“ But teach me only how to serve my country.”

There

There is an education, therefore, becoming a prince, and there are men fit for receiving none other. Jason¹ of Pheræ declared, without a figure of speech, that he was famished for want of empire. Power, it seems, was as necessary to Jason, as food to other men; and if he had not gained a crown, he must have ceased to live. This magnanimous Theſſalian had learned, forsooth, only how to command, but a citizen must also learn how to obey; and it is justly observed, that, in the equality of free commonwealths, men must be disciplined by obedience, before they can be safely intrusted with authority. In proportion, therefore, as the form of government approximates political perfection, the virtues of a good man and of a good citizen will the more nearly coincide. In all such governments, prudence in the governors, and right opinion in the governed, are essential and peculiar requisites; other virtues are common to both, but variously modified by age, sex, office, and condition.²

If virtue, in the strictest sense, be essential to a citizen, by what name shall we call those low mechanics, who are condemned by their indigence to unwholesome and degrading drudgery? They are not slaves, they are not mere inhabitants, their labour is useful to the state, and yet the lives which necessity compels them to

Citizens
and their
virtues dif-
ferent in
different
forms of
govern-
ment.

¹ See History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. pp. 377, 378, & seq.

² I have transposed and compressed this passage, omitting some obscure clauses which are elsewhere more clearly expressed.

lead,

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lead, contribute not in any degree to the formation of virtue, either intellectual or moral. In ancient times, these mean artificers were sometimes classed with slaves; and as slaves in many cities, they still continue to be considered; for it is worthy of remark, that defining a citizen as above, "one entitled to share the government of his country," we exclude from that rank, women, minors, and children, who are not less essential in a state than mechanics and artificers. But as there are various forms of government, there must also be various kinds of citizens. In democracies, artificers and even day-labourers may enjoy the honours of the state, in aristocracies this is impossible, because office is the reward of virtue; in oligarchies, the labourer never can, but the artisan sometimes may, attain the rank of citizen; because in such governments wealth chiefly opens the road to preferment, and industrious and skilful workmen often acquire considerable opulence. A law therefore prevailed at Thebes, excluding every artisan who had not shut shop upwards of ten years, from enjoying any office of magistracy. In times of national calamity, strangers, bastards, persons of half-blood, and even slaves, have been associated to the honours of the commonwealth; but this liberality gradually ceased with the public exigency, and an honourable descent, first on the father's side at least, and afterwards on the side also of the mother, was again required for constituting a citizen. Homer introduces Achilles complaining that he is treated

treated like "an unhonoured stranger." A BOOK
 participation in honours and offices is, in fact, III.
 essential to the character of him who is truly a
 citizen; and when the appellation is bestowed
 on any other, it is to be considered as nothing
 better than a flattering cheat. It is plain, there-
 fore, that the character of a good man coincides
 in some governments with that of a good citizen,
 in others not; but that even in the former, the
 two characters completely coincide in the case
 only of those properly qualified to share and to
 direct the public administration.*

We now proceed to investigate the number, Chap. 4.
 the nature, and the genius of the different forms
 of government^b. Man, we have said, is natu- Of the dif-
 rally a herding and political animal; he delights ferent
 in the company of others, and covets it for no forms of
 other purpose but merely that of enjoyment. govern-
 But utility soon strengthens the association ment.
 which nature has collected; for society is re-
 commended to us, not only for the purpose of

* Hard would be the lot of mankind if those only were fit to live in society who had acquired confirmed habits of virtue. The purpose of comfortable subsistence, for which communities are instituted, does not require in the greater part of the persons composing them such consummate perfection. There is one case, however, pointed out in the text, in which the character of a good citizen necessarily infers that of a good man. This is the case of magistrates or ministers, of those called to direct or conduct the affairs of the community. In political life, the distinction between private and public character was first invented by the most detestable knavery, as it is unhappily perpetuated by the most lamentable credulity.

^b Aristotle here repeats, that government is the arrangement of men in society, and especially of those men who, by the forms of the constitution, are invested with the sovereignty. He enumerates also some different kinds of republics, as is done by him more fully hereafter in the next chapter.

sup-

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supporting life, a thing so sweet in itself that men are eager to preserve it even under most deplorable circumstances, but for the purpose of living honourably and happily. The comfortable subsistence, therefore, of the whole body collectively, and of each individual separately, ought to be regarded as the end and purpose for which communities have assembled, and the bond by which they are held together. In that most unequal of all associations, the association, if it may be so called, of the master and the slave, we have already proved that there is a strict coincidence of interests; for though the advantage of the master be the thing principally intended, the advantage of the slave (we mean the slave by imbecility of nature) is also a necessary result.^c

That all just government has for its end and object the good of the governed.

In the management of families, the interest of fathers and husbands coincides with that of wives and children; but as every art has for its object the benefit of those on whom it is exercised; physic, the health of the patient; gymnastic, the strength and dexterity of the scholar; so the art of domestic government must have for its object the benefit of the house or family. The benefit of the master is likewise the usual result; for as he who professes the gymnastic may himself sometimes be a wrestler, and

^c See above, p. 37. The imperfection of modern language does not enable us to express by one word *δικοτομία*, which I have translated the association of master and slave: an association which the author endeavours to prove mutually beneficial to both parties, by observing, as he had before done, that the destruction of the slave would put an end to the *δικοτομία*.

as

as he who directs the vessel must always be a **BOOK**
 passenger, so the one sometimes, and the other **III.**
 always, derives personal advantage from his re-
 spective art, the direct and essential object of
 which lies, however, beyond himself, and cen-
 ters in those for whose improvement the lessons
 of the former are given, and for whose safety
 the skill of the latter is exercised. In political
 partnerships, the same principle holds good;
 and the art of government, like all other arts,
 is practised directly and principally for the be-
 nefit of those over whom it is exercised, that
 is, the good of the governed^d. This is so
 strictly true, that in the equality of ancient re-
 publics, those who performed the task and sus-
 tained the burden of magistracy, and who sub-
 jected themselves to the painful duties of unin-
 terrupted vigilance and strenuous exertion in
 the service of the public, thought it just that
 others next in succession should perform the
 same task, sustain the same burden, and submit
 to the same duties; and thus repay the benefit
 which they had previously received, and serve
 in their turn as guardians and watchmen of the
 community^e. But fees and salaries have cor-
 rupted this natural and healthy condition of so-
 ciety, and engendered the disease of avarice,
 which is only to be palliated by the emolument
 of perpetual office. The emolument, however,

^d Plato, and, before him, the Pythagorean Fragments, forcibly maintain and beautifully illustrate this doctrine. Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584. edit. Ficini. and History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi. p. 28.

^e Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584.

B O O K is accidental ; the burden essential. Those governments, therefore, which consult the good of the public, and those only, are right and just. Those which consult the good of the magistrates alone, are mere perversions of government, corrupt tyrannies of unworthy masters over reluctant slaves : but a commonwealth is the partnership of freedom.

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Chap. 5. In enumerating and explaining the various forms of government, method requires that we begin with those which are right and just, because these being previously defined, their counterfeits and corruptions will at once become manifest. In every political association, it is necessary that one man, the few, or the many, should bear sway ; and whichever of them happens to take place, if the public good be the great rule of administration, the government is right and just, and is called a monarchy when lodged in the hands of one ; an aristocracy, when in the hands of the few, and a republic when in the hands of the many. The word aristocracy denotes the government of the best men, or the government that is best in itself. A republic is the general name of all commonwealths, but is applied particularly to denote a government administered by the people at large, but administered with justice, not oppressive to any class of citizens, but impartially consulting the good of all.

The distinctive characters of governments. The propriety of these names is justified by the nature of things. That one man, or a few, may be adorned by an accumulation of virtues, is

is what experience will justify; but that the multitude in any country should be so illustriously distinguished, is inconsistent with experience. The virtue most likely to pervade a whole people, is martial spirit. Citizens, therefore, who are soldiers, naturally bear sway in that form of civil polity which is called by way of distinction *the republic*^f. The corrupt deviation from monarchy, or rather from royalty, is tyranny; for a tyrant is a monarch who rules with no other view than the benefit of himself and his family. Aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy, when the few, who are rich, govern the state as best suits the interests of their avarice and ambition: and a republic degenerates into a democracy, when the many, who are poor, make the gratification of their own passions the only rule of their administration^g.

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Wherever

W. H. Money

^f The natural connection between republicanism and martial spirit is strongly attested by all the historians of antiquity from Herodotus to Livy. See Herodot. l. v. c. lxxviii. and History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii. p. 364. and vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 7. Read in Livy the History of Rome after the expulsion of the Tarquins, and the destruction of the Decemvirs. But it is worthy of observation, that this essential connection has been sometimes overlooked in modern times, and well it might by those who attended only to names; for in speaking of the greatest battle fought among the Italian states, many of which were called republics, towards the end of the fifteenth century, Machiavel has the following memorable words: "Et fuc questa giornata combattuta con più virtù, che alcun altra che fosse stata fatta in cinquanta anni in Italia; perche vi mori tra l'una parte & l'altra più che mille huomini." Delle Historie, l. viii. p. 306. "This action was fought with more valour than any other which had happened for fifty years in Italy; since on the two sides, the number of the slain exceeded 1000 men."

^g Aristotle makes an apology for speaking so freely of oligarchies and democracies, which were in fact the only governments then existing in Greece; and into one or other of which all republics have

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Wherever wealth alone opens the road to preferment, oligarchy prevails; poverty, on the other hand, is the constant attendant of democracy; and the distinctive character of those governments consists not in this, that the many or the few bear sway, but in the one case, that rapacious poverty be armed with power, and in the other, that contemptuous opulence be invested with authority. But as eminence in wealth can only fall to the share of a few, and as *all* may participate the advantages of equal freedom, the partizans of the rich and of the multitude agitate republican states, each faction striving to engross the government.

Chap. 6.

The unjust
pretensions
of the par-
tizans of
democra-
cy; and

In the contentions which take place, both parties pretend to have justice on their side; but there is a democratical and an oligarchical justice, which strongly favours of iniquity. Most men are wretched judges in their own cause. Passion narrows their understanding; and in every complicated case they see those circumstances only which are favourable to themselves, and obstinately shut their eyes to whatever favours their adversaries. Justice, the partisans of democracy assert to be nothing but equality; adding, that where men are equal in

so natural and so strong a tendency to degenerate. He says, that in treating a subject philosophically, and not merely for the purpose of practical utility, a just theory cannot be deduced, unless the particulars which enter into the general question be fully enumerated and fairly examined. We are happy in living in a country where the injustice and cruelty both of oligarchies and democracies may be unreservedly exposed and fearlessly arraigned.

liberty,

liberty, they are entitled to an equal enjoyment of all other advantages. Justice, the partisans of oligarchy maintain, and maintain rightly, to consist not in equality, but in proportionⁿ; not in this, that the shares of all be equal, but in this, that each man have his due: but as they themselves are superior in wealth, they claim a superiority in all other respects.

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Their reasoning would be conclusive, had communities been formed merely for the purposes of preserving and accumulating riches. On that supposition, the proportions of the profit might be exactly ascertained by the shares of the capital. But commonwealths have *not* been instituted for the sake of riches, nor for commerce by which riches are acquired, nor for that sort of conventional justice, by which they are maintained and defended. The Tuscans, Carthaginians, and other maritime nations, are connected by the bonds of mutual traffic; their exports and imports are carefully regulated by treaties; they have courts of justice to which the subjects of one country may apply when injured by those of another; and they have alliances in war, stipulating mutually to ensure to each other their respective commercial advantages. But here, their reciprocal connections end; they are not subject, in other matters, to the same laws, nor governed by the same magistrates; they are not united by affection or

the unjust
pretensions
of the as-
sertors of
oligarchy,
or what is
now called
aristocracy

Difference
between a
common-
wealth and
other asso-
ciations.

ⁿ The subject of justice is fully discussed in the Fifth Book of the Ethics, to which the author here refers. See vol. i. p. 361, & seq.

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friendship; and provided each party be just in his dealings, it is totally indifferent to the other what may be his character in all other particulars; an indifference which cannot prevail among those who are fellow-citizens in reality, and not merely in name. But suppose the connection to be rendered more intimate, and imagine the walls of Corinth to be united with those of Megara: suppose still farther, that the right of intermarriage, a right essential to the existence of communities, were established; and admit that each individual were protected in his industry and in his dealings, by laws wisely framed, faithfully administered, and realising the metaphor of the sophist Lycophron¹, "that law is a surety and a pledge;" yet nothing of all this, neither the community of residence, nor the connection of affinity, nor mutual dependence in trade, nor common association in war, none of these ties, nor all of them together, would be sufficient to consolidate the political edifice, and to constitute that kind of partnership which is properly called a commonwealth: a partnership aiming not merely at subsistence, but at well-being; and subservient not merely to the interests of life, but to the interests of that kind of life which is ultimately desirable to man, as the perfection of his social and moral nature.

This perfection cannot be attained independently of the community of residence, the con-

¹ This Lycophron is mentioned by our author in his *Sophistic Elench.* passim; & *Rhetor.* l. iii. c. iii.

nections

nections of affinity, and the long-continued habits of daily and familiar intercourse. Festivals, sacrifices, common occupations, and common amusements, knit mankind into friendship, collect families into cantons, and consolidate cantons into commonwealths. By exercising the energies and operations of the social principle, the genuine happiness of human life is improved and perfected: and that man who, by his personal excellencies and the loveliness of his character, contributes most to this great end, whatever may be his inferiority to many others in birth or in wealth, ought to be regarded as the principal sharer in the great political partnership.^a

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It has been found a matter of difficulty to determine in what portion of the state the sovereignty ought to reside. In the majority of the people at large? Then the sovereignty must be vested in poverty; and if the poor plunder the rich, who shall arraign their injustice? In the few, who are wealthy, or those still fewer, who are virtuous? Then the public must be insulted in the one case, and dishonoured in the other; for offices of authority are the honours conferred by republics; and should the same men remain always in place, they must purchase this pre-eminence by the disgrace of the people at

Chap. 7.

Difficulties attending the question, in what portion of the state the sovereignty ought to reside?

^a The author concludes this chapter with a sentence unconnected with the context, namely, "The doubts and disputes concerning governments arise from considering justice, which is a complex object, under one only aspect; and thus substituting a part of it for the whole." This remark, which was before made, it seemed unnecessary to repeat.

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large. Shall we then establish a king? The evil evidently would become the greater, how meritorious soever we may suppose the character of this king to be¹, since the sphere of honour would thus be still more narrowly contracted, and that of disgrace still more widely expanded. Perhaps the vigour of sovereign power is incompatible with the imbecility of human passion; and, therefore, ought not to be committed to man, but intrusted to law. Yet if the spirit of your laws be democratical or oligarchical, wherein will this alteration avail you? The evils complained of, will evidently still prevail.

Solution of
these diffi-
culties.

Great as these difficulties seem, they are not, however, altogether incapable of solution. The people at large, how contemptible soever they may appear when taken individually, are yet, when collectively considered, not, perhaps, unworthy of sovereignty^m. It is a trite observation, that those entertainments where each man

¹ The author here does not dogmatise, but discuss. In pursuing the principle on which he now reasons, he draws a conclusion against royalty: but viewing the subject under a different aspect, he considers, in other passages, the kingly power as a fit balance between the people and the great; and regards the royal authority as a firm pledge, that the poor shall not be oppressed, nor the rich plundered.

^m This is the only question which the author here examines; leaving, as he observes, the solution of the other difficulties to another opportunity. In the whole of what he says, he speaks merely as an advocate; and his arguments, he observes, apply not to any people indiscriminately, but to a people peculiarly circumstanced (*προς τι πλῆθος*), who are the only fit materials for what he calls his *πολιτεια*, or republic; as will be explained more fully hereafter. It is farther worthy of remark, that when Aristotle speaks of the people, he here means *populus*, not *plebs*; the people at large, not the lower ranks only.

sends

sends the dish most agreeable to his own palate, are preferable to those furnished by the most sumptuous delicacy of individuals. The people at large are allowed to be the best judges of music and of poetry. The general taste is thus acknowledged to be better than that of the few, or of one man, however skilful. Considered collectively, the people form a complex animal, with many feet, with many hands, with many faculties, with many virtues; each member contributing something, more or less valuable, to the perfection of the whole body. The moral and intellectual excellencies of the multitude thus differ from those of a wise and virtuous man, as the beauty of a fine picture^a does from the beauty of individuals; of whom some may have eyes, and others may have other features, more perfect and more beautiful than those of the picture; yet the picture, collecting only excellencies, and always avoiding deformities, will be found more beautiful and more perfect than any original in nature, with whom it can be compared. The excellencies, therefore, of that complex entity, the Public, may sometimes surpass those of the most accomplished prince or most virtuous council. That this commonly holds, I would not, indeed, venture to affirm. It rather seems manifest, that to some bodies of men the argument cannot possibly apply; for if

^a Such was the Helen of Crotona painted by Zeuxis. "Neque enim putavit, omnia, quæ quæreret ad venustatem, uno in corpore se reperire posse," &c. Cicero de Inventione Rhetorica, l. ii. c. i.

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For what
functions
the people
at large are
best quali-
fied.

The exer-
cise of the
deliberative
and judicial
powers.

it applied to them, it would extend also to wild beasts, since wherein some multitudes differ from wild beasts it is not easy to discover.

The safety of every free government requires that the major part of the citizens should enjoy a certain weight in the administration. If this does not take place, the majority must be dissatisfied; and where the majority are dissatisfied, the government will soon be subverted. But what sort of magistracy is the humble citizen, the mere unit of the crowd, qualified to exercise? Offices of high personal trust, or of important executive authority, his ignorance would disgrace, or his injustice might betray. For the performance of extraordinary tasks, extraordinary virtues, as well as extraordinary abilities, are required; and such virtues and abilities are not to be expected in the individuals of a promiscuous multitude. It remains, therefore, that the people at large be intrusted with the deliberative^o and judicial powers of government, because the members of assemblies, senates, and courts of justice, acting not individually, but collectively, prove mutually assisting to each other. In such popular tribunals, virtue and passion, reason and sentiment, courage and wisdom, are harmoniously blended into one salutary composition, in which even the grossest ingredients are not without their use; for experience teaches, that the purest nourishment is

^o In what sense the word "deliberative" is to be here understood, will be explained presently.

not

not always the best, but that fine flour is most wholesome when mixed with the coarse.^p

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Objections
on this sub-
ject, pro-
posed and
answered.

Guided by this principle, Solon and some other legislators committed to the people at large the power of appointing the magistrates, as well as that of taking an account of their administration. This political arrangement, indeed, is exposed to the following objection. To appoint a physician, or to take an account of his conduct in his profession, seems to belong only to those who are skilled in the art of physic^q. A geometer must be examined by geometricians; and a pilot, by men acquainted with navigation. Wherefore, then, ought the people indiscriminately to be entitled to judge their magistrates, and to appreciate their merit or demerit in employments, which the people indiscriminately are not qualified to exercise? This objection may be answered by recurring to the principles already established, that the people collectively considered (unless consisting of a vile and slavish populace) are capable of discharging functions,

^p Nam multitudo fere melius quam singuli de rebus omnibus judicat. Singuli enim quasdam habent virtutum particulas, quæ simul collatæ unam excellentem virtutem faciunt. Quod in medicorum pharmacis, ac in primis in antidoto eo, quod Mithridaticum vocant, perspicue cerni potest. In eo enim pleræque res per se noxiæ, ubi confusæ fuerint, salutare adversus venena remedium afferunt. Buchananus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. xxviii.

^q Persons thus skilled, the author divides into three classes: *δημῶν, ἀρχιτεκτονικοί, πεπαιδευμένοι*: mere practitioners; men of accurate and profound science; and persons instructed, but less correctly and deeply, in the healing art. The distinction between *οἱ ἀρχιτεκτονικοί*, or *οἱ ἰδοῖς* and *οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι*, occurs frequently in other parts of his works, and in reference to other arts and sciences.

of

BOOK of which, in their individual character, they
 III. seem altogether unworthy. Besides this, the
 productions of every art are not best appreciated
 by its professors. The pilot is a better judge of
 a helm than the ship-carpenter. A cook is sel-
 dom consulted about the merit of the supper
 which he has dressed; and he who inhabits a
 house, needs not a jury of architects to ascertain
 the degree of praise or of blame due to the con-
 trivance of the builder.

There is still another ground on which the
 arrangement of popular governments is cen-
 sured. That magistrates should be elected by,
 and responsible to, the promiscuous crowd of
 citizens, convened in assemblies and courts of
 justice, seems highly unreasonable, because the
 upper ranks of men are thus subjected to the
 authority of their inferiors. To be a general
 or a treasurer, that is, to command the public
 force, or to manage the public purse, or to per-
 form any separate function of executive magis-
 tracy, it is necessary to be endowed with cer-
 tain pre-eminent qualifications; a mature age,
 an ample patrimony, an uniformly approved and
 respected character. Ought such dignified per-
 sons to be examined, tried, and sometimes prose-
 cuted to punishment, by men of no estimation;
 of different ages, different characters, and often
 destitute of fortune? Is not this to commit the
 greater magistracy to those judged unworthy of
 holding the lesser? These questions may be satis-
 factorily answered by observing, that the indivi-
 duals composing the senate or assembly are not
 11 them-

themselves the assembly or senate. They are parts only of those awful tribunals, and the magistrates are tried not by the parts, but by the whole; that is, by the assembly, senate, or courts of justice, which, whatever may be the character and condition of many of the members composing them, are certainly more wealthy and more respectable than any of those magistrates who are held amenable to their jurisdiction. The present difficulty, therefore, may thus be removed; but the doubt which we first started, proves that the laws should always decide whenever their general language (for their language must be general) applies to the case in question; and that judges should then only speak when the laws are silent. But what laws are entitled to the appellation of good, does not yet appear. This only is manifest, that the laws must depend on the nature of the government; just, therefore, under a good government, and unjust under a bad one.

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Every science and every art proposes to itself some end or purpose which it considers as absolutely good and ultimately desirable, that is, good and desirable in itself without reference to the attainment of any object beyond it. Of politics, the most comprehensive and the most important of all sciences, the end and aim is the public good of the community, which can only be upheld, by justice, which, as we before said, forms the great law of the moral world. To a certain length, the general opinions of mankind with regard to justice agree with the accurate decisions of philosophy. Among equals, justice

Chap. 8.

According to what circumstances and qualities, political honours and advantages ought to be apportioned and distributed.

is

B O O K is acknowledged to consist in equality ; among
 { **III.** are those who are unequal, it is acknowledged
 to consist in proportion, that is, in giving
 to each his due. But what, and how many,
 are the circumstances which ought to regulate
 this proportion, is not clearly ascertained.
 Ought a superiority in every advantageous
 quality, when other things are alike, to entitle
 its possessor to a superiority of political
 advantages? Shall men's statures or colours be
 considered as laying a foundation for the discrimination
 of ranks in society? In lesser matters, such a
 principle of distinction is not allowed to operate.
 At a concert of music, the best instrument is
 given, not to the handsomest man, but to the best
 performer. How much soever he may be surpassed
 in beauty or nobility, and how much soever the
 value of beauty and nobility may surpass that of
 musical skill, yet the best performer is always
 honoured with the best flute. The reason is plain ;
 the circumstances in which his rivals are superior,
 contribute nothing to the work in hand. They have
 no manner of relation to musical performance :
 and therefore, with regard to it, cannot stand
 in competition with the quality in which he excels
 them. For things specifically different, and which
 admit not of a common measure, can only be
 estimated by considering how far they respectively
 contribute to some common end. To compare them
 abstractedly is impossible or absurd. A difference
 in every valuable quality ought not, therefore,
 to be a source of political distinction. Swift-
 ness

nefs meets with due honour at the Olympic games. But the honours conferred by cities are apportioned to qualities essential to the existence or well-being of the state. A community cannot consist of beggars or of slaves. Liberty, therefore, and wealth and birth, naturally contend for pre-eminence; but if these things be necessary to constitute a commonwealth, justice and valour are not less necessary to defend and uphold it. In the contest, therefore, for civil pre-eminence, education and virtue seem fairly entitled to the first honours, because of all things, education and virtue most contribute to the perfection of civil society. The partisans of wealth allege, that the rich are most faithful to their engagements; and that those who have the greatest share in the public stock, ought to be invested with the government. The nobles contend, that as slaves are essentially different from citizens, those who are farthest removed from a servile extraction, ought to be regarded as citizens of a superior class, and therefore to be armed with authority. They strengthen this conclusion, by observing that nobility is nothing else but the virtue of the race, hereditary worth, and prescriptive dignity. But such arguments, in their ultimate tendency, would prove, that one man, if more noble and wealthy than the rest, ought to be made king; and even in a virtuous republic, that he who surpassed his fellow-citizens in virtue, ought to be exalted to regal power. Such is the absurdity resulting from the supposition, that

BOOK

III.

BOOK that those who are superior in one particular^r,
 { **III.** } ought to be entitled to a superiority in political
 society; in which mankind have assembled in
 order to club their respective advantages, and
 in order to direct their various but united ef-
 forts to one salutary end and purpose; and in
 which the people at large may always quash
 the vain pretensions of the few, by saying, *we*
collectively are richer, wiser, and nobler than you.
 The best laws, therefore, are those which are
 framed for the general benefit of the citizens;
 that is, of men qualified alternately to govern and
 to obey, differently qualified, indeed, in different
 governments; but in the best, qualified and de-
 termined to govern and to obey according to the
 rules which right reason prescribes.

Chap. 9.

Virtue be-
 yond com-
 pare unfit
 for society.

The existence of every commonwealth pre-
 supposes, however, a certain degree of equality
 among those who are its constituent members.
 Should excessive inequality prevail, especially
 in those things which form the power and splen-
 dour of society itself, the association will gradu-
 ally tend to a dissolution; and, therefore, if one
 man, or a few, should display a degree of virtue,
 by which that of all the rest would be totally
 eclipsed, such men, if too few in number to
 subsist by themselves in a separate society, could
 not form a part, or be considered as members,

^r Aristotle observes, that nothing is easier than to establish a demo-
 cracy, an oligarchy, or a tyranny; because all those governments are
 perfectly simple in their construction; to make them, requires no ac-
 curacy of comparison, no power of combination. But he observes
 and proves, again and again, that they are all of them mere perva-
 sions and mockeries of just government.

of

of any community whatever. It is the law of commonwealths, that the citizens composing them should rule by vicarious succession; because those who contribute, nearly in equal portions, to the benefit and lustre of the community, are entitled to expect from that community nearly the same treatment. But the same treatment, that is, a mere equality of honours and advantages, would be the height of injustice to conspicuous eminence and incomparable worth. Who is to govern the natural governors of mankind? What laws are made for men who are a law unto themselves? The attempt to legislate for such men would be exposed to ridicule; and they might answer the arguments of those foolish enough to undertake this task, as Antisthenes* says, that the lions, in the assembly of beasts, answered the eloquent harangue of the hares on the subject of equal laws.

The ostracism of democratics was invented for levelling that extreme inequality, under which such forms of government cannot possibly subsist. The assembly banishes for a limited time those too conspicuously distinguished by wealth, popularity, connections, or any other political advantage. For a similar reason, the Argonauts, we are told, rejected the assistance of Hercules. His virtues too much overtopped those of the adventurers with whom he wished to be associated. The council, therefore, which Periander gave to Thraſybulus is not blameable,

Necessity
of the ostracism.

* Antisthenes was a scholar of Socrates, who, in imitation of his master, mixed facetiousness with severity. See History of Ancientreece, vol. iii. c. xxiv. p. 149.

abstract-

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abtractedly and in itself, but because that counsel was both given and employed for the purpose of supporting a cruel tyranny. Periander, we are told, said nothing to the question of Thraſybulus, "by what means he ſhould maintain the ſovereignty of Miletus;" but, conducting his meſſenger into a field of corn, lopped the tall-eſt ſtalks, and thus levelled the ſurface. The meſſenger reported what he had ſeen, and what Thraſybulus appears to have underſtood, having ſpeedily ſet himſelf to cut off the firſt men of the city. Both democracies and oligarchies follow the ſame policy. The Athenians, in violation of treaties, chaſtiſed the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians, in order to break the ſtubborn pride of thoſe fierce iſlanders, and to level their aſpiring ſentiments with thoſe of their more obſequious allies. The Perſian monarch has often ſmit and humbled the Medes and Babylonians, vainly elated by the remembrance of their ancient empire^c. The levelling maxim, therefore, is univerſally applicable in all ſuch governments. The ſame principle obtains in muſic, in mechanics, in painting, and indeed in every art. A painter would not admit into his performance any limb or member, however beautiful, exceeding the proportional magnitude of the figure which he delineates. A ſhip-builder muſt adapt the helm, and every other part, to the ſize of the whole veſſel; and in a chorus of muſic, an overpowering voice would diſturb and deſtroy

Illustrated
by the ex-
ample of
the arts.

^c The author does not ſay that theſe things are right; but he maintains that they are neceſſary for the ſafety of the government, which, being bad in itſelf, can only be preſerved by bad means.

the

the effect of the symphony. The ostracism, BOOK
III. therefore, in democracies, and some analogous institution in monarchies, is useful for maintaining the harmony of the political concert. It is better, indeed, that the legislator, at the first formation of the commonwealth, should provide against the necessity of ever having recourse to such violent remedies. But if this has not been done originally, he must, in that case, as at sea, tack about, and thus steer the vessel of the state into a safe harbour.

The ostracism, however, instead of being seasonably and usefully employed, is too often abused to factions and pernicious purposes. In corrupt commonwealths, justice is measured by the utility of that portion of the state, to whose interest the public good is, on all occasions, readily sacrificed. Such apparent or relative justice is, indeed, real and absolute iniquity; but it is the only kind of justice that, under bad governments, can possibly prevail. The ostracism, therefore, will not be properly applied in those cases to which it is solely or chiefly applicable; for it is a matter of doubt, whether this invention ought ever to be employed in a virtuous and well-regulated community. When a man conspicuously overtops his fellow-citizens, I say not in other political advantages, but in virtue itself, what is then to be done? It will not be said, that in a well-regulated state, his superiority in virtue ought to subject him to banishment. Nor will it be said, that such conspicuous superiority, submitting to the law of vic-

The gross
abuse of
this in-
stitution.

To what
case inap-
plicable.

B O O K rious succession, ought to command and obey
 III. alternately. This would be as absurd as divid-
 ing the empire with Jupiter. It remains; there-
 fore, that all men should cheerfully and uni-
 formly obey such rulers, and acknowledge the
 natural and perpetual sovereignty of their vir-
 tues.

Chap. 10.

Of monar-
 chy, and
 its five
 kinds.

This observation naturally leads us to speak
 of kings. We have formerly numbered mo-
 narchy among the just forms of government.
 But whether is it universally the best form; or
 useful in some states and hurtful in others? First
 of all, it is evident that there are various kinds
 of monarchy. The kings of Sparta, who seem
 to be of all kings the most limited by law, con-
 duct the military expeditions, and preside in the
 religious worship, of their country. They are
 the hereditary generals of the commonwealth.
 In the heroic ages, kings were not armed with
 the power of life and death, except by a kind
 of martial law, limited in its execution to a day
 of battle. Agamemnon patiently endures re-
 proach and insult in the council; but issuing to
 the field, he says,

“ Who dares inglorious in his ships to stay?
 Who dares to tremble on this signal day?
 That wretch, too mean to fall by martial power,
 The birds shall mangle and the dogs devour,
 For death is in my hand.”

^u Iliad ii. v. 391. Aristotle quotes Homer, and even Herodotus,
 from memory; so familiar was he with those admired authors. From
 this circumstance, his citations are not always correct; as in the
 example before us, where to the four verses in the text, he adds from
 another part of the Iliad, *πᾶς γὰρ ἐμὸς θάνατος*, — “ For death is in
 my hand.”

This,

This, therefore, is one kind of monarchy, a perpetual generalship, sometimes hereditary, and sometimes elective. Another species of monarchy is that which prevails among the Asiatic barbarians. Their kings exercise a power absolute, unlimited, and almost tyrannical; yet their authority is legal, hereditary, and secure. The genius of the Greeks is, in point of government, different from that of the Barbarians; and the genius of the Europeans is different from that of the Asiatics, who of all nations are the most patient of despotism. Their kings, therefore, are guarded, not as tyrants are in Europe, by the arms of foreign mercenaries, but by the servile fidelity of their native troops; and their dominion becomes lawful, because voluntarily endured; in so much that the guards of European princes are employed against the citizens, and the guards of Asiatic princes consist of the citizens themselves. A third species of monarchy is that of the *Æsymnetes* in ancient Greece, who were nothing else than *elective tyrants*, sometimes chosen for life, and sometimes appointed for a limited time, or the conclusion of a particular business. The people of Mitylené thus chose Pittacus to conduct the war against the exiles, headed by Antimenides, and the poet Alcæus; who, in one of his convivial songs, arraigns the folly of the multitude, "for appointing, vociferously and tumultuously, the baneful Pittacus to tyrannise a frantic and ill-fated country." The government of the *Æsymnetes* partook both of tyranny and of royalty; they were despots exercising

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cising lawful power, because lawfully granted; but differing from Asiatic monarchs, because their temporary power was not congenial to the spirit and usages of their country. A fourth species of monarchy prevailed in the heroic ages, a limited royalty; just, legal, and hereditary. Those who signally benefited mankind in arts or arms, who collected societies, formed settlements, and established colonies, received voluntary submission from public gratitude^x. They became generals in war, judges in peace, and presided in such acts of religion as were not exclusively attached to particular priesthoods. In deciding the differences of their subjects, they swore to observe the rules of justice; and the form of the oath consisted in elevating the sceptre^y. In progress of time, these branches of authority were either voluntarily resigned by kings, or forcibly resumed by their people. In most commonwealths, kings have been reduced to the condition of mere presidents in religious ceremonies; and in that country of Greece in which their office best deserves the name of royalty, they are merely hereditary generals.

^x See Sarpedon's speech in Homer, *Γλαυκί τῇ δὲ πρὶ τιμημισθῶν μάχῃ*, &c. Il. xii. v. 310. and Pope, v. 370 — 386.

“ Such, they may cry, deserve the sovereign state,
Whom those that envy, dare not imitate.”

^y The sceptre was given to kings as the badge of their authority, and entitled them to administer the *θεμίστρας* *Διός*, Jove's laws; which when they perverted or infringed, the sceptre dropped from their hands. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. passim.

To

To these four kinds of monarchy above mentioned, we must still add a fifth and last kind, the most absolute of all. A king may bear to a state the same relation which a master does to a family, having the whole power of the sovereignty concentrated in his own person. The office of such a monarch, and that of a king of Sparta, form the two ultimate limits of monarchical power, which cannot be greater than it is in the first case, nor lesser than it is in the second. The perpetual generalship of Sparta cannot even be said to constitute a particular form of government. It is not the constitution itself, but rather a law of that constitution; and a law that may take place under any other constitution whatever. We shall not, therefore, at present examine its advantages or inconveniences; but proceed to consider those kinds of royalty which contain the specific qualities of kingly government.

In appreciating their merits or defects, we must estimate the contending pretensions of good laws and good men². The partisans of kings observe, that laws can only speak a general language; that their applications to particular cases, which taken collectively, form the sum of human transactions, is often doubtful, dangerous, or hurtful; that there is not any art of which the practice can be regulated by immutable precept; that even in Egypt, a country

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Chap. II.
—
An estimate
of the ad-
vantages
and defects
of monar-
chy.

² In treating of monarchy, Aristotle has principally absolute monarchy in view. He states the objections to it with that fulness and force with which he commonly represents the arguments of his adversaries; refuting them afterwards with as much brevity as the subject can possibly admit.

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singularly attached to the formality of rules, physicians are allowed, after the third day of the malady, to alter the mode of treatment prescribed by authority; and even before that time, to alter it at their peril. The advocates for laws assert, and assert justly, that the question partly resolves itself into one more general, "whether ought reason or passion to bear sway?" Laws, therefore, must be established; but as they cannot completely involve the decision of each particular case, whether ought one man, or many, to administer and apply them? The arguments in favour of the *judgment* of the many, we have already had occasion to explain^a; and in favour of their *justice*, it may be observed, that the many are less liable to corruption than one man or the few, in the same manner that a large lake is less corruptible than a small pool. If we deal, therefore, impartially with kings, magistrates, and people, regarding them all as composed of the same materials, endowed with similar excellencies, and liable to similar imperfections; it must be acknowledged that in communities consisting of such members, and particularly in the cities of Greece, a republic is better than an aristocracy, and an aristocracy than a monarchy. Kings were originally established by the gratitude of small communities, in which there were but few persons of considerable weight or distinguished merit. But as the number of men deserving the name of peers, or equals, increased, the

Why introduced,
and where-
fore abolished.

^a See above, c. viii. p. 216.

kingly

kingly government was changed for an aristocratical republic. Under this government nations flourished, and riches were accumulated. Riches were followed by luxury, and luxury by rapacity. The wealth of the state became the plunder of individuals. Oligarchies, and then tyrannies, successively prevailed; an usurping faction continually narrowing the basis of its own power, till this power, supported on a single point, was easily overturned by the just resentment of the multitude^b. Democracy then arose, and prevailed in its turn; and it is a matter, perhaps, of some difficulty to establish any other form of government in large cities and populous communities.

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Should monarchy be admitted as an useful institution, a new question occurs, whether it ought to be hereditary? Whatever be the character of a young prince, ought he, in default of his father, to assume the government, and to rule for the ruin of his country? But the king,

Incon-
veniences of
hereditary
monarchy.

^b Aristotle's theory of political revolutions is wonderfully confirmed by the ancient History of Italy. In that country limited monarchies first prevailed, which degenerating into tyrannies, made way for aristocracies. Rome, Naples, Capua, Nola, Tusculum, were long governed by senates: but as cities became more populous, an epidemical malady seized the People of persecuting the Patricians. This evil raged during the Carthaginian wars, from which time there was a continual progress towards democracy. Yet in all these republics, whether popular or aristocratical, the supreme power of the state was generally held by distinguished individuals; a Valerius, Camillus, or Fabius, of Rome; a Manilius, chief of the Latins; a Herennius, of the Samnites, &c. all of them dignified magistrates, or illustrious generals, acting a similar part in their respective countries, which the Medici did in modern times in Florence; and the Malatestas, Viscontis, Felorios, &c. in other cities of Italy.

B O O K knowing the profligacy of the prince, will provide a more worthy successor. This surely supposes a degree of virtue greater than can be expected from man, that, for the good of the public, a father should exclude his own son from a throne. As administrator of the laws, the king must be intrusted with a military force, sufficient to render them effectual. This force, it is easy to see, ought to be such as will enable him to coerce refractory individuals, but not to oppress the community. Such was the proportion of troops anciently committed by the Greeks to their *Æsymnetes*; and such was the rule by which a citizen of Syracuse wished to limit the military force entrusted to Dionysius.

Chap. 12.

Monarchy
arraigned.

But some persons assert, that it is impossible to modify kingly power into any thing like reason and justice. That the invention is altogether unnatural; and that placing a prince on the throne is nothing else than raising passion and a wild beast to the seat of sovereignty. That no man is a fair judge in his own cause; and that a king, therefore, can never judge fairly between himself and his people. That physicians, when sick, trust not to their own skill, but require the advice of others; and that masters of the gymnastic exercises pretend not to be proper judges of their own exhibitions. In all cases whatever, mankind acknowledge the danger of impassioned, and therefore partial, decisions, and ought the more earnestly to strive against this danger, in proportion to the importance of the objects that inflame the ardour of desire, and strengthen

strengthen the bias of selfishness. That the only just sovereigns, therefore, are God and the laws; especially those unwritten, moral, and universal laws, founded in nature, reared and perfected by education and custom. Besides this, were the heart and will of a king not to be distrusted, his head and his understanding would be totally unequal to the discharge of an office not made for humanity. Can one man be supposed capable of superintending the concerns of a whole people? Let him be ever so good, two must still be better than one.

“ By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made;
The wise new prudence from the wise acquire,
And one brave hero fans another's fire ^c.”

And Agamemnon, sensible of his own inability to exercise regal power, prayed,

“ Oh ! would the Gods, in love to Greece, decree
But ten such sages as they grant in thee ^d;
Such wisdom soon should Priam's force destroy,
And soon should fall the haughty towers of Troy ^e.”

That the laws must be administered, and their general language adapted to particular cases, by the discernment of upright judges, affords not any argument in favour of the judge as superior to the law. For it is acknowledged, that in every case to which laws are applicable, they only ought to judge and to govern; and from the law itself men derive those principles that enlighten their reason and direct their decisions. Enured to the discipline of this wise school-mistress,

^c Pope's *Iliad*, ii. 224.

^d *Ibid.* 370.

^e *Ibid.* 443.

they

B O O K they not only understand the letter, but imbibe
III. the spirit of her instructions ; and in continuing
 habitually subject to the laws, they become duly
 qualified to explain them, which that man can
 never be, who is raised above the laws.

All mon-
 archies
 resolve
 themselves
 into oligar-
 chies, or
 aristocra-
 cies.

Besides, there is an absurdity in supposing that one man with two eyes and two ears can observe as widely, or with two hands and two feet can act as vigorously, as many men with many perceptive and many active powers. Kings themselves bear witness to the law of nature, associating to their government many eyes, many hands, many organs of sense, and many instruments of action. Their *friends*, that is, the friends both of their persons and government, are full partners in power ; they would not exert themselves to support a system to which they were unfriendly ; and friendship, we have before proved, can only subsist among equals. The government of one, therefore, necessarily terminating in that of many, his peers and equals, it is surely most advisable to form directly and at once, that kind of constitution which must always be circuitously established.

Monarchy
 defended :
 to what na-
 tions it is
 best adapt-
 ed.

These arguments against royalty are not so conclusive as they seem ; because they rest entirely on the fallacy of extending to mankind in general, observations that have been found applicable to some particular communities. Government is nothing else but the arrangement of individuals in a state, and the propriety of every arrangement or composition must depend on the number and nature of its materials. Some so-

cieties

cieties of men are fitted for living under what we have called a republic, that is, a just and equal polity, administered by rotation; and no people whatever are fitted for living under a tyranny, whether of one man, of an oligarchical senate, or of a democratical assembly; all which we have declared base perversions of government, and direct violations of nature. But between these extremes, there may be some nations so constituted as spontaneously to obey a lord or despot, as servants obey a master; and others so constituted as voluntarily to obey a king, or even an aristocratical senate, as wives and children obey their fathers or husbands. Those who are unequal by nature, cannot be levelled by any contrivance of man; and when authority is just and useful, submission will be ready and cheerful. Even in republics themselves, where men are arranged, not according to their wealth, but according to their worth; where the citizens love liberty, which they have arms and courage to defend; yet should the illustrious virtues of one man, or one family, totally eclipse the merit of the community at large, such a man, or such a family, must either be banished by the ostracism or enthroned. So much concerning monarchy, its nature and kinds; what nations it suits, and for what reasons it suits them.^f

^f The last chapter is merely a recapitulation; after which the author says, that it is his intention to proceed to treat of the best form of government.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

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IV. **I**N the First Book of his Politics, Aristotle examines the origin of society and government, the essential distinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and the best plans of political œconomy. In the Second, he describes the most admired schemes of policy, either delineated by philosophers, or instituted by legislators. In the Third, (of which a considerable part is now lost,) he explained the nature and principle of the various governments existing in Greece, and in the ancient world, whether republican or monarchical; bestowing just and liberal praise, where praise seemed to be due; but declaring himself not completely satisfied with any thing that philosophers had devised, legislators prescribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in the Fourth (commonly published as the Seventh) Book to exhibit the result of his own reflections concerning the great question, which form of government is the best?

This

This problem cannot, he observes, be solved **B O O K**
 abstractedly ; because government being an ar- **IV.**
 rangement, the best government must be the
 best arrangement, and the best arrangement
 is that which the materials to be arranged, are
 the best fitted both to receive and to preserve.
 The great nations of Egypt and the East had
 shewn themselves incapable of subsisting under
 any milder dominion than that of absolute mo-
 narchy, which was not tyranny to them, because
 voluntarily endured ; congenial to their original
 character, and confirmed by hereditary and pre-
 scriptive usage. The genius and temper of
 the Greeks, indeed, were as different from those
 of the Asiatics and Africans, as from those of
 the fierce and undisciplined barbarians in the
 north and west of Europe. The question there-
 fore comes to be, what is the best government
 for the Greeks, or rather for that portion of the
 Greeks, sufficiently numerous to form a com-
 munity apart ? for Aristotle thought the whole
 nation far too bulky to be moulded into one
 commonwealth, but well adapted by its magni-
 tude to form a powerful confederacy ; which by
 pursuing a line of policy which he marks out,
 in its foreign as well as domestic transactions,
 might have greatly accelerated the improve-
 ment and eminently heightened the prosperity of
 the surrounding world. The question, therefore,
 still returns, How are the first elements of this
 confederacy to be produced ? What ought to be
 the constitution, and what the properties of that
 political germ, destined to invigorate into such
 solid

B O O K solid strength, at the same time that it expands
 { **IV.** } to such flourishing beauty?

In treating this subject, Aristotle proves, with convincing evidence, that the same energies and habits constitute the happiness both of individuals and of nations. Men make governments, not governments them: nor by any system of political arrangement can a happy commonwealth be constituted from fools or cowards, profligates or knaves. The bricks must first be prepared before the edifice can be reared; and to the sophists of Greece, who maintained, that as men were corrupted by bad governments, so they might be corrected and purified by good ones, the author replies by asking, how a good building can be made from bad materials? To make a government requires great length of time; and to amend a corrupt government, he observes, requires still longer time; because, in this latter case, men have not only to learn what they did not before know, but also to unlearn what they had previously been taught. The happiness of the community at large is the end of all good government: but Aristotle derides the vain opinion that this happiness, which is often destroyed by the injustice and cruelty of magistrates, is only to be recovered and restored through the operation of popular assemblies. The majority of the people are poor, their justice will therefore be rapacity; the majority of the people are ignorant, their policy therefore will be folly; the majority of the people are themselves domineered by headstrong and im-

10

petuous

petuous passions, their dominion therefore will be anarchy, oppression, and cruelty; and to intrust government, even for a moment, to such clumsy and artless hands, will, instead of having any tendency to reform it, be the likeliest means to prevent the possibility of any thing like rational reform from ever being effected.

Virtue, in a political sense, is defined the love of the constitution; but under the best constitution possible, virtue simply, and political virtue, perfectly coincide. How virtue, simple and unqualified, that is, virtue in the strict philosophical sense, may be rendered the actuating principle of government, Aristotle proceeds with great accuracy to explain; and the aristocracy which he thus establishes, while it maintains the just pre-eminence of the few, will invariably promote the best interests of all; containing in itself a perennial spring of gradual but sure improvement; and raising to higher benefits all descriptions of men, (not excepting slaves themselves,) exactly in proportion to their capacities for enjoying them.

Readers of reflection will peruse with pleasure his judicious observations concerning the extent and populousness of his commonwealth; the most advantageous soil and climate, the best situation of the country and of the capital; their necessary accommodations, and most desirable embellishments. Such particulars as these sufficiently explain themselves; but the three following points, two of which relate to domestic, and one to foreign policy, are not unworthy of illustration.

For

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For cementing his citizens into friendship, and for maintaining unimpaired, the true spirit of any thing like a free and a good constitution, Aristotle, both in this and other Books, ascribes singular efficacy to those convivial meetings, called by the Greeks *syssities*, and by the English *clubs*. In the Greek sense of the word, clubs long formed the prevailing characteristic and peculiar delight of one modern nation. Our neighbours neither had the name nor the thing; and an Englishman who had inhabited the capital, whatever inducements might lead him to foreign lands, always sighed with regret (and that in a degree proportional to his good sense) for those precious hours unincumbered by care and unfettered by ceremony, where frankness chastised by decency, and ardour fraught with knowledge, flowed in full and free streams of unguarded conversation. Before hastily condemning Aristotle for ascribing great and momentous effects to slight and trivial causes, it may be worth while to pause, and carefully to consider how much this singularity in our own manners contributed to form that character, and especially that temper, which is best calculated for enjoying, without abuse, the inestimable benefits of a free government.

A second point on which Aristotle rests the chief support of his commonwealth, is the distribution of public functions among its citizens, according to their respective ages. That a city or commonwealth may subsist comfortably, as to matters of bodily accommodation, it must be provided

provided with peasants, mechanics, and merchants; that it may subsist happily, securely, and respectably, it must be provided with magistrates, priests, and soldiers. Aristotle endeavours to prove, both by experience and arguments, that the classes of men habitually employed as instruments of productive industry, ought to be all of them strictly confined, each to his assigned task; and that the more minutely their tasks are subdivided, and the more rigidly each through life adheres to his own, the more promptly and the more perfectly will the work of all be performed. But does the same reasoning apply to those public and political functions which constitute the duty and dignity of a citizen? As the trade of a weaver ought never to be conjoined with that of a smith or a carpenter; in the same manner ought the military profession never to be exercised at the same time, and by the same persons who perform the offices of priests and magistrates. Aristotle maintains, that those functions ought to be performed by the same persons, not however simultaneously, but at different periods of their lives. Young men in the bloom of their health, strength, and courage, make the best soldiers; the matured vigour of understanding is necessary to the due exercise of deliberative and judicial powers; whereas the honourable functions of the priesthood, not requiring any painful or any strenuous exertion either of the body or of the mind, ought to be reserved for the occupation and the reward of declining years.

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Aristotle would have easily perceived the incompatibility of such regulations with the condition of modern times. The civil law of Athens, and of every other republic of Greece, was a science still more simple than the civil law of Rome, of which Cicero boasts, that amidst all his variety of occupations he could make himself master in the course of a few weeks. In the Christian kingdoms of Europe, priests are not only the performers of religious ceremonies, but the great moral instructors of mankind; and the preparations requisite for the profession either of the law or of the church, are sufficient to employ and exhaust the diligence of that portion of life which, according to Aristotle's plan, ought to be dedicated to far different pursuits. It is thus that the arrangements in political society must always depend on the materials to be arranged; and that institutions seemingly the most natural and most salutary will, under given circumstances, be found the most absurd and most destructive. The study of abstract politics is, therefore, of all sciences the most liable to abuse, though of them all the most useful, when confined within its proper sphere. By determining those arrangements which, independently of local and temporary circumstances, are most conformable to the essential structure and essential ends of society, it supplies the conductors of public affairs with a political limit or model of perfection, to which, without ever reaching, they may continually strive to approximate; thereby counteracting that

that tendency from bad to worse, of which the superficial as well as the deep observers of human life have at all times, and in all countries, so justly and so universally complained. In moral and intellectual endowments, one man is scarcely ever more different from another, than the same man is different from himself at different periods of his life. The distinctions of age are the most natural, the most palpable, and the least invidious of all distinctions; and wretched must be that commonwealth, in which the prerogatives of virtuous old age are not both honourably sustained and cheerfully acknowledged!

The just and natural prerogatives of age ought, however, to be carefully distinguished from the absolute and unnatural dominion of fathers over their children, which was established by law in ancient Persia, and in ancient Rome. With respect to the former country, Aristotle says, that its regulations concerning the *patria potestas* were barbarous and tyrannical^a. At Rome, fathers were not punishable for selling their children, or even for putting them to death; and a son, while his father lived, could not, unless emancipated, legally enjoy any separate property. Extraordinary as those powers seem, they were not, however, rashly given to fathers by the founders of the Roman state, the deepest of all politicians, "since they were induced to confer them, by considering the natural pre-eminence of fathers, the innumerable labours which they sustain for the sake of their children,

^a Ethic. Nichom. viii. 12.

B O O K the necessity of keeping the latter under a watch-
 { **IV.** ful authority; which they knew, from the in-
 stinctive affection of parents for their offspring, would be mildly exercised." Such are the sentiments of Simplicius^b; but Aristotle holds, that parents, as to the treatment of their children, and masters, as to the treatment of their slaves, ought to be amenable to the laws, and accountable to the magistrates; since power without responsibility is not made for man.

The third point in the present Book requiring illustration, relates to the most important branch of foreign policy. According to the theory at least, though not the practice, both of the Greeks and Romans, war could be warrantably undertaken only for the purposes of self-defence, of making reprisals, and of revenging injuries^c. But the mild and manly spirit of Christianity, reprobating, as an unjustifiable cause of action, every species and every degree of revenge, is thought to have altered and improved the law of nations respecting war and peace; and to have restricted the right of hostility simply to resistance. Even this law of resistance or defence has been rejected by the scruples of some of the austere sects: but their arguments, founded on the literal sense of particular texts, have been answered by proving, that these texts enjoin forbearance only in the case of slight and trivial injuries, and are to be regarded as general recommendations of Christian patience, not as

^b Ad Epicet. Encheirid.

^c Omnia quæ defendi, repetique et ulcisci fas sit. Liv. l. v. c. xlix.

parti-

particular commands for abandoning to unjust violence our persons, our families, our friends, and our country. Had Christianity purposed the complete abolition of war on all grounds whatever, such an innovation must have been announced in language specific and peremptory. The new and extraordinary law would not have been left to be collected by inference; it would have been expressly declared and solemnly promulgated. By the power, indeed, of moral motives, and the force of rational arguments, Christianity renders odious or contemptible, ambition, avarice, uncharitableness, and all those selfish passions which are the principal and ordinary causes of aggression. Were its divine doctrines universally respected, wars would from that moment universally cease, because none could meditate future wrong; and the party who had already committed injuries, would be solicitous amply to repair them. But until this happy revolution be effected in human manners, violence may be repelled by force; crimes may be punished for the sake of amendment and example; and incorrigible offenders, whether individuals or communities, may be utterly cut off, when their destruction appears essentially requisite to the public safety. Besides those plain and palpable grounds of war, which have always been avowed in the practice at least of all Christian nations, Aristotle maintains, that individuals or communities, qualified for command, may assert by arms an authority justifiable, because useful, to those who are its sub-

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IV.

jects; an authority moderate and political over freemen, absolute and despotic over slaves. For extenuating the harshness of this decision, it may be observed, that by metaphors familiar to most languages, we speak of the infancy of society, indicating that many human beings, who have attained the age of manhood, are nearly as incapable as children of governing their own conduct. To such full-grown children, it would surely be a piece of good fortune to fall under the direction of a wise and virtuous father. We speak of other communities of men as servile, barbarous, savage, and even brutal; it would, assuredly, be highly advantageous to such nations to meet with wise and virtuous masters. Barbarous and savage nations, therefore, may be rightfully attacked in war, if, without being conquered, the former could not be civilised, nor the latter be tamed.

This specious maxim is liable indeed to be frequently abused, because it must be explained and applied by human reason, dark in itself, and often clouded by passion. But does the principle of self-defence, which Grotius would substitute in its stead, delineate an unerring rule of action? According to the uniform current of modern history, has not the approved right of self-defence been constituted by an apprehension of remote and improbable contingencies? In the practice, at least, of nations, does it not include whatever our avarice, our ambition, in one word, our selfishness, supposes essential to our well-being, the increase of our wealth

wealth or power, the superiority of our military or naval force; the preservation of our hereditary advantages, and the insurance of our future prospects? One nation is too strong—our safety requires that it should be weakened; another, by its situation, may be tempted to extend its borders—our own frontier is to be fortified by new acquisitions of territory, and defended by new bulwarks; by territory to be gained by invasion, and bulwarks which inspire more real terror than that by which they were raised. It would be endless to recite the incongruities resulting from the interpretation of a law, which tends to set the practice of nations at continual variance with their principles; a law too refined for the coarseness, and too limited for the variety of human transactions; which, in our present imperfect state, require that the exercise of the right of war, like all other deliberate acts, should be governed by the fallible dictates of human prudence, adjusting, as well as may be, the measures of coercion to the salutary ends of public expediency, including the best interests both of the victors and of the vanquished.

It may be worthy of remark, in concluding this introduction to Aristotle's ideal commonwealth, that his great political as well as philosophical adversary was employed, in 1663, to delineate a plan of government for Carolina. He gave the whole authority, legislative and executive, to the eight proprietors. The great Milton proposed a plan of government for England.

B O O K land^d. The sovereignty was to reside in a grand
IV. council, not only supreme but perpetual. Compared with Aristotle's commonwealth, that of Locke will appear no better than a diet of *flarosts*; and that of Milton, an oligarchy of *decemvirs*.

^d See his "Ready and easy Way to establish a Free Commonwealth."

BOOK IV.*

ARGUMENT.

Different views of national happiness. — Fair estimate thereof. — The best commonwealth. — Extent and nature of its territory. — Commerce — Naval power — Climate — Constituent members — Health — Marriage — Children.

RIGHTLY to investigate the best form of government, it is necessary previously to ascertain what is the best kind of life; since the latter of these remaining undetermined, the former also must continue to be unknown. Those men (barring improbable accidents) are the happiest, who live under the best government of which their circumstances admit. We must begin, therefore, by examining what kind of life is most eligible for mankind in general; and secondly, whether the well-being of individuals and of communities results from the same causes, and is to be estimated by the same standard. The former of these topics has been sufficiently discussed in our popular discourses; where we made use of a division that appears to be indisputably accurate; namely, that the happiness of men depends on their external prosperity, on the frame and habit of their bodies, on the state and condition of their minds. He

BOOK
IV.
Chap. I.

The foundation of public happiness.

* Commonly published as Book VII.

surely

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IV.

surely would be unworthy to be called happy, who possessed not the smallest particle of fortitude, of temperance, of justice, or of prudence; since the wretch totally destitute of these virtues respectively, would be frightened at the buzzing of a fly; would wallow unrestrained in the most beastly sensuality; would not hesitate, for the smallest gain, to destroy his best benefactor; and in point of intellectual operations, would betray either childish imbecility or frantic absurdity. That a certain portion of virtue is essential to the well-being of a human creature, cannot, therefore, be a matter of dispute; but to what this portion ought to amount, occasions much diversity of opinion. In general, mankind are satisfied with their respective shares of virtue, how scanty soever they may be, but extremely dissatisfied with their shares of all other advantages; for their measure of virtue, however inconsiderable it may appear to others, rarely appearing deficient to themselves, they seek not to augment it; while their estates and money, their fame and their power, cannot possibly, in their own opinion, be too widely enlarged, or too highly accumulated. But *we* say to them, that such vulgar illusions, even vulgar observation may suffice to dispel. The external advantages of power and fortune are acquired and maintained by virtue, not virtue by them; and whether we consider the virtuous energies themselves, or the fruits which they unceasingly produce, the sovereign good of life must evidently be found in moral

and intellectual excellence, moderately supplied with external accommodations, rather than in the greatest accumulation of external advantages, unimproved and unadorned by virtue. External prosperity is indeed instrumental in producing happiness, and therefore, like every other instrument, must have its assigned limits; beyond which it is inconvenient or hurtful. But to mental excellence no limit can be assigned: the farther it extends, the more *useful* it becomes, if the epithet of *useful* need ever to be superadded to that of *honourable*. Besides this, the relative importance of qualities is best estimated by that of their respective subjects. But the mind, both in itself and in reference to man, is far better than the body, or than property. The excellencies of the mind, therefore, are in the same proportion to be preferred to the highest perfection of the body, and the best disposition of external circumstances. The two last are of a far inferior, and merely a subservient nature; since no man of sense covets or pursues them, but for the sake of the mind, with a view to promote its genuine improvement, and to heighten its native joys. Let this great truth then be acknowledged; a truth evinced by the Deity himself, who is happy, not from any external cause, but through the inherent attributes of his divine nature.

Prosperity and happiness, then, are things altogether different. Chance or fortune may bestow the former, but they cannot produce the energies of virtue, which are the essential source of

Chap. 2.

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The same
with that of
individuals.

BOOK of the latter. These energies are precisely the same, whether exercised by individuals or by communities; neither altering their inward form, nor changing their external effects. Public and private happiness, therefore, must rest on precisely the same foundation, a conclusion justified even by universal consent; since those who place the happiness of the individual in riches, are solicitous chiefly about preserving and augmenting national wealth; and those who place the happiness of the individual in power, are solicitous chiefly about preserving or augmenting national dominion. A similar inference is drawn by the admirer of virtue: He who regards it as the supreme felicity of the individual, also considers it as the main source of national happiness.

Chap. 3.

The best
schemes of
national
happiness.

But since virtue is twofold, speculative and practical, and that men ambitious of excellence respectively dedicate themselves to the pursuit of philosophy or that of politics; it is worth while to consider which of the two kinds of life, a life of strenuous action or of peaceful contemplation, is most deserving of being imitated by states; since it is the office of wisdom to teach nations as well as individuals to prefer the best ends, and skilfully to pursue them. The advocates for peaceful repose and contemplative tranquillity observe, that for a nation to govern its neighbours despotically is the height of injustice, and therefore the most consummate folly; and that to govern them moderately and carefully, though not liable to such palpable objections,

tions, is however a work of great difficulty, and fraught with much trouble and much anxiety. Other reasoners, though they condemn every kind of injustice and despotism, maintain that the contentious agitations of war and government form the happiness and glory of nations, since they afford the best and noblest field for the public exhibition of illustrious abilities, and of pre-eminent virtues. A third class, and this is the most numerous, boldly patronise ambition and tyranny, and assert that the main business of nations consists in extending their power and aggrandising their empire.

In Sparta and in Crete, the public education, as well as the laws, are contrived merely as means for attaining this favourite end. The same remark applies to the Scythians, the Persians, the Thracians, and the Celts; and, indeed, to all those great nations whose valour or populousness have enabled them to assert their pretensions, or encouraged them to display their ambition. In Carthage, a soldier is entitled to wear as many rings as he has served campaigns. There was an old law in Macedon, that the man who had not slain an enemy in the field of battle, should be girt, not with an ornamental belt, but with a halter. The Scythians, in their public festivals, never presented the circling cup to hands guiltless of blood. The Iberians, a martial people, adorn the tombs of their deceased warriors with obelisks or pillars, equal in number to the enemies whom they have

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The practice of most great nations shews that they placed it in valour and conquest.

BOOK have respectively slain*. Similar institutions
 { **IV.** prevail in other countries, either enacted by
 law, or established by custom; and yet nothing
 can appear more absurd to men capable of reflection, than to believe it the business of government to hold either nations or individuals in reluctant subjection. Who ever heard that it was the duty of a physician to compel, or even to persuade his patients to be cured, or the duty of a pilot to compel, or even to persuade the ship's company to be saved? The science of government, like that of physic and of navigation, is invented for the public benefit; and men will allow themselves to be benefited, without persuasion and without compulsion.

* The institutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity, which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Aristotle, who flourished towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were distinguished above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffusion, of military honours. From the time of the Publilian law, "ut plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent." U.C. 416, which was a confirmation of the Valerian, U.C. 306; and which was itself confirmed by the Hortensian, U.C. 467*, the people at large enjoyed an ascendancy in the government; and the military ambition of the commonwealth thereby acquired that degree of vigour and activity which (external circumstances permitting) has always most conspicuously appeared under such a political arrangement. In modern times, military distinctions, as well as the martial spirit, have prevailed most in monarchies. This was not the case anciently, but completely the reverse: and it may be observed, that external circumstances being the same, the ambition of conquest diffused through the general mass of a society must be a more ardent as well as a more firm and steady principle of action than when confined within the breasts of a few individuals, whose passions are not, like those of communities, immortal.

* Conf. T. Liv. III. 55. vii. 42. Plin. Nat. Hist. xvi. 10. & Pompon. de Origin. ii. 8. Aul. Gell. xv. 27.

The

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IV.

Their estimate proved to be erroneous.

The conduct of nations has perplexed this subject, because the conduct of nations has been distorted by passion. They have imposed laws on their neighbours, which they themselves would have indignantly rejected. Behaving moderately and equitably at home, they have acted tyrannically abroad, confounding the limits of politic and despotic government, although, as we have already proved, to enslave freemen is not less absurd and contrary to nature than to hunt and eat them. A state may be so circumstanced as to exist happily without conquest and without war; and how splendid soever military glory may be deemed, it is valuable merely as the means of obtaining a still more valuable end. This end cannot surely consist in gratifying the lust of ambition, for no pleasure is more contemptible than that of commanding slaves, and to reduce freemen into servitude is an unnatural gratification, equally dangerous and deceitful. The happiness of communities, as well as of individuals, consists, doubtless, in action; but to the external action of a state, a wide field lies open in the diversity of genius and character of the surrounding nations, each of which, to be treated justly, must perhaps be treated differently. Besides this, there are many internal relations which the constituent parts of a commonwealth bear to each other, and many resulting duties to be habitually and daily performed^f. But were nothing of this kind to be performed,

^f Aristotle here repeats what is often said in other parts of this work, the injustice of any kind of authority not derived from nature;

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IV.

performed, nor any external effect to be produced, action would not, therefore, cease; nor the purpose of happiness be defeated. The pleasure of intellectual action is the more perfect, in proportion as such action terminates in itself. The geometer who solves his problem, the philosopher who pursues his speculation^c, respectively exercise energies immediately delightful in themselves, independently of any distant end, or any external effect. What can be external to God and the universe? Yet the action of the universe is not therefore suspended; and the Deity^b, who sustains the whole, enjoys the

nature; the differences between the power or jurisdiction of masters, fathers, and husbands, and the evils resulting from confounding the limits of governments specifically different.

^c *τις ταις διανοιαις αρχιτεκτονας.* The word architect in Greek was extended to signify a contriver in general, the man who planned with his head, what others were to execute with their hands. In this sense it is used in the text; of which I have endeavoured to convey the full meaning without adhering literally to the words. How, indeed, can we translate clearly, yet literally, *καλυ μωλλον ταις αυτοτελικαις*. . . *η γαρ ενπραξια τελος, ουτε και πραξις τις.* Cicero, in many of the finest passages of his works, expands and adorns Aristotle's thoughts. "Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum insulis, immortalæ ævum, ut fabulæ ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum judicia nulla fierent? aut ipsi etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudinis indigeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo; nec iustitia, cum esset nihil, quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quæ regeret eas, quæ nullæ essent libidines: ne prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo dilectu proposito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturæ, et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. Ex quo intelligi potest, cetera necessitatis; unum hoc voluptatis." Cicero Fragment. Philosoph. sive Hortensius.

^b This is conformable to a sublime theological passage in the *Treatise de Cælo*, L. ii. c. xiii. p. 465. in which Aristotle, after explaining the Pythagorean system of astronomy, is endeavouring to refute one of its principal doctrines. The Pythagoreans held the element of fire to be more precious than that of earth, and therefore assigned to

the perfection of felicity in exercising his divine energies. By such sublime comparisons we are taught, that the happiness of men, considered collectively or individually, is still to be found within themselves; and that the same kind of life which is the best for each citizen apart, is also the best for the whole community.

This short preface seemed a necessary prelude to our treatise concerning the best form of government, for it was proper to begin with that which is the most important of all, to which all other things are relative and subservient, and *without* which they are not, all of them taken collectively, of any, the smallest value: we now proceed to examine those external advantages and outward accommodations, which serve as the materials from which the best common-

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Chap. 4.

Transitions
to the ex-
amination
of what is
absolutely
the best
common-
wealth.

to it the more honourable place, and considered it as the center of the celestial motions. Plutarch. in Vit. Num. p. 67. edit. Xyland. This center being the post of greatest importance in the universe, and requiring the most vigilant watch, they called the fire occupying this post Διὸς φυλακή, the watch of Jupiter. In opposition to these hypotheses, Aristotle, constantly guided in his conclusions by observation and analogy, takes notice that the center or middle is certainly that which is most important and principal in any system when it is that by which the system is connected and sustained. But this middle, or rather this principle of connection, will not be found to coincide with what is the middle in point of magnitude, or with what is called the center of gravity. In animals the connecting and sustaining principle resides not in the middle of their bodies; neither is there good reason for supposing it to be so situate in the universe. Philosophers need not, therefore, give themselves trouble about the safety of the universe, setting a watch at the center of its space or magnitude, but ought rather to investigate its connecting and sustaining principle, where, and of what kind, it is. The rest is mere matter; this is the soul of the system: ἡ αἰτία τῆς συστάσεως, "that which gives the system its characteristic form, makes it subsist, and be what it is."

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wealths

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IV.

That such
a common-
wealth has
limits in
point of
populouf-
ness.

wealths are composed, and as foundations on which the best constitutions are constructed.

In explaining this subject our suppositions, doubtless, are arbitrary; but good sense requires that they be not impracticable. The statesman, like the shipbuilder or the weaver, requires a due provision of materials; and the better those materials are, the more perfect will be the fruit of his political labour. The materials of the statesman or legislator are the number and character of his people, the extent and quality of his country. The excellence of a commonwealth, however, is not to be estimated by its populoufness or extent, but by its fitness for performing its proper functions. Hippocrates was a greater physician than many physicians twice his size. Slaves, sojourners, and strangers render a city populous, but do not make it *great*; neither can this epithet be bestowed where there are many mechanics and manufacturers, but few citizens completely armed and skilfully disciplined. The experience of history proves, that states of unlimited populoufness have never been well regulated. How is it possible that they should, if law be nothing else than an arrangement, and if *that* be incapable of arrangement which is indefinite in number or quantity? To harmonise immensity into system, is the work only of that Divine Power which comprehends the universe. Beauty commonly results from the proportion of quantity; and that which exceeds, as well as that which falls short of the due proportion, cannot be called beautiful, either

either literally or figuratively. There is a limit, BOOK
IV. therefore, to the magnitude of every whole or system, whether it be the work of nature or of art. A ship of two furlongs in length, is as unfit for the purpose of navigation as one of two spans; and although a community may contain a greater number of individuals than are requisite for those purposes of self-sufficiency and comfortable subsistence, for which commonwealths are instituted, yet this excess is not unlimited; since, when carried beyond certain bounds, it would disqualify the body-politic for its proper functions; rendering it incapable alike of prudent command and of prompt obedience. An army reinforced by continual accessions would finally cease to be an army; for were Stentor fit to be its herald, who would presume to be its general? What human skill would undertake to combine its operations, and to harmonise its movements?

The sovereign functions of a state consist in appointing magistrates, and in deciding differences. But it is impossible that magistrates should be judiciously appointed, or differences skilfully decided, unless the characters and abilities of the citizens be carefully observed and accurately ascertained: and these precautions will not be easily taken in countries of unbounded populousness; in which, also, there is this inconvenience, that strangers and sojourners will have an opportunity, through the difficulty of detection, of clandestinely usurping the rank of citizens. The magnitude of a commonwealth, What these limits are.

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B O O K though variable, has, therefore, on either side, **IV.** its fixed boundaries. It must be all-sufficient in itself for the purposes of comfortable subsistence, and for the reciprocal supply of mutual wants. But its inhabitants must not be too numerous to be comprehended at one glance of the statesman's eye, and to be conducted in all their actions by the vigilant operation of political discipline.

Chap. 5.

Concerning the extent and nature of the territory.

Upon similar principles we must decide concerning the extent and nature of the territory. That which is most fertile in the greatest variety of productions seems entitled to a just preference, provided this fertility be not so luxuriant as to encourage indolence or engender voluptuousness¹. Military men will tell us what makes a country easy of egress yet difficult of invasion. The territory should also be compactly situate; that it may easily fall within the superintending eye of the statesman or general, that its parts may be able mutually to assist each other, and that the whole may be readily defended.

Chap. 6.

Whether the capital ought to be situate near the sea.

The maritime position of the capital will greatly contribute to this last purpose; for its inhabitants may speedily embark, and sail to the defence of any part of their possessions that happens to be attacked; and they may attack the enemy in those parts that are most vul-

¹ The author here promises to examine more accurately hereafter what ought to be the limits of national wealth; but in the work as it now stands, this promise is not fulfilled. Several other questions are started by Aristotle in his Politics, which are not any where answered; which proves that performance to have come down to us in an imperfect state.

nerable.

nerable. It is also of great importance to commerce, and especially to the transportation of wood and other bulky articles, that the capital be conveniently situate with regard both to the sea, and to the circumjacent land. Yet, in other respects, the vicinity of the sea^k is attended with dangerous consequences. Men will generally entertain a higher veneration for their hereditary institutions, in proportion as they less communicate with strangers; and the promiscuous crowd of sailors and foreigners, which traffic naturally collects, can scarcely fail to injure the morals of well-educated citizens.

If we cultivate commerce, it must be for accommodation only, not for gain: our citizens are not to degrade themselves into brokers and carriers, nor to squander away in the arts of luxury that labour which may be far more profitably, as well as more honourably, employed in the cultivation of the soil, and in the production of necessaries; the occupation which is of all others the best adapted to the bulk of mankind,

How far commerce ought to be cultivated, and how its inconveniences may be remedied.

^k Maritime power was so grossly abused by the ancient republics, that it is continually branded by moralists as producing vile and versatile manners, *ἡν ποικίλα καὶ φαυλά*, Plato de Leg. sub. init. The surprising of defenceless cities, the desolating of unguarded coasts, attacks without glory, and retreats without shame, were represented as operations not less inconsistent with true courage, than incompatible with humanity and justice. Isocrat. Orat. de Pace, & Plato ubi supra. The ancient republics entrusted arms to those only who had a property to defend. Their soldiers were levied from the first classes, or privileged orders, of society. But sailors were taken from the promiscuous crowd, and generally from the meanest populace. This practice, which prevailed equally in Greece and Rome, was founded on sound policy. The exertions of sailors, being naturally directed against foreign enemies, are less likely to prove dangerous to the internal stability of government.

B O O K the most favourable to the health of their minds
 { **IV.** and bodies, and therefore the best fitted to promote national prosperity. Our commerce must be limited to the purpose of supplying our domestic wants; and in order to attain this purpose without endangering the purity of our domestic manners, we may imitate the example of those cities and countries which have their docks and harbours enclosed by walls and fortifications, and separated at a due distance from the capital; thus permitting the importation of foreign commodities, but intercepting the contagion of foreign vices.

Concern-
 ing naval
 power.

Naval power is peculiarly useful for the purposes of intimidating our enemies and protecting our allies; but its extent ought to be commensurate with the rank which a state aspires to hold in the political system. A people ambitious of command must be provided with a strong navy; and this may be equipped without raising the naval crowd to the condition of citizens. Even on shipboard, those who brandish the spear must maintain their superiority over those who handle the oar; and the latter, in whatever number they may be wanted, will easily be raised from the mass of the peasants and labourers. Such is the practice of several wise states, particularly of that of Heraclæa, which maintains a numerous fleet of galleys, yet preserves its citizens untainted by the contagious profligacy of mariners. Thus much may suffice concerning the extent of the city and territory, and concerning the magnitude of the naval force.

force. We formerly assigned due limits to the number of the citizens, and now proceed to consider what ought to be their genius and character; a question that will be best solved by passing in review, and examining, those nations of Greece, and of the world in general, which appear to be most worthy of our esteem.

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IV.

The inhabitants of Europe, and of most cold countries, abound in strength and courage; but their intellectual powers are feeble or defective. They enjoy liberty, but are unacquainted with good polity; and though capable of maintaining their independence, are unworthy of aspiring to empire. The inhabitants of Asia, on the contrary, are artful and ingenious, but mean-spirited and dastardly. They have, therefore, always been, and continue to this day, either subjects or slaves. But the intermediate situation of the Greeks seems to have happily blended in their character the virtues of courage and prudence, and to have formed them for thinking calmly, yet feeling strongly. They enjoy, therefore, the double advantage of liberty and laws; and are qualified for ruling the world, were they happily confederate under one form of government¹. The Greeks, however,

Chap. 7.

Of the character resulting from a cold climate;

from a warm climate;

from a temperate climate.

¹ Aristotle maintained in a former chapter that a commonwealth had its limits in point of populousness; and endeavoured to point out with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes what these limits were. In the passage before us he says, γινε; Ἑλλᾶσι δυναμὶς ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μίας τυγχάνου πολιτίας. "That the Greeks, if under the same governance, would be able to command all nations." In fact, the extreme difference in the forms of government in Greece was the great obstacle to their national union in one political confederacy;

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The best
moral ma-
terials for
legislation.

ever, are not all equally conspicuous for this happy temperament, and the manly policy which is its natural result. In some nations the character is rude and shapeless; one quality being deficient, while another is redundant: but in whatever people ardent courage most naturally harmonises with cool combination, and dignity of sentiment with energy of intellect, that people must be considered as the best materials for legislation, and the fittest to be moulded into a virtuous commonwealth. It is said by some writers, that the military guardians of states ought, like faithful dogs, to shew themselves mild towards those whom they know, but fierce towards strangers. Yet true magnanimity is incapable of ferocity, and is never moved even to asperity, but in resentment of injustice or insult. When these provocations proceed from friends and acquaintances, our anger is enhanced by this circumstance. "Wast thou not tormented by thy friends?" says Archilocus, to whet his satire; and it is reasonable that men should be doubly offended when they meet with injury and neglect, where they had a right to expect friendship and regard. Hence the proverbs, "cruel are the wars of brothers;" and "those who are incapable of anger and resentment, must also be incapable of friendship and gratitude;" and indeed all those affections originate

which is the thing here intended by Aristotle, since, according to the principles above explained, Greece was far too populous to be happily united in one commonwealth.

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in one and the same source¹. Thus much may suffice concerning the qualities most useful towards the formation of good citizens; for in practical matters, scientific accuracy is neither attainable nor requisite.

B O O K
IV.

Every whole or system, whether it be the work of nature or of art, may require many things for its subsistence which are not to be numbered among its constituent parts. Food is necessary for supporting animal life, but is not a part of those animals who consume it. Land and other objects of property, whether inanimate or endued with life, are necessary for upholding states, yet none of these possessions or instruments form any part of the commonwealth; which, as defined above, is the association of equals for the purpose of living happily, that is, of living virtuously, for happiness has been proved to consist in the exercise of virtuous energies; though men, indeed, seek to find it in very different pursuits, hunting vain shadows, which diversify without correcting their modes of life, and vary without improving their forms of government.

Chap. 8.
Distinction between the integral parts of a state and the things necessary for its subsistence.

The things essential to every state, whether as constituent parts or as concomitants², may be reduced to the six following heads. 1. Food, the great want of mankind. 2. Arts, because to effect the comfort of life is a work requiring many instruments. 3. Arms, for citizens must

Enumeration of the things necessary for the subsistence of a commonwealth.

¹ See vol. i. b. vi. c. ii. p. 396. & seq.

² The author dwells here on this distinction, which is fully explained elsewhere.

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BOOK be armed to prevent domestic disorders, and ward off foreign violence. 4. Money, as the medium of exchange, and measure of value, and necessary in the exigencies of war as well as in the operations of commerce. 5. An establishment for the functions of religion^a, which are of all functions the first in dignity. 6. Councils of deliberation, and courts of justice, which are of all establishments the most necessary. Any of these objects being wanting, the commonwealth is imperfect, or incapable of answering its end. In every commonwealth, therefore, there must be husbandmen, artificers, soldiers, merchants, priests, and judges.^b

Chap. 9.

In the best commonwealth, those employed in mean and mercenary labour not to rank as citizens.

A question arises, whether in that most perfect community of which human nature is susceptible, the citizens should assume indifferently, and as their occasions may require, all those various characters; or whether certain employments be not inconsistent with the habitual exercise of those virtuous energies which we have proved to be the principal end and aim of every political partnership. It appears, at first sight, that a life of mechanical drudgery, or a life of haggling commerce, is totally incompatible with that dignified life which it is our wish that our

^a If we except the French republic, the Chinese are the only great nation who, according to recent accounts, ever dissented from Aristotle in this particular. See Staunton's Embassy to China, vol. ii. p. 101.

^b Under the name of judges he means to comprehend, as in the following chapter, το βουλευόμενοι περί των συμφερόντων, as well as το κρινόν περί των δίκαιων, "those who deliberate and determine in questions of public expediency," as well as "those who examine into and adjust the controversies between individuals."

citizens

citizens should lead, and totally adverse to that generous elevation of mind with which it is our ambition to inspire them. The mere trade of husbandry, the assiduous labour and minute attentions which it requires, would be destructive of that secure leisure which is essential to the formation of their characters; and such fordid cares would impede and obstruct the generous and manly exertions by which virtue is displayed and confirmed. Men, habitually addicted to the lowly pursuits of providing necessities and accumulating gain, are unfit members of our republic, because they are incapable of relishing those enjoyments in which we have supposed its chief happiness to consist. They are to be classed with things necessary to the commonwealth, but not to be ranked with its citizens; for the best and most perfect commonwealth must provide for the happiness of all its members, and a commonwealth founded on virtue cannot provide for the happiness of men who are but feebly touched by her charms. Such men, therefore, though necessary to a commonwealth, are not parts of the commonwealth, any more than food, though necessary to an animal, is part of an animal; or than the instruments employed in producing any work, are themselves parts of that work. The productive labour of peasants and artisans, how necessary soever to the purposes of outward accommodation and comfortable subsistence, is not, therefore, to be confounded nor classed with the high political

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B O O K political functions of soldiers, priests, and magistrates.^p
 IV.

What are
the proper
employ-
ments of
citizens.

It remains, therefore, to examine, whether arms, religion, and magistracy ought to be regarded as things specifically different, and of which the offices ought to be separately exercised by distinct professions. In every good government the military ought, doubtless, to depend on the civil power; but will men bearing arms be contented with a condition of unalterable dependence? Or will those who feel their ability to change the constitution at pleasure, submit for ever to a political arrangement disgraceful to themselves? Such patient resignation cannot reasonably be expected, nor can that which is contrary to reason be requisite to good government.

That these
employ-
ments
ought to be
distributed
according
to the dif-
ferent
periods of
human life.

The capacity for exercising military and civil functions depends on qualities that are variable, because they result from a variable cause, the changeable powers of man in the different periods of human life. Strength, agility, and courage attain their highest perfection at that period of youth when the body reaches its prime; foresight, temper, and wisdom do not acquire their full maturity, but with the acmé and perfection of the mind. The *same* persons, therefore, but at *different* periods of their lives, must exercise military and civil functions; and thus each

^p In this passage I have changed the order of the sentences, the better to prepare the modern reader for a decision, which to him must appear harsh in the extense, though it could not be viewed in that light by the readers of antiquity.

class

class of citizens will perform that office for which it is best qualified, and to which it is best entitled. It remains only to speak of the priesthood. This solemn function must, doubtless, be exercised by men of the most respectable class. But to perform with decency and dignity the rites of religion, requires not any violent exertion of body or mind. Such honourable duties, therefore, ought to be reserved for the occupation and the reward of declining years; and those who have spent their youth and their manhood in more active and strenuous cares, ought to dedicate their old age to the calm ceremonies of religion, and finally to repose in the peaceful sanctuaries of the gods.

B O O K
IV.

The distinction between the constituent parts of a commonwealth, and things merely necessary for its subsistence, remounts to the highest antiquity. Both in Egypt and in Crete^p, the soldiers have long been, what they continue to this day, a class altogether distinct from the peasants. Sesostris is said to have established this arrangement in Egypt; and Minos, in Crete. The *syssitia*, or public tables, in that island, are thought to have been instituted as early as the time of Minos; and similar establishments are said to have taken place in Italy at a still earlier date. For the historians of that country inform us, that Ænotria received the name of Italy from

Chap. 10.

That the wisest nations of antiquity acknowledged the distinction between citizens on the one hand, and peasants and artisans on the other.

^p This chapter may be considered as an illustration of the principles established in the preceding, from the history of those nations who diffused religion, laws, and civility over the ancient world.

King

BOOK
IV.

King Italus; a name comprehending the coast between the Scyllatine and Lametine gulphs; which are opposite to each other, and distant by land only half a day's journey^a. Italus is said to have changed the CEnotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and to have given them other laws relative to their new mode of life, and particularly those regulating the public tables; which remain in force among his descendants to this day. For northwards, from the country first called Italy, the Opici and Aufonians extend themselves, on one hand, towards the Tuscan sea; but on the other hand, the Chaonians, an CEnotrian tribe, have stretched towards the Ionian sea and Iapygia. Among them the establishment of *syssitia* first prevailed, and from them it was adopted by other nations. But the separation of citizens and peasants prevailed much earlier; for the age of Sesostris long preceded that of Minos. It is probable that political, like all other inventions, have been often discovered and often lost; and that many institutions have been laid aside and revived, times without number. Men having acquired necessities, naturally seek accommodations; and having provided for the strength and support of their political edifices, they set themselves to improve and embellish them. The style of superfluous ornaments varies with the caprice by which they are produced; but there are ornaments connected with

^a Vid. Cluverii Ital. Antiq. p. 1290. & seq.

use,

use, which ought to be found in every well-regulated commonwealth; and why we take the *syssitia* to be of this kind will be afterwards explained.

BOOK
IV.

We are now to speak of the distribution and character of the peasants and artisans, which, according to our principles, must be partly the property of the public and partly the property of particular citizens; for although our republic rejects the community of goods as repressive to exertion, and even destructive of virtue, yet wishing possessions to be strictly appropriated, we wish that their uses be freely communicated; that according to the proverb all things may be common among friends; and that no one of the citizens may long continue in want of any object with which another can conveniently supply him. The citizens, therefore, are to be maintained at public tables, the expences of which, as well as those of the sacrifices and religious festivals, are to be supplied from the lands laboured in common by the public slaves; for men of small incomes could not contribute sufficiently for these purposes, and at the same time support easily the charges of their private families. The territory, therefore, ought to consist partly of common, and partly of private property; and each of these ought to be again subdivided, since the common is destined to answer two purposes, and to supply the expences of religion and those of the *syssitia*; and since the lands of each citizen ought to lie partly in the vicinity of the capital, and partly on the frontier, or, if united in one mass,

Of the distribution and character of the peasants and artisans, and that liberty ought to be proposed as the reward of all slaves worthy to enjoy it.

B O O K mafs, ought to have some fituation nearly equi-
 .IV. distant from thofe extremes. Both juftice and expediency require fuch a diftribution; for advantages and inconveniencies will thus be more fairly balanced among the private citizens, and the ftate itfelf will be thus rendered more unanimous in public deliberations and military enterprifes. As poffeffions are now arranged, one portion of the community is commonly too much, and another too little, alarmed at the profpect of a foreign war; wherefore fome ftates have enacted that landholders living on the frontier fhould not be allowed to vote in queftions concerning war and peace, becaufe fuch perfons are likely to facrifice to private intereft the advantage and honour of their country. Such ought to be the diftribution of the territory; and thofe who cultivate it ought (if we can have them to our wifh) to be flaves of various extractions, different in manners and endowments, but all deftitute of courage. But if this cannot be obtained, let them be the barbarians in our neighbourhood, of ftrong bodies and fervile minds. How flaves are to be treated we fhall afterwards explain; and alfo affign our reafons why liberty ought to be the reward of all flaves univerfally^r who approve themfelves worthy

^r The moft folid objection to flavery is that of its perpetuity; that a human being, how great foever his acquirements and his merits, fhould never be the director of his own conduct; and how well qualified foever he may become to govern himfelf, fhould be perpetually and unalterably fubjected to the authority of another. This objection forcibly ftruck Aristotle at a time when the lower claffes of
 men

worthy of obtaining and capable of enjoying it. BOOK
IV.

We have explained what is the best situation of the capital, both with respect to the sea and to the contiguous territory. But its situation ought also to be relative to health, which depends chiefly on good air and good water; and calculated for the enjoyment of peace, and for safety in war. The circumstances, therefore, that ought to determine the position of our capital are these four,—air, water, comfort, and security. In Greece, cities open to the east are deemed the most healthful; and next to that, a northern aspect is preferred, chiefly for the sake of coolness. A capital situate to our wish, ought to abound in salubrious fountains; and if that advantage cannot be obtained, preparations should be made for receiving the rain water in copious reservoirs: and the purest springs should be set apart for the sustenance of human life, under strict prohibitions of employing them

Chap. II.

The situation of the capital ought to be determined by circumstances most conducive to health, comfort, and security. The circumstances most conducive to health;

men in all countries and under all forms of government universally subsisted in the condition of servitude. It is to be regretted that we have not his reasons at length why emancipation, the practice of which was so common in the ancient world, should not depend on the will of individual masters, but should result from the general will of the community, granting on certain conditions, and after a certain time, liberty to slaves. It may be objected indeed, that a cruel or unjust master would be ready to impose a double task on those who were likely soon to escape from his hands. But this is answered by saying, that according to Aristotle's principles such a man was not qualified, and therefore not entitled to be a master; and that slaves in the ancient republics, at least, were under the protection of the laws, which refrained or punished the cruelty or injustice of masters. See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 38.

VOL. II.

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for

B O O K for any less important purpose. This law ought
 IV. not to be regarded as frivolous : for good health
 depends chiefly on the quality of those things
 of which we make the most frequent use ; and
 such manifestly are air and water.

to comfort
 and secu-
 rity.

The nature of fortifications and fortresses is relative to the nature of government, and ought to vary with the alteration of its forms. Lofty and impregnable citadels best suit monarchies and oligarchies. The equal defence of walls, guarding with impartial justice the safety of the people at large, is best adapted to republics and democracies ; and the authority of aristocratical nobles will be most securely maintained, neither by walls nor citadels, but by a number of well-fortified castles. With regard to the form and distribution of mansions and streets, the modern style of building, introduced by the architect Hippodamus*, is most favourable to health and pleasure, and most convenient for all the occupations and purposes of civil life. But his straight lines and spacious openings impair strength while they embellish beauty, and render his cities easily pervious to an invading enemy. For the purposes of war, streets ought to be winding and intricate, obstructed by impediments and entangled by perplexities. But that cities may answer the ends both of war and peace, they should be at once strong and elegant ; and this complex object will be best effected by imitating the labours of the gardener

* See b. ii. c. vi. p. 112, & seq.

in planting his quincunx, where the power of resistance combines with fair arrangement, and where perplexity results from uniformity itself. There is more folly than magnanimity in the opinion, that cities ought not to be walled. True courage will not reject the assistance of art under manifest inequality of strength; and as missile weapons and battering engines have been perfected by the ingenuity of the present age, the safety of cities requires that the science of defence should keep pace with that of attack. The Lacedæmonians and others who have disdained walls as the refuge of cowardice, have dearly paid for their temerity.

BOOK
IV.

By good regulations, fortified cities may enjoy all the advantages of those that are open to the country on every side; and the bulwarks and battlements may be converted into agreeable ornaments, scenes of pleasing recreation to the citizens, but of threatening aspect to hostile neighbours. The guard rooms may serve as halls for the *syssitia* or common tables; near to which may be worshipped, in one edifice, those gods whose temples neither laws or oracles command to be separated, at a certain distance, from all other buildings. This edifice, erected in honour of religion in general, ought to be as lofty and conspicuous as its purpose is useful and dignified, of awful magnificence and commanding strength. Around this temple a forum ought to be formed and inclosed, similar to that of Theffaly, called the liberal rendezvous. This spacious inclosure is not to be incumbered by

Chap. 12.

The ornaments of the capital.

The liberal rendezvous.

T 2

the

B O O K the shops of artificers, nor polluted by the tricks
 of traffic. Neither peasant nor mechanic is ever
 to enter its pure precincts, unless summoned by
 the magistrate; for it is consecrated as the scene
 of ingenuous converse and martial exercise; where
 persons, classed by their ages, are to invigorate
 and confirm their powers by emulous contention;
 and where youth is to be trained to modesty
 and manliness, under the vigilant superintendence
 of virtuous old age. The square employed for the
 market-place is to be totally distinct: it ought to
 be easily accessible to imports by sea, and transportations
 by land; the officers of police and the courts of justice
 are to assemble in its neighbourhood; it is destined
 for business and necessity, as the liberal forum is
 destined for exercise and enjoyment. The districts
 and townships are to be regulated after the model
 of the capital; but on this subject it is not necessary
 to enlarge: to contrive good arrangements is easy;
 the difficulty lies in reducing them to practice. Good
 intentions are sufficient for the first; the second
 requires the co-operation of good fortune.

The market-place,
 and courts of justice.

The districts and townships.

Chap. 13.

Transition to the character of the citizens of the best commonwealth.

Having thus explained the external accommodations of our commonwealth, we next proceed to examine what ought to be the genius and character of its citizens; and to explain what are the means most likely to inspire that genius, and impress that character which will best qualify them for enjoying political happiness. The perfection of human felicity requires that we should choose the best ends, and employ the best

best means for attaining them. These objects sometimes harmonise, and are sometimes discordant; the means being bad while the ends are good, or the ends being bad while the means are good; and sometimes neither the one nor the other are worthy of approbation; which happens when the means are not likely to attain the end proposed, and when this end itself, though attained, is not likely to promote the great ultimate purpose of good or happiness. This takes place in physic, when the physician errs both in ascertaining that habit of body which is most conducive to the health of his patient, and in appreciating that mode of life, that diet and exercise which are fitted to superinduce the habit which he has erroneously preferred. But the felicity of men depends not entirely on human efforts; for nature or fortune must also contribute their share. Yet to minds confirmed in virtue, few accommodations are requisite; while such is the depravity of some characters, that the most favourable circumstances only heighten their wretchedness; and to think with the vulgar, that external advantages alone can produce happiness, is not less absurd than to call the lyre a musician, and to ascribe *that* to the instrument, which ought to be referred to the artist. A good man will, on every occasion, act handsomely; and perform his duty under poverty and disease, as well as in health and prosperity. A just judge will condemn guilt as well as reward merit. Yet the happiness of a good man and the just judge is

What this
character
ought to
be.

B O O K connected with the latter circumstances rather
 { **IV.** than with the former; because in the latter no
 painful conflict is required, but the mind is left to
 the free exercise of virtuous energies, unclogged
 by difficulties¹ and unretarded by obstacles. In
 forming our republic, we may, therefore, sup-
 pose the work of fortune to be done to our
 hands; our business is to teach the legislator
 how to perform his duty; or, in other words,
 how to render his commonwealth virtuous and
 happy.

Chap. 14.

Analysis of
 education.

Happiness depends on virtue; and virtue de-
 pends on nature, custom, and reason. That we
 are formed capable of virtue, and susceptible of
 certain qualities of mind and body, is the bounty
 of Nature, which has made us of the human
 kind. But habit can improve or pervert these
 natural advantages. Other animals march uni-
 formly in the track of nature; some few are
 guided also by custom: but man only is disci-
 plined by reason; and may be persuaded even
 to change bad habits, by the influence of ex-
 ample and the conviction of argument. From
 these two united, the power of education re-
 sults; that forming and preserving power with-
 out which the best political fabrics would soon
 crumble into dust; and which we now proceed

¹ This doctrine is more fully explained in those passages of the Ethics which treat of happiness. What the author calls in the text the *χρησις αρετης τελεια*, and the *χρησις εξ υποδιαισεως*; "absolute and conditional virtue;" is sufficiently explained by the examples given in the translation. Happiness consists rather in such actions as are virtuous *simply and absolutely* than in such as necessarily imply some pre-existing evil, which they are exerted to remedy.

to explain, having, formerly described what **BOOK**
ought to be the natural dispositions of those **IV.**
most susceptible of its benefits.

First of all, this education ought, according That edu-
cation
ought to
be public
and uni-
form. to our principles, to be uniform; for it is our aim to render the citizens at large virtuous and happy, and to qualify all of them for the offices of government as well as for the duties of obedience. Were one portion of the community as far distinguished above the rest, as we believe the gods and heroes to be exalted above men, or, as Scylax says, "that the kings of India are superior to their subjects, in the virtues of mind and body," it would be proper that these dignified races or families should be invested with hereditary and unalterable authority; and, for this purpose, trained and educated in a manner peculiar to themselves, and relative to that pre-eminent rank which they were for ever destined to hold. But since such races or families are nowhere to be found in these parts of the world, justice concurs with good policy, in requiring that the citizens should rule by vicarious succession; and how this ought to be done, Nature herself sufficiently indicates. According to the order of nature, some men are young while others are old. This distinction of age is the least invidious of all distinctions; and it is well observed, that those only are qualified to command, who have been skilfully trained to obey. Of the command exercised by despots we do not here speak; *their* government is useful only to themselves, to their families and favourites; but the

B O O K the government of a commonwealth is instituted
IV. for the benefit of the governed; who in youth
 will cheerfully submit to many tasks and many
 services, which would be disgraceful if per-
 formed merely for the sake of others, but which
 are ennobled by their tendency to promote the
 improvement of those on whom they are im-
 posed.

What are
 the ends at
 which it
 ought to
 aim.

Since the education of the citizens ought then
 to be uniform, and since we formerly proved that
 the virtues and happiness of the citizen coincide
 with those of the man, we have next to inquire
 wherein the perfection of the individual con-
 sists. In the human soul there are two distinct
 parts, one of which is endowed with reason,
 and the other, though not possessing reason in
 itself, is framed capable of listening to, and
 obeying its dictates. On the disposition of these
 two parts, the virtues and excellencies of human
 nature depend; but in which of the two the
 ultimate end or chief happiness of man is placed,
 will not be difficult for those acquainted with
 our philosophy to decide. From the works of
 art and nature submitted to our observation, it
 is easy to remark that things which are worse,
 are always made for the sake of those that are
 better; that this order is never on any occasion
 reversed; but how long soever may be the series
 of means and ends, that all the intermediate
 ends finally terminate and center in some one
 great and ultimate purpose. But that part of
 the soul which is endowed with reason, is mani-
 festly better than that which is merely capable
 of

of obeying its dictates; the operations of the one, therefore, must be proportionably better than those of the other; and the exercise of the latter must be considered as merely preparatory to the energies of the former. The energies of reason or intellect may either be employed in contemplation, or applied to the practice of life. It is, therefore, theoretical or practical; the former engaged in the pursuit and contemplation of truth and beauty, the latter occupied in the acquisition of things necessary or useful to ourselves or others. Human life is thus divided between war and peace, business and leisure, the occupations imposed by necessity, and the enjoyments attending that refined pleasure which accompanies and completes our intellectual energies. In his system of education, the legislator ought to have respect, doubtless, to all these objects; yet never to forget that war is undertaken for the sake of peace, and business for the sake of leisure; and that the occupations of utility and necessity ultimately terminate in the pursuit of beauty and truth.

But in opposition to these unalterable maxims, the most famed legislators of Greece have illiberally preferred things useful to things honourable, and have been illiberally and absurdly praised by Thibro, and other writers, for this preposterous preference of means to ends. Lycurgus is celebrated for forming a nation of conquerors; his laws were in force when the Lacedæmonians were defeated and subdued. Yet had his design been successful, it would not have

BOOK
IV.

That these ends have been mistaken by Lycurgus and other legislators.

B O O K have been either commendable or profitable, since the unjust dominion exercised by Sparta over her neighbours and allies would have taught some second, but more lucky Pausanias^a, to render himself the tyrant of his country. Absolute power over equals is desirable neither for individuals nor states; nor ought war ever to be waged in order to obtain it. Yet the military virtues will be cultivated by every wise republic; first, for its own defence; secondly, for acquiring a dominion just and lawful, because advantageous even to the vanquished; and thirdly, for reducing into slavery nations incapable of living safely under any more honourable condition. Experience justifies these assertions. Most ambitious nations have been saved for a while by war, but finally ruined by conquest. Their characters rusted like iron, and in peace lost their splendor. Their misfortunes are chargeable on a faulty legislation, which had not taught them to enjoy leisure.

Chap. 15.

Our commonwealth to be formed on a more extensive plan; great in war, but chiefly illustrious in peace.

But, according to the proverb, leisure is not made for slaves. This best blessing must be acquired and preserved by ardent enterprise and unbending fortitude; since a community destitute of courage and impatient of suffering, must speedily fall under the yoke of some more warlike neighbour. The active and stubborn virtues of war are necessary, therefore, as remote means towards enjoying the happiness of peace; but they are necessary barely as means, for the

^a See History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xii. p. 56 & seq.

enjoy--

enjoyment itself must be sought in wisdom. **BOOK**
 The virtues of justice and temperance are ne- **IV.**
 cessary under all circumstances, but chiefly in
 peace and prosperity; for the hardships of war
 are a school of discipline, whereas the indul-
 gences of peace naturally engender insolence;
 so that were the fable of the Fortunate Islands
 to be realised, their inhabitants would of all
 men most require the assistance of wisdom, jus-
 tice, and temperance; since, destitute of those
 virtues, they would be of all men the most
 wretched. Our commonwealth, therefore, is
 not to be moulded after the narrow Lacedæmo-
 nian model, nor are our citizens to be great
 only in war; they are to be chiefly illustrious in
 peace; and to render them such, must be the
 work of early and assiduous culture.

In explaining how this culture ought to be
 conducted, we must again observe, that man
 being compounded of soul and body, the soul
 itself is composed of a rational and irrational
 part; and that those parts of our complex frame
 which are first in their origin, are last in dignity.
 The body is made before the soul, and the de-
 sires and passions of the soul, constituting its
 irrational part, appear in young children, and
 infants long before the age of reason. Yet the
 rational part is that which properly constitutes
 the man, being the end and perfection of his
 nature. With reference to this end, therefore,
 culture should begin early to operate, by means
 of custom and habit, on the appetites and pas-
 sions; so that when reason first dawns, these
 subor-

This must
 be the work
 of educa-
 tion. The
 order in
 which it is
 to be con-
 ducted.

B O O K subordinate powers may already be disposed to
 IV. acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the sweetest harmony. Such then is the order in which education must be conducted. The body is first to be formed, and that for the sake of the soul; and then the irrational part of the soul is to be disciplined, and that for the sake of the rational.

Chap. 16. According to this system of arrangement, the first care of the legislator ought to consist in ascertaining the age and qualities of persons fit to be joined in wedlock. Persons so united, ought to descend together into the vale of years; and their powers of producing beings like themselves ought together to co-exist, uniformly to decay, and nearly at the same time to cease: the contrary of which seldom fails to occasion much domestic uneasiness. Respect also should be had to the succession of children, who ought neither to be too remotely distant, nor too closely to tread on the heels of their parents. When the former takes place, parents can expect to derive but little benefit from their children; and when the latter is the case, children will seldom entertain much reverence for their parents, who, being nearly their equals in age, will be considered as on a foot of equality in all other respects; and with whom, therefore, they will be often ready to differ in matters of opinion, or to quarrel about matters of interest. It happens most fortunately that all these ends and purposes may be attained and answered by precisely the same means, the coupling parties

—
 Importance of the question respecting the age fittest for entering into wedlock.

parties in wedlock at the proper and season-
able age. BOOK
IV.

About the age of seventy, men commonly cease to be husbands ; and after the age of fifty, women seldom become mothers. The times of entering into marriage for the different sexes ought to be respectively regulated by these extreme limits ; which will reduce the fittest marriageable age of women to eighteen, and of men to thirty-seven, a little more or less ; for the propriety of practical matters consists not in an indivisible point. In consequence of this regulation, the contracting parties, in that which forms one main object of their union, will enjoy the happiest correspondence, their powers will simultaneously flourish, and simultaneously decay. Premature conjunctions produce imperfect offspring, females rather than males, and those feeble in make, and short in stature. That this happens in the human race as well as in other animals, is visible in the puny inhabitants of countries where early marriages prevail. But to the female sex premature wedlock is peculiarly dangerous, since in consequence of anticipating the commands of nature, many of them suffer greatly in child-birth, and many of them die. The evil reaches the mind itself, for early habitudes make the most indelible impressions ; and the germ of voluptuousness too speedily expanded, will penetrate the whole frame, and for ever vitiate the character. In males, premature venery seems to stunt the growth : the animal ought to be itself perfect before it is duly qualified
to

What this
age ought
to be in
either sex.

BOOK IV. to propagate its kind. Let the sexes, therefore, contract marriage at the periods above determined. They will be then respectively in the acmé and full bloom of their age. The correspondence of their powers will render their desires harmonious, and their lives happy. They will grow old together ; and, as such seasonable marriages will for the most part be soon productive of progeny, the son will be advancing to perfect manhood when the father is verging to the extremity of old age.

The fittest season and best habit for the purpose of wedlock.

Winter is the fittest season for consummating marriage ; and, as naturalists tell us, when the wind blows from the north *. The state of body most likely to supply the commonwealth with good children, is neither the artificial brawniness of prize-fighters, nor a frame emaciated and worn out by abstemiousness or fatigue ; but a constitution equally remote from these vicious extremes, invigorated by such exercises as the life of a free citizen requires ; not excessive, but frequent ; various, not violent.

Attention due to pregnant women for the sake of their minds and of their offspring.

These observations are applicable to both sexes ; but of women in pregnancy particular care is to be taken that they do not indulge themselves in indolence, nor enfeeble their offspring by using too thin a diet. For the prevention of both evils, (since exercise will

* This explains why the governors of the winds were invoked by the Greeks wishing to have children ; a thing which Archbishop Potter thinks extraordinary and unaccountable : — “ What business the winds have in generation is difficult to imagine.” Potter’s *Antiq.* vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 318.

strengthen

strengthen appetite,) the legislator should enjoin his countrywomen, when pregnant, to walk daily to the temples, and pay their devotions to the powers presiding over childbirth. At the same time the female mind, in this delicate situation, should be diligently attended to, neither soured by neglect, nor ruffled by passion; but amused by images of pleasure, and soothed into unalterable serenity; for plants do not more certainly indicate the soil from which they spring, than children receive and reflect the temper of their parents.

Concerning the exposition of children, let it be enacted that nothing that has life shall be destroyed, unless it be defective in its members, or grossly deformed in its shape. Yet means must be taken to prevent excessive population; and, as one period of life is unripe, so another is too far decayed for the purposes of wedlock. Those who distribute the epochs of life into periods of seven years, assign fifty for the acmé of the mind. Four or five years after fifty, a man, therefore, should abstain from the rites of love merely for the sake of offspring, which would probably enjoy neither vigour of mind nor health of body.

Concern-
ing the ex-
position of
children,
and chas-
tity.

ἢ το δὲ ἴσως καὶ το μὴ διαρρηγνύναι τὴν αἰσθησὶν καὶ τὴν ἔσθλαν. Aristotle would have the exuberance of population to be restrained, yet nothing that has life to be destroyed, unless marked or depraved, by excessive deformity. In the career of his stern decisions he stops short of the unrelenting Chinese: "among whom habit seems to have familiarised a notion that life only becomes truly precious, and inattention to it criminal, after it has continued long enough to be endowed with a mind and sentiment; but that mere dawning existence may be suffered to be lost without scruple, though it cannot without reluctance." Staunton's Embassy to China, v. ii. p. 158.

Let

B O O K Let the rites of the marriage-bed be at all times
IV. equally respected by the husband and by the wife ; but should the husband, during the period limited for giving children to the republic, be convicted of a breach of chastity, let him be punished with public infamy, and those evils which follow in its train.

Chap. 17. The nourishment of children is bountifully supplied by Nature in the copious exuberance of milk, which the example of warlike nations, and even of wild animals, proves to be of all kinds of food the most congenial to the body, and the most favourable to its growth and strength. Wine, doubtless, gives spirits and vigour, but the use of wine in children might be productive of disease. All young animals delight in freely exerting their natural motions ; and this instinctive propensity is equally strong and equally salutary to infants. Care, however, must be taken that their delicate members be not distorted through too eager a contention : in this view various mechanical contrivances have been invented, and proved by experience to be of important use. Infants should be early accustomed to bear cold ; which will invigorate their strength, and gradually prepare their bodies for resisting the hardships of war. Some barbarous nations plunge their new-born infants into rivers. The Celts expose their children in thin coverings to the northern blast ; and whatever is to be effected by custom, should be begun early, and carried on gradually. In the present case, the first experiments will not be attended with danger,

Concerning the nourishment of children, their exercises and treatment.

ger, for the natural heat of children enables them to resist and repel the impressions of cold. Such are the attentions required by our first years. BOOK
IV.

In the following age, and until children have completed their fifth year, no painful task should be imposed, and no violent exertion required from the mind or body, lest health might be injured, and growth obstructed. All that utility demands, is to keep their faculties awake, and to prevent them from contracting any habits of sloth; which will be best effected by such plays and sports as are neither illiberal, nor fatiguing, nor sedentary. The tales and fables which are told them, ought to be written, at least examined, by the magistrate who presides over education; and their playful amusements ought, in general, to be imitations of those serious transactions in which they will be concerned when called to the business of life. Laws and contrivances have been devised and framed for preventing those compressions of the breath and those exertions of the voice which are frequent with young children; but all such attempts to counteract the designs of nature, we totally disapprove. The contentions of the breath and spirits are known by experience to invigorate the exertions of men; and the crying of children, which occasions similar intensions and remissions of their organs, is equally salutary to them, promoting their growth and augmenting their strength.

Until the age of seven complete, the school for children ought to be the father's house; but The education of children till the

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during

BOOK
IV.

age of puberty,
chiefly physical and
moral.

during this early period, they must be strictly guarded against the infectious communication of slaves ; no illiberal gesture is to be presented to their sight ; no illiberal image is to be suggested to their fancy. Lewd indecency of language ought to be reprobated and punished in every well-regulated city ; for from using filthy expressions without shame, there is an easy transition to the practising of filthy actions without disgust. Obscene statues or pictures are never to be seen but in the temples of those divinities, whom the law enjoins to be worshipped under such emblems, by fathers, in behalf of their wives and families ; nor ought children to be spectators of comedy or farce, before the age of admission to the public tables, when education, if well directed, will have confirmed their morals. Theodorus, the celebrated tragic actor, made it a rule never to allow any player, how inferior soever might be his talents, to occupy the stage before him ; observing, that mankind were always governed by first impressions. If that be the case, how much care should be taken to render the first impressions of children favourable to virtue, and to make them regard as strange and monstrous whatever might sow the seeds of malice, cruelty, or profligacy ? Let them behold in their tender years, those honourable occupations, and those martial exercises, which they are destined in due time carefully to learn, and skilfully to practice. Above all, let those important periods of life preceding and following puberty, be the objects of most assiduous vigilance ;

lance ; but as this depends not entirely on age, **BOOK**
we are less to regard the fanciful distinctions of **IV.**
numbers, than to watch the solid differences of
nature ; of which it is the great and perpetual
duty of education to second the views, and to
supply the defects.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK V.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK
V. **I**N the Fourth Book Aristotle describes the best form of government; and in the Fifth, he explains that system of education by which this government will be best upheld. Plutarch and other approved authors, ancient and modern, who have expressly written on education, do little more than expand and illustrate the pregnant sense which uniformly pervades this Book; omitting some remarks, which, being peculiar to Aristotle, will be found by most modern readers equally new and important.

Music, considered under a certain aspect, was the classic learning of antiquity, and regarded as intimately, almost inseparably, connected with morality, as well as poetry. The author, therefore, as might be expected, expatiates on the subject of music; which he classes with those sciences that terminate completely in themselves, and which, independently of profit or

* Commonly published as Book VIII.

utility,

utility, 'merit cultivation merely for the sake of pleasure; forming at once the highest embellishment and happiest exercise of the mind.

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V.

Having repeatedly remarked, that education ought to be relative to the nature of the government, he maintains as a consequence of this maxim, that the customs prevalent in his own age ought to be totally reversed; and that the people in democracies ought to be trained to modesty and respect for their superiors, while the nobles in aristocracies ought to be habituated to moderation and affability towards their inferiors. In conformity with this doctrine, he thinks that education ought to be public; and I believe that the experience of modern as well as of ancient times will justify and confirm his conclusion; having had an opportunity to remark during a long residence in a great variety of different countries, that the inhabitants were better educated almost exactly in proportion to the degree in which public education prevailed among them.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Education. — Its different branches. — How far to be cultivated. — Grammar — Drawing — Gymnastic — Music. — Exercises adapted to different ages. — Doubts concerning music. — Its different kinds. — Purgation of the passions.

BOOK

V.

Chap. I.

Education
the forming and sustaining
power of
government.

THAT the education of youth ought to form a principal object of the legislator's attention cannot be a matter of doubt; since it is education that first moulds, and that afterwards sustains the various modes of government; a democratical education alone suiting a democracy, an oligarchical an oligarchy; and the better and more perfect are the different systems of education, the better and more perfect will be those plans of government which they are respectively calculated to introduce and uphold. Preparation and exercise are necessary for the acquisition of every art; and not least for the attainment of the great art of political life. In this important object, fellow-citizens are all equally and all deeply concerned; and as they are all united in one common work for one common purpose, their education ought to be uniform and public, and regulated by general consent; not abandoned, as at present, to the blind decision of chance,

chance, or the idle caprice of parents. For the children of citizens belong to the commonwealth, of which they are destined to be members; and, like every member or part, must be formed and fashioned in subserviency to the good of that whole, or system, to which they collectively appertain. Such are the maxims of the Spartans, which cannot in this particular be too highly extolled. Of all men they are the most attentive to education, and their education is public.

But wherein ought political education to consist; what are its different branches, and in what manner, or to what extent, ought each branch to be cultivated? The discordant practice of nations has involved these questions in much perplexity. Different systems of legislation have different scopes and tendencies, and even when they agree in the same end, they employ different means for its attainment. Is education to be chiefly directed to things of common and vulgar use, subservient to bodily accommodation and productive of external prosperity? Or ought its main business to consist in sharpening, fortifying, and ennobling the mind? If the mind and virtue be justly preferred to the body and fortune, yet by what principles are we to arrange the virtues themselves? With which of them ought our culture to begin, and in which of them ought it to terminate? First of all, it is evident that children ought to be instructed in things subservient to the purpose of external accommodation, in proportion to their necessity or utility,

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Chap. 2.

Wherein
political
education
consists.

Its different
branches.

To what
extent each
branch
ought to be
cultivated.

B O O K utility, provided such things be not illiberal and
 { **V.** } **f**ordid, tending to distort or enervate the body,
 to narrow or debase the soul, to chill the fancy
 or encumber the intellect. From such mean
 and mercenary drudgery, which would disqualify
 them for the exercise of virtue, and unfit them
 for the offices of freemen, our citizens must
 totally abstain. Even to those arts dignified by
 the epithet of liberal, their application ought
 not to be directed without due selection and pru-
 dent reserve. In many accomplishments, medio-
 crity is preferable to excellence; for an am-
 bition gratified by what is frivolous will be
 incapable of aspiring to what is great. In as-
 certaining the doubtful nature of those frivolous
 but agreeable talents, much depends on the
 end or purpose for which they are acquired and
 cultivated. To display them for vanity or gain,
 is worthy of none but slaves; but they will not
 misbecome a citizen, if he exercises them for his
 own amusement, or the gratification of his
 friends; as relaxations from severer studies, or
 preparations for higher pursuits.

Chap. 3.

Grammar
or letters,
their use.

Drawing,
its use.

Education is most commonly reduced to four
 heads, grammar^a, gymnastic, music, and draw-
 ing. Letters are the elements of calculation, as
 well as of grammar or composition, and are
 essentially requisite in innumerable purposes of
 daily occurrence. The same may be observed
 of drawing, which teaches the knowledge of
 forms, about which so many indispensable oc-

^a Conf. Diodor. Sicul. vol. i. p. 486.

cupations

cupations are continually converfant. The gymnastic is fubfervient to ftrength and courage, invigorating the body and fortifying the mind. Muſic, indeed, is now degraded into a playful paſtime, but was introduced into education, by our wifer anceſtors, becauſe youth ought to be taught, not only how to purſue buſineſs, but how to enjoy leiſure ; an enjoyment which is the end of buſineſs itſelf, and the limit in which all our active purſuits finally terminate. This enjoyment is of a nature too noble and too elevated to conſiſt in plays and paſtimes, which it would be abſurd to conſider as the main end and final purpoſe of life, and which are chiefly uſeful in the intervals of toiliſome exertion, as ſalutary recreations of the mind, and ſeaſonable unbendings from contentious activity.

Leiſure is in itſelf pleaſurable ; and on its own account, defirable : whereas buſineſs is never undertaken and purſued merely for its own ſake, but for the ſake of ſomething beyond it ; a ſomething as variable as the opinions of men are manifold, and their habits diſſimilar ; ſome placing happineſs in one kind of enjoyment, and others in another ; but thoſe who are beſt formed and moſt ſkilfully educated, placing it in ſuch enjoyments only as are honourable and laudable. An education, therefore, is requiſite to make us delight in thoſe things which are beſt calculated to afford genuine ſatiſfaction ; and the arts and ſtudies from which this ſatiſfaction reſults, are not to be degraded by the epithets *uſeful* or *neceſſary*, ſince

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Gymnaſtic,
its uſe.
Muſic, its
uſe.

The example of
muſic
proves that
there is an
education
requiſite to
the enjoyment
of liberal
leiſure.

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V.

since they relate to nothing external, but terminate in themselves, and are on their own account and ultimately the objects of desire, as the immediate causes of rational and honest pleasure. In this view the ancients considered music, and gave it a distinguished rank in their scholastic system; not as a thing useful, for to what purpose does it serve? Not as necessary in the way that letters are necessary in accounts, in oeconomy, in literature or science, and a thousand political purposes, both civil and military; or as drawing is useful in teaching the knowledge of forms, in appreciating works of art, and in preventing deception in the purchase of instruments and utensils, the implements of trade, or the articles of furniture. It remains, therefore, that music should be acquired and cultivated as a thing desirable in itself, for the agreeable occupation of liberal leisure, and the elegant embellishment of life. Therefore Homer says, "Let sweet Thalia decorate the feast;" and again, "The bard is called to ravish every ear." And Ulysses thus paints the best enjoyments of peace and prosperity,

"How sweet the products of a peaceful reign,
The heaven-taught poet and enchanting strain ^b."

The example of music, as taught by the ancients, justifies us, therefore, in asserting, that our sons ought to be instructed not only in

^b Odyss. ix. v. 213.

things

things useful or necessary, but in things liberal and honourable. How many, and what these things are, and by what means the taste for them may be best inspired, and the knowledge of them best communicated, we shall examine hereafter. At present it is sufficient to have proved by the authority of the ancients, that such things exist, and ought to be objects of our care. This is plain in the case of music; and a little attention will shew that it holds true in other studies. The knowledge of letters is useful in the business of life, in reading and accounts, and innumerable other purposes. But the study of them is not bounded by this vulgar utility. They are preparations for higher branches of science. Drawing also is useful for the ordinary and coarse purposes above specified; it is, therefore, admitted into the general course of common education. But the study of drawing leads to something beyond these vulgar uses; and by familiarising us with the nature and variety of forms, carries us to the contemplation of *beauty*, as letters, which are the elements of calculation and composition, terminate in the contemplation of *truth*. Those men rest satisfied with a condition far short of the perfection of their nature, whose minds have never opened to such sublime pleasures. To be always seeking what is useful, is unworthy of a liberal, and inconsistent with an elevated, character.

We have before observed, that moral education ought to precede the intellectual, and that

Chap. 4.
How the
the body is to

B O O K the culture of the body ought to precede that
 V. of the mind. The nations most attentive to the
 be har- formation of the body, strive to give to it an
 dened by athletic habit, which injures the beauty of the
 exercise shape, and stunts the growth. The Lacedæmo-
 without in- nians avoid this error; but by imposing exces-
 spiring fe- sive labours on the body, they engender ferocity
 rocidity of in the mind, thinking this conducive to martial
 character. spirit. But, as we before observed, education
 ought not to be confined to any one object, nor
 chiefly directed to such objects as military
 valour; and if this excellence were our prin-
 cipal concern, it would not be inspired by the
 Spartan discipline. For neither in men nor in
 animals does valour accompany fullen ferocity,
 but is rather found in mild, generous, and lion-
 like natures. There are many nations who de-
 light in carnage, that are destitute of courage.
 The Achæi and Heniochi of Pontus, cow-
 ardly as they are, feel neither horror in shed-
 ding, nor disgust in tasting human blood;
 some inland nations of Asia equal or sur-
 pass this brutal savageness; they are cruel
 beasts of prey, not valiant men. Even the
 obstinate fierceness of Sparta could not main-
 tain her pre-eminence. She has been excelled
 by her neighbours in the virtues of war as well
 as of peace. While the Lacedæmonians alone
 cultivated arms, they acquired an easy as-
 cendency over undisciplined troops. But since
 their neighbours have been trained to martial
 exercises, they have approved themselves supe-
 rior in war to the Spartans. Neither a wolf nor
 any

any other such bloody savage, but only a brave man, is truly qualified to maintain an honorable conflict. For mere warlike courage, taken separately by itself, is a doubtful and defective quality; and cultivated too assiduously by the hardening discipline of toils and struggles, will degrade and debase the man, blunt his faculties, narrow his soul, and render him as bad a soldier as he is a contemptible citizen.

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The gymnastic, therefore, must be taught and exercised in subserviency to nobler pursuits. Till the age of puberty, the lighter exercises only should be enjoined and practised: athletic exertions and a forced regimen ought to be proscribed and prohibited; for such artificial violence would mar the work of nature, disfigure the shape, impede the growth, and for ever prevent the attainment of manly strength. That this must be its effect, experience evinces. In the long list of Olympic victors, scarcely two or three have gained the prize, both when they were boys and after they became men. Their capacities were checked, and their powers exhausted by premature exertions and an unseasonable regimen. During the three years immediately following puberty, the application of youth should be directed to those branches of education which form and invigorate the mind. They will then, at the age of seventeen, be capable of submitting to a regulated diet, and of sustaining the fatigue of athletic exercises. For laborious contention of the mind and of the body ought not to take place at the same age; the

Of the exercises best adapted to the respective ages.

BOOK V. the exertions of the body obstructing those of the mind, and the exertions of the mind relaxing the vigour of the body.

Chap. 5.

Doubts concerning music.

Is it merely a soothing recreation?

or an essential branch of discipline?

or an enjoyment complete in itself?

Difficulties attending these questions.

In a former chapter, some difficulties occurred respecting music, and some doubts were started concerning its power and its end. Is it merely a soothing recreation, like the two *care-killing* powers of sleep and wine? Thus they are characterised by Euripides; and it must be acknowledged that, by many, music, sleep, and wine, are arranged in the same class, and used for the same purpose; to which, dancing, also, is by some thought to contribute. Or is music not merely a recreative pastime, but an essential branch of discipline, capable of moulding and fashioning the mind, not less than the gymnastic moulds and fashions the body? Or is the efficacy of this noble art limited by neither of these uses, and music to be regarded neither as a recreation from past labours, nor a preparation for future exertions, but as an enjoyment complete and perfect in itself, analogous to the pleasure essential to moral and intellectual energies, which, forming the perfection of man, are desirable on their own account, independently of any thing that has preceded, or of any thing that is to follow them?

That music, considered as a branch of education, is not merely for recreation or sport, is deducible from this, that every effort of attention, and therefore the learning of music, is, in children, attended rather with pain than pleasure. It is equally evident, that children are not

not instructed in music as the agreeable employment of their liberal leisure; for such perfect enjoyments could not be relished by their imperfect faculties, nor the most complete fruits of life gathered from their crude immaturity. But, perhaps, children are taught music that it may contribute in their riper years, to their recreation, their improvement, or their enjoyment. Yet these purposes may be better attained without learning the art, or ever touching the lyre. The Persian and Median kings attain them completely, when they enjoy the correct execution of the best musical performers; the Lacedæmonians, without learning music, boast that they can readily distinguish between manly and effeminate airs; between melodies that contribute to moral discipline, and those that vitiate the mind, or dissipate themselves in empty sound. To distinguish and relish good victuals, is it necessary to be a cook? Which of the poets ever introduced Jupiter singing and harping? Such occupations are universally ascribed to inferior divinities; and among men, we know that they belong to mercenary practitioners, whose undivided application to music has given them great proficiency in this art, but has debased their souls and narrowed their faculties; whereas by truly liberal and ingenious minds, music is seldom considered as a serious engagement, and is rarely practised, but as a recreative pastime, or a natural expansion of jovial merriment. Such are the doubts attending the accurate arrangement and proper use of music;

B O O K music ; and such the difficulties in ascertaining
 { **V.** the place which this agreeable art ought to hold, and the function which it is calculated to perform, in the important system of political discipline.

Solution of
 these diffi-
 culties.

Yet, let it be considered whether this refined art, though it cannot be accurately and exclusively referred to any one of the ends above specified, may not in some measure comprehend them all. Play is introduced for the sake of recreation ; and affords no small degree of pleasure, merely as a repose from the pain of labour, of which it is the natural remedy. But the liberal exercise of our best energies is sweetened by pleasure as well as ennobled by dignity ; for happiness, which consists in this exercise, certainly includes both these elements. Now music, whether simple or accompanied by poetry, is acknowledged and felt to be one of the most delightful of pleasures ; wherefore Musæus says,

“ Of human joys, the sweetest is to sing.”

On this account, its power is summoned to gladden our festivities, to brighten and exalt the enjoyments of peace and prosperity. Our children, therefore, ought to be instructed in music, because every innocent pleasure is not only useful as a salutary and seasonable recreation, but desirable in itself as one of the best enjoyments of life. But as the lives of most men are a continual variation of toil and repose, they are apt to confound the light and temporary pleasure of recrea-

recreation, with those more permanent and more serious joys, which constitute the perfection of human happiness; especially since there is this resemblance between them, that neither of them have reference to futurity, our noblest and most delightful energies *terminating* in *themselves*, and our lightest and most frivolous pastimes, being the medicine of *past* labours, and relative to nothing that is future.

Yet it is worthy of consideration, whether recreation and enjoyment be not both of them, in this case, mere accessories; and whether music, if properly directed, may not effect a more important purpose; promote moral improvement, refine the sentiments, and exalt the character. Music will be acknowledged to have this tendency, should it appear capable of affecting the passions and changing the manners; and that it really does this, manifestly appears from various examples, and particularly from the melodies of Olympus, that cannot be listened to without inspiring enthusiasm, which is plainly a moral affection. Independently of measure or melody, even the simple cries of nature, when faithfully imitated, powerfully excite our sympathy, and dispose us to joy or to grief. Music is naturally pleasant, and the main object of moral education is to teach us to be pleased or offended as propriety requires, to love what is truly amiable, and to hate what is truly detestable. Nothing, therefore, is of more importance than to learn this art, and by custom to confirm our approbation of those rythmical successions of melodious sounds,

BOOK
V.
The efficacy of music in moral discipline.

B O O K which are expressive of decent and dignified manners, of manly and honourable actions. Ingenuous and well-disciplined natures find in the varieties of melody and rhythm, striking resemblances of anger and meekness, of manliness and temperance, and of all other such moral affections, as well as of their contraries. This is proved by the effect of musical performance ; which, while we listen to it, changes the form and quality of the soul, melts it to tenderness, or hardens it to fortitude ; and the habit of being thus powerfully affected by the resemblances of manners, is nearly related to that of being affected still more powerfully by their realities ; since, were we highly delighted with looking on a portrait, for no other reason than its beautiful form, it would follow of necessity, that we should also be still more delighted with beholding the original. Of all the objects of our senses, sounds are the most striking resemblances of manners. The objects of our touch and of our taste have no moral resemblance whatever : and even in the objects of our sight, shapes and colours, the resemblance is faint and imperfect, because calm and motionless, and rather a mere sign of manners than their natural imitation, since manners can only be exhibited by actions, and therefore only represented by motions, by which alone actions are forcibly expressed. Yet even the mere signs of manners are not to be rejected as things useless in education ; and our youth ought, doubtless, rather to contemplate the works of Polygnotus, and such artists as skilfully employ

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The cause
 of this effi-
 cacy ex-
 plained.

employ those signs or marks, than stare on the unmeaning productions of Pauson. But if the mere signs be useful, how much more efficacious must be the resemblances. And such resemblances evidently prevail in the *melodies*; each of which having its distinctive character, produces its peculiar effect; so that our affection changes with each change of the music; and in hearing one melody we are agitated with quite different emotions from those with which we were affected upon hearing another. At the will of a skilful composer, the mind expands into joy, or contracts into grief; some airs melt us into softness, while the Dorian mode confirms our fortitude, and the Phrygian inspires us with enthusiasm. These remarks have been well illustrated by the writers on music, who take experience for their guide; from which it appears that the efficacy of time, that is of rhythm or measure, is not less than the efficacy of tune, that is of the modes and melodies. Some movements are brisk and lively, others grave and sedate; some vulgar, and expressive of irregular passions; others liberal, and expressive of well-governed affections. But music consists in the skilful combination of time and tune, from which its power appears manifestly; and, therefore, the propriety of teaching it to youth, especially as music is naturally pleasant, and the attention of that early age is difficultly detained in any exercise or employment in which pleasure is not an ingredient. It appears also that there is an affinity between measures and melodies, and that

BOOK both have a near relation to the soul; from
 { **V.** which some have inferred that the soul is har-
 mony, and others, that harmony is one of its
 essential attributes.

Chap. 6. We now proceed to examine whether children
 should be taught, not only to understand and
 relish, but to practice and perform music. This
 question must be answered in the affirmative;
 for it is impossible, at least exceedingly difficult,
 to be a good judge of performances which we are
 ourselves unable to execute; and whatever affec-
 tions or qualities music may excite or produce, its
 efficacy will be the stronger when it is the work
 of our own hands. Besides this, children re-
 quire some employment to occupy and exhaust
 their restless activity; for which reason Archy-
 tas's rattle is no contemptible invention, since
 while shaking this noisy plaything, their activity
 is agreeably and harmlessly employed. Educa-
 tion, well directed, is the rattle of boys; and at
 this age they may be taught arts, which it would
 misbecome them afterwards to exercise, but of
 which the practice in youth will enable them in
 manhood to relish works of art the better, and
 to appreciate them the more skilfully. The ob-
 jection to music as illiberal, may be easily re-
 moved, if we distinguish between that taste and
 skill in the art, which would disqualify a man
 from performing the offices of a citizen, and that
 taste and skill which would be attended with no
 such pernicious effect. If the music that we
 study, enervates or debases the soul, or the in-
 struments on which we practice, distort or en-
 feeble

feeble the body, or if the mind is narrowed by the intense application to one secondary pursuit, it is plain that this ingenious art will occasion much mischief, and both incapacitate the young for learning their political duties, and disqualify the old from performing them honourably. The artificial and complicated music, therefore, which has little other merit than the difficulty of execution, and little other effect than to astonish the gaping multitude, but which has engrossed and degraded our public exhibitions, ought never to have been introduced into education, whose best purposes it is only calculated to pervert.^b

Musical performance may be cultivated, and manual dexterity acquired; but the degree in which they are desirable, is limited by that proficiency requisite for enabling us to relish liberal rhythms and manly melodies, not to practise those vulgar sleights and musical trifles which delight children, slaves, and even some brute animals. [It is plain, therefore, that the simplest instruments deserve the preference, as fittest for the purpose of education. The flute, the harp, and others of that kind, are to be rejected as too artificial and complex, and requiring more attention and practice than liberal minds can spare from more important pursuits. The flute is, besides, better fitted to excite enthusiasm than to regulate the affections, and is therefore better

To what extent musical skill ought to be cultivated.

What instruments are fittest to be employed.

^b For better understanding what follows concerning music, the reader may consult *History of Ancient Greece*, v. ii. c. v. p. 238. & seq.

BOOK adapted to purgation than to instruction; to
 { **V.** operate as a violent remedy under violent disorders of the mind, than to serve in usual health for salutary nourishment. In playing the flute it is impossible to use the voice, on which account our ancestors finally rejected this instrument, which they had first introduced into education with innumerable other novelties, amidst the intoxication of their Persian victories. After the repulse of Xerxes, a Lacedæmonian exhibiting at his own expence a chorus of music, himself played on the flute; and there was then scarcely an Athenian citizen totally unacquainted with this instrument, as appears by the picture dedicated by Thrasypus of the musical exhibition, which he defrayed and directed. But on mature reflection, the flute was proscribed in education, and its use forbidden to freemen; and the same may be said of the dulcimer and various other instruments of different shapes and names, which are fitly employed for amusing the vulgar, by their admitting wonderful displays of manual dexterity. It is an ancient and well-contrived fable, which says, that Minerva, after inventing the flute, rejected its use. The reason why she did so, is not a bad one; namely, that she was angry at seeing how much the blowing of the flute distorted her countenance. Yet it is far more probable, that Minerva, who is believed to preside over learning and science, disdained an instrument which contributed nothing to mental improvement; which neither fortified discipline, nor sharpened intellect, nor elevated

elevated sentiment. All complex and difficult instruments are, therefore, to be banished from the pure region of education, and to be con-
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V.
 signed to the sordid displays of mercenary practitioners, who cultivate music, not for any salutary purpose, but for the low gratification of an illiberal audience; whom such things only can please as nourish their corrupt passions, by a mean compliance with which, the musical performers in our days disqualify themselves in mind and body, from performing the duties of good citizens.

In music two things are to be considered, Chap. 7.
 tune and time, the varieties of the former constituting the different modes and melodies, the Analysis of
music.
 varieties of the latter constituting the different measures and rhythms. Are all these gradations and all these proportions of sound to be used indifferently, or ought due selection to be made? Ought this selection to be invariably the same, or ought it to be modified by the different ends and purposes of musical performance? And in music, which is the principal, time or tune? For minute and circumstantial solutions of these questions, we refer to the philosophical writers on music, meaning to touch but slightly on the subject, and as far as seems requisite in a work on legislation. We approve the general division of music into moral, practical, and rapturous; according as it is fitted to regulate our affections, to excite us to action, or to inspire us with enthusiasm. Experience proves that different melodies and rhythms are respectively

Its division
into moral,
practical,
and raptu-
rous.

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V.

What is
meant by
purgation
of the pas-
sions by
music.

adapted to these different purposes; so that as moral strains are to be employed for mental discipline and liberal pleasure, the enthusiastic, and sometimes the practical, may be listened to for the purpose of what, by a natural metaphor, is called purgation^c, which shall be more fully explained in our treatise on Poetry. Let it suffice at present to observe, that those passions (such is the unison of minds) by which one person is strongly affected, are felt in a certain degree by all around him^d; and, therefore, when skilfully expressed by the musician, they will be powerfully communicated, especially to those who, by their natural constitution, are peculiarly exposed to their influence; and whose extreme sensibility will thus be excited and agitated, and thereby purified and refined^e, and (*as melancholy*

^c Plutarch de Auditione, p. 42. edit. Paris, quotes a saying of the philosopher Arifton, that neither a bath nor a discourse did any good unless they cleansed and purified; using the verb from which the substantive here translated "purgation" is derived. In the following sentence, by a bold mixture of metaphors, he says, *λογω δριμύει την διανοιαν αχλυν πολλης και αμυδλυττης γιμνασαι ικαθαρη*. "That we ought to be thankful to philosophers, who, by the severity of their exhortations, purge our understanding from the thick darkness and bluntness with which they are filled."

^d Compare above, c. v. *ακρωμενοι των μιμησεων γιγνεται παντες συμπαθεις*.

^e This obscure sentence is best explained by a collateral passage in Plato de Republica, p. 625. edit. Ficini. He is treating of the necessity of combining in a well-directed education, music with the gymnastic; because men who apply only to music, will soften into effeminacy; and those who apply only to the gymnastic, will harden into brutality. In expanding and illustrating this observation, he says that strength is increased and courage confirmed by the gymnastic; but what will happen if a youth is trained to the gymnastic only? *εκ, η τι επι αυτη φιλομαθης εν τη ψυχη, ατι ουτε μαθηματος γυνομενον υδενος, ου ζητηματος, ουτε λογω μετασχον, ουτε της αλλης μουσικης, ασθινεις* τι

choly is purged by tears') disburdened and light- BOOK
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ened with a pleasurable relief. Thus it is that, at

τι καικωφον και τυφλον γιγνεται, ατε εκ ημερομηνια, ηδι τριφομενη, ηδε διακαθαρομηναι των αισθησεων αυτη. "In this case, even should he naturally be endowed with an ingenuous and inquisitive mind, yet having never tasted the pleasures neither of science, nor investigation, nor reason, nor the other music, his condition as a man will be that of blindness, deafness, and debility, his faculties having never been nourished, excited, agitated, and purged." What Plato means by saying, *the other music*, may be understood by the words of Strabo in the admirable mythological digression in his Tenth Book, where he remounts to the root and source of mysticism in the human heart, and examines the fabulous traditions and religious arcana of his country, with that liberal criticism which became an historian, that was a traveller and a philosopher. ευ μιν γαρ ηνεται και τυτο, της ανθρωπου· τοτε μαλιστα μιμισσάι της θεου, όταν ευεργετωσι· αμεινον δ' αι ληροι τις, όταν ευδαιμονωσι· τοιςτοι δε το χαιρειν και το ιορταζειν και το φιλοσοφειν και μουσικης απτισθαι· μη γαρ η τις εκπτωσις προς το χιρειν γινεται των μουσικων ης ηδυπαθειας τρεποντων τας τεχνας η τοις συμποσει; και θυμελαις, και σκηποι; και αλλοις τοιςτοις, διαβαλλισθω το πραγμα· αλλα η φυσις η των παιδιυματων εξεταξισθω την αρχην εθενδε εχουσα. Και δια τυτο μουσικη εκαλειςιν ο πλατων, και ιτι προτεροι ες πωδαρομηναι, την φιλοσοφιαν, και κατα αρμονιαν τον κοσμον συντεταται, παν το μουσικον θειον εργον υπολημν βασιοντις. Ουτο δε και αι Μυσαι θειαι και Απολλων Μυσαγωγη; και η ποιητικη πασα υμνητικη υσα· ισαντως δε και την των ηθων κατασκευην τη μουσικη προσημεσι ες παν το εκακορρωτικον τε ην τοις θεοις εγγυς ον. — "It has been well said, that a man most imitates the gods, when he does good; but it would be better said, when he is happy; that is, when he enjoys merriment and festivity chastified by the decent charms of music and philosophy. For though music is often degraded in our theatres, in our streets, and at our entertainments, into the pander of sensual passions, yet the art itself ought not, therefore, to be arraigned, but rather the merit of that discipline fairly estimated, of which music is the principle and the source. On this ground Plato, and the Pythagoreans before him, called philosophy, music, maintained that the world subsisted by harmony, and that music in its largest sense, meaning arrangement and proportion, shone in every work of the gods. The muses themselves are goddesses; Apollo is the leader of the muses; and poetry, which originally consisted in hymns, was invented to sing the praises of the divinity. To music the ancients also referred moral philoso-

^f Plato de Repub. L. xii.

BOOK at the celebration of Orgic rites, enthusiasm
 { V. vents itself and evaporates in those sacred
 melodies, during the performance of which the
 mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is
 thereby cured of its frenzy. The same thing
 happens in all other violent affections, whose
 excesses cure themselves; and of which, in pro-
 portion as the preceding agitation has been the
 greater, the subsequent relief proves the more
 delightful.

The differ-
 ent kinds
 of music;
 their na-
 ture and
 effects.

To this purpose theatrical music might be hap-
 pily directed; but as the spectators at theatres
 consist, not merely of the liberal and enlight-
 ened, but of the vulgar and illiterate; of me-
 chanics, manufacturers, servants, and slaves;
 such persons require pastimes suitable to their
 taste; and their perverse minds can relish none
 but perverse music; a music overstrained by the
 vehemence of contention, and disfigured by a
 crowd of motley embellishments. But that
 which is a fit amusement for slaves and men of
 servile characters, would be of all things the
 most improper for the liberal discipline of youth.
 To the purpose of education, the manly Doric,
 and other congenial moral melodies, are found
 to be the best adapted. Socrates in Plato's Re-

phy, or ethics, considering as the gift of Heaven whatever tended to
 exalt and purify the mind.*"

* Literally, "considering as near to the gods whatever is corrective of
 the mind." If every work of the gods partook of music, then moral
 philosophy, as corrective of the mind and a gift of Heaven, might be
 referred to music as the species is to its genus. But this will not necessarily
 follow, if we translate with Casaubon, "that all music is the work of the
 gods."

public

public admits no other modes of music but the Dorian and Phrygian; but there is an inconsistency in admitting the latter after he had excluded the use of the flute, for the Phrygian is among melodies what the flute is among instruments, a pathetic enthusiastic strain; and so peculiarly adapted to dithyrambics, that when Philoxenus attempted to set these rapturous hymns to Doric music, he found the thing impossible, and naturally reverted to the Phrygian mode. The Dorian is to be preferred for its firmness, gravity, and stability, as holding the middle place between two excesses, that of fury on the one hand, and that of effeminacy on the other.

In education we ought never to lose sight of possibility and propriety; and propriety generally lies in the middle between two vicious extremes. Propriety, therefore, is mediocrity; but this mediocrity, in practical matters, does not consist in an indivisible point, but admits of considerable latitude, and is to be modified in different cases by different circumstances; and in the case of music, chiefly by the circumstance of age. Strong sounds and rapid movements accord not with the debility of declining years. The writers on this subject, therefore, justly blame Socrates for banishing the gentle languor of soft music, as producing the noxious consequences of wine, when the ardour of intoxication has given place to painful lassitude or listless torpor. But men measure every thing by their own standard; and that may be approved by

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The different kinds of music respectively adapted to different periods of human life.

B O O K by old age, which seems feeble or languid to
 V. the prime of life. Youth, also, has a music pe-
 { cularly adapted to it. This is the Lydian,
 which unites grace with strength, and while it
 regulates the affections, has no small tendency
 also to embellish the manners. It is plain then,
 that possibility, mediocrity, and propriety, are
 views and boundaries, of which, in education,
 we ought never to lose sight.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VI.*

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Book Aristotle approves himself, as **BOOK VI.** even Locke acknowledges, "a master in politics;" surpassing in perspicuity and precision every writer ancient or modern in explaining how "civil society is formed into different models of government, and the several species of it¹." His writings on this subject are eminently distinguished from those of his rivals and detractors. Assuming a loftier stand, his sight has a wider range; and while his situation is more commanding, his eye is also more piercing. A great part of his life was employed in doing for moral and political philosophy, that which, with regard to modern geometry, Vieta and Descartes began; Barrow and Leibnitz and Newton so wonderfully carried on and improved; and that which Waring and a few others of our contemporaries are striving still further to extend and perfect. The extraordinary elevation which that noble science has attained, is owing chiefly

* Commonly published as Book IV.

¹ See Locke's Letter to King.

BOOK to obstinate and patient industry in improving
VI. and perfecting the signs by which our notions
 of magnitude are compared; and the results of
 our comparisons surely drawn, and clearly expressed. The Stagirite was equally successful with those great men, in the still more important task of simplifying and improving the signs or expressions by which comparisons are made, involving the civil happiness of mankind and the best interests of society. His distinction between the essential members of a commonwealth and its barely ornamental concomitants; his divisions and definitions of the different forms of government, with the important principle by which the form is distinguished from the substance; the mutual relations between government and laws; and the relations between both these and the variable moral nature of man, which make those institutions and arrangements, that are just and salutary in one country, unjust and pernicious in another; these and other collateral points are explained in the present Book, with a copiousness that affords satisfaction, and a clearness that defies contradiction.

In treating of the *sovereignty* in a state, our author analyses this complex object into deliberative, appointing or elective, and judicial, powers. To justify his division in comparison with that which modern writers have substituted in its stead; namely, powers legislative, executive, and judicial; it may be observed that in every community the sovereignty, whether residing in one, the few, or the many, must necessarily

fairly be employed in deliberating concerning public measures; in electing or appointing magistrates; or in distributing justice, and deciding differences. But the work of legislation, when once complete, ought never afterwards, according to our author, to be touched but with a cautious and trembling hand^b; and to say that the actual sovereign, whether king, nobles, or commons, or all three collectively, are invested with the plenitude of legislative authority, is in his opinion to grant to them a power, which, in its full extent, they cannot ever rightfully exercise, unless it could be supposed that one generation of men might be fairly entitled to intercept from posterity the improvement made, and the light accumulated in the long course of preceding ages. To do this, is a stretch of authority to which the most despotic princes of Asia have never yet laid claim. In the absolute monarchies of Europe, while unjust wars were undertaken, exorbitant taxes imposed, and temporary regulations respecting every public measure capriciously made, and capriciously abolished, the fundamental laws of their respective kingdoms were acknowledged and respected by those branded as the wildest and most furious despots. In matters of policy, that cannot be just or fit, which never can be useful; and our author endeavours to prove that it never can be useful for a nation completely and suddenly to depart from its hereditary institutions: a depar-

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^b See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 117.

ture

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ture which, destroying that principle on which the efficacy of all laws is founded, would destroy government itself^c; that illustrious work of nature, which mere human powers, as they could not originally establish it, cannot have a right to pursue those measures by which it is most likely to be eventually overturned.^d

The branch of government now denominated the executive, Aristotle calls the appointing power, when it resides in one; the electing power, when it resides in many. His language is more accurate than our's. To give orders, and to appoint or elect those empowered to carry them into execution, is doubtless a branch of the sovereignty; but the part merely executive belongs to low instruments; and all the intermediate functions, between the first order or appointment, and the final execution or effect, fall within the department of dependent and responsible ministers.

After thus analysing the sovereignty, the author proceeds to examine how its different elements are distributed in the different forms of government, and how they ought to be placed in a well-constituted commonwealth; holding the just mean between the vicious extremes of domineering oligarchy and furious democracy. Nothing can be added to the copiousness and perspicuity with which he explains under what circumstances democratical and oligarchical

^c See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 118.

^d Ibid. b. i. c. ii. p. 25, & seq.

laws

laws are to be alternately selected; and on what occasions neither the one nor the other ought to be entirely and exclusively adopted, but rather both to be blended into one really political and truly salutary institution. The perfection of practical matters, as he often observes, lies not in a fixed and indivisible point; it varies with the indefinite variation of circumstances; but the best practical tests of good government, he holds to be universally the two following: first, when men of the middle ranks abound more than either the insolent rich or the turbulent rapacious poor; and secondly, when there is a difficulty in determining to which of the simple forms of government the constitution most inclines, and ought most properly to be referred. There is a pleasure not to be expressed, but which every friend to his country must warmly feel, in reflecting that Aristotle's two tests are more applicable to the government established in this island, than to any other which history exhibits.

The praises which the author bestows on the superior happiness of the middle classes in society, tends to reconcile the people at large with their respective lots, and to shew that the condition to which every man by an ordinary degree of prudence and good fortune may attain, is precisely the best in which he could be placed. The miseries of individuals, as well as the convulsions of nations, originate in that most prevalent and widely diffused error of considering rather their relative than their absolute advantages.

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tages*. To the blessings of health and competency, with security and a good conscience, what slender additions can be made by the most extensive power and most unbounded opulence? The lowest situation in civilized society is preferable to the highest among barbarians. But instead of contemplating with grateful complacency the real enjoyments within its reach, discontent broods over its comparative inferiority; and each thinking too highly of himself, even the more fortunate individuals will scarcely allow that full justice is done to their merit; while they depreciate the prodigious sum common to all, and magnify the minute differences by which the shares are distinguished.

* *Suique ipsam, malo arbitrio, quo a proximis quisque minime anteiri vult, penitusse.* T. Liv. l. vi. c. xxxiv.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Governments — Their classification. — Democracy — Its four kinds. — Constitutions — One thing by law — Another in fact. — Materials respectively fitted for different governments. — Mixed governments. — Tests of good government. — How governments may be meliorated. — Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people — And the people the nobles. — Analysis of the sovereignty — Constitution of its different branches — Agreeably to the different spirit of different governments.

IT is the business of every science, and every inquiry that bears a reference to any whole class of objects, to consider not only the powers or capacities belonging to the best and most perfect individuals comprehended under that class; but those which belong to the class in general, or rather to the most considerable portion of it; and also those which belong to such individuals of the class as are peculiarly circumstanced. The master of exercises, the physician, and every other artist, pays due attention to this threefold division. The teachers of the gymnastic art, for example, well know that of the youths committed to their care and discipline, few are capable of attaining the most athletic habit, or likely to carry off the first prizes either of strength or agility. Yet it is

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Chap. I.

Politics, as a science, how it ought to be treated.

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the duty of their profession to improve the natural powers of their disciples, and to exercise each of them in such accomplishments as are most suitable to their respective views and particular constitutions. It is not enough, therefore, for the speculative politician, if he would render his speculations practically useful, to consider what arrangements best suit men provided with a complete accumulation of external and internal advantages. He must consider also, what are the arrangements best adapted to the particular circumstances in which communities are placed ; and most likely to promote that particular scheme of national happiness which the founders of the commonwealth have thought fit to prefer ; though neither the most desirable absolutely in itself, nor the best even in relation to the means and materials which nature or fortune had supplied. Above all, the political philosopher ought most diligently to investigate that form of government adapted to mankind in general, circumstanced as they are most commonly found to be ; from the neglect of which inquiry, authors who have written well, have not written usefully. In all matters of practice, possibility is to be considered as well as perfection ; and things easily accomplished are preferable to those barely possible. In opposition to these maxims, projectors in politics content themselves with devising arrangements adapted only to men formed and circumstanced agreeably to their mind and wish, the mere creations of their own fancy ; or if they conde-

scend to take lessons from history, they are satisfied with extolling and recommending the Lacedæmonian or some other approved government, without stopping to reflect whether the ordinary circumstances in which nations are placed, will ever allow them to imitate such admired models. For it is not an easier task to regenerate a constitution, than originally to establish it; since in working this reformation, it is necessary that men should not only learn what they did not formerly know, but *unlearn* many things which they had previously been taught^f.

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To treat the science of politics completely and usefully, we must not be contented with the general division of governments into monarchies, aristocracies, and republics; and their respective corruptions, tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies. It is necessary still farther to examine wherein one government, or one corruption of government, differs from another bearing the same name. We shall then more easily discern for what materials each political structure is best adapted; what are the changes which it is most likely to undergo; and what are the laws and regulations by which it may be preserved, subverted, or amended.

Chap. 2.

How governments are to be divided and classed.

The cause of the wide variety in governments must be sought for in the wonderful diversity of their constituent parts; for a state is a very complex object, composed of individuals

Chap. 3.

General division.

^f In the first chapters of this book there is much derangement, and much repetition. I have endeavoured to express the author's sense in fewer words, and with greater perspicuity.

BOOK and families; some rich, others poor; some
 { **VI.** subsisting by agriculture and pasturage, others
 by manufactures and commerce; and some provided with arms, while others are altogether defenceless. The higher classes of men are also variously distinguished by their abilities, their virtues, their birth, or merely by their wealth; which last, when considerable, enables them to rear and train horses, a circumstance which alone has been sufficient to decide the nature of the government. For in ancient times, wherever the national force consisted in cavalry, oligarchy was prevalent; as among the Chalcideans, the Eretrians, the Magnesians situate on the banks of the Meander, and many other wealthy communities of Asiatic Greece*. It is plain, therefore, that governments vary according to the differences of those constituent parts of the state, which either engross or share the sovereignty. The most palpable, and also the most specific difference (as will appear hereafter) is the distinction of riches and poverty: wherefore, all governments have been divided into oligarchies and democracies, as the winds are divided into the north and the south, the former comprehending the west, and the latter the east; and as melodies are divided into the Dorian and Phrygian, all other kinds of music, in proportion to their respective proximities, being ascribed to the one or the other of those very different scales. But the general di-

* History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii.

vision,

vision, above given in this work, appears more satisfactory and more useful: namely, that certain polities are wisely combined and justly tempered, as certain harmonies are skilfully composed and properly blended; that other polities, as well as other harmonies, are vicious deviations and base corruptions, whether they be strung into despotism, or relaxed into democracy.

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The more minute subdivisions of governments must be obtained by the same means, by which other objects of science are compared and classed. In zoology^b, we begin by considering what are the constituent parts of animals, or in other words, the parts essentially necessary to their existence. These are some one of the senses^c, with an instrument for seizing, and another for receiving food, together with some instrument or member by which the motions belonging to the animal may conveniently be performed. But all these parts or organs are susceptible of great variety in their respective structures, since, in some animals, one member is very differently formed from an *analogous* member in other animals; that is, from a member answering a similar purpose. But if our enumeration of the parts or organs be correct, and if we have carefully distinguished the differences in the structure of each organ, we must obtain the whole number of kinds or classes by multiplying the number expressing the differences in one constituent part, into the product

Chap. 4.

Particular
division.

^b See Analysis, p. 145.

^c *ἡνὰ τὰν αἰσθητικῶν.* See Analysis, &c. p. 48.

BOOK VI. of the numbers expressing the differences in all the other constituent parts.

The constituent parts of commonwealths.

The same principle applies to the classification of commonwealths, those complex moral entities, consisting of many parts or members, differently constructed, and variously combined. An essential ingredient in every commonwealth is, that great portion of the people employed in providing food, which may be variously supplied by the different modes of industry and accumulation above specified. A second indispensable ingredient consists of those employed in arts and manufactures, whether necessary for subsistence, or useful for accommodation. A third class of the people are those conversant about exchange or traffic, foreign as well as domestic. The soldiers form a fourth class, not less necessary than any of the preceding; since communities are collected for all-sufficiency, and cannot have attained their end, if continually exposed to destruction or servitude. Judges, to administer justice, and persons qualified by their abilities to deliberate and decide concerning public concerns, are the fifth and sixth classes: for if a soul be necessary to constitute an animal, not less than a body, justice, valour, and political wisdom, are not less essential to a state, than those exertions of bodily labour by which daily wants are supplied*. The seventh and eighth classes consist in those who perpetually, or interchange-

* The author here, as elsewhere, blames Plato for considering in his "Republic" soldiers as mere supplements, while he places husbandmen, weavers, &c. among essential parts or members.

ably,

ably, exercise the various duties of executive magistracy ; and those who, by their seasonable contributions, supply the occasional exigencies of the public service. Of those various offices or functions, some indeed may be united in the same person. The same individual may alternately decide as a judge, and deliberate as a senator ; the same hands may alternately hold the plough and brandish the spear. But as opulence and poverty cannot in any country be ascribed to the same person at once, the most distinct classes of every state are the poor and the rich ; and the evident differences in government must result from these distinctions ; from power engrossed by wealth, or power usurped by indigence. Kings, they say, are chosen in *Æthiopia* on account of their beauty and stature. If the same rule prevailed in electing republican magistrates, the principle of election would be highly oligarchical, because the tall and beautiful are always the smaller number. The rich also are commonly the few ; and the poor the many : but to constitute an oligarchy, the few, who are masters of the government, must be rich ; and to constitute a democracy, the many, who are masters of the government, must be poor ; for it is only when both circumstances concur in those governments, that their respective characters are strongly impressed, and their opposite genius fully displayed. At *Appollonia*, near the *Ionian* sea, and in the isle of *Thera*, the descendants of the first settlers retained the whole government in their hands, notwithstanding

BOOK ing powerful accessions of new inhabitants.

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But the government was not a democracy, because the rulers were inconsiderable in number when compared with the subjects over whom their power was exercised. At Colophon, on the other hand, the many were masters of the government; yet they did not constitute a democracy, because, before the Lydian war, the far greater proportion of the inhabitants of that commercial city were possessed of considerable opulence.

Democra-
cy, its four
kinds.

The nature of oligarchies and democracies must vary in consequence of variations in their parts or elements. When the notables, or nobles, are distinguished by their education and virtue, there will result a very different kind of oligarchy from that in which the sovereigns of the state are characterised merely by their birth or their wealth. The differences in the people at large are occasioned chiefly by the different occupations which they pursue. Some live by agriculture; others by manufactures and commerce; and many cities and islands subsist chiefly by the sea. Their vessels are employed in war, commerce, fishing, and carriage. In some places, almost the whole shipping is destined for one single use; as the fishing boats of Byzantium and Tarentum, the galleys of Athens, the merchantmen of Ægina and Chios, and the transports of Tenedos. Among the commonalty of a country, there may also be a variety in the proportion of mere populace, persons destitute of property, condemned through poverty to the meanest drudgery,

drudgery, and participating, on one side at least, of a foreign or even servile extraction. Such are the differences in the parts or elements, from which such a variety of dispositions, habits, manners, and characters must necessarily flow, as will render those arrangements which suit the genius of one people altogether unsuitable to that of another. The first kind of democracy requires that all men should be treated alike; that the rich and the poor should indifferently share the government, and enjoy an authority in its deliberations and measures exactly proportional to their numbers. Liberty, the partisans of this government assert, is chiefly to be found in democracies; and when all men are placed on a foot of equality, then, and then only, this liberty will be complete. The second kind of democracy requires a small qualification in point of fortune, in those entitled to offices of government. The third kind excludes from those offices persons branded by any note of infamy, or chargeable with any public delinquency. The kind first mentioned does not make these distinctions, but admits to magistracy without exception, the citizens at large. Yet all these democracies are governed by general and fixed laws, which it is the duty of magistrates and assemblies to administer and apply, without ever interposing their own authority, unless the law be silent or its voice uncertain. But there is a fourth species of democracy, differing from the others just mentioned, in this important particular, that it is governed not by permanent laws, but

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but by occasional decrees. This happens through the dangerous artifices of demagogues, a description of men for which there is not any room in countries subject to law ; but where law is set aside, the authority of wise and good men is overturned, and that of demagogues established on its ruins ; the people in the assemblies assuming the form of one complex monarch ; tyrants not individually, but collectively. The authority of the many is reprobated by Homer, in what sense is uncertain¹. In such a democracy, then, the people knowing itself to be an absolute monarch, assumes all his pretensions, and exercises all his prerogatives ; setting every principle of order at defiance ; rewarding and honouring none but the basest flatterers ; and exhibiting in all its transactions the same contrast to a well-constituted republic, which a tyrannical usurpation exhibits to a legal monarchy. Of the real individual tyrant, and of this tyrannical corporation, the manners are precisely the same. The decrees of the one are as despotical as the edicts and ordinances of the other. Both prove the bane of human society, the oppressors of virtue, the munificent rewarders of vice. The court flatterer flourishes under the tyranny of one man ; the demagogue under the tyranny of the multitude ; and the flatterer and demagogue are equally solicitous to extend that

¹ *ἐκ ἀγαθῆ παλυκοίρατι*, Iliad, ii. v. 204. Aristotle says, it is uncertain whether Homer meant to brand the complex tyranny of the multitude, or the authority of many individually. Pope prefers the former meaning, "That worst of tyrants, an usurping crowd." Iliad, ii. v. 242.

unlaw-

unlawful domination on which their own influence depends. The demagogue persuades the multitude to disregard the authority of precedent, and to trample under foot every law of the constitution, that full scope may be given to the authority of occasional decrees, well knowing that while the passions of the multitude govern, he who can best wield those passions must be master of the state. The multitude listen with delight to one who seems to have nothing at heart but to promote their interest, or gratify their pleasure; and cheerfully accept his invitation of taking the public concerns entirely into their own hands; so that every established magistracy, and every regular function of political power is enfeebled, suspended, or utterly abolished. The author, therefore, who arraigns such a democracy as unworthy of the name of government, seems to reason justly; for what government can subsist without laws? If we admit, therefore, democracy to be a form of government, it is plain that a state continually subject to the caprice of occasional decrees, cannot properly be classed even under the name of democracy.^m

Of oligarchy as well as of democracy, there are various kinds. The first kind is that in

Chap. 5.

Oligarchy,
and its four
kinds.

^m This worst species of democracy is what Polybius calls an ochlocracy. — It takes place, he observes, wherever the will of the majority prevails; one case only excepted, that of a people among whom it is habitual and hereditary to venerate religion, law, virtue, and old age. Comp. Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. & c. ix. This ochlocracy, he observes, necessarily terminates in the tyranny of one despot. Ibid.

which

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which all political power belongs to men of a certain census or fortune, and in which this census is so high, that the great body of the people are totally excluded from every share in the administration. The second kind is that in which the pecuniary qualification for office is not so high as totally to exclude the majority of the citizens, but in which the various councils and magistracies supply by election the vacancies that happen among their own members; if they elect from the citizens at large, they act conformably to the principle of an aristocracy; if they confine their choice to men of a certain census only, they act conformably to the principle of an oligarchy. A third kind of oligarchy takes place, when offices are hereditary; and a fourth, when in addition to this circumstance, the magistrates govern by their own will and pleasure, and not by established laws. This last and worst kind is called in Greece a dynasty. It bears the same relation to oligarchy that tyranny does to monarchy, and that the turbulence of the democracy last described bears to the fair equality of popular government.

A constitution sometimes one thing by law and another in fact.

Such then are the various kinds of oligarchies and democracies. But it ought not to escape the notice of a diligent inquirer into politics, that a constitution may be of one kind by law, and of another in fact. Some states are governed democratically, of which the fundamental laws are not democratical; and others are governed oligarchically, of which the fundamental laws

laws are not oligarchical. In such common-wealths the practice of the government is at variance with its theory; and this most frequently happens in consequence of a silent, gradual, and therefore unperceived revolution. In operating this revolution, there is sometimes a long conflict between laws and manners. — Manners finally prevail. The law remains only as a dead letter; while the men who have effected the change, become masters of the commonwealth.

B O O K
VI.

How this
happens.

The forms of oligarchy and democracy, which we have hitherto examined abstractedly, have each of them suitable materials with which they naturally incorporate. A people subsisting chiefly by agriculture, and possessed, as is usual with such a people, of very moderate fortunes, naturally arrange themselves into a legal and well-constituted democracy. They may subsist comfortably by labour, they would be soon ruined by idleness; they contrive a government, therefore, which requires as little expence of time as possible; and employ on all occasions, when it is practicable, the great machine of law to save the labour of man. Their assemblies convene but rarely, because they never convene unnecessarily. A certain census is requisite for enjoying a share in the government; but this census is so moderate that it may be acquired by every industrious citizen, without greater exertions of labour than are necessary to make provision for his family. Among such a people, government is carried on without salaries, without revenues,

Chap. 6.

Of the
people qualified for
enjoying
the best
and cheapest form of
democracy.

and

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Of the
people fit
only for
the worst
and most
extrava-
gant demo-
cracy.

and without taxes. The affairs of the community, therefore, are left to assume their natural order; since men have no undue motive to engage them to abandon their own profitable concerns, in order to employ themselves in matters which will be much better managed without their unseasonable interference.^a

Between this simple and frugal democracy, and that which naturally establishes itself in consequence of wealth acquired by commerce or conquest, there are two intermediate gradations; one, in which without requiring any qualification in point of fortune, all those who are not of a servile or foreign extraction, are held partners in the government; and another, in which without any regard even to descent or birth, all those who are freemen enjoy the rights of citizens. Yet as under both these gradations, salaries and fees of office are unknown, there will not be any unseasonable interference in matters of administration; and the regularity of law will prevail over the caprice of human affection. The fourth kind of democracy arises the last in point of time, because it cannot take place till cities have acquired a certain measure of population and of wealth. A great population, and that condensed in cities, makes the multitude feel, and enables them to exert their strength. All men indiscriminately claim a share in the government; and as most people

^a This meaning is naturally suggested by what immediately follows.

cannot

cannot, without reducing themselves to beggary, afford time for exercising the functions of the citizen or statesman, their public services must be paid by the commonwealth, and the revenues of the state must supply the deficiencies of their private fortunes. By such an expedient the poorer citizens obtain a greater command of leisure than even the rich themselves. The former have nothing to care for, their wants being supplied by the public; the latter are encumbered with the weight of their private affairs; and on every occasion so much outvoted, that they often cease to attend any assemblies whatever, either deliberative or judicial, thus abandoning their country to the licentious and lawless multitude.

The first kind of oligarchy naturally takes place, when there is a great, but not an excessive disproportion, among the estates of individuals; and when the census requisite for sharing the government excludes the majority of the people, yet comprehends, however, such a considerable number of men, that motives of personal interest are outweighed by considerations of public good. Excessive wealth and excessive poverty are equally productive of that restless temper which subverts laws and ruins states. When the members of a democracy are not so poor that they must subsist at the public expence, and the members of an oligarchy not so rich that they disdain the management of their private estates, neither the one nor the other will be easily persuaded unseasonably to

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VI.

Chap. 7.

Of the
people fit
for living
under the
different
kinds of
oligarchy.

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Z

inter-

BOOK interfere in matters of government; and their
 { **VL** own interest and convenience will naturally lead
 them to prefer the authority of laws to that of
 men. But when the wealth of an oligarchy in-
 creases as the number of its members diminishes,
 then ambition will take possession of every breast;
 and the *oligarchy* will be exactly the more
 vicious, in proportion as it approaches to *ty-
 ranny*. While diffident of its own strength, it
 will content itself with commanding elections,
 and raising to office its creatures and dependents.
 It will then proceed to govern by itself without
 the instrumentality of others, and advancing
 from one step to another in its ambitious career,
 will render its power first absolute, and then he-
 reditary; thus successively degenerating into
 what has been called a lawless and tyrannical
 dynasty.*

Chap. 8.

Of aristo-
 cracy, and
 its different
 kinds.

Besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy,
 there are two other kinds of government; that
 which is commonly called an aristocracy, and
 that which we have named by the general ap-
 pellation of all commonwealths, a republic; a
 form of political arrangement which, as it rarely
 occurs, has been omitted by Plato and other
 writers. In strictness of language, an aristo-
 cracy is that form of polity in which the pre-
 eminence of birth, wealth, and every such po-
 litical advantage totally disappears and vanishes
 in comparison of that which is infinitely greater

* Aristotle here repeats that this kind of oligarchy corresponds
 with the fourth species of democracy.

than them all ; a government in which civil honours are distributed or apportioned by no other rule or standard but that of virtue alone ; and in which the duties of a good man perfectly coincide with the duties of a good citizen. But the aristocracies which commonly prevail, are formed on a coarser model ; and as they differ from oligarchies on the one hand, so they differ from this perfect republic on the other. In such aristocracies, respect is had, not merely to wealth, not merely to virtue, not merely to strength and numbers ; but all those political advantages claim their respective shares of political consideration ; and, combined with each other, form the rule or principle according to which honours and offices are distributed and conferred. Such is the political arrangement of the aristocracy of Carthage. Virtue, pure and unmixed, is not the governing principle of that state. Yet virtue still enjoys a certain share of influence ; maintaining in the political conflict, an honourable struggle against wealth and numbers ; equal to either of them singly, though inferior to their united strength. In Sparta, virtue and numbers long divided the field ; and the reciprocal shocks of those contending principles maintained the pre-eminence of the few ; and the freedom of all. There are then various kinds of aristocracies, besides that which is the best and most perfect ; and to those already mentioned, we may add every form of mixed government in which the balance of power visibly inclines to the side of the few.

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Chap. 9.

Of a republic,
strictly so
called, or
mixed
government:

its definition.

It remains now to treat of this mixed government and of tyranny; which last we throw into the background, as being of all others the least deserving the name of polity. The nature of a mixed government, or what for distinction sake we call a republic, will evidently appear by considering the elements of which it is composed. These are, oligarchy and democracy; though such mixed governments as incline most to the side of democracy are commonly called republics, while those which incline most to the side of oligarchy are commonly called aristocracies; because morals and education seem to have a natural connection with wealth; the rich being already in possession of that very object for the acquisition of which men are most frequently stimulated to injustice. In vulgar language, therefore, a rich man is confounded with a good one; and as there are only three distinct principles which contend for political authority, virtue, wealth, and numbers, (for birth may always be analysed into hereditary virtue or hereditary wealth,) it is plain, that if we comprehend under the name of aristocracy, all those governments in which virtue forms a constituent element, we must define a republic, strictly so called, to be that in which wealth and numbers, that is, the prerogatives of the few, and the rights and liberties of the many, are duly respected and impartially maintained. The laws, therefore, adapted to a republic, must be formed by properly blending those which prevail in democracies and oligarchies. When, with regard to

to any one object, the respective laws of these distinct forms of polity are not incompatible with each other, both are to be employed ; when they are totally inconsistent, neither of them is to be employed, but a new law is to be framed holding a due middle between them ; and when the oligarchic and democratic laws regulating any object, are both of them complex, and consist of many articles or clauses, some clauses are to be copied from the one, and some from the other. In oligarchies, for example, the service of the rich as jurymen, is compelled by a fine ; but that of the poor is not rewarded by a fee. In democracies, on the contrary, the attendance of the poor is rewarded, but the non-attendance of the rich is not punished. A law, truly politic and republican, must unite both those partial regulations, by punishing the non-attendance of the rich, and paying the attendance of the poor. Again, in oligarchies a high qualification, in point of fortune, is necessary to constitute the right of voting in the national assembly ; in democracies this qualification is often reduced to a mere trifle. A good political law will adopt neither of these extremes, but prefer and establish what is the just middle between them. Again, appointment to office by suffrage is most suitable to the nature of an oligarchy, and appointment to office by lot is most suitable to the nature of democracy ; in the former government a high census is required in the candidates : in the latter a small census only, or none. A well-constituted

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republic,

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By what
nice prin-
ciples esta-
blished, and
regulated ;

illustrated
by exam-
ples.

B O O K republic, therefore, will borrow the clause re-
 VI. specting the mode of appointment to office
 from oligarchies, and the clause respecting the
 pecuniary qualification of the candidates, from
 democracies. It will *elect* its magistrates, but
 without paying undue regard to their opu-
 lence.

Rule by
 which it
 may be
 known
 whether a
 republic be
 well con-
 stituted.

The strongest proof, that a republic is well
 composed and happily blended, results from this,
 that the terms oligarchy and democracy may
 be applied to it with equal, though not exact
 propriety. Such a republic seems to compre-
 hend both extremes, because it contains a due
 mixture of opposite principles, nicely poised
 and accurately adjusted. Of this kind is Sparta,
 which many call a democracy, because the chil-
 dren of the poor enjoy a similar education with
 those of the rich; because, in their advance-
 ment to manhood, the same institutions and
 modes of life still embrace both ranks; in their
 dress and diet there is not any distinction; they
 eat at common tables, and the clothes of the
 most wealthy are such as even the poorest can
 afford to wear. Of the two highest magistracies,
 the citizens elect the one, and may be them-
 selves elected to the other. The senators are
 chosen by the assembled multitude, and every
 one of the people may be chosen to fill a place
 in the council of the Ephori. On the other
 hand, many call Sparta an oligarchy, because
 all offices are conferred by suffrage, none be-
 stowed by lot; and because the power of life
 and death resides in the breasts of a few. A
 well-

well-mixed republic, then, must participate of **BOOK**
 oligarchy and democracy; it must seem to be **VI.**
 both, and neither; and it must subsist by internal vigour, not by foreign influence. Any form of commonwealth, good or bad, may be kept together by the impression of external force; but that form is good which flourishes by its native energy; for this can only take place, when each component part feels its own benefit intimately connected with the safety of the whole.

We now proceed to speak of tyranny, rather for the sake of method, than that such an institution is at all worthy of consideration. In treating of monarchy, we formerly examined whether kings were, in general, useful in a commonwealth; and under what particular circumstances royal government might with propriety be established. We likewise mentioned two kinds of tyranny, both of which bear a resemblance to royalty; the first is, that which generally prevails among Barbarians, and which is consonant to their genius and character; the second is, that which occasionally prevailed in some countries of Greece, the government of the *Æsymnetes*. Both the barbarian monarchs and the Grecian *Æsymnetes*, were unquestionably tyrants, since they exercised unlimited and absolute power. But they resembled kings in this, that their power was voluntarily conferred, cheerfully submitted to, and, therefore, lawfully established. But there is a third kind of tyranny, which most properly deserves that
 z 4 odious

Chap. 10.
 Of tyranny, and its different kinds.

BOOK VI. odious name, and which stands in direct opposition to royalty; it takes place when one man, the worst, perhaps, and basest in the country, governs a kingdom with no other view than the advantage of himself and his family; a government, which it cannot be supposed, that those who know what freedom is, should voluntarily endure.

Chap. II.

Principles
by which it
may be de-
termined,
what is
practically
the best
form of
govern-
ment.

We proceed now to investigate what is practically the best sort of commonwealth; not such a commonwealth as requires for its construction any extraordinary combination of virtues and talents, embellished by an accumulation of external advantages; the union of all which ought to form the object rather of our prayers, than of our hopes; but such a commonwealth as is adapted to the ordinary condition of society, and of which most men are qualified to be members. The aristocracies which we formerly described, are either too refined for the coarseness of practice, or approach so nearly to what we have called a republic, that they may be examined by the same principles, and estimated by the same standard; and, indeed, the maxims which we formerly established in our treatise of Ethics, will enable us to appreciate the practical value of all governments whatever. The best and happiest life, we proved in that treatise, to be a life of virtue, unobstructed in its exertions by external impediments; and virtue itself, we proved by an accurate and full analysis, to consist in mediocrity. What the best kind of life, therefore, is to an individual, the best

best government is to a state ; for the government I mean (as above specified, not the government constituted by law, but the government existing in fact) is the life of the state. The perfection, therefore, of this political and incorporated life, must be found within the same limits or boundaries which comprehend that condition of external circumstances, and that inward frame of mind, constituting the happiness of those individuals of whom communities are composed.

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With regard to external circumstances, communities are composed of three classes of men : men encumbered by wealth, men oppressed by poverty, and men enjoying a happy mediocrity of fortune. Excess of wealth, like superiority in strength or in beauty, disdains the dictates of propriety, and spurns the authority of reason : extreme poverty, like weakness and deformity, sours the temper, and debases the character. The former excesses produce insolence ; the latter engender baseness : and these, together, form the ordinary sources of all human turpitude ; the one spreading into every species of audacious guilt, the other sinking into every kind of cowardly fraud and mean mischief. Under great inequality of external circumstances, a city therefore must be filled, not with men, but with despots and slaves, of those unfit for exercising legal authority, and those unfit for yielding liberal obedience ; while friendship, the bond of social life, is broken, destroyed, or corrupted into contempt on the one side, and into envy on the other. A certain mediocrity is

Illustration
of these
principles ;
and the
praise of
mediocrity.

B O O K is necessary to equality, equality to friendliness,
 { **VI.** and friendliness to security. Under all govern-
 ments, the happiness of those men is most secure,
 whose condition is above committing wrong, and
 too humble to expose them to envy. Therefore,
 Phocylides^a said, and prayed,

“ How happy is the middle walk of life,
 “ O ! may it be my portion in the state ! ”

It is plain, therefore, that the best common-wealth is that in which middling men most abound ; and prove, if not more powerful than both, at least, superior to either of the extremes. When this does not take place, the common-wealth necessarily degenerates either into oligarchy or into democracy ; both which forms of government are much more likely than a republic abounding in the middle ranks to fall under the tyranny of one man ; as shall be explained more clearly hereafter, in treating the subject of political revolutions. Such a republic is not only less liable to be subverted : it subsists unagitated by sedition ; the great intermediate mass restraining the activity of the two hostile extremes ; for this reason, democracies are found to be more durable than oligarchies, because in the former, the middling class is more numerous than in the latter ; and large commu-

^a A gnomic or moral poet of Miletus, who flourished five hundred years before Christ, the contemporary of Theognis, of Megara ; which two, together with old Hesiod, Isocrates considers as the best masters of life and manners. Orat. ad Nicocl. The remains ascribed to Phocylides do not contain the words in the text : but although they amount to only 215 verses, they thrice repeat the sentiment. See vv. 12. 52. 65.

nities

nities enjoy more tranquillity than small ones, which, from the paucity of their members, have few citizens of an intermediate condition between riches and poverty. It is this intermediate class, however, that alone balances and keeps steady the vessel of the republic; when this class is destroyed or removed, an outrageous democracy takes place, which is speedily overwhelmed in its own fury.

The best legislators have, in point of rank and fortune, been men of an ordinary level. As to himself, Solon attests this in his poetry. The same is to be said of Charondas, and of almost all others. Lycurgus was not the king, but the legislator of Sparta. A republic founded on the salutary principles of mediocrity and just equality is, indeed, a rare phenomenon. Of all those invested with power, one man alone*, as far as history informs us, could be prevailed on to establish such a political arrangement; most other leaders, whether of the nobles or of the people, never contenting themselves with equality, but always aspiring to superiority, and alternately abusing their advantages for giving an undue preponderancy to their respective factions. In this fatal ambition they have been encouraged and confirmed by the leading states of Greece, which have always been solicitous to mould every neighbouring republic after their

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VI.

The passions of individuals and of states, resist the establishment of the best government;

* Aristotle perhaps means Clifthenes, the Athenian, whom he praises in other parts of this work, particularly l. vi. c. 4. See the History of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xviii. p. 118. Clifthenes restored the institutions of Solon. This was his chief merit. I rather think, therefore, that Aristotle means Solon himself.

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BOOK VI.

which is a limit and model of perfection, to which legislators ought continually to approximate.

Chap. 12.

The legislator and statesman ought always to strengthen the middle class, and to render it more powerful than either extreme.

own model. Blinded by passion, contending parties have been unable, or unwilling, to perceive any thing between the miserable alternative of commanding with insolence, or obeying with servility; and substantial happiness has therefore been almost constantly sacrificed to silly pride. Having thus examined what is practically the best commonwealth, it will be easy to appreciate the merit of all others, by their degrees of approximation to this model of perfection; a model, which the legislator ought always to keep in view under every condition of society, but which the wide variety of materials, on which he has to operate, will enable him to imitate under different circumstances with more or less exactness, and more or less facility.

In every community whatever, the stability of government requires, that those who desire its continuance should be more powerful than those who desire its dissolution. The political arrangement, therefore, of every state, must always depend on the prevailing inclination of that party which is preponderant; and this preponderancy again must consist either in quantity or quality; quantity, denoting mere superiority in number; and quality, the distinguishing excellencies of the upper ranks; birth, wealth, education, the love of glory and of the republic. Quantity and quality often acting in opposite directions, their relative forces must be estimated, and a proportion instituted for discovering which principle will prevail in the conflict.

If

If one party surpasses in quality more than it is surpassed in quantity, it is plain that the balance must incline to the side of the few, and different kinds of oligarchies must necessarily be established. If, on the contrary, the popular party exceed more in quantity, than they are excelled in quality, democracy must prevail: the first and best kind of democracy, if the majority of the people be husbandmen; the last and worst, if tradesmen and manufacturers; and, in proportion to the ingredients composing them, the intermediate kinds, more or less faulty. But, in all those cases, a wise legislator will constantly endeavour to comprehend, in his scheme of polity, men of the middle rank, and to render them, if not more powerful than both the extremes, at least superior to either; because, when this takes place, the government is likely to prove durable. There is not any reason to apprehend, that the rich and the poor should lay aside their natural animosities, and conspire against this class which is comparatively on good terms with both, and the natural mediator between them. The contending parties cannot, therefore, weaken or diminish its influence, without proportionally strengthening the power of their respective adversaries. But those who establish oligarchies neglect this consideration; and by aspiring to an imaginary good, incur a real evil: for the preposterous ambition of the great proves ruinous to more states than even the unjust violence of the multitude.

The

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Chap. 13.

The political sleights by which the great deceive the multitude, regard five objects.
1st, The assembly.

The great, in order to disguise their ambition, and the multitude, in order to palliate their injustice, have recourse to many juggling artifices, by which they endeavour mutually to deceive each other. These devices regard the five following objects; the assembly, the courts of justice, the magistracies, the militia, and the gymnastic exercises. To engross all power in the assembly, the rich and noble easily delude the people into a law, exacting a severe fine for non-attendance from men of a certain census. Such men, therefore, will be careful to attend; while the poor, who are not liable to any penalty, will for the most part desert their duty, and thus abandon their share in the government.

2d, Courts of Justice.

A similar contrivance succeeds with regard to the courts of justice, and the duty of serving as jurymen. By a law of Charondas^p, a fine was in this case imposed even on the poor; but so small, that it served no other purpose than that of saving appearances; for when one trick is discovered, another is substituted in its stead. Thus, all who have inscribed their names in the public register, are entitled to exercise the functions of deliberative and judiciary power; but if, after this, they neglect to exercise them, they subject themselves to a severe penalty; the poor, therefore, avoid enrolling their names, lest they should incur the penalty. With regard

3d, The magistracy.

to burdensome offices, they are permitted to excuse themselves from holding them, without

^p See above, b. ii. c. x. p. 141.

other

other proof than that of their own oaths; they are not compelled, under heavy fines, to provide themselves with arms, nor to acquire skill in the gymnastic exercises; and all these exemptions, which they are taught to regard as indulgences, effectually diminish their consideration in the state.

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4th and
5th, Arms
and exer-
cises.

The lower classes of men sometimes endeavour, in their turn, to encounter the artifices of the great with similar address. The non-attendance of the rich in the assembly, or courts of justice, is not punished; but their own attendance is rewarded; and this fee or reward, which is to them a mighty matter, is far too small to operate as a motive on their superiors. A well-constituted republic ought, as we observed before, to see the poor, and fine the rich; by which means, both parties would be rendered diligent in the discharge of their political functions, and neither side be enabled to engross power, and usurp the commonwealth.

Those by
which the
democrati-
cal party
deceive the
great.

Wealth is a thing relative and indefinite; and the census, therefore, in each state, must vary with the circumstances of the community. It ought never to be so high, as to leave that portion of the citizens which is excluded from office, more considerable than that which is admitted; otherwise, the government cannot be expected to prove durable. The mere populace will easily submit to exclusion, but they will not tolerate injustice, or brook insult. They will even fight boldly, if they are fed abundantly; and the patient submission of the people may generally

Rule by
which the
census
ought to be
established.

B O O K generally be ensured by the prudent moderation
 of their superiors.

VI.
 Rule by
 which the
 military
 force ought
 to be esta-
 blished;

illustrated
 by history;

The census, we have said, is a thing comparative and indefinite: but the right of bearing arms has its precise limit. It must be bestowed on citizens, and them only; for to disarm men is little less than to enslave them. In some states, as the republic of Malea, all those who have ever borne arms, exercised the deliberative and judiciary powers; but offices of executive magistracy belonged to those only who were actually enrolled as soldiers. After the subversion of royalty, the first governments in Greece were entirely in the hands of military men, and those wholly horsemen; for before the invention of tactics, the strength of states consisted merely in cavalry. But as populousness increased, and tactics were improved, the sphere of political consideration was extended, and the people at large became sharers in the great partnership of government. What is now regarded as an aristocratical republic was, therefore, anciently called a democracy, but had, in *fact*, a strong tendency to oligarchy, or even to royalty. The intermediate ranks were then few in number, and destitute of strength; and therefore they, as well as their inferiors, easily submitted to the authority of the same men in peace whom they had been accustomed to follow and obey as their leaders in war.

Chap. 14.

Analysis of
 the foregoing

Having thus examined states in relation to the materials of which they are composed, and shewn how many, and what kinds of compositions

tions result from the various combinations of the same simple elements, we must proceed to analyse and explain what is properly called the sovereignty. This complex object comprehends the deliberative, executive, and judicial powers^a; powers, which must be differently regulated and distributed in relation to the nature and plan of each particular constitution; but which, in all constitutions, ought to be regulated and distributed agreeably to public utility, the great end of all legal governments. The deliberative power is generally supposed to include the right of determining concerning war and peace; concerning laws, treaties, alliances, death, banishment, and confiscation; as well as the right of calling the magistrates to account for malversation in office. These important matters must be entrusted either to the people at large, or to a certain description of the people constituting one or more distinct councils: or some of those great questions must be decided by the popular assembly, and others committed to distinct tribunals, or particular magistrates. That all matters of deliberation should be decided by all the people, which is consonant to the nature of democracy, is susceptible of many variations; for all the people may be entitled to deliberate and decide, either collectively, or successively;

BOOK
VI.

reignty in-
to the deli-
berative,
the execu-
tive, and
judicial
powers.

Wherein
the deliber-
ative power
consists.

The va-
rious modes
in which it
may be re-
gulated in
democra-
cies;

^a I have here expressed Aristotle's sense in modern language. In this chapter he treats concerning that part of the sovereignty which he calls, το βουλευτικόν, translated the deliberative; in chapter xv. concerning that part which he calls το περί τα ἀρχαί, translated the executive; in chapter xvi. concerning that part which he calls το δικαστικόν, translated the judicial.

BOOK

VI.

which latter obtains in the republic of Telecles the Mileſian. In ſome republics, the different magiſtrates form a ſupreme council, which directs the ordinary buſineſs of government; but magiſtracy is exerciſed by men drawn promiſcuouſly from tribes, wards, diſtricts, and the minuteſt ſubdiviſions of the people, until it paſſes ſucceſſively through the whole body. Yet the citizens at large never convene in the popular aſſembly, except for the purpoſe of making new laws; of regulating the conſtitution; or of hearing, on any important emergency, the reſolves of the magiſtrates. In other republics, the aſſembly convenes not only for thoſe purpoſes, but for the purpoſe of elections, for deciding war and peace, and for examining the conduct of men in office, who, on all ordinary occaſions, direct, as well as carry on, the buſineſs of government, acting for the people at large*, from whom they are appointed by lot, or elected by ſuffrage. Another mode of conſtituting the deliberative power is, that the national aſſembly convene, to appoint the magiſtrates, to take an account of their adminiſtration, and to decree war or peace; but that all other matters be determined, as well as

* In modern language, repreſenting the people at large. We ſhall ſoon find deliberative and elective aſſemblies, compoſed of a part of the citizens, acting for, or repreſenting the people at large; which Ariſtotle ſometimes conſiders as the beſt form of democracy, and ſometimes qualifies with the title of πολιτικά. οἱ δὲ ἐν τρόπῳ τῷ παντὶ, πλιώς. οἷς μὲν, τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλὰ μὴ παντὶς ἀθροῦς. This is ſaid with regard to deliberative aſſemblies, c. xiv. and with regard to elective aſſemblies, he ſays, c. xv. τὰ δὲ, μὴ παντὶς αἵμα μὴ καθήκοντα, ἐξ αἰκαιῶν δὲ, :: πολιτικόν.

CON-

conducted, by distinct magistrates, or ministers appointed by lot, when ordinary talents and plain honesty are sufficient for the proper discharge of their duty; and elected by suffrage, when, in addition to these qualities, experience and skill appear requisite for the due execution of their office. The last and worst mode of constituting the deliberative power, is that of lodging it on all occasions with the great body of the people, convened in the public assembly, and rendering the magistrates, as to matters of volition, mere passive instruments for executing the pleasure of the multitude. This preposterous distribution prevails only in that kind of democracy, which we have proved to be analogous to oligarchic dynasty and monarchic tyranny.

All the modes of regulating the deliberative power, above explained, are consonant with the nature of democracy; but when this power is always lodged with a part of the community, or with a particular description of men, to the perpetual exclusion of all others, an oligarchy necessarily takes place. Yet, when this description includes men of moderate fortunes, and when all who acquire such fortunes are of course summoned to the council, and when there are certain fundamental laws, which even this supreme council does not think itself empowered to abrogate or alter, the moderation of such an oligarchy approaches nearly to the arrangements of what we have called a well-constituted republic. That also may be called

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In oligarchies;

B O O K a moderate oligarchy, in which men of a certain
 { **VL** census elect a council entrusted with the delibera-
 tive power, but bound to exercise this power agreeably to established laws. The oligarchy degenerates into a tyrannical dynasty, when the deliberative body supplies, by its own authority, the vacancies among its members; or, what is still worse, when prudence in deliberation is supposed an hereditary virtue, and the right of deciding absolutely for the community at large is vested in certain families, and descends from fathers to their children*. When some matters of deliberation are entrusted to the magistrates, and others committed to the people at large, particularly the alternative of war and peace, and the impeachment of men in office, such an arrangement may be called aristocratical; particularly when the magistrates are appointed by election, or by a mixture of choice and chance, that is, appointed by lot from persons whose characters have been previously examined, and generally approved. The mixture of lot and suffrage, and the appointment to some deliberative functions in the one way, and to other deliberative functions in the other, is consonant to the nature of what we call a republic. Such then are the modes of distributing this portion of the sovereignty, conformably to the nature of different governments.

in mixed
govern-
ments.

How de-
mocracies
and oligar-

It would be highly conducive to the improvement of what is now called democracy, were

* See above, p. 334. with which compare Polybius, vi. 8. vol. ii. p. 471. edit. Sweigh.

that

that oligarchic regulation to be introduced which fines the rich for non-attendance. By this means, the assembly would be better composed, and its deliberations more moderate and more salutary, the passions and interests of different orders mutually repressing that violence to which all of them, unchecked, are liable. It would, also, prove greatly advantageous, that in each tribe or district, certain deliberative functions should be conferred by suffrage, and others distributed by lot; and if the populace be extremely numerous, that only certain divisions of them should be entitled successively to receive fees, or allowed successively to try their chance in the appointment by lot. In oligarchies, on the other hand, the people at large might be rendered less hostile, nay, friendly, to the government, were certain deliberative functions entrusted to men chosen from the whole promiscuously, or were an institution to be introduced similar to what prevails in some republics, called the *Council of Preadvisers*, who prepare and impartially examine those public questions, which the nobles or citizens are afterwards entitled to decide. Nay, the nobles or magistrates might assume the office of preadvisers, which would give them a negative, before debate, on all popular decrees; or they might submit public measures to the free discussion of the people, reserving to themselves the right of ultimate decision. In republics, the people convened in the national assembly ought to have the power of acquittal, but not of condemnation; the latter, in the last resort, ought

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chies may
be improv-
ed into bet-
ter govern-
ments.

BOOK VI. always to rest with the magistrates and the law. The reverse of this prevails; the power of acquittal depends on the few, that of condemnation is lodged with the many. So much with regard to the deliberative power, which constitutes the foundation and root of the sovereignty.

Chap. 13.

Of the executive power in republics.

The executive power of government must necessarily be entrusted to magistrates, in whose appointment, regulation, and distribution, there is a great variety of cases. How many magistrates ought there to be? with what functions ought they to be entrusted? how long ought each office to last? a year, six months, longer than the former period, or shorter than the latter? Ought any offices to be for life, and ought the same offices to be held more than once by the same person? Still farther, who ought to elect or appoint the magistrates? from whom ought they to be chosen or appointed? and in what manner ought the appointment to be made? A philosophical statesman ought clearly to comprehend all those varieties, and to be capable of solving each question in all the ways that are particularly adapted to the nature and end of the different forms of government.

Wherein the executive power consists.

First of all, it is not perhaps clearly ascertained what properly constitutes a magistracy. A state requires many assistants and many superintendants—priests; ambassadors; sacred heralds; exhibitioners, at their own expence, of public amusements; all of whom, if not necessary for its mere subsistence, are yet essential to its

its well-being and happiness. None of these, however, are called magistrates, though they be appointed, as all magistrates are, by suffrage or lot; neither do we call magistrates those destined to functions merely subservient to œconomy, as corn-meters; nor those employed in offices rather menial than magisterial; offices, which in states moderately wealthy, are commonly consigned to slaves. He then is a magistrate who, in his own person, or associated with colleagues, is in certain matters entrusted by the public with the power of deliberating, of judging, above all, of commanding; and to define the word more nicely is not necessary for our present purpose.

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To return then from words to things, we observe that the division of labour greatly facilitates all pursuits, and that each kind of work is best performed, when each is allotted to a separate workman. To the complicated affairs of government, this observation is particularly applicable; but is not always possible that it should be practically applied. Small communities require nearly the same distinct offices of magistracy, that are necessary in large ones; but they do not require, that the duties of any one office should be so often exercised, or that the magistrates should so often perform precisely the same functions. Small communities therefore, may, without much inconvenience, admit of pluralities; and this is a fortunate circumstance, since it would not be easy, in such communities, to find a succession of men willing

The discrimination of offices in relation to the magnitude of the community, and the various forms of government.

BOOK and well qualified to exercise all public offices separately. It is necessary, therefore, to have recourse to an accumulation of employment, and to make the same individual answer several purposes; competently, though not perfectly; like those complex contrivances, the *obelisco-lychnia*, which, in the houses of the poor, serve alternately as spits and candlesticks. Some offices must be separated, on account of the different places in which they are exercised; and others, on account of the different objects or persons to whom they relate. Can the same magistrate, who presides over the police in the market-place, direct that important object elsewhere? Ought he, who superintends the modesty of boys, to have the additional burden of guarding the morals of women? Under different forms of government there must be different magistrates, and those invested with different degrees of power, and appointed from different descriptions of persons. The office of senator is consonant to the nature of democracy; but that of preadviser, which was above described, is peculiarly applicable to oligarchy. In some democracies, indeed, the authority of the senate is inconsiderable; but this happens only in that last and worst kind of democracy, where the people, corrupted by fees, forsake their private affairs, to carry on the lucrative trade of government. The censor of manners, is a magistrate adapted only to an aristocracy. What should he do in a democracy! Is it possible, under such a government, to keep the wives of the poor in their houses! and his remon-
strances

frances would be superfluous in an oligarchy, where women, especially the wives of the magistrates, are dissolved in luxury. BOOK
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We now proceed to the important subject of the appointment of magistrates; a subject included within three terms, each of which admits of three variations. The three terms are, those who may appoint, those who may be appointed, and the manner of the appointment. Those who appoint, may consist either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in some offices, they may consist of all; in others, of a part. Those who may be appointed, may consist either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in some offices, of all; in others, of a part. The manner of appointment is also threefold, by election; by suffrage; in some offices by election; in others by suffrage. There are, therefore, in all, nine variations or differences; and it comes to be considered in how many ways those nine differences may be combined with each other; the appointers, the appointed, and the mode of appointment entering into each combination. The three variations or differences, in the appointers, combined with the same number of variations or differences in the appointed, will give, it is plain, nine combinations of two terms; and each of these nine may be repeated three times, since the appointment may be made in three ways. There are, therefore, in all twenty-seven combinations, or twenty-seven varieties in the appointment of magistrates; of which varieties, some are consonant to the nature of one kind of

The various ways of appointing magistrates,

BOOK of government, and others to that of another.

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That *all* the citizens should be capable of appointing or capable of being appointed, is consonant to the nature of democracy; but more especially when the word *all* is taken to denote the whole body of the citizens collectively. It also denotes the several tribes and minuter divisions of the citizens, which, united, compose the whole. In this latter sense, all the citizens are capable of appointing successively, or of being successively appointed; each division enjoying those advantages in its turn; which regulation, while it prevents the tumult incident to numerous assemblies, ensures the benefits of equality and freedom^{*}. We have shewn that each of the three terms concerned in the appointment of magistrates, admits of three varieties. If two of the terms, namely, the appointers and appointed, be limited to two varieties only, and consist in all elections either of the whole or a part of the citizens, without coupling together the whole and the part in the manner above specified, then all the varieties in constituting magistrates will be reduced to twelve[†]. For the whole citizens may appoint

^{*} Such, according to Aristotle, was once the plan of the republic of Mantinea, so justly celebrated; and such was the republic of Telecles the Milesian. Polyb. l. vi. c. xliii. Ælian Var. Hist. l. ii. c. xxii. Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. vi. The last mentioned author calls Mantinea an aristocracy, which the learned Schweighæuser, Annot. ad Polyb. t. v. p. 384. says, agrees with Aristotle, Polit. l. vi. c. iv. This, however, is not true; for Aristotle calls it a democracy.

[†] When there are three varieties in each of the three terms, then $3 \times 3 = 9 \times 3 = 27$; but when two of the terms are supposed to vary only

appoint from the whole, by suffrage ; by lot ; in some offices by suffrage, in others by lot : or the whole may appoint from a part by suffrage ; by lot ; and sometimes by suffrage, sometimes by lot. This, then, affords six varieties ; and there must be the same number precisely when a part only appoints. For this part may appoint from the whole by vote ; by lot ; or sometimes by vote, sometimes by lot ; and likewise from a part, by the same three modes of appointment, that is ; by vote ; by lot ; and sometimes in the one way, sometimes in the other. There will, therefore, be twelve combinations, without coupling together the whole and the part, either in the appointers or the appointed ; that is, without reckoning the combinations resulting from the right of the whole to appoint in some cases, and a part in others ; and from the capacity of the whole to be appointed in some cases, and a part only in others. A simple democracy requires that the whole collectively should appoint from the whole by vote, by lot ; or in some offices by vote, in others by lot. A well-ordered republic requires that the whole not collectively, but separately by divisions, should appoint from the whole, or from a part ; by suffrage, by lot, or by a due mixture of both. An oligarchy requires that a part only should be invested with the right of appointing, either by vote or by

adjusted to
the different
forms
of govern-
ment.

only in two ways, then $2 \times 2 = 4$. & $4 \times 3 = 12$. The text is corrupt ; and it seems scarcely possible to give any clear explanation of it, that will not be liable to philological objections.

lot ;

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lot; or in some cases by vote, in others by lot; and this last mode, as it is most satisfactory to the people at large, is most favourable to the stability of the government. In aristocracies, all the citizens may be invested with the right of electing, but the elected must be persons of a certain description. In oligarchies, the sphere of the candidates, as well as that of the electors, must be narrowed and confined to persons of a certain census. Such then are the principal modes of constituting magistrates, which are respectively adapted to different governments; but when different modes are equally well adapted to the frame of the government, the propriety of preferring the one to the other will depend on the duties and functions of the office or magistracy itself. Under the same form of government there may be good reasons for appointing a general in one way, and a judge in another.

Chap. 16.

Of the judiciary power.

Of the three portions of the sovereignty above mentioned, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, the last only remains to be treated. The varieties of courts of justice are limited by the different modes in which they may be constituted; the qualities of the members of whom they may be composed; and the various kinds of causes which they are empowered to determine. Judges may, like other magistrates, be appointed by suffrage, or by lot; from all the citizens indiscriminately, or from persons of a certain description only; but the different nature of the causes which they are empowered to deter-

determine, forms the specific distinction among **B O O K**
 courts of justice. These causes may all be re- **VI.**
 duced to the eight following classes: 1. The **Judicial**
 responsibility of magistrates; for in every go- **proceed-**
 vernment not arbitrary, there must be a court of **ings re-**
 impeachment. 2. Acts of injustice respecting **duced to**
 the property of the community, whether com- **eight kinds.**
 mitted by magistrates or private persons. 3. All
 acts, by whomever committed, which have a
 tendency to subvert or change the constitution.
 4. All matters relating to fines and amercements.
 5. Disputes concerning contracts of a certain im-
 portance, or concerning objects exceeding a cer-
 tain value. 6. All causes concerning homicide,
 including under that general name, malice pro-
 pense, chance medley, and all the various cases
 in which the life of a man is acknowledged to
 have been taken away, but the criminality of
 the act is the matter in question. The court of
 Phreattæ in Athens tries persons who, having
 fled for murder, have returned to their country;
 which causes, however, cannot prove so nu-
 merous as to require a separate jurisdiction, even
 in large communities. 7. The causes of strangers,
 whether among themselves or between strangers
 and citizens, form the seventh class. 8. The
 eighth includes pecuniary questions of small
 amount, five drachmas or a little more, which
 must indeed be determined, but which ought
 not to occupy the attention of a numerous tri-
 bunal. How inferior courts are formed, is not
 always a matter of the most essential importance;
 but unless those supreme judicatures be well re-
 gulated,

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The various ways
in which
courts of
judicature
may be
constituted.

gulated, which decide great political questions, and ascertain men's rights in society, confusion and sedition will ensue.

Such courts may be constituted from the citizens at large, appointed by lot or suffrage, to judge of all political or public causes; or the judges in some causes may be appointed by lot, and in others by suffrage; or in trying the same causes, or causes of the same nature, the same court may be constituted partly by suffrage and partly by lot. There are, therefore, four ways in which the judges may be appointed from all the citizens collectively; and there are precisely as many when courts are constituted from all the citizens, not collectively, but successively; that is, when each division of the people enjoys in its turn the privilege of supplying the country with judges. Again, if the judges are to be appointed from men of a certain description only, courts may, on this supposition also, be constituted in four ways. For men of this description, distinguished by wealth, birth, or merit, may be appointed by lot or suffrage to try all political or public causes; or the judges in some causes may be appointed by lot, in others by suffrage; or in trying the same causes, or causes of the same nature, the same court may be constituted partly by lot, and partly by suffrage. There appears, therefore, to be in all twelve modes of forming judiciary assemblies, without coupling together the whole and the part; that is, without supposing that some courts are formed from the whole citizens collectively or successively, and

and others composed of men of a certain description only; or that the numbers of the same courts are chosen partly from the citizens at large, and partly from men of distinction.

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That all political or public causes should be determined by judges chosen from the people at large, is agreeable to the nature of democracy; that all such causes should be determined by men of a certain description, is agreeable to the nature of oligarchy; but that some courts should be formed from the citizens at large, and others from a distinguished portion of the citizens; or that the members of the same court should be appointed, some of them from the whole body of the people, and others from a distinguished part of the people; some of them by lot; and others by suffrage; all these mixtures and combinations are agreeable to the nature of a justly constituted and fairly balanced republic.

Adjusted to
the different
forms
of government.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VII.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK
VII. **T**HIS Seventh Book treats of political revolutions, whether slow and gradual, or rapid and violent; whether originating in the nature of civil society itself, or resulting from the form and principle of different constitutions of government. Had the author written with the express design of benefiting the present age, this part of his work could not be more useful or more seasonable. Even a more serious attention is due to it, than to any thing which the present times could possibly produce; since at this momentous æra, when the nations which have overturned their own governments, are continually exhorting and encouraging neighbouring states to imitate their example, we here find the opinions of the wisest man of antiquity on the great and awful questions which now agitate the world: the opinions of an author remote from our concerns, unmoved by our

* Commonly published as Book V.

passions,

passions, unaffected by our interests. On this **BOOK**
 serious subject, therefore, which now more than **VII.**
 at any other period in modern history, comes
 home to the business and bosoms of individuals,
 I need not be greatly apprehensive of tiring the
 reader, when I endeavour to place in a clear and
 strong light, those observations of the Stagirite,
 which seem best calculated to answer the imme-
 diate purpose of public and present utility.

From the nature of society, which, as above
 explained, is not a mere mass but a system, im-
 plying a distinction and subordination of parts;
 and still more palpably, though not more neces-
 sarily, from the nature of property, the creature
 of society, which in its very essence implies ine-
 quality, there must grow up and co-exist, with
 every community of men, whatever be the form
 of the commonwealth, a popular and an aristo-
 cratical interest^a; and thence, not indeed a
 perpetual conflict, but a perpetual tendency
 to conflict, between the rights and privileges
 of the many, and the pre-eminences and pre-
 rogatives of the few. This fermenting dis-
 content may be hindered from blazing into
 sedition, either by force or by art. All ranks
 may be levelled by the cruel hand of despotism;
 they may all be confounded by the wild rage of
 democracy. But these are remedies which cure
 the evil by killing the patient. The important

^a In some of the Italian republics of the middle age, the people
 destroyed the nobles; but the distinction immediately sprang up
 between "il popolo grasso & il popolo minuto;" and faction, instead
 of being softened, was thereby exasperated. Machiavel, Nerli, Ma-
 lavolti, passim.

BOOK question is, how this tendency to dissension may
 { **VII.** be repressed, without destroying that degree of
 independence or security which is essential to
 happiness, or that degree of power and authority
 which is essential to humanity itself; since indis-
 pensably necessary in rearing and holding to-
 gether the fabric of political society, in which
 all the perfections of humanity originate, and in
 which only their energies can be unfolded and
 displayed.^b

The proposed question Aristotle endeavours to answer. He observes that the evil most threatening to society, may be lessened by skilful political arrangement, nicely adapting to each other the principles and springs of government; but that it never can be eradicated unless one portion of mankind are so trained and educated that they will disdain to commit injustice, and think themselves more degraded by offering an insult, than even by receiving it; while those of an inferior stamp, how much inclined soever many of them may be to do wrong, are convinced that it cannot be done with impunity, and that they cannot hurt their superiors, without thereby more materially hurting their families and themselves^c. In an age exposed like the present to the conflict of opposite and unrelenting factions, the Stagirite, therefore, maintained that oligarchies, aristocracies, and every description of government vested in the few, can only be upheld by moderation in language as well as in behaviour; and that a

^b See above, p. 23, & seq.

^c Book ii. c. vii. *passim*.

single word of contumely had sometimes shaken the proudest *dynasties*^d. He maintained, that popular governments on the other hand, could rest securely on no other foundation than that of political justice; which consists in distributing to each individual his due, and in assigning to wealth and birth, as well as to talents and virtues, their legitimate distinctions and fair honours. While he thus endeavours to moderate the hostility of contending extremes, and to smoothe their mutual asperities, he strenuously exerts himself to make the middle classes of men love and cherish their condition as the very best and happiest in which they possibly could be placed; and, therefore, to reject and repel every attempt that might disturb or destroy it, as a daring invasion of their dearest interests. Governments are good and nations happy, in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppression of the great, as well as to resist the rapacity and malignity of the vulgar. Where this grand test of national felicity is found, the citizens or subjects ought to regard as matters of little moment, and even to consider with distrust, any proposed additions to their political advantages; which it will be always easier for vice and folly to destroy or diminish, than for the most enlarged wisdom to meliorate or extend.^e

Governments must always have their imperfections, while conducted by such imperfect

^d See above, p. 334.

^e See above, Book iv. c. xi.

B O O K creatures as men, whose nature it is to bestow
VII. an undue preference on the present above the
 future, and on a slight immediate benefit resulting to themselves above a far greater, more extensive, and more permanent advantage accruing to the public. All governments, therefore, that ever were established or devised, have contained, on the slightest examination, innumerable inconveniences; which, when deeply and intimately mingled in the nature of the constitution itself, ought rather to be patiently endured than violently corrected^f, because they are as much more tolerable than would be the evils of anarchy and sedition, as a state of civilization in which men lie under many oppressive restraints, is preferable to that of savage ferocity in which they are continually tearing to pieces each other; a melancholy spectacle which history never fails to exhibit, when government is for a moment suspended, or its powers to a certain degree enfeebled. The inherent vices of man, his pride, avarice, ambition, and selfishness, render it necessary that power should somewhere be exercised, lest injury should every where be committed; and the fewer and feebler those vices are, the government will naturally be the milder and more moderate. All plans of policy which suppose a complete reformation in the manners of mankind, are chimerical; but reformation to a certain point, salutary discipline will gradually pro-

^f See above, Book ii. c. vi. p. 110, & seq.

duce ;

duce; and exactly in proportion to the effect of this discipline, governments may be meliorated, and one system of policy be rendered more gentle and more desirable than another². For this reason our author observes, that the more society is improved and education perfected, the more equality will prevail, and the farther will liberty be extended. BOOK VII.

But even this political equality or liberty has, according to the Stagirite, its fixed and unalterable limits; since no political advantage, except the equal protection of just laws, can be carried to its utmost height, without becoming inconsistent with other advantages, collectively more important. Men in one sense are born equal; they are all equal as to their visible powers or *energies*, because they are all at their birth devoid of *any* that can be of the least public utility; but they are even then, extremely unequal as to their latent endowments or *capacities*; since, with precisely the same treatment and the same education, different individuals will attain very different measures of courage and wisdom, as well as of strength and agility. This original inequality is confirmed and strengthened by the exigencies and necessities of society, under all its possible forms; which, the more perfect it is, the more perfectly it will concur with the views and intentions of nature in promoting the benefit and happiness of the human race; purposes that can only be pro-

² αἰν δε το βελτιστον ηθος, βελτιστος αιτιον πολιτειας. Polit. l. viii. c. i.

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moted by the subordination of passion and ignorance to reason and wisdom. This is the great and paramount law of political society by which all men are bound from infancy to old age, and from their birth to their death^b. Society then is a system, having the good and perfection of humanity for its end, and requiring for the specific purposes for which the system is ordained, an interchange of action, a reciprocity of aid, a distinction and subordination of parts; heads to contrive, and hands to execute. For this reason, the inferior ranks of men, those habitually employed in personal service or productive industry, were debarred in most Grecian republics from high political functions; functions deemed incompatible with those mean and mercenary employments, that have a tendency to narrow or debase the faculties; to obstruct liberal thought, and restrain manly exertion. What is properly called the populace in contradistinction to the people at large, then consisted almost entirely of slaves; a palpable and odious deformity in the ancient republics; since a great proportion of mankind was thus subjected to a government, not of law, but of arbitrary will¹. Yet perfect equality and universal suffrage are

^b "A natural aristocracy is diffused by God through the whole body of mankind." Harrington's *Oceana*, p. 14. edit. 1656. "An army may as well consist of soldiers without officers, as a commonwealth consist of a people without a gentry." Ibid. Yet Harrington, surely, was not a man of a slavish mind. How far have the professed followers of Locke, the Rousseaus, the Turgots, the Prices, &c. outdone the enlightened friends of liberty in former ages!

¹ See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 36. The Grecian institutions, as I have there shewn, tended to palliate, but certainly did not cure the evil.

arrange-

arrangements not less blameable or less dangerous; since, as our author perpetually inculcates, these wild projects would totally subvert the principles on which society is built, and overturn the great fundamental law on which only it can rest.

Innumerable examples might be given of the same kind, all conspiring to prove that an ambition to reach perfection in one point of advantage, is destructive of other advantages not less essential. An experiment has been made in our own times of forming a simple legislature; or, in other words, of confiding what is called by Greek writers the deliberative power of government to one single assembly. This experiment stands in direct opposition to the recorded wisdom of antiquity, which maintained that two deliberative assemblies were essentially necessary in every well-regulated state, because absurd and ruinous resolutions were much less likely to be taken by two different bodies of men deliberating concerning the same object, than by one body of men only; whether a senate of the nobles, or an assembly of the people. If we suppose it to be ten to one, that such an extraordinary combination of circumstances should occur, as might extort from one of those courts or assemblies a decree ruinous to the state, or to any part of it, the rules of calculation will teach us, that it is not twenty, but an hundred to one, that the same decree should at the same time be confirmed by the second court or assembly, differently composed, and

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differ

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differently constituted. For the safety of the public, therefore, two deliberative bodies are always better than one; and according to the same principle of reasoning, three would be still better than two, and four better than three. But it is easy to perceive, that though the purpose of mature deliberation would thus be more perfectly secured by the multiplication of courts and assemblies, the great end of seasonable and wise decision would not thereby the more probably be attained; but on the contrary, through delays and dissensions, would commonly be entirely defeated. From this plain and palpable example, we may learn to perceive with our author that, in matters of far more difficulty and delicacy, political wisdom consists in avoiding extremes. He continually inculcates and repeats, that the propriety of practical things lies not in an indivisible point, but in a broad middle; that in them nice accuracy is not to be aimed at; but that we must be contented in politics with such a degree of perfection as suits the coarseness of the subject; nor preposterously forego, by over-refinement in one point of advantage, other advantages still more solid; relinquish certainty for hope; or incur the danger of real evil for the sake of imaginary improvement.

Of all political errors (an error long prevalent in the practice as well as in the theory of the Greek republics) the greatest is that of thinking that the institutions of one people may be safely communicated to another, differently endowed

endowed and differently circumstanced. Men are no where to be found unwritten tablets. Their minds are deeply impressed by education and habit, as well as by the events of time and chance, which giving to each nation its distinctive character, peculiarly adapt it to that form of political arrangement into which it has been gradually moulded. The establishing of governments is the work of time; and to new-model them successfully and happily, requires still more time than originally to establish them; because laws operate as practical principles of moral conduct, and old principles must be obliterated by time and custom, before the new can by the same means be communicated and impressed. Men destitute of principles are the most odious and most abominable of savages; and practical principles are to be acquired by practice only; they are the result of repeated acts, fortified by time and familiarised by custom. Yet in direct opposition to these maxims of reason, confirmed by universal experience, we have seen the revolutionary doctrines which prevailed in the worst times of Greece, revived in the present age; and a single nation proposing in a tone of authority the institutions, which she herself has thought fit to adopt, to all the countries around her; and, in her eagerness not only to diffuse her political principles as extensively as the world, but to reduce them every where to practice, striving, with the cruel tyranny of Procrustes, to fit the body of each captive

B O O K captive traveller to her murderous and torturing
 VII. bed.

When Aristotle opposes innovation, however, it is not on coarse popular arguments: he does not appeal merely to our feelings; he does not address our *prejudices*; he does not attempt to excite a superstitious veneration for antiquity. To prefer what is ancient, merely because it is ancient, and to deduce the expediency of our laws and customs merely from the practice of our remote ancestors, he well knew, was to appeal to the imagination and passions, in a case that ought to be decided by the sole authority of reason. In various parts of his works, and not least in his book on political revolutions, he powerfully interests the heart; but he always endeavours to reach it by the road of the understanding: nor did it ever occur to his discernment, that any thing could be prudently said to the feelings of the former, which might not bear to be examined by the light of the latter. With him, mere feeling was but a part of the low animal nature, a part which in brutes is directed to its proper ends by an intelligence not their own; but which in man must, according to the ordinance of Deity itself, be directed and disciplined by reason and custom, that it may thus be strengthened into habit and exalted into virtue; for, in the language of ancient philosophy, virtue, as the attribute of a man, is synonymous with habit. In every well-regulated state, early institution is the great forming and vivify-

vivifying power of government; and that which education begins, the law carries on and perfects^f. They are both practical principles, and

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^f Aristotle places the stability of government chiefly in the three following points; first, the respect due to age and experience; secondly, the distribution of honours and offices according to evident and approved merit; thirdly, an education accurately adapted to the pattern of the commonwealth. Were we to examine the history of all the governments on earth, we should perceive that they have been upheld by an adherence to those grand principles, and subverted by a departure from them. I shall select, for the sake of illustration, the examples of China and France; the former of which is rendered familiar to the reader's mind by a recent publication, and the latter is impressed by the momentous events and unexampled calamities which mark the present times. In China, the paternal authority is the main pillar of the political edifice; all offices are bestowed, according to the proficiency of the candidates in useful knowledge, by comparative trials, similar to those by which academic honours were formerly conferred in Europe; and the education of youth is so accurately fitted to the plan of the government, that the education in China exactly suits that country, and it only. The consequence of all this is plainly attested in history: the constitution of China has been and continues, the most invariably stable of any known in the world. The constitution of France, on the other hand, has been completely subverted in the course of a few years. What are the causes? The veneration for aged experience had ceased; intrigue supplied the place of merit; and the principles instilled into youth, and into the public at large, directly counteracted the spirit of the government. The ministers of Louis XV. are known to have set the first example in France of bestowing the highest dignities of the church on young gentlemen of family; thus degrading those sacred honours which Aristotle maintains ought to be the exclusive reward of venerable age; from which chiefly they derive their awful influence over the minds of men. Their ambition, and that of their successors under a new reign, rendered them the armed abettors of American independence. Reasons were to be found for justifying a measure in direct opposition to the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties. These reasons were only to be deduced from that principle, fruitful in monsters, the unalienable sovereignty of the people; which was, therefore, now first adopted in France; cherished, invigorated, and propagated with a degree of zeal and activity which established a democracy in the public mind, even during the existence of the monarchy. The disorders of the finances were the immediate occasion, not the primary cause, of the revolution. The notables, and afterwards the states general, had only to assemble in order to prove by their conduct that opinion governs the world.

right

B O O K right only, when originating in a right practice;
 { **VII.** by means of which, combined with example
 and exercise, they operate an early and wonderful change on the passions and appetites; so that as reason fortifies and improves, these subordinate powers of our nature are continually more disposed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the sweetest harmony. To alter laws and political institutions without the most evident necessity, is, therefore, wantonly to tamper with the spring of moral action; to weaken or destroy that principle in man, on which the persuasive efficacy of all laws is founded; from which governments derive their strength; and individuals, their security.

In opposition to the tenets which have been so industriously propagated in some modern nations, Aristotle, while he inhabited the freest and most democratical republic of all antiquity, maintained that, from a due mixture of aristocratic elements, the fabric of political society derives both its solidity and its splendour. The very popular doctrine, therefore, which maintains that all power is derived from the people^s,

^s According to Dr. Price, liberty is "The power of a civil society to govern itself by its own discretion, or by laws of its own making, by the majority, in a collective body, or by fair representation. In every free state every man is his own legislator." Price on Civil Liberty. This definition contains the essence of Locke on Government, and of its French transcript, Rousseau's *Contrat Social*." Locke, I firmly believe, was a religious man, and a good subject; yet by a strange combination of circumstances, the philosophical opinions of this great adversary of Aristotle, have had no small tendency to promote scepticism, and his political principles to encourage rebellion.

to the majority of whom it unalienably belongs, and by whom it may always lawfully be resumed, must have appeared to him not less wicked than it is weak, not less detestable than it is extravagant; especially, could he have foreseen that many of the authors who supported this wild assertion, should have exerted themselves most strenuously to destroy all reverence for those institutions, which, while they enlarge the wisdom and exalt the affections of the few, have the most direct tendency to restrain the vices and to moderate the passions of the multitude. What renders Rousseau of Geneva, and other writers of that stamp, so hostile to Christianity? They tell us that it commands submission to the higher powers; and is, therefore, a religion fit only for slaves^a. But an author, not inferior to Rousseau in vigour of fancy, incomparably his superior in point of learning and judgment, and a far better advocate in the cause of true liberty, had long before proved that the pretended slavishness of Christianity amounts to nothing more than that its awful sanction may be employed to support established magistracy, and uphold lawful authority^b. In this particular, Christianity commands what philosophy had uniformly prescribed; maintaining that obedience to authority is essential to humanity^c, since the powers of human nature cannot be unfolded

^a Contrat Social, l. iv. c. viii.

^b Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. lxiii. lxiv. & lxv.

^c This sentiment is well expressed by Josephus, in describing the principles of the most philosophical sect among his countrymen: *α γὰρ δεῖα οὐ περιγίνομαι τὴν το ἀρχῶν*. De Bello Judaic. ii. 8.

but

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but in a state of society; and since, without government, society could not for a moment be securely preserved, any more than it could, without government, have been originally established. Upon this foundation, the Stagirite asserts that birth and wealth, as well as talents, morals, and experience, ought to have their due weight in every community which has the good of the whole for its main object, and that every principle which tends to maintain a reasonable and moderate aristocracy, ought to be improved and cherished, in order to counteract that dangerous propensity to sedition and anarchy, which, wherever they prevail, render the habitations of men more bloody and more abominable than the dens of wild beasts¹.

As a due proportion of aristocratic elements is essential to the very existence of a commonwealth, it is a question of the utmost importance how this necessary aristocracy ought to be constituted? When superiority in wealth is accompanied by superiority in worth, which will naturally happen when the higher ranks are more watchfully and more liberally educated, in proportion to the extent of their fortunes, the plain and palpable distinction of opulence will then, doubtless, be entitled to a certain degree of political pre-eminence. The evil is,

¹ αἰσιμος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπληρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσι. How is this universal evil, the senseless desires and dangerous propensities of the multitude, to be controlled? αἰ ἥτις τε ὥσι, καὶ μὴ ἀδικαῖνται. "By the weight of authority, and the equity with which it is administered. Polit. l. ii. c. vii. p. 324.

when

when the respect either for wealth, or for birth, which is recommended chiefly as hereditary wealth, gives to such distinctions, independently of the education and manners with which they ought to be accompanied, too decided and too overbearing a superiority; and when the aristocracy is thereby so much narrowed, that its interests are detached and separated from those of the community at large. The worst species of aristocracy degenerates into what Aristotle calls a *dynasty*; the absolute power of fierce and arbitrary chieftains over timid and servile vassals. When power is not an appendage of the person or the individual, but belongs to the whole body of nobles, who serve mutually to check and controul each other, the government, by a proper degree of moderation in the magistrate, may be rendered safe and salutary, and the object even of affection to the governed^m. But the best adjustment of those aristocratical elements is that by which they are rendered subservient to the interests of the community at large; productive of its prosperity, and conducive to its stability. Aristotle has endeavoured to shew how these desirable ends were attained in some governments of antiquity. But the most illuf-

^m This observation is strongly confirmed by the history of the two aristocracies of Venice and Bern, the former (till its late destruction) comprehending the most beautiful and best cultivated territory in the north of Italy, and the latter extending over the third part of Switzerland. Under both those governments the subjects have long enjoyed an enviable condition of peace and prosperity; happy in themselves, and therefore contented with their masters. But it would be an error to believe that those republican institutions which suit a certain mediocrity of circumstances, might be safely adopted by great nations.

trious

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trious example of this kind which the history of the world ever exhibited, is the aristocratical arrangement in the constitution of Great Britain. The nobles of this country are not invested individually with any degree of pre-eminence or authority that can be at all dangerous to the meanest of the people, since all executive power flows solely from the crown, and is exercised by responsible ministers; a king of Great Britain being constitutionally, in the words of the Stagirite, "a public guardian;" and his high office, "a pledge and security that the nobles shall not be subjected to injustice, nor the people to insult." The peers, taken collectively, form
a second

^a Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 403. That the majesty of the throne is the best safeguard of equal laws and public liberty, is a truth perpetually attested in the annals of modern Europe. The people at large, whenever they had an opportunity of declaring their sentiments freely and fully, uniformly maintained the authority of their kings against the arrogant pretensions of priests and nobles, and the daring invasion of upstart factions. The nations of the north and of the south on every occasion discovered the same disposition, and preferred even the absolute power of a prince to the more dreaded exertions of a divided authority. To the deputies of the people at large, assembled not as usual at Odensee, but in the midst of the populace of Copenhagen, the kings of Denmark owe the prerogatives which they have enjoyed since 1660. The crown of Sweden, which had been trampled on by the nobles in 1756, was restored to its ancient splendour by the co-operation of the burghers and peasants in 1772. If we examine the history of the cortes of Spain, the states general of France, the diets of Germany, we shall see in all those assemblies alike, that the Tiers Etat, the deputies of the people, were the most steadfast adherents to the sovereignty of kings^{*}; and in England, when monarchy was overthrown by a combination of knavery and

^{*} In the tumultuary states of 1614, the deputies of the people defended against the nobles and clergy the authority of an undivided executive. "Que l'autorité du roi soit et demeure absolue sur tous ses sujets de quelque profession qu'ils soient; & soit ce tenu pour loi fondamentale du royaume que la personne du roi est sainte et inviolable, auquel est due toute obéissance et fidélité, sans qu'il soit loisible à aucun de ses sujets, de quelque qualité et condition qu'il soit, ecclésiastique ou séculier, de s'en exempter."

fanaticism,

a second deliberative assembly, which was formerly proved to be an institution essentially requisite in every well-regulated state. They constitute also the properest tribunal that could possibly be devised for trying persons impeached by the Commons. A seat in the House of Peers is naturally and not unfrequently the reward of important services and illustrious merit; and must, therefore, continue to operate in the commonwealth as a perpetual incentive to emulation, and an unceasing spring of energy. With all the privileges and advantages peculiar to that order, the peers are entitled even to respect, only when they exhibit characters suitable to their rank. They dare not oppress; they dare not injure; they cannot insult with impunity the meanest of their fellow-subjects. They are intimately united in their most essential interests with the other branches of the constitution. They cannot, consistently with their own safety, co-operate with those leaders of the people who might be inclined to institute a republic; because their own honours and pre-eminences originating in the monarchy, can only be upheld by its stability; they could not abet the measures of those courtiers or ministers (were it possible to find any of such consummate folly) who might be inclined to render the crown ab-

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fanaticism, it was re-established with more general consent than was, perhaps, ever given to any public act by so great and populous a nation.

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solute;

B O O K solute; because they would thereby not only
VII. surrender the birthrights of their own children,
but totally degrade and debase themselves. Their lives, and liberties, and properties, are maintained by the same salutary institutions, which guard those of the people at large. Compared with this inestimable benefit of just and equal laws; how light in the balance are their pre-eminences, their distinctions, and their titles? The constitution of England has taken for its model Nature herself; and in asserting the exclusive privileges of the few, offers to the enjoyment of all, great and absolute benefits, before whose steady lustre and intrinsic worth, personal and relative advantages fade away and vanish.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Causes of seditions. — Insolence and rapacity of men in power. — Secret combination of obscure factions, &c. — Particular causes in each form of government respectively. — How governments are to be preserved. — By strengthening the middle ranks, &c. — Of laws relative to Democracy — Oligarchy — Monarchy — Tyranny.

HAVING considered almost all the other questions that formed the object of this inquiry, we proceed to examine the important subject of political revolutions; their nature and number, their causes and their consequences: an examination which will enable us to determine by what regulations and expedients, government in general, as well as each form of government in particular, may be strengthened and upheld. Justice, the great law of the moral world, is acknowledged in all communities; but dissensions, and thence revolutions, take place, because the rules of justice are often estimated by very different standards. The citizens at large, because they are all equal in freedom, think themselves entitled equally to participate in all other advantages; the distinguished portion of the community, because they are superior in some particulars, think themselves entitled to claim pre-eminence in all other

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Chap. I.

Of the primary causes, or fountains, of sedition.

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other respects; and as it is difficult for any system of government to gratify the expectations of the rich or noble, on the one hand, and those of the people at large on the other; the seeds of discontent lurk in the bosom of every community, and require but a favourable season to ferment into sedition. Birth, wealth, strength, and every such political element, strives to extend its influence, and to enlarge its dominion; and when checked in its ambitious purposes, is prepared to convulse the state. Virtue alone remains contented with the place allotted to it in the general arrangement, and though contributing more to the happiness of civil life than all its other elements united, yet virtue never emblazons its titles, nor exaggerates its prerogatives; it neither plans conspiracies, nor foment factions; and in this forbearance, it shews as much wisdom as goodness, for the virtuous are comparatively so few in number, that should they imprudently enter the political lists, their party would be foiled in every conflict.

The general object and aim of revolutions.

Such then are the principles, and, as it were, the fountains of sedition; of which the object may be, either to subvert established government, or to acquire the principal share in administration; to change monarchy or aristocracy, into a republic or a democracy; or to incline the balance of power, more than the constitution warrants, to the side of the prince, of the nobles, or of the people; to alter or abolish some particular magistracy, as Lyfander, at Sparta, endeavoured to destroy the office of king;

king; and Pausanias, in the same republic, strove to abolish the authority of the Ephori. At Epidamnus^a, the power belonging to the heads of tribes was transferred to a senate. The government was thus partially altered.^o

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In all political conflicts, the contending factions alternately appeal to justice; but the one party, as we observed before, measures justice by an arithmetical, and the other by a geometrical standard^p; whereas, in fact, it ought to be regulated by both; and such governments as equitably combine arithmetical and geometrical proportion into one compound political ratio, can alone expect to be prosperous or stable. Regard ought, therefore, to be had to pre-eminent advantages peculiar to the few; regard ought, also, to be had to ordinary but useful qualities, common to all; yet, in the great partnership of a commonwealth, if men's shares are to be apportioned by one single ratio only, that of equality, in point of safety, is preferable^q; for in democracies, there is but one principle of discord, the jarring interests of the many and of the few; but in oligarchies, the

The best
means of
preventing
them.

^a Epidamnus an Illyrian city, and one of the most considerable sea-ports on the coast of the Adriatic. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 185.

^o The next sentences have a reference to similar changes in Athens; but the text is imperfect and corrupt.

^p See what is above said of arithmetical and geometrical proportion, vol. i. b. v. c. iii. p. 370.

^q The author here prefers democracy to an oligarchic dynasty, as explained above, b. vi. c. vii. p. 330. But every people are not fit for living under the former government, "since, wherein some savage multitudes differ from wild beasts, is not easy to point out." See above, b. iii. c. vii. p. 216.

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few not only maintain a perpetual conflict with the many, but frequently quarrel with each other; whereas, the dissensions of the people, among themselves, are comparatively slight and inconsiderable. Besides, a democracy is nearer to what we have called a republic, or government residing chiefly in men of the middle rank; which, of all popular constitutions, is the best and safest.

Chap. 2.

In political
 revolutions
 three things
 to be con-
 sidered.

Of the
 causes of
 discontent
 incident to

In examining the nature of political revolutions, we have to consider the situation of mind or disposition of those who are dissatisfied with the existing government; the causes which excite this dissatisfaction; and the various selfish passions of which the meanest, when fully roused, is sufficient to inflame discontent into sedition. Men who think themselves worthy of being treated as equals, will not contentedly submit to be treated as inferiors; and men who think themselves entitled to pre-eminence, will not contentedly brook equality. The situation of men's minds, therefore, which fits them for attempting revolutions, is a conception, well or ill founded, that they are deprived of their due rank in the commonwealth. This rank is a complex object, and resolves itself into profit and honour. Men, therefore, are tempted to sedition by a desire to increase these objects, and to diminish their contraries; to increase their profits and honours; or, on the other hand, to prevent loss and avoid disgrace. They are tempted to sedition, not merely that they may enrich or aggrandise themselves, but because they

they see other men unjustly enriched, and unjustly aggrandised; and, oftentimes, the most solid merit offends by the glare of too conspicuous a prosperity. The ordinary sources of sedition then are, insolence, contempt, fear, disproportionate or too rapid increase, and immoderate elevation. Impelled by such causes, men fly to arms, and suddenly subvert the government. The same event happens as surely, but more slowly, through the combination of obscure factions^r; through negligence in the magistrates, particularly in disregarding the effect of small alterations; and through a variety of differences and incongruities, particularly a moral dissimilitude in the citizens.

That the insolence, the rapacity, and the invidious honours of men in power, are, all of

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all govern-
ments.

Chap. 3.

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The in-
solence and
rapacity of
men in
power.

^r Of this there is a striking example in the following passage of Livy, l. ix. c. 46. "Eodem anno (scil. U. C. 449.) Cn. Flavius Cn. filius, scriba, patre libertino, humili fortuna ortus, ceterum callidus vir et facundus, ædilis curulis fuit. Ceterum Flavium dixerat ædilem forensis factio, Appii Claudii censura vires nata; qui senatum primus, libertinorum filiis lectis, inquinaverat: et postquam eam lectionem nemo ratam habuit, nec in curia adeptus erat quas petierat, opes urbanas, humilibus per omnes tribus divisit, forum et campum corripit. Ex eo tempore in duas partes discessit civitas: aliud, integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum, aliud, forensis factio tenebat." This unfortunate division of the city, fomented by Appius, a proud aristocrat, and by Flavius, a plebeian notary, gave to the rabble of the Forum a decided advantage over the sound and respectable part of the community. The former party supplied by experience and trick, their gross defects in point of fortune, morals, and liberal education. Their triumph, however, was not lasting. The illustrious Q. Fabius, who from this achievement, acquired the name of Maximus, purged the commonwealth from this excrement, which he threw into "four city tribes." Omnem forenses turbam excretam in quatuor tribus conjecit, urbanasque eas appellavit. Tit. Liv. ubi supra.

C C 4

them,

BOOK them, causes of sedition, is too obvious to require illustration. **VII.** Resentment is easily transferred from persons to things. In odious hands, authority itself becomes hateful: and the feelings of mankind conspire with their reason, to destroy a government pregnant only with mischief, disgraced by private injustice, or deformed by public peculation. The undue influence of one man, or of a few, and their elevation towering too high above the level of the community, converts free governments sometimes into monarchies, and sometimes into *dynasties*, the worst species of oligarchy. To prevent such fatal revolutions, the Argives and Athenians have recourse to the ostracism. But it is better to repress the first symptoms of immoderate elevation, than to counteract its tendency by a remedy as cruel as it is violent; a political amputation, which severs from the commonwealth those qualified to form its best defence and highest ornament.

Fear its twofold operation as a cause of sedition.

Contempt, its operation illustrated by examples.

Fear operates in two ways as a cause of sedition; since those who dread to suffer wrong, will attempt to disarm the oppressor; and those who have committed wrong, will attempt to anticipate the hand of vengeance. Contempt converts oligarchies into democracies, when the strength of the many is brought into comparison with the weakness of the few; and the same passion subverts democracies, when the concerted wisdom of the few is contrasted with the folly and anarchy of the multitude. The tumultuous democracy of Megara was destroyed by

by its own violence. The same cause over-
turned the popular government of Thebes, after
the famous battle in the vineyards. Anarchy
subjected Syracuse to the tyranny of Gelon;
and the disorderly behaviour of the Rhodians
enabled an aristocratical conspiracy to seize the
government.

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The disproportionate increase of any of the
constituent parts, is not less fatal to the political,
than to the natural body; and when any of these
parts is changed, not only in quantity or bulk,
but in organization or form, new governments
must result, specifically different from the old.
Such alterations happen sometimes gradually
and imperceptibly; at other times, suddenly
and palpably. Soon after the Persian invasion
of Greece, the flower of the Tarentine nobility
was cut off in a battle against the barbarous
Iapygians; and this disaster, diminishing, by a
sudden jerk, the weight of the aristocracy, en-
abled the people to change the *mixt polity* of
Tarentum into a simple democracy. The over-
throw of the Argives by Cleomenes, king of
Sparta, compelled them to associate their pea-
sants to the honours of government. In the
Lacedæmonian war, the Athenians were sum-
moned to take the field in the order of the
muster-roll; and the most distinguished portion
of the citizens thus suffered a great and speedy
diminution; which operated the same effect on
the form of government, as would have been
produced by a sudden and disproportionate in-
crease of the populace.

The dispropor-
tionate
increase of
any of the
constituent
parts of the
common-
wealth.

Govern-

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VII.

The secret combination of obscure factions.

Governments change gradually through the secret combination of obscure individuals. At Heraea, the aristocratical mode of appointment to office was changed for one more popular, because a combination of mean mechanics determined to vote for none but persons of their own level. The higher ranks of men, therefore, preferred the capricious decision by lot, to the certain partiality of election.

Negligence.

Governments are changed through negligence, when high offices of state are entrusted to persons unfriendly to the constitution. The oligarchy of Oreum¹ was thus subverted by Heracleodorus, a partisan of democracy. Great revolutions sometimes arise from slight neglects. At Ambracia², the census requisite for a citizen was small. It was imprudently reduced to nothing; and the country soon fell into the hands of a houseless rabble.

Diffimilitude of manners and character;

Nothing is more unfriendly to public tranquillity than diffimilitude of character in the citizens. A heterogeneous assemblage of mixed tribes cannot speedily coalesce into a nation; and communities, which have grown populous by sudden accessions, are generally torn by sedition. The Achæans and Træzenians³, united in colonising Sybaris; but the Achæans reinforced

its effect in producing revolutions

¹ Formerly, Histiaea, a city in the isle of Eubæa. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 389.

² A Corinthian colony in the Ambracian gulph, which derived its name from Ambrax, the grandson of Lacaon. The capital was situate on the doubtful confines of Thesprotia and Molossia. Comp. Stephan. Byzant. Pausan. Eliac. p. 437. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxviii. c. 4.

³ Træzené, a city in the territory of Argos.

by new colonies from home, expelled the Træze-
nians. The Sybarites who colonised Thurii, ex-
perienced a similar misfortune; and claiming su-
periority over their fellow-planters, in virtue of
their prior possession of the country, they were
driven into banishment. The new inhabitants of
Byzantium were discovered conspiring against the
old; attacked, defeated, and expelled. The An-
tistæans first received with hospitality, but after-
wards ejected by arms, the Chian exiles; and the
exiles of Samos ejected the Zancleæans*, by whom
they had been hospitably received. Apollonia, on
the Euxine, was deformed by domestic discord,
from the moment that its populousness was
increased by a new colony. After the expul-
sion of their tyrants, the Syracusans enrolled as
citizens, mercenaries and foreigners. Dis-
sentions and battles ensued. Amphipolis admitted
a colony from Chalcis†: most of the original in-
habitants were driven into banishment. So true
it is, that every promiscuous multitude cannot
be fashioned into a commonwealth, the forma-
tion of which requires materials skilfully pre-
pared, and must be the work of time; for the

B O O K
VII.illustrated
by exam-
ples.

* Zancle, the ancient name of Messina, now Messina, derived from the Sicilian word *ζαγκλον*, a scythe or sickle. Steph. Byzant.

† The Chalcis in Thrace, which gave name to the Chalcidicæ. History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xv. p. 196. The Thracian Chalcis was so called from its metropolis, the principal city in the isle of Eubæa, situate at the narrowest part of the Euripus, where Eubæa is supposed by Pliny to have joined the continent of Bœotia. Plin. l. iv. c. 12. This city colonised the eastern shore of Sicily, and was the mother of a new Chalcis, of Naxos, Catana, Leontium, and other Sicilian republics. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. pp. 12, & seq.

causes

B O O K causes of dissension are innumerable. Even the
 { **VII.** diversities of local situations engender parties,
 and foment faction. At Athens, the inhabitants
 of the Piræus are distinguished from those of
 the upper city, by their fond admiration for
 democracy. In the city of Clazomené, the
 inhabitants of the main land were commonly
 at variance with those in the island. Localities,
 equally unimportant, distracted into parties the
 citizens of Colophon and of Notium².

Chap. 4.

Even the
 frivolous
 quarrels of
 the great.

Their
 baneful ef-
 fects illus-
 trated by
 example.

In war, the smallest ditch or rivulet disorders
 the ranks, and breaks the phalanx. In politics,
 every distinction forms a ground of separation,
 and opens a source of hostility; and the slightest
 differences may occasion the most important re-
 volutions, when they happen to arise among
 persons of weight in the state. Syracuse was
 anciently divided into two exasperated factions,
 in consequence of a frivolous love-quarrel be-
 tween two young men, who happened to be
 both in the magistracy. In the absence of the
 one, the other corrupted his mistress²; the in-
 jured man retaliated, by seducing his colleague's
 wife; and the whole state took part with one side
 or the other. The difference, slight in itself, had
 this extensive consequence, because it arose be-
 tween persons in the magistracy, and thus affect-
 ed the source and principle of the government it-
 self; and the principle, or beginning, by the trite

² Notium derived its name from νοτος, the south, being situate a
 few miles to the south of Colophon. History of Ancient Greece,
 vol. i. p. 292.

² τοῦ ἑρμῆος.

but

but just proverb, is counted "the half of every thing;" so that a small deviation from rectitude at the first outset, diverges into a great and even indefinite distance at the further extremity. Shortly after the Persian invasion of Greece, the dispute of two brothers, men of note, concerning their father's inheritance, involved Hestiaea in a civil war. The rich sided with the fortunate brother; and the poor took party with him who complained of being deprived of his patrimony; and of the concealment of a large treasure which, he said, had been found by his father. An ancient quarrel about a marriage occasioned all the seditions that have happened at Delphi to the present hour. A bridegroom, terrified by some unlucky omen, rejected the bride; whose relations, enraged at this injury, conveyed into his pocket, while he was sacrificing, a quantity of the sacred money, and then slew him as guilty of sacrilege. At Mitylenè, two young women, heiresses, occasioned all the misfortunes of that republic, and the war with the Athenians, in which Paches took the city. The young women were the daughters of Timophanes; Doxander sought them in marriage for his two sons; his demand was slighted; he meditated vengeance, began to cabal at home, and applied to the Athenians, with whom he was allied by hospitality, and stimulated them to a war, which proved ruinous to his country. An incident nearly similar occasioned the sacred war at Phocis. An heiress was concerned; the authors of the sedition

were

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were Mnafias, the father of Mnefon, and Euthy-crates, the fon of Onomarchus. A contract of marriage changed the government of Epidam-nus. The father of a young woman betrothed, happening to be archon, had occafion to exer-cife his authority as a magiftrate, in fining his intended fon-in-law; the latter, thinking him-self not only injured but affronted, confpired with thofe diffatisfied with the government, and effected a revolution.

Govern-
ments over-
turned by
an altera-
tion of the
relative im-
portance of
their con-
ftituent
parts.

Governments are changed, when the relative importance of their conftituent parts is altered. During the Perfian war, the council of the Areo-pagus, by the wifdom and firmnefs of its mea-fures, acquired juft renown; and the merit of this tribunal, compofed of the principal citizens, tended to invigorate the ariftocracy; but foon afterwards, the Athenian feamen, confifting of the loweft rabble^b, having gained the battle of Salamis, and thereby raifed their country to the fovereignty of the fea, increafed the weight of democracy in a far greater proportion. The credit gained by the Argive nobles in the bat-tle of Mantinæa, and the defeat of the Lace-dæmonians, occafioned the attempt to deftroy the popular government at Argos. The Syra-cufan mariners having conquered the Athenians, changed, on the other hand, the mixed republic of Syracufe into a fimple democracy. The merit of the people of Chalcis, in affifting the nobility of that city to deftroy Phoxos, the ty-

Examples
thereof.

^b See above, b. iv. c. vi. p. 256.

rant,

rant, procured for them a share in the govern- BOOK
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ment. A circumstance exactly similar converted the oligarchy of Ambracia, after the expulsion of the tyrant Periander, into a democracy. And the observation universally holds, that whenever any portion of the state, magistrates, nobles, or people, has procured for the public some signal advantage, a foundation will be thereby laid for political commotions, which often terminate in revolutions. For the honours bestowed on those public benefactors excite jealousy, and embitter envy; and the benefactors themselves, elated by their newly-acquired importance, disdain to rest satisfied with their hereditary rank and prescriptive advantages.

General
theorem on
this subject.

Governments, also, are universally liable to be shaken, when parties, animated by principles of mutual hostility^c, are nearly equal in strength; when the natural influence of wealth, or of nobility, is resisted, for instance, by the weight of numbers and the independence of industry; for should either the rich or the poor be incomparably more powerful than their adversaries, the weaker party abandons the struggle in despair. For this reason, virtue, though the principal element in public happiness, and therefore justly entitled to political pre-eminence, seldom, however, comes forward to assert its pretensions, and to claim its well-earned reward. Virtuous men know how inconsider-

Governments disturbed in consequence of the near equality of hostile parties.

^c Parties are thus animated when there is not a middling class between the great and the vulgar to hold the balance between them. See above, b. vi. c. xi. p. 344.

able

B O O K VII. able their own party is ; they feel and acknowledge the irresistible strength of their opponents.

All revolutions effected by force, or by fraud, or by a mixture of both.

Such then is the general nature of political revolutions. They are produced either by violence, or by fraud, or by the union of both ; for, sometimes, what is begun by fraud is ended by force. It was thus that the tyranny of the four hundred was established at Athens. The people were first cheated out of their liberties, by the delusive hope of Persian subsidies ; and when the deceit was discovered, the four hundred had recourse to arms. In this case, force was employed as an auxiliary to fraud ; but fraud is often sufficient to do the work alone.

Chap. 5.

General causes of revolutions modified by the nature of each government in particular.

The causes of sedition, hitherto enumerated and explained, apply universally to all governments ; but these general causes are variously subdivided and modified by the nature and form of each government in particular. The impudence of demagogues is the ordinary bane of democracies. By private calumny, and public impeachment, these incendiaries exasperate the poor against the rich ; and compel the rich, through their common fears, to unite into an exasperated faction, actuated by opposite interests to those of the community at large. The resentment of men of property, provoked by the wickedness of demagogues, overturned the democracy of Cos. In Rhodes, the demagogues prosecuted and defrauded the Trierarchs, in order to corrupt the soldiery ; the troops, raised from the promiscuous multitude, were thus

Democracies ruined by the impudence of demagogues.

thus seduced and bribed at the expence of those who generously equipped and maintained the guardian navy of that maritime republic. But the indignation of the Trierarchs mutinied against this complication of ingratitude and injustice, destroyed the demagogues, and overturned the democracy. Heraclæa, soon after its populoufness was augmented by an Athenian colony, fell a prey to sedition. The persecution of demagogues drove most families of distinction from the place; but the emigrants returned with an armed force, and established an oligarchy. Revolutions, proceeding from similar causes, and exactly similar in their issue, happened at Cumæ and at Megara: And it may be regarded as a general theorem in politics, that demagogues are the pests of democracies, ruin liberty under pretence of preserving or augmenting it, corrupting the multitude by indulgence, and exasperating the rich by agrarian laws and the weight of public burdens, till necessity compels the latter to resist oppression by force, and to fight in their own defence with courage heightened by despair.

In ancient times, when the talents of the statesman and the general were often cultivated by the same man, democracies often ended in tyrannies. The demagogues, equally skilled in war and in eloquence, supported their arguments by arms, and eked out fraud by force. But since rhetoric has become a science of such extent, that none can acquire it in distinguished perfection, but those who cultivate it with un-

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Why democracies in ancient times terminated differently from the manner in which they terminate at present.

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divided

B O O K divided attention, demagogues have been contented with deceiving the people, and have seldom attempted to enslave them. Tyrannies, besides, were of old more frequent than now, because it was then usual to entrust particular magistrates with more extensive discretionary powers, (witness the Prytanes of Miletus,) and because, while men lived scattered in the country, diligently employed in their husbandry, cities were less populous than at present, and therefore less capable of resisting with concert and activity, the eloquence and artifices of their demagogues, especially when reinforced by military skill and martial spirit.

How demagogues deceive the people, and by what means their machinations might be defeated.

The confidence of the multitude, however, was the great engine by which these military politicians and politic generals assailed the freedom of their country; and the pledge of this confidence was their hatred and persecution of opulence and nobility. It was by persecuting the wealthy Pediaci that Pisistratus enslaved Athens: Theogenes pursued the same plan at Megara, and there met with similar success. Dionysius, by the impeachment of Daphnæus and other rich men, raised himself to the throne of Syracuse. Democracies sink into the lowest degeneracy, when the national assembly is persuaded to supplant the authority of laws by the caprice of occasional decrees: This generally happens through the seduction of those, whose ambition to obtain office is too extravagant to regard any civil duty, and too violent to be checked by any moral obstacle; and who avail

themselves of the confusion and tumult incident to crowded assemblies, to precipitate the heedless multitude into the most ruinous measures. To prevent or diminish this evil, it will be expedient to alter the mode of election to magistracy, and to entrust this power not to the people collectively, but to the various parts or tribes into which the community happens to be divided.^a

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There are two most manifest causes of revolutions in oligarchies. When the people at large are grossly injured by men in power, they willingly hearken to and follow any leader of sedition; but this leader is more especially dangerous, if he happens to be one of the magistrates. This was the case in Naxos, where Lygdamis, jealous of his colleagues, overturned the oligarchy, and afterwards made himself king^b. When an oligarchy, the name of which denotes that the few govern the many, is still further narrowed, so that magistracy, instead of extending by rotation among the general mass of wealthy and eminent citizens, is confined within the circle of a few families, opulence and eminence will not patiently brook an absolute exclusion from authority, but will rather convulse the state than submit to be debarred from civil honours. In the concentrated oligarchies of Marseilles, Ister, and Heraclea, the political edifice was overthrown in consequence of the narrowness of its base. The wealthy citizens of Marseilles never

Chap. 6.

Causes of the revolutions in oligarchies. Insolence or injustice of the magistrates.

Oligarchies overturned by narrowing their base.

Examples thereof.

^a See above, b. vi. c. xv. p. 357.

^b Athenæus, l. viii. p. 348.

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ceased plotting against the government, till all men of a certain census were declared capable of holding offices, not indeed simultaneously, but, as in some other countries, alternately or successively; that is, first, the eldest brother of a family, and then the younger, or if more in number, each in his order. The rigour of oligarchy was thus mitigated at Marseilles. In Ister, the oligarchy was changed into a democracy: And at Heraclæa, the power which had formerly been lodged in few hands, was communicated to six hundred citizens. The dissensions of the Cnidian nobles, respecting the limitation of candidates for office, encouraged the people, headed by one of the better sort, to attack and overthrow the oligarchy. In ancient times Erythræ^c was well and wisely governed by the family of Basilides, of which the individuals lived in perfect harmony with each other: yet the people disdained to remain subject to their authority, and to permit those honours and offices, which they considered as the public stock, to continue the patrimony of a family.

Oligarchies
destroyed
by the flat-
tery of sy-
cophants.

Oligarchies not only perish by external violence, but suffer, and sometimes sink, under internal disorders; they are not exempted from the pest of demagogues, flattering partisans of tyranny, as the demagogues in democracies are of licentiousness, and who, to promote their own views,

^c There were cities of this name in Bœotia, Locria, Lybia, and Ionia. That in Ionia was one of the twelve Ionic cities, and founded by Neleus, son of Codrus. It is now reduced to a miserable village, but still called Erethri. See *Hist. of Ancient Greece*, vol. i. c. iii. pp. 103, & seq.

seduce,

seduce, inflame, and betray that party in the state to whose interests they affect to be most entirely devoted. At Athens, Charicles was the demagogue of the thirty tyrants; and Phrynichus was the demagogue of the arbitrary faction of the four hundred. When persons by their census capable of office are dependent on the people for their elections, like the state gardens of Larissa and Abydus, those who covet preferment frequently have recourse to the dishonest arts of seduction and flattery. The same consequence happens, when the judiciary power is in the hands of the people at large; the nobles are ruined in the courts of justice, and the oligarchy is thus overturned: this was the fate of the government of Heraclæa^d on the Euxine. Sometimes an oligarchy is narrowed into a junto; and the party, illegally excluded from office, is compelled in its own defence to appeal to the people.

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VII.
Examples
thereof.

Spendthrifts are always promoters of innovation: in oligarchies they strive to usurp tyranny for themselves, or to procure it for one who will reward their labours. At Syracuse the spendthrift Hipparinus warmly seconded the views of Dionysius. The profligate Cleotimus, by the assistance of a colony from Chalcis, raised an insurrection in Amphipolis. In Ægina, a man of ruined fortune, distinguished by his well-known transaction with Chares, attempted to

Oligarchies
overturned
by spend-
thrifts, by
mercena-
ries, and
by the arro-
gance of
the magis-
trates.

^d One of the Greek cities on the southern coast of the Euxine, of which Sinopé was the mother and the queen. See Hist. of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxvi. p. 224.

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change the government. Ambition and rapacity often set the members of oligarchies at variance with each other; and when divided among themselves, they are easily subdued by the people. This happened at Apollonia on the Euxine: but where perfect harmony prevails, an oligarchy is not easily subverted; witness that of Pharfalus. The oligarchy of Elis was narrowed into a cabal of ninety senators, whose authority was arbitrary, and whose office was perpetual^c. In war, oligarchies are ruined for want of confidence between the nobles and the people: the former hire mercenaries for the public defence, and the leader of the mercenaries often becomes master of the state. It was thus that Timophanes made himself tyrant of Corinth. When there are different bodies of mercenaries under different leaders, these will sometimes combine their strength, and form themselves into what is called a dynasty, the worst species of oligarchy. To prevent these evils, the nobles, when they have occasion to use the service of the people in war, sometimes voluntarily admit them to a share of the government. In peace, oligarchies are subverted when the nobles and the people are mutually so distrustful of each other that they commit the safety of the state to a garrison of foreign mercenaries, whose commander, instead of continuing the mediator between the two parties,

^c Aristotle says their election resembled that which prevailed in electing senators in Sparta. The text is corrupt. See above, b. ii. c. vii. p. 127.

• makes

makes himself the master of both : this hap- BOOK
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 pened both at Larissa and at Abydus. The
 overbearing insolence of individuals, quarrels
 about marriages and law-suits, sometimes occa-
 sion public commotions which terminate in re-
 volutions. Diagoras's disappointment in mar-
 riage overturned the oligarchy of the knights
 or horsemen of Eretria^f. Seditions arose in
 Thebes and in Heraclæa in consequence of the
 degrading sentences passed on Archias and
 on Eurytion, that they should stand (the for-
 mer for adultery) in the pillory in the market-
 place. The despotic arrogance of the magis-
 trates subverted the oligarchies of Chios and
 Cnidos.

Revolutions also happen in consequence of In conse-
quence of
the events
of time and
chance.
 the events of time and chance, independently
 of human design or human foresight. In oligar-
 chies, and in what we have called republics in
 opposition to wild democracies, a certain census
 is requisite for holding civil offices ; all whose
 fortunes fall short of this standard are excluded ;
 so that the majority of the people are excluded
 in oligarchies, and those who in point of fortune
 are considerably below the middling class, are
 excluded in republics : but in consequence of a
 long peace, or other fortunate events, the value
 of lands may be so greatly enhanced, that the
 possessions of the poorest man shall exceed the

^f A flourishing sea-port of Eubœa before the Trojan war, oppo-
 site to Delphinium in Attica. Strabo, p. 687. It was demolished
 by the Persians in their invasion, but its ruins were to be seen in the
 time of the above-mentioned geographer. Ibid.

B O O K regulated census : and this, whether it happens
VII. slowly or suddenly, will occasion a political re-
 volution. Governments change not only from
 one form into a contrary, but from one sort of
 democracy or of oligarchy into another that is
 different ; as from governments acknowledging
 the authority of laws to democracies ruled by the
 caprice of the multitude, or oligarchies consist-
 ing of a junto of tyrants.

Chap. 7. The supreme authority may center in a few
 men of wealth and credit, or may reside in a
 few persons of distinguished virtue ; in the latter
 case the government is called an aristocracy,
 and is exposed to revolutions from the paucity
 of those invested with power. From a coinci-
 dence in this circumstance, an aristocracy is
 liable to be confounded with an oligarchy, which
 a high-minded people must always be desirous
 to overthrow. The Partheniæ, sprung from the
 best blood of Sparta, but degraded by the ille-
 gitimacy of their birth, and debarred from pub-
 lic honours, were caught conspiring against their
 country, and sent to colonise Tarentum. The
 lofty virtue of Lyfander disdained to acknow-
 ledge a superior even in a king : the stubborn
 audacity of Cinadon^s conspired to destroy every
 Lacedæmonian of a rank superior to his own.
 Aristocracies are also liable to convulsions in
 consequence of the great inequality of private
 fortunes, especially when, by an invading ene-
 my, any considerable part of the country has

**Causes of
 the revolu-
 tions in ari-
 stocracies.**

**Their simi-
 larity to oli-
 garchies,
 which a
 high-mind-
 ed people
 will not
 brook.**

^s For all these events consult the History of Ancient Greece.

been

been ravaged, and the inhabitants reduced to beggary: this happened to Sparta in the Messenian war, when the people insisted on an equal division of lands, as we learn from a poem of Tyrtæus, called the *Eunomia*, by which he appeased the sedition.

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As the accumulated honours even of good men are apt to excite envy and jealousy, so the moderate and defined honours of bad men prove incentives to the lust of dominion, and encourage them to attempt rendering their power arbitrary and their honours unbounded: this fatal project was at Carthage adopted by Hanno; and in Sparta by King Pausanias, who repelled the invasion of the Medes.

The magistrates corrupted by their honours.

An error in the original structure of government often proves ruinous to republics and aristocracies. When the ingredients of virtue, wealth, and numbers (especially the two latter) are unequally combined, or improperly blended, the composition has a tendency to separate with noise and violence into its constituent elements: when the balance inclines to the side of numbers, a republic, that does not degenerate into a simple democracy, retains its original and specific name; but when the balance inclines to the side of wealth, it is frequently, though improperly, called an aristocracy. Of those two sorts of republics, that verging to democracy is the most secure and the most permanent, because the majority are masters of the state, and the people at large, as before observed, are less liable to the temptations of a selfish ambition: yet
wherever

Revolutions in republics, or mixed governments,

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when the
elements of
wealth and
numbers
are not
equally ba-
lanced :

unexpected
effects
thereof,

Examples.

Cause of
revolution
peculiar to
a republic
inclining to
an aristo-
cracy.

wherever the political forces of wealth and of numbers are not duly adjusted, that is, when they are not proportioned to each other with as much accuracy as matters of practice require or admit, the fabric of the constitution is always liable to overfet. Sometimes it falls on that side to which it formerly inclined. A republic thus relaxes into a perfect democracy; and what is called an aristocratic government is strung into a tyrannical and cruel oligarchy: but this does not invariably take place; for when the prevailing powers are guilty of gross injustice, the strenuous efforts of their oppressed antagonists to recover their due weight in the state, sometimes change the constitution into its direct contrary; the resentment of the poor changing an aristocratic republic into a democracy, or the indignation of the rich converting a popular republic into an oligarchy. The former event happened at Thurii; the balance of political power being on the side of the nobles, or rather on that of property, they yielded to the temptation of injustice, and engrossed, contrary to law, almost the whole lands of the country; provoked at their rapacity, the people, who were warlike, flew to arms, expelled the mercenary garrison, and divested the nobles of their overgrown and unjustly acquired estates.

An aristocratical government, in proportion as it partakes of the nature of an oligarchy, has a tendency to foment insolence on the one hand, and to excite resentment on the other. By committing too much authority to the nobles, it enables

enables them to promote what they take to be their private or domestic interests, at the expence of what is the interest of the community at large. The connection formed by marriage, between a family of distinction at Locris and Dionysius the tyrant, ruined that state; and such a connection would not certainly have been permitted either in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocratical republic.

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Example.

The neglecting of little matters, as altogether immaterial, was formerly said to be a general cause of political misfortune. Nothing, however little, should be regarded as unimportant which touches the spring of the government; since by changing the form of the smallest part, the beauty of the whole system may be destroyed. It was the custom at Thurii, that those who had been officers in the army should not be re-elected to military command till after an interval of five years. Some spirited young men, whose martial ardour had acquired for them great popularity among the troops, endeavoured to procure a law for enabling them to retain their rank: a committee of the senate appointed for examining this business, at first resisted, but finally yielded to the project of innovation; thinking, that being gratified in this one point, the officers would not proceed farther, but allow the constitution in general to remain unaltered; but in this they were miserably disappointed. New alterations were proposed, which the magistrates, now overawed by an armed force, durst not venture to oppose; their

Neglect in
little mat-
ters.

Example.

BOOK VII. **VII.** their authority was thus overturned; and the government fell into the hands of those who had been gratified in their first dangerous demand.

External
causes of
revolutions
in republics.

Such are the internal sources of the dissolution of governments. They may also be destroyed by external violence. To this evil they are particularly exposed, when a neighbouring state is governed on principles directly opposite: or when this opposite system prevails in a state more remote but also more powerful, with which the governments in question are connected by the ties of commerce and consanguinity, or by the relations of war or alliance, of war undertaken or meditated, of alliance enjoyed or coveted. It was thus that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as their fortune alternately rose and sunk in the scale of Greece, respectively destroyed, the former oligarchies, and the latter democracies; because each of those domineering republics aspired to mould the political edifices of their neighbours or allies after their own model.

Example.

Chap. 8.

How good
governments are
preserved:

We now proceed to examine how governments in general, and each form of government in particular, are to be upheld and perpetuated. First of all, it is evident, that if we clearly comprehend the causes which destroy governments, we may easily discover those which are best fitted to preserve them; for destruction and preservation being things in their nature contrary, contrary means will be successfully employed to produce those contrary effects. In well-

well-balanced republics, then, all deviations from established laws are to be carefully avoided, especially in matters, which because they are little, are apt to appear insignificant: it is by small expences that the greatest estates are brought to ruin, because the occasions of such expences are so numerous, that they may be considered as countless and infinite; and because men are always liable to be deceived by the vulgar sophism, that one grain makes not an heap; and therefore that a trifling expence may safely be incurred, or a trifling alteration may be harmlessly made.

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by avoiding small, and seemingly insignificant alterations:

The next rule of importance for upholding the stability of well-mixed governments is, that the nobles and the people be mutually on their guard against the political artifices or juggling sleights, formerly enumerated and described^f, by which the one party endeavours to disguise its ambition, and the other to palliate its injustice.

by counter-acting political sleights.

Some republics have been long preserved, not by the excellence of their structure, but through the solid virtues of those who governed them: though appointed from men of a privileged order, the magistrates, while they lived with their colleagues and equals in fraternal harmony, were careful never to insult, never to injure their inferiors; they were careful never to provoke the proud by contempt, nor to exasperate the poor by rapacity; and the leaders of the

Governments, defective in their structure, preserved by the virtues of the magistrates:

^f See above, b. vi. c. xiii. p. 342, & seq.

multitude

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multitude most distinguished for their merit, whatever might be the circumstances of their birth, were seasonably exalted to a higher class, and thus associated to the honours of government⁵. When the nobles are extremely numerous, they form a sort of democracy among themselves, and ought therefore, in managing the affairs of their own order, to adopt the institutions best calculated for preserving that form of government. It will be useful, for instance, to insist on a frequent rotation of office; and in some cases to enact that magistracies shall be held only for the term of six months; for as democracies have their demagogues, so oligarchies and aristocracies have their tale-bearers and sycophants, mean and malicious flatterers of men in power; who, in proportion to the extent and duration of that power, will be more likely to degenerate into tyrants.

by the
proximity
of danger:

Governments are sometimes preserved, not by the remoteness, but by the proximity of danger. The terror hanging over them keeps men continually on their guard. This salutary vigilance may be excited by imaginary causes, when real ones are wanting; by approximating distance, and anticipating futurity. The dangerous animosities of the great are to be diligently watched, and, if possible, speedily appeased; and much care is to be applied that

⁵ The reader's own sagacity will apply these observations to the effects resulting from the different constitution of the privileged orders, as they have been called, in the different countries of modern Europe.

those

those who still remain dispassionate and impartial, be not whirled within the vortex of either of the contending parties: discord between men distinguished by rank, fortune, and office, may produce the most baneful effects, because its operation is exerted on the first principle or moving power of government; and to perceive and obviate errors in their principle or beginning, which might swell to much greater evils, is the work of no ordinary statesman. To prevent such revolutions as gradually proceed from the augmentation or diminution of private fortunes, it will be necessary to have recourse to the census. In smaller states, which are liable to more frequent concussions, the census may be taken annually; in larger republics, every third or fifth year; and the qualifications for office must be heightened or lowered in proportion to the increase or diminution of estates.

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by obviating errors in their first principles;

It is dangerous under every form of government, whether simple or mixed, whether democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy, to allow such disproportionate exaltation of particular men, or particular families, as greatly overtops that of persons and families of their own order. Honours to be lasting must be moderate; and there are but few minds of such a firm, resisting texture as to bear with impunity the infectious assaults of sudden and signal prosperity. Yet if any honoured individual has been greatly exalted by an accumulation of dignities, it is not advisable to reduce him at once to the ordinary

by preventing the disproportionate exaltation of individuals or families:

ΒΟΟΚ nary level; his too luxuriant honours must be
 VII. lopped gradually; and above all, it ought to be
 the aim of a wise legislation, in the first place,
 to prevent, if possible, any individual from at-
 taining too conspicuous a superiority in power,
 in wealth, or in the number and strength of his
 adherents; or, if the evil has not been pre-
 vented, to remove him from his vantage-ground
 at home, under pretence of employment in ho-
 nourable commissions abroad.

by the cen-
 sorial
 power:

Since manners have so powerful an influence
 on government that many are found willing to
 overset the constitution for no other reason but
 that in future they may be at liberty to live as
 they list; it is useful in every commonwealth to
 have a particular magistracy to superintend the
 manners of the citizens, and to check or dis-
 courage every deviation from that mode of life
 which is best adapted to the nature and prin-
 ciple of each form of government.

by strength-
 ening the
 middle
 ranks:

The events of time and chance will often
 give to some one of the constituent parts of a
 state, or to some particular magistracy, more
 than their due importance and their proper
 weight. This alteration must be carefully
 watched, and wherever the balance inclines,
 whether on the side of the rich, the noble, or
 the populace, care must be taken to correct the
 preponderancy; and by the distribution of ho-
 nours and offices to equalise the contending fac-
 tions, and to strengthen that intermediate por-
 tion of the people which is always more sted-
 fastly

fastly attached to the public welfare, than either those who are elated by wealth, or those who are depressed by poverty^b. BOOK
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Every principle of law, and every maxim of government, ought to be skilfully and steadily directed against the speculation of men in office. Oligarchies, especially, ought never to lose sight of this object; for the people at large will be greatly incensed when they are not only excluded from offices and honours, but robbed by those who administer the one and engross the other; whereas the first hardship, taken separately by itself, will be greatly softened by the consideration that an exclusion from public employments operates as an advantageous exemption; and allows those who enjoy the immunity, to apply with undivided attention to the improvement of their private fortunesⁱ. by preventing
speculation:

• A republic, in which the various offices of state should be paid merely by honour, but rewarded by no emolument whatever, might unite the advantages both of aristocracy and democracy, without incurring the inconveniences of either. The people at large might be entitled to every employment; but the poorer sort would certainly waive their claim to unprofitable posts, by paying
the magistrates with
honour, not
with fees
and salaries:

^b See above, b. vi. c. xi. p. 337.

ⁱ Such maxims were pursued for many centuries by the aristocracy of Venice, where all honourable offices were proportionably expensive. The policy of the aristocracy of Bern was directly the reverse. A man's fortune might be often ruined by holding those offices which belonged exclusively to noble Venetians; his fortune is always benefited by holding those which belong exclusively to the citizens of Bern.

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by exactly
inspecting
the admini-
stration of
the public
revenues.

The dema-
gogues in
democra-
cies must
not harass
the rich by
agrarian
laws, and
the de-
mand of
expensive
exhibitions.

that they might ply their profitable trades. They would relinquish public concerns to those who had more time to spare than themselves. The better sort of the citizens, therefore, would thus escape the grievance to which they are subjected in democracies, of being frequently governed by persons greatly their inferiors; and the poorer and lower classes of men would escape the grievance, to which they are subjected in aristocracies and oligarchies, of being legally and perpetually excluded from all public preferments. The abolition of fees and salaries will not, however, be alone sufficient to ensure the benefits of this salutary regulation. The revenues of the state must be publicly received, and publicly deposited; and separate accounts of them must be kept in the halls of the various tribes, wards, and fraternities into which the republic may happen to be divided.

To maintain the stability of democracies, the leaders of the populace must cease to harass the rich and noble by agrarian laws. The old proprietors must not only retain their hereditary lands, but also enjoy, unmolested, their annual fruits; which, as matters are now managed, are often indirectly and imperceptibly wasted for purposes the most useless and the most frivolous. Shows, dances, vain illuminations, and pompous processions, are unprofitable to those who behold, and ruinous to those who exhibit, them. A reasonable people, instead of condemning their richer fellow-citizens to such grievous ex-
pences,

pences, would turn with disdain from the childish gratifications for which they are incurred*.

To maintain the stability of aristocracies or oligarchies, great regard must be had to those classes of the people who are excluded from a share in the sovereignty. Injuries committed against them, especially when accompanied with insult, must be punished with more severity by the magistrate than those committed against persons of his own rank or his own order. Such subordinate employments as are attended with fees or perquisites should be granted in preference to the poorer sort of citizens; and to promote equality, as much as is consistent with the nature of the government, it will be proper to restrain the freedom of donations and marriage contracts, and thereby to limit or prevent the accumulation of too many estates in one family. It is of essential use in preserving all governments, that those who are the least sharers in the sovereignty, be treated with great equity, and even peculiar indulgence, in all other respects. In oligarchies, the people, in democracies, the wealthy, ought respectively to enjoy every advantage and every preference that is not incompatible with the nature of the government. The superiority given to them in

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In oligarchies peculiar indulgencies should be granted to those classes of the people who are excluded from a share in the sovereignty.

A similar rule applicable in all governments.

* It appears from the History of Greece, that this was indeed most salutary, but with respect to him who proposed it, very dangerous advice. By a law of the demagogue Eubulus, it was made capital at Athens, to propose diverting the theatric funds to any other purpose than that of the public amusement. History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 473.

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Chap. 9.

The requisites for holding supreme magistracies.

—Patriotism. Capacity. Virtue.

When these requisites do not all concur, by what rule the preference among them is to be decided.

matters of little moment, will dispose them patiently to brook their inferiority in solid power.

To partake of this power, or of what in every state forms the sovereignty, three qualifications are essentially requisite. The supreme magistrates must be animated with the warmest love for that constitution, the government of which they are called to administer. They must be endowed with the capacities and powers necessary to the discharge of their high functions. They must, in the third place, possess that particular species of virtue, and especially of justice, which, in each form of government, is best fitted to ensure the stability of that particular constitution; for as justice is measured by different standards in oligarchies and democracies, it is plain that, in a political sense, the virtue of justice is itself variable, and that what is right in one government, may be wrong in another. When the three requisites above mentioned do not concur in the same person, an important question will arise, to which of them is the preference due? In the appointment, for instance, of a general, a man presents himself possessed indeed of great military talents, but not remarkably distinguished by his justice or his patriotism. Another is eminent for those virtues, but has never exhibited any signal proof of his genius for war, and his capacity for command. By what rule ought the preference to be decided? We answer, there is a middle portion of talent, as well as of virtue, that is the

the ordinary lot of humanity. Whatever exceeds this middle portion can fall to the share of a few only. Many men possess enough of justice and enough of patriotism to make good generals; but there are few endowed with that degree of skill and experience which is requisite for the honourable discharge of high military trust. This degree of skill and experience is, therefore, chiefly to be regarded in the choice of a general. Were we to appoint a public treasurer, we must still reason on the same principle, and because we reason on the same principle, we must in this case vary our decision; and give the preference to moral, rather than to intellectual, accomplishments. The skill, experience, and capacity, requisite in a magistrate of this description, are such as the greater part of mankind may be supposed to possess. But his justice and integrity ought to rise above the common level; and it will be the best recommendation to his office, that those virtues shine in his character with more than ordinary lustre.

But as to a proper discharge of public offices in general, it may be asked, why I have said that there are *three* essential requisites? Let us suppose a man endowed with a sufficient capacity for his employment, and animated by a warm love for his country; will not those qualifications alone render him an upright and useful servant of the public? I answer, they will not; and affirm that, in addition to them, and in order to complete the character of a good magistrate or minister, a third ingredient must

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Application of the rule to particular cases.

Proof that patriotism and capacity are not alone sufficient to form the character of a supreme magistrate.

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necessarily enter into the composition. He must possess, at least in a certain degree, the practical habit of all the virtues, without which, how much soever he may love his country, and how well soever he may understand its interests, he will often be hindered by sloth, dissipation, intemperance, or cowardice, from rendering it any essential service; nay, he may be tempted by those, though oftener by contrary vices, to do his country much positive mischief. Men are generally clearighted enough in perceiving their own interest; and they cannot be suspected of not loving themselves with an affection sufficiently sincere; yet how many, through a defect of moral attainment, daily plunge themselves into inextricable distress? Can it be expected that they should treat their country better than they treat themselves?

In what
manner
laws are
relative to
different
govern-
ments,

Laws, we have said, are things relative, and therefore variable; and in order to be good, they must be adapted to the circumstances of the people for whom they are promulgated. Whatever law is well adapted to the constitution, will facilitate its motions, invigorate its health, and thereby confirm its stability; and especially if the law, pregnant with that which we have often mentioned as the great and principal element of political safety, conspires to convince the people at large, or at least that portion of the community which is most numerous or most powerful, that their interest and happiness are intimately connected with the preservation and permanence of the constituted authorities.

Besides

Besides this, the safety of states requires that the legislature should never lose sight of that golden mean, which is universally overlooked or despised in corrupt republics. Many institutions, seemingly favourable to democracy, have proved its ruin; and many institutions, seemingly favourable to oligarchy, have totally destroyed that form of government. Demagogues and sycophants, the partisans of the multitude, and the flatterers of the great, regard that plan of policy which they respectively espouse, as the consummate pattern of perfect excellence, and therefore think, or affect to think, that they cannot possibly do too much for promoting the interests of democracy on the one hand, or of oligarchy on the other. In this, however, they err egregiously; and set themselves in opposition to the first principles of society, and to the whole analogy of nature. The limb of an animal may be elegant without being straight; and the nose, that characteristic feature, may deserve in a certain degree the epithets of depressed or aquiline, and yet this small deviation from straightness into curvature may heighten and embellish beauty. But if you increase too much its swell or its depression, you will thereby disfigure the whole countenance. There is not any reason whatever, why the same observation should not apply to forms of government. The popular and aristocratical powers, acting in nearly opposite directions, will, if nicely adjusted, keep the motion of government straight and uniform. This right line, however, may,

BOOK
VII.particularly
to democ-
racies and
oligarchies.

Illustration.

BOOK by a small variation in the relative force of the
VII. generating powers, deviate a little into either
of the opposite curvatures, without affecting the
beauty of the system. But if you vary this
force or celerity too much, if you render the
democracy too democratical, or the aristocracy
too aristocratical, you will first of all enfeeble,
then shake, and finally subvert the government.
The nature of democracy requires that the su-
preme authority of government should reside,
not in the distinguished few, but in the great
body of the people; the nature of oligarchy or
aristocracy, requires that the supreme authority
of government should reside, not in the people
at large, but in the few distinguished by wealth
or virtue. Both oligarchies and democracies,
therefore, imply the existence of those opposite
descriptions of persons, the rich and the poor,
the few and the many. These descriptions are
the elements of which such governments are
composed; and in proportion as you diminish or
destroy either of the constituent elements, you
must impair or demolish the whole fabric of the
constitution. How absurdly, therefore, do those
demagogues and those sycophants reason, who,
the former in democracies, would plunder and
harass the nobility; and the latter, in oligarchies,
would oppress and persecute the people? How
weak as well as wicked are those oaths which
are taken in some oligarchical governments;
“ I will resist the populace with all my might;
I will bear them eternal ill-will, and never cease
to inflict on them every injury in my power?”

The errors
of dema-
gogues and
sycophants.

Did

Did these haughty but contemptible nobles consult their own interest and honour, they would swear the direct contrary; "I will never injure the people, I will always treat them with kindness."

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But the main source of political safety consists in an expedient now universally neglected by states, though it has more efficacy alone, than all other contrivances combined. How wisely soever laws may be framed, and with whatever precision they may be penned, they will prove impotent and useless, unless those who are destined to administer them, be carefully trained to shape their lives agreeably to the pattern of the commonwealth. The constitution of a state, as well as that of an individual, may be ruined by intemperance; and the danger of intemperance can only be prevented by early and assiduous culture. If the government, therefore, is a democracy, the education must be democratical; if it is an oligarchy, the education must be oligarchical. But an education properly adapted to either of these forms of government, must not be such as will excite their respective magistrates to indulge their political propensities, and to gratify their selfish or factious passions, but such as will give to their public conduct that firmness and moderation, which the safety of the state requires, and without which it will be impossible for the popular party long to defend the democracy against the nobles; or for the partisans of the Few, long to defend the oligarchy against the people. Education, when

The citizens must be taught to shape their lives by the pattern of the commonwealth.

Of democratical and oligarchical education.

BOOK VII. when properly directed, is the preserving and vivifying principle of all good policy; but as it is now conducted, it becomes the cause of instability, and produces frequent revolutions. Under every species of oligarchy, the children of the great are brought up delicately, and often indulged criminally. The children of the poor are hardened in their bodies by exercise, and fortified in their minds by discipline. Can it be expected that weakness should long continue to prevail over strength; or that men softened by sloth, should long continue to command men invigorated by exertion? In democracies, on the contrary, where justice is defined by equality, and where it is thought sufficient, that all be treated alike, without considering whether each will thus have his due, liberty too naturally degenerates into licentiousness, and the citizens, instead of submitting cheerfully to the salutary restraints of discipline, think themselves entitled, as Euripides says,

“ Each man to live as perverse will directs:”

because otherwise, forsooth, their liberty would be abridged. But this is absurd in the extreme. To be obliged to shape our lives to the pattern of the commonwealth, is not slavery but safety. Such then are the causes and contingencies which, in republics, promote or prevent revolutions: We now proceed to explain those causes and contingencies which have been found to overturn or to uphold monarchies.

Monar-

Monarchies, whether limited or absolute, are liable to nearly the same changes and accidents which befall republics; for royalty is analogous to aristocracy; and tyranny is composed of rigid oligarchy and the worst species of democracy, and is, therefore, most ruinous to its subjects, as containing the evils and deformities of two pestilent mischiefs. The two kinds of monarchy are different in their origin. Royalty is produced from the weight and influence of the nobles concentrated in one distinguished and illustrious character, in order the more firmly to resist the dangerous encroachments of the populace. Tyranny, on the other hand, is generated by the combined strength of the populace, who think they can never enough exalt the leader who undertakes to defend the popular cause, and to repel oligarchic oppression. Most tyrants, therefore, have sprung out of demagogues, who had captivated the affections of the people, by traducing and persecuting their superiors. This, I say, has happened in large states; for in ancient times, and before the aggrandizement of cities, kings would often transgress the limits of their lawful power; and magistrates, availing themselves of the duration and importance of their civil and religious offices, which then lasted much longer than they do now, would often by theft or robbery usurp a throne. The tyranny of Pheidon of Argos was nothing but an undue extension of his royal authority. The same may be said of the other tyrannies which about that time prevailed in Greece.

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Chap. 10.

Of revolutions in monarchies.

The origin of royalty.

Of tyranny.

BOOK Greece. Phalaris of Agrigentum, and the tyrants of Ionia, were originally republican magistrates, who abused the authority of their elective functions for obtaining unlimited power. But Panætius of Leontium, Cypselus of Corinth, Pisistratus of Athens, and Dionysius of Syracuse, all these, and many others, acquired tyranny by flattery; they first captivated the *affections* of the people, before they enslaved their *persons*.

Royalty
analogous
to aristocracy.

Royalty, we said, is analogous to aristocracy. It may, in fact, be analysed into the same elements; since kings are created for their personal or hereditary worth, and for the benefits which they seem capable of conferring, or which they have actually conferred on their nation. Codrus, who defended the Athenians in war; Cyrus, who delivered Persia from bondage; the martial leaders of the Lacedæmonians, Macedonians, and Molossians, whose successful valour acquired lands for their respective followers, and maintained them in quiet possession of their important conquests; these and such illustrious men received the honours of royalty from the admiring gratitude of the public, and adorned the throne by the same virtues through which they were enabled to ascend it.

Definition
of a king;
and contrast
between
kings and
tyrants.

A king, in his nature and end, is a public guardian. His office is a pledge, that the nobles shall not be subjected to injustice, nor the people to insult. A tyrant, as we have said and repeated, is not essentially governed by any public-spirited motive; and if ever he consults the interest

terest of his country, it is merely as that interest happens accidentally to affect his own. To enjoy pleasure, the meanest pleasure, is the only reasonable aim of a tyrant; to acquire glory, the brightest glory, is the aim of a king. A tyrant, therefore, delights in wealth, as furnishing means to his end; a king delights in honour, justly obtained and hardly earned. A tyrant is guarded by mercenary foreigners; a king, by the affection of his people.

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The mischief of that complex thing a tyranny, will manifestly appear by considering the inherent evils of its constituent elements. It is composed, we said, of rigid oligarchy and of lawless democracy. From the former it borrows that rapacity for wealth, (the proper end of oligarchy,) without which the tyrant can neither purchase criminal pleasure, nor pay his mercenary attendants. In imitation of oligarchic magistrates, the tyrant will distrust and disarm his subjects, plunder and banish them, as fear or avarice directs; and, disregarding every domestic and every social tie, transplant them, as suits his convenience, from one district to another, and thus tear asunder their affections, and render them strangers in their native country. From democracy, on the other hand, tyrants will borrow their animosity to the nobles, and lose no opportunity of destroying them, secretly or openly; of banishing them from their country, and of inflicting on them every calamity, that either vengeance can dictate, or that fear may suggest. For tyrants never forget

Analysis of
tyranny;
the inherent
evils
of its constituent
elements:

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get that the most distinguished portion of the community must ever be the most hostile to their government, and the most able as well as the most willing to subvert it; because of such men, some will be ambitious of dominion, and all of them must be impatient of subjection. Tyrants, therefore, regarding them as hindrances in the way of their power, and obstacles to the unbounded gratification of their passions, will never lose sight of the advice of Periander to Thraſybulus, "that in order to reap the full harvest of their government, it is necessary to cut off the tallest stalks, and to level the political field."

Causes of
the revolutions in
tyrannies.

Insult.

Examples.

From these observations, it is plain that both the causes which precede, and the consequences which follow revolutions, must be nearly the same in monarchies and in republics. The immediate and impelling causes of innovation, are injustice, suffered or apprehended, fear, contempt, and especially such acts of injustice as are accompanied with insult. The ends in view are to strip the tyrant of his ill-gotten wealth, and to divest him of his usurped power, in order to apply the former to the exigencies of the community, and to divide the latter among lawful magistrates. Conspirators sometimes strike at the tyranny, sometimes at the person of the tyrant. The latter takes place in the case of insult; for persons insulted commonly seek not advantage, but vengeance. It was thus that Harmodius and Aristogeiton overturned the tyranny of the Peisistratidæ. The insult offered to his sister, animated the hand of Harmodius;

the insult offered to his beloved Harmodius, sharpened the steel of Aristogeiton. Periander of Ambracia provoked the vengeance even of his pathics by the insolent obscenity of his language. Philip of Macedon was slain by Pausanias, because he made light of the disgrace which that young nobleman had suffered from the audacious impurity of Attalus. The indignant manhood of Derdas punished by death the brutal assaults of Amyntas, surnamed the Little¹. The resentment of blows and stripes has often threatened the safety of men in power, and often proved fatal to them: witness the Penthalidæ at Mitylené, and also Penthilus himself, the former of whom were destroyed by Megacles, the latter by Smerdes; witness also, the assassination of Archelaus King of Macedon, effected at the instigation of Decamnichus, whom that prince had caused to be whipped, in compliance with the desire of Euripides the poet²; who was provoked at being taunted by Decamnichus for his stinking breath³. Innumerable instances might be given of kings and tyrants who, through such causes, have been at once deprived of their power and of their lives; especially when the indulgence of their unbridled passions has been accompanied by an open defiance of the sentiments of mankind, and

¹ A few sentences are omitted, the subject being as impure as the text is corrupt.

² History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxiii. p. 6.

³ This passage is somewhat abridged. Compare Diodorus Siculus, b. xiv. sect. 37.

when

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Fear, contempt, &c.
with examples.

when injury has been heightened by mockery and insult.

The fear or the contempt of subjects often proves ruinous to kings. Xerxes commanded Artabanus, the captain of his guard, to kill Darius. Artabanus did not obey the order, thinking the King himself might forget, or be willing to revoke it, as the command was given in his cups. But the officious envy of courtiers failed not to refresh the King's memory; and Artabanus, alarmed for his own safety, conspired and slew his master. The mean effeminacy of Sardanapalus, who, if the story told of him may be credited, was found weaving and spinning with his women, excited that contemptuous indignation which tumbled him from the throne. The drunkenness of the younger Dionysius, which rendered him despicable to his subjects, animated the republican patriotism of Dion, and enabled him to rid Syracuse of a tyrant. This passion of contempt is most likely to operate on two classes of men; on the friends of the monarch, who, because they enjoy his confidence, think it will be easy for them to deceive and to destroy him; and on the ministers of his power, because they think it will not be difficult for them to usurp his dominion. Cyrus was only the general of a provincial army; but he became master of the East, because he despised the luxury of Astyages, and the slothful effeminacy of his guards. Seuthes, the Thracian general, conspired against his master Amadocus, and seated himself on his throne. Some-

Sometimes avarice, and sometimes ambition, combines with contempt, and accelerates revolutions. The love of money made Mithridates dethrone Ariobarzanes. Ambition often springs up in men of courageous natures invested by monarchs with high military command; for courage becomes enterprize, when armed with power. Ambition also, in another view, is productive of revolutions; an ambition not to gain power, but to obtain glory. Conspirators, animated by this principle, are few in number; for they must disregard what most men highly value, personal safety; and like the high-minded Dion, must be careless how far they proceed in their enterprize, but think, that while invading the power of a tyrant, the first ground they gain will be an honourable grave.

Monarchies, like other forms of government, perish through external violence. An interference of interests renders them obnoxious to democracies: for as potters, according to Herodotus, envy potters, so is a single tyrant exposed to the hatred and vengeance of a tyrannical populace. An opposition of principle and system renders tyrannies odious to royalties and aristocracies. The aristocracy of Sparta, therefore, destroyed many tyrannies; as did also the republic of Syracuse, while wisely governed. In destroying monarchies, external violence is often assisted by domestic discord. This happened in the case of Gelon; and recently in that of the younger Dionysius. Thra-sybulus, Hieron's brother, playing the demagogue, corrupted by pleasures and profligacy

External
violence,
the hatred
of republics;

assisted by
internal
discord.

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the heir-apparent of Gelon's monarchy, that he himself might be king. A conspiracy was formed to destroy the person of Thrasybulus while his tyranny remained safe, but a part of the conspirators seized the opportunity of divesting the whole family, at once, of honours which no individual of it seemed worthy to wear. The family of Dionysius was divided against itself; for Dion was his kinsman. By the assistance of the people he expelled the tyrant; but through the unjust suspicions of the same people, he was afterwards himself most unworthily slain.

Different
 operation
 of hatred,
 contempt,
 and anger.

Of the two causes which destroy tyrannies, hatred and contempt, the first is inherent in the very nature of tyranny, since that man cannot fail to be odious, who is invested with arbitrary power. Contempt, though not essential to tyranny itself, is, however, a more frequent cause of its destruction. Experience justifies this remark. Those who were the first to mount a despotic throne, have for the most part been able to preserve it; they were odious, but not contemptible; but their successors, naturally becoming contemptible as well as odious, have universally been divested of their unlawful power; and as shamefully disgraced as they were unworthily exalted. Anger may be regarded as a species of hatred; it differs however in this, that as its proceedings are destitute of reflection, it is always more prompt, and sometimes more efficacious; but hatred, as it acts under the direction of reason, though more slow, is commonly more dangerous and more fatal. The arbitrary government of the individual perishes (to speak in general)

general) through the same causes which destroy rigid oligarchies and lawless democracies ; both of which are nothing else but complex tyrannies.

B O O K
VIL

Royalty is not easily demolished by external violence ; and this form of government often lasts long, since honours are naturally durable in proportion as they are moderate. Royalty perishes, however, through the internal discord of men in office, and through the preposterous ambition of kings to make themselves absolute. At present, states are seldom erected into royalties ; for amidst the great equality of mankind, few are thought worthy of unrivalled pre-eminence, or deemed capable of sustaining with dignity a lawful and voluntary sceptre ; and a king, whose authority must be supported by force or by fraud, immediately degenerates into a tyrant. To the causes, therefore, already mentioned of the destruction of monarchy, we must add one peculiar to hereditary monarchy ; the contemptible characters of youths born in the purple, and their proneness to offensive insolence. The authority of such youths cannot be *voluntarily* endured ; and thus, the government, if a royalty, is effectually destroyed, and a tyranny, probably of short duration, substituted in its stead. These and other such causes produce revolutions in monarchies.

Of revolutions in limited monarchies.

The worthlessness of youths born in the purple.

The means of their preservation, it is plain, must in general be directly contrary to the causes of their destruction. As to limited monarchy, or royalty, the more it is limited, the longer

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Limited monarchy preserved by moderation.

BOOK VII. longer it is likely to last. Moderation, therefore, is the great preservative of this form of government. Princes, the farther they recede from despotism, and the nearer they approximate to equality of right with their subjects, are the less exposed to hatred, envy, and all that train, or all those complications of passions, which so often prove ruinous to their power. Moderation long upheld the monarchy of the Molossians. The royalty of Lacedæmon, which has proved so permanent, was, from the beginning, moderated by division between two kings; and farther attempered, under Theopompus, by a due mixture of popular and democratic powers.

When that wise prince instituted the office of the Ephori, he abridged the power of royalty, but increased its stability. The short-sighted pride of his queen asked him, whether he was not ashamed to transmit to his posterity a sceptre less splendid than that which he had received from his ancestors? "No, surely," he replied; "I shall transmit to them a throne more steadfast and more durable."

Absolute monarchy preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission.

Absolute monarchy, or tyranny, is preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission. The first mode consists in tightening the reigns of power, by vigilance and severity; it is usual and hereditary among tyrants. The suspicious and stern Periander exercised it in all its bitterness at Corinth. The cruel institutions of the Persian monarchs are stamped with the same character; and the maxims which we formerly mentioned, of mowing the tallest stalks;
of

of prohibiting, under severe penalties, convivial meetings of clubs and assemblies; of destroying public schools; and of subverting every establishment that may have a tendency to engender mutual confidence, or to create a national spirit; all these precautions, and others of the same kind, would, if any thing could, render tyranny secure. It will tend to the same purpose, that persons of distinction frequent the halls, or crowd the gates, of the palace; their machinations against the government will thus be easily discovered and speedily suppressed; and their minds, degraded and debased by the servility of court attendance, will finally become incapable of forming any generous resolution. These, and such like, are Persian, Barbarian, and tyrannic maxims, directly tending to destroy that freedom of communication which is as essential to mutual confidence, as mutual confidence is essential to boldness of enterprise. Spies, accusers, insidious listeners, like the Syracusan tale-bearers, are instruments useful to tyrants, whose interest it is to set their subjects at variance, instigating the people against the nobles, and the rich and noble against each other. Above all, the poverty of the subjects is the best pledge of the permanence of tyranny; for people impoverished have neither the leisure to contrive, nor the means to effect, revolutions. The pyramids of Egypt, the magnificent dedications of the Cypselidæ, the rebuilding of the Olympian temple by the sons of Pisistratus, the sumptuous works of Polycrates of Samos; these

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The former mode explained with an enumeration of tyrannic maxims.

Examples.

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were the productions of toil and misery, monuments as useful for the power of monarchs, as ruinous to the prosperity of their subjects. Enormous contributions in money, and enormous contributions in labour, have precisely the same tendency. By both alike the people are reduced to poverty and wretchedness; their *time* is enslaved; they must be beggars or drudges; and men robbed of leisure are not likely to recover liberty. Under the tyrannical government of Dionysius, the subjects of Syracuse returned, in the space of every five years, the amount of their whole property into the exchequer. Still faithful to his principle, the tyrant delights in war; extorting not only the wealth, but the blood of his people, especially since military expeditions are calculated to engross their whole attention, and to confirm their habitual submission. The safety of a king lies in his friends; but a tyrant distrusts *his friends* beyond all others; knowing that all others are willing, but that his friends only are always able to destroy him. The institutions adapted to lawless democracy, equally suit tyranny. The unbridled licence of slaves and of women, forms the reproach of both these governments. The order of society is inverted; in families, slaves are disobedient, and women are imperious; they are spies and accusers of their masters and husbands; and cherished by the squire, as well as the complex tyrant, for those odious purposes, they become abettors of unjust domination, which they strive to perpetuate and extend.

extend. None but the worst or meanest of mankind can have credit in democracies and tyrannies. The furious sanguinary demagogue is all-powerful in the first; the cruel unfeeling courtier is alone regarded in the second; for the licentious multitude and the tyrant are governed by their passions; and as their passions are criminal, wicked instruments alone are qualified to gratify them. Tyrants, sensible of their own worthlessness, stand in perpetual need of flattery, without which anodyne, the internal smart of their crimes would render them intolerable to themselves. But men of elevated minds are totally incapable of every species of adulation. Tyrants, therefore, cannot endure any such men; their liberal spirit and conscious dignity are regarded as insolent usurpations of the imperial prerogative. None, therefore, can associate with tyrants, but those who will comply with their humours; and in admission to their table and familiarity, foreigners, as less dangerous, will always be preferred to their native subjects. Such are the expedients by which tyranny is upheld; expedients wicked in the extreme, and indefinite in number, but which are all contrived for the three following purposes: First, to debase the souls of their people; for it is not the part of low-minded persons to become political reformers. Secondly, to destroy all mutual confidence, for without confidence in each other, it is impossible for any set of men to effect a revolution; tyrants, therefore, are necessarily enemies to honesty, not only because men of integrity

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Tyrannic
maxims
all reduced
to three.

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grity are naturally hostile to their government, but because such men alone, by the confidence which their characters inspire, are capable of subverting it. Thirdly, tyrants will strive to reduce their people to indigence and debility; and thus deter them from all thoughts of sedition, by making them sensible of their total inability to effect any salutary revolution.

The mode of preserving tyranny by remission, with maxims by which a tyrant may obtain popularity, and appear not a plunderer but a protector.

This, then, is the first mode of preserving a tyranny; the second is directly the reverse. We may perceive wherein it consists, by reflecting on what was above said concerning the destruction of royalty. As royalty is destroyed by rendering it tyrannical or absolute, so tyranny may be preserved by rendering it royal or moderate; with this condition, however, that the monarch, while he slackens the reins of his power, still continues to hold and to guide them: for should he once abandon his power, and begin to reign merely by the voluntary submission of his subjects, he would from that moment cease to be a tyrant, and rise into a lawful prince. His power, therefore, must be preserved, as the only foundation of his authority; but while he keeps hold of tyrannic power, he may seasonably decline to exercise it, and with great advantage to his own security, begin to play the part of a king. In assuming this borrowed character, he will first of all pretend to be mightily concerned for the interest and glory of his country. He will not incense the people by lavishing the hard earnings of their sweat and toil,

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on harlots, flatterers, and fiddlers. Some tyrants have been such admirable actors of royalty, as even to give their subjects a faithful account of their receipt and expenditure. The deluded multitude considered them as stewards, not as masters. Those, however, who have power, can never be in want of property; and an ambitious monarch, frequently engaged in foreign enterprises, acts wisely in not leaving at home a rich treasury behind him, since those whom he appointed to guard it, would prove his most formidable adversaries. Generous in his own person, he views with complacency inexhaustible treasures, always at his command, in the purses of his subjects; yet, he never demands their money or their services but under pretence of the public exigency. It is the honour and safety of the country, not the ambition of the prince, that summons them to war. They follow his standard readily, regarding him, not as a tyrant, but as a protector. If he proceeds in other instances to act his part well, he will endeavour to inspire, not fear, but respect: this, indeed, is not easy, if his character at bottom be really contemptible; yet, much may be done by pretending a sincere love for his country, and exhibiting himself to the multitude as the guardian and champion of the state. An absolute monarch, who would preserve his power, must, in public at least, keep a watch over his voluptuousness, and take care that none of his ministers or favourites insult the youth and beauty of either sex.

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sex. His wives and mistresses must also be taught to correct that supercilious and offensive haughtiness, and to repress those insolent airs, which have already caused the subversion of so many tyrannies. As to sensual pleasures, his conduct ought to be directly the reverse of that usual with some princes, who are not completely gratified by the most criminal indulgence in lust and luxury, unless they openly expose their wickedness and emblazon their profligacy; challenging the admiration of mankind, for that drunken debauchery and prodigal whoredom which ought to cover them with eternal infamy. A crafty tyrant will avoid giving such causes of offence; knowing, that he who is drunk or asleep is more obnoxious to a conspiracy than the man who is vigilant and sober. Instead of dissipating his treasures in perishing luxury, he will employ them in embellishing his capital, and improving his country. This will exhibit him under the amiable character of a public guardian; and above all, he must appear to be much addicted to religion, and anxiously attentive to whatever regards the honour of the gods. Persons of this character are less likely to commit injustice, and therefore less the objects of fear: they are, also, less liable to suffer wrong, because men will be afraid of injuring those who reckon the gods themselves in the number of their friends. A tyrant, therefore, must endeavour to appear religious; but this specious shew of religion must not be deformed by abject superstition. It will contribute much

to his security, to be diligent in discovering and rewarding merit, wherever it may be found; and to be careful to treat men of eminent talents with such distinguished honour, as will leave them little room to regret that it is not their lot to live under a free republic. Of rewards and honours, he himself must be the dispenser; but punishments must be inflicted by the authority of his courts of justice, or the command of his substitutes.^m

It is a maxim of state in every kind of monarchy, never too highly to exalt any individual subject. When great powers must be delegated, it is better that they should be lodged with a commission, consisting of several persons, whose rivalry and jealousy will afford the best pledges of their fidelity; but when the nature of any important function of sovereignty requires that it should be intrusted to one only, the tyrant should take care, that this minister be not of too enterprising a spirit; or if he has imprudently aggrandized such a person beyond the due measure, he must beware not to curtail him of his ample dignities at once, but slowly and imperceptibly. The sudden fall of an ambitious minister has shaken the stability of many a government. All kinds of offensive insolence

^m See *Libro del Principe*; particularly chapters 18, 19, 21. Machiavel has neither the merit nor the infamy of the maxims usually ascribed to him, but which he has copied verbatim from Aristotle. Yet, in describing the contrivances for preserving tyranny, whether by the way of intention or remission, the Grecian philosopher is more careful than the Florentine secretary to avoid saying any thing that is liable to misrepresentation or reproach.

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B O O K are to be most carefully avoided, especially such
VII. insolence as vents itself in acts of violence or
 lust. The crafty tyrant must persuade the vic-
 tims of his outrageous and infamous passions,
 that they are the objects of his love, and repay
 their secret submissions by conspicuous honours.
 But when he suspects that his insolence has
 really offended, he must be particularly on his
 guard against men jealous of their honour, inca-
 pable of restraining their anger, and willing, as
 Heraclitus says, to purchase vengeance at the
 price of their lives.

As every state consists of two principal classes,
 the rich and the poor, the tyrant must endeavour
 to make it appear, that his authority is use-
 ful to both; or if that be impossible, he must
 diligently court and gain the strongest party. If
their favour can be obtained, it will be needless
 for him to have recourse to the ordinary expe-
 dients of emancipating his slaves and disarming
 his subjects, since the strength of his guards,
 abetted by a powerful party among the people,
 will be sufficient to uphold his tyranny. It is
 needless to expatiate on this subject; for all the
 other maxims that might be enumerated must
 still have the same end in view, to gain popu-
 larity, and must be calculated to make the ty-
 rant appear, not as a master, but as a steward;
 not a plunderer, but a protector^a. By avoiding

^a How well did the late Frederic II. of Prussia, as well as his
 model, Philip II. of Macedon, practise the more essential part of
 Aristotle's maxims! See my View of the Reign of Frederic, c. vi.
 p. 276, & seq.

blameable

blameable excess, and confining his life within the bounds of moderation, he will cease to be the object of fear and hatred; his reign will be more illustrious and more honourable, in proportion as his subjects are less miserable and less abject; his throne also will be the more secure. As to morals, therefore, let him, if it is impossible to be virtuous, be at least half virtuous, and not altogether wicked, but only half wicked.¹

Of all governments, the least durable are oligarchies and tyrannies. The most lasting tyranny on record was that of Orthagoras and his sons in Sicyon. It continued a hundred years. The cause of its long duration was the laudable moderation of those princes, and their cheerful submission to the laws. Cætheres, besides, was a man of equity; calm, temperate, and, therefore, by no means a dangerous redoubt of content, which so often produces revolutions; and he, as well as the other members of his family, knew the arts of government, and assiduously cultivated popularity. His impartial equity crowned the honest boldness of the judge who, in a dispute respecting a gymnastic victory, adjudged the prize to his competitor. It is said, that the statue sitting in the market-place of Sicyon, adorned with a crown, perpetuates the

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That oligarchies and tyrannies are the least durable of all governments.
Examples.

¹ Machiavel says more explicitly, "non partire dal bene, potendo; ma sapere entrare nel male, necessitato." The maxim, if it has any sense, only shews that tyranny being a bad thing in itself, can only be preserved by bad means.

remem-

BOOK VII. remembrance of the judge's integrity, and of Clifthenes's magnanimity. Peisistratus of Athens gave an useful lesson to tyrants. When summoned before the Areopagus, he appeared in person to plead his cause, and respectfully heard the decision of that ancient tribunal. The second example of a durable tyranny is that of Cypselus and his family at Corinth. It lasted seventy-seven years and six months; for Cypselus himself reigned thirty years; Periander, forty-four; and Psammetichus, the son of Gondius, three years and six months. The duration of this government proceeded from the same causes. Cypselus was a man of uncommon address, and knew how to practise every seductive and every popular art. He even disbanded his guards, as useless for his safety. His son Periander was indeed obtained tyrant; but his character was ennobled by recourse to the spirit, and illustrated by mitigating his slaves the third and last example of a durable tyranny was that of the Peisistratide at Athens. It was not, like those above mentioned, uninterrupted; for Peisistratus twice abdicated and fled; so that in the course of thirty-three years, he reigned only seventeen; his sons reigned eighteen years; the whole duration of their government, therefore, exceeded not thirty-five years. That of Gelon and his family in Syracuse was more short-lived still. Gelon reigned seven years; Hieron reigned ten; but Thrasylbulus was banished in less than twelve months. The greater part of tyrannies

tyrannies have perished still more suddenly^m. BOOK
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Thus much concerning revolutions in monarchies, how they are caused, and how they may be prevented.ⁿ

^m When Aristotle speaks of tyrannies, he here means usurpations of arbitrary power in countries formerly free; whether under a lawful monarchy, or under a republican government. It is strictly consistent with his principles, that such usurpations should be short-lived, because they are incompatible with the sentiments, principles, and habits of thinking, most prevalent among the people at large.

ⁿ The conclusion of this chapter is employed in refuting Plato's fanciful notions concerning political revolutions; notions founded on the wonderful powers ascribed by the Pythagoreans to periods and numbers. This wild doctrine is explained in the eighth book of Plato's Republic. Aristotle proves by the facts above stated, that it is totally inconsistent with experience. The revolutions, however, which history describes, and which theory explains, it is the business of policy to apply, that the experience of the past may thus serve for regulating the conduct of the future. While the same causes produce the same effects, nations similarly circumstanced must, it is thought, necessarily run the same political career; obtain by similar exertions the same exalted prosperity; commit, through ambition or insolence, nearly the same errors; and, in consequence of those errors, be subjected to equally dreadful reverses of fortune. The truth of these general observations cannot be disputed; but in making particular applications of them, either for the purpose of confirming their own confidence, or of inspiring terror into their enemies, men are almost continually deceived by appearances; sometimes mistaking even contrasts for parallels. It is not unusual with the great military republic of recent date, to assume the right of comparing itself with Rome, and its naval and commercial rival with Carthage. Yet it is only under one aspect, and in particulars the slightest and most superficial, that Carthage and England can be brought to exhibit even a false air of resemblance; while in their characterising properties, the two maritime commonwealths form the subject of a contrast rather than of a comparison. The one continental, the other insular; the former depending entirely for defence on foreign troops, the latter exulting in domestic strength; Carthage noted for penuriousness and perfidy; England equally distinguished for probity and profusion; the African republic, addicted solely to lucrative pursuits, considering literature and philosophy as things beyond its sphere; Great Britain, the seat of arts and elegance, of growing fame in literature, and of unrivalled pre-eminence in science.

The parallel between Rome and France is attended with this singularity, that the latter has run through the same stages in a few years, which

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which the former did in as many centuries. It has expelled or destroyed its royal line; abolished privileged orders; laid all honours open to the people at large; displayed the enthusiasm of liberty; proved the connection between this principle and military energy; defeated its neighbours on the Continent; obliged them to supply its armies with pay, corn, and clothing; plundered their altars and temples, carried off their pictures and statues. I need not say more of what France has done; but among the transactions indicating what she in future is likely to do, the reader of ancient history will recollect that Buonaparte is entrusted with nearly the same commission that the Romans bestowed on Cæsar before he became dictator, and in precisely the same countries on both sides the Alps.

The above note was first printed in 1797; and the prediction has been verified in the establishment by Buonaparte, of a military despotism commanding from his slaves, whether called subjects or allies, every particle of labour, every sou of money, and every drop of blood; a tremendous energy, while it lasts, and has materials to work on. Yet as single years in the French empire have hitherto corresponded with whole centuries in the Roman, it may be conjectured that this proportional progress applicable to its growth and aggrandizement, will continue, also, to apply to its declension and downfall; a supposed acceleration, which, amidst many agreeable and respectable qualities, is not a little justified by the hasty, impetuous temper of the French, and their variable, unbottomed character. From the nature of the materials, the empire of Rome was a volcano requiring ages to exhaust it; that of France is a feu de paille, bright, glittering, crackling, and hastily reducing itself by its own violence to dust and ashes.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VIII.*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book is placed last in order, because it seems to have been written to supply the defects of several preceding parts of the work. Aristotle had sufficiently explained the principles and arrangements of the simple forms of government; but he thought it might be useful further to examine wherein governments bearing the same name, might yet essentially differ in their nature. This leads him to enumerate and describe the different kinds of democracies and oligarchies, and to shew how the worst kinds might be improved and corrected; and, when thus happily altered, how they might best be upheld and perpetuated. In this Book he also examines the different kinds of military or naval force in their relation to the different forms of government; shewing which kinds of the former are respectively best adapted to the different modes of the latter. He concludes the

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* Commonly published as Book VI.

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Book with an accurate analysis of the executive power; enumerating and describing the different functions of magistracy essentially requisite in every well-regulated commonwealth. On this important subject, the following remarks will not appear unseasonable.

When our author first analysed government into deliberative, judicial, and executive^a powers, he meant something more than merely to explain the subject as a matter of speculation. For it is necessary, he observes, not only to know what, and how many are political functions, but according to what subordination they ought to be arranged and distributed. That they ought to be as minutely subdivided as state necessity will permit, he thinks most evident from this simple consideration, that each individual will be likely to act his part most properly, when each has his assigned task. The military power ought to depend on the civil^b; that the army may be formidable only to the enemies of the state: and the executive power ought to be clearly distinct from the legislature; lest tyrannical laws should be enacted, and these executed tyrannically. All magistrates ought to be responsible for the exercise of their authority; and their accounts subject to the inspection of those who never themselves handle the public money. The of-

^a The executive is called by him the appointing or electing power, for a reason above assigned, p. 314.

^b But to reduce it to this dependence is not an easy matter, as will be experienced by a great modern republic. Yet unless this be done, the commonwealth is a camp, and its liberty an empty boast.

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fice of collecting and applying the revenue ought never, therefore, to belong to the same persons who administer justice, and punish crimes; lest the financial administrator should abuse his authority to the base purposes of extortion or vengeance. "The law is above the judge; and the judge, as organ of the law, above all other magistrates. But the office of judge is incompatible with every function, that might pervert his judgment or twist his decisions; for a judge is a ruler, and how can a ruler give straightness to other things if itself be crooked?"*

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These great political principles afford the nearest approximation which the wisdom of antiquity ever made to that improvement and perfection which the events of time and chance, co-operating with the virtues of our ancestors, gradually introduced into the British constitution. But the grand secret in policy, of a government, carried on by kings who can do no wrong, and whose persons are sacred, through the instrumentality of accountable advisers and responsible ministers, was totally unknown to the free states of antiquity; on which account chiefly, none of them could lay claim to that stability and perpetuity at which, Cicero maintains^d, all wise government ought ever to aim. As this is a point which deserves the greatest attention, I shall not be blamed for making an unnecessary circuit, when I take the best, or

* Rhetor. I. i. p. 512.

^d Fragm. de Repub. I. iii.

BOOK the only, road to establish so important a truth
 { **VIII.** on authority which demands respect, and by arguments which admit not of answer.

The learned and judicious Polybius, who was not merely a *speculative* politician, but one conversant from his youth with courts and camps, and the management of great affairs, of unbounded curiosity, and with extraordinary opportunities, explains as the main result of his reading and experience, what he calls the theory of political revolutions: revolutions so necessary in their event, and so immutable in their order, that they may be easily foreseen, and boldly predicted. The discourse is contained in the sixth book of his History, and applied to the commonwealth of Rome in the beginning of the seventh century from the foundation of the city, the firmest and most flourishing period of the republic; when external victory conspired with internal arrangement to render the public security as stable, as the policy of the state was profound, and its renown was illustrious.

In that invaluable fragment, the historian finds fault with the usual division of governments into monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies; observing that these are neither the best, nor the only, kinds of civil polity. Monarchies are the first governments in their origin, and the work of Nature herself; but they have never yet been so skilfully moulded by art, that they had not a strong and palpable tendency to degenerate into tyrannies. It is
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the nature of power to corrupt those invested with the exercise of it; and the exercise of hereditary power is, in this respect, still more dangerous than that of any other. When princes, therefore, begin to abuse their prerogatives and authority for the unbridled indulgence of their rapacity, lust, and luxury, their proceedings cannot fail to provoke indignation and anger among the more dignified classes of their subjects, whose temper is the least likely to brook disgrace tamely. The people at large will sympathize with their resentment, and assist in destroying the monarchy, which had degenerated into a tyranny. An aristocracy will naturally rise on its ruins; since the gratitude of the public will cheerfully accept for rulers those by whom the country was delivered from oppression. The new magistrates will continue for a while to conduct themselves with propriety and patriotism; administering justly and wisely the affairs both of the citizens individually, and of the public collectively. But when the exercise of their power devolves on their descendants, who have not the merit of their fathers, nor enjoy like them the advantage of having been trained in the school of adversity, these unworthy successors will begin grossly to abuse their pre-eminent functions; giving loose reins to the most odious and most disgraceful passions. The aristocracy is thus transformed into an oligarchy; which, sinking under the weight of its own inherent vices, will be speedily overturned

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by the first leader of the multitude who has courage to assail it; since the whole body of the people, exasperated by an accumulation of indignities, will be prepared to abet his measures and to second his efforts. The people at large, now taking the commonwealth into their own hands, will establish a democracy; and while the greater part of those continue to live, who have experienced the evils resulting from governments of arbitrary will, the community will flourish under the blessings of law and liberty. But when the administration of the democracy is delivered down from father to son through successive generations, the restlessness of man will begin to spurn advantages with which he is satiated; ambition will nauseate equality, and fight for pre-eminence; those who have accumulated great wealth, will covet a proportional share of political power; and to attain this much-envied object, will not hesitate to destroy their own fortunes by profusion, and to corrupt the public morals by bribery, until the whole mass of the community be so deeply tainted with the impatience of rapacity, that the populace will no longer wait for their precarious or tardy dole, but putting themselves under the command of the first daring and unprincipled chief, whose boldness equals his wickedness, will invade the constitution; subvert the government; confiscate, banish, murder, and plunder, until having filled up the measure of their savage ferocity, the folly of their own passions delivers

delivers them enslaved and bound, into the hands of a single despot.^d

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Such is the perpetual round, which, according to Polybius, all unmixed governments are found by experience to run; from monarchy to tyranny; from aristocracy to oligarchy; from democracy to the tyranny of the multitude; for every multitude, he affirms, merely as such, is filled with levity and inconstancy, lawless in its pursuits, headstrong in its passions, unjust in its proceedings^e. In none of the simple forms of government, therefore, is there any constitutional firmness; there stability depends on opinions which are transient, and on circumstances which are accidental. They may be kept afloat by a tide of external prosperity; while the achievement and partition of foreign conquests conceal the inherent evils of the constitutions under which they are made. But the flame of discord, the longer it is suppressed by the mere accumulation of fuel, will finally break out with the greater violence; which has always been experienced by states whose institutions were well adapted to the contentious activity of war, but which had never been taught to enjoy the in-

^d The same doctrine is maintained by Aristotle, b. vii. c. v.; and by Plato in the following passage: ἡ γὰρ ἀγὰν εὐθιρία τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ ἄλλοις τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μεταβάλλει :: ἐκ τῆς αἰρετικῆς εὐθιρίας, δούλεια πλεῖστη καὶ ἀγριότης. “Excessive liberty is not likely to change into any thing else but excessive slavery. Tyranny, therefore, more naturally results from democracy than from any other form of government; the highest liberty being converted into the completest and cruellest servitude.” Plato de Republ. lix.

^e Polybius, l. vi. c. 56. p. 594. edit. Schweigh.

B O O K estimable gifts of peaceful leisure and unambi-
VIII. tious security.

Having rejected and reprobated all simple forms of polity, Polybius proceeds to examine those that are complex; governments of reciprocal controul; of which, he maintains, the most perfect model was to be found in the constitution of Rome, as it stood in the beginning of the seventh century of the republic. In that constitution, monarchic, aristocratic, and popular elements were so skilfully combined and so equally balanced, that the Romans themselves could not positively ascertain with which of the three species of governments their own ought to be classed^f. When they contemplated the splendid functions of the consuls, *their* authority seemed equal to that of kings. In the senate they beheld and felt the full strength of an aristocracy. The people at large, headed by their tribunes, appeared imperiously to exercise

^f The whole of Polybius's observations on this subject seems to have escaped the notice of our great law-commentator Blackstone. "Thus these three species of government have all of them their several perfections and imperfections. Democracies are usually the best calculated to direct the ends of a law; aristocracies, to invent the means by which that end shall be attained; and monarchies, to carry those means into execution. And the ancients, as was observed, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government, but these three; for though Cicero * declares himself of opinion "esse optimam constitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali optimo & populari, sit modice confusa;" yet Tacitus † treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lasting or secure ‡."

* Fragm. de Repub. l. ii.

† Annal. l. iv. c. 33.

‡ Blackstone's Comment. Intro. sect. ii.

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the plenitude of democratic power. The consuls, our author observes, even before leading their respective armies into the field, carry on within Rome itself the chief administration of affairs. To them all magistrates, except the tribunes, are subject. They assemble the senate, propose matters of urgency for its deliberation, and carry its decrees into execution. They likewise convoke the popular assembly, report to the people the resolutions of the senate, collect and declare the votes, and give efficacy to the will of the majority. When the consuls are at Rome, the ambassadors of foreign states can, through them only, be admitted to an audience in the senate. In military matters their authority is supreme. They appoint the military tribunes, enrol the legions, select the men fittest for each kind of service^a, and impose their undisputed commands on the allies. All who serve under their standards, are alike liable to their coercion and chastisement; and the questors attend them in the field, merely to disburse whatever sums they may think fit to demand. Such, Polybius observes, are the royal and monarchic powers^b of the consuls.

The senate is not, however, destitute of its due weight in the state. First of all, this re-

^a Compar. Polyb. l. vi. c. 12. p. 481. & l. vi. c. 20. p. 496. The military institutions of the Romans called forth the whole energy of the state. With them, the public was every thing; the citizens, nothing. According to their age, strength, and stature, they were draughted into the several legions, and divisions of legions; *cohorts* and *maniples*; without the smallest regard to their partialities and prejudices. Vid. Polyb. ubi supra.

^b L. vi. c. 12. p. 481.

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BOOK ^{VIII.} {pected council governs the exchequer, into which no sums are received, and from which none are issued, but by the express orders of the senate. By the senate's command only, the questors disburse all monies for the public service, except those sums with which they supply the consuls in the field. Even that heavy expenditure which is incurred by the state at the end of every period of five years, for the repairs or extension of public works, is made by the censores under the authority of the senate; which body also takes cognizance of all public delinquencies committed in any part of Italy; such as treasons, conspiracies, poisonings, and assassinations. To the senate it belongs to settle all disputes which arise in Italy, whether between individuals or communities; as well as to dispatch all embassies to foreign parts, either to treat of peace, or to denounce war; either to offer its advice and protection, or to interpose with its authority and commands. When foreign ambassadors arrive at Rome, the senate receives them in the manner it may judge most fit; and answers their demands as it may deem most expedient. Thence, to strangers who come to Rome in the absence of the consuls, the commonwealth appears in no other light than that of a simple aristocracy.¹

It

¹ Polybius, l. vi. c. xiii. p. 482. I abridge the author's narrative as much as attention to perspicuity will admit; yet I am fearful lest his analysis of the Roman government prove tiresome to those, who beside considering the importance of the subject itself, do not continually keep in view the important consequence that I would deduce from

It may very naturally be inquired, what political functions, then, remain for the exercise of the people at large? the greatest and most important of all; for the people are the dispensers of rewards and punishments. They elect the magistrates, they impose fines on those guilty of malversation in office; they alone can inflict the punishment of death. The laws proposed by the senate are either confirmed or rejected by the people; and the people may either ratify or annul all transactions between the senate and foreign states.*

from his elaborate discussion. Of all mixed governments, Polybius thinks the Roman, as it stood in his time, the best model of a well-balanced commonwealth. He observes, however, that emergencies must occur, that would infallibly destroy its equipoise. His prediction was fulfilled; as all similar predictions had been fulfilled concerning governments similarly constituted. I presume not to maintain, that he chose for his example, the best model of mixed government that could possibly have been selected. Perhaps the ancient Government of the Cretans, whose institutions, as well as manners, had sadly degenerated in his time, might have answered his purpose better; and the equipoise in the constitutions both of Carthage and of Sparta was maintained during a period of longer duration, though of less splendour. But the result of his reasoning, confirmed by that of all the great writers of antiquity, is, that every one of those mixed governments, in many of which there was a nice balance of political powers, and in some of which the people (as above proved) acted by their representatives, yet I say that every one of them contained in itself the seeds of its dissolution. Their radical infirmity originated not in those causes to which it is universally ascribed, the want of representation and a balance; but it consisted principally in this, that their first magistrates, by whatever title they might be distinguished, consuls, archons, or kings, were incapable of performing what Aristotle considers as the main function of royalty, the defending the poor from insult and the rich from injury, and thus keeping the component parts of a state in their proper places, and thereby giving to the constitution inalterable stability.

* Polybius, l. vi. c. xiv. p. 484, & seq.

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In this complex form of the Roman constitution, the moving powers are, according to Polybius, admirably adapted to the purposes of harmonious co-operation, and of seasonable counteraction; since the parts reciprocally control each other, linked in a nice chain of mutual dependence. The consuls, at the head of their armies, depend both on the senate and on the people; on the senate, without whose authority their soldiers cannot be provided with corn, or clothing, or pay; which can either prorogue their command, or appoint new generals; which can aggrandize and emblazon their transactions, or depreciate, vilify, and obscure them; and without whose willingness to furnish the requisite expence, they cannot be gratified with the honour of a triumph. The consuls are dependent, also, on the people, to whom, at the year's end, they are responsible for their behaviour in command; and to whom it belongs, either to ratify or to annul their transactions with foreign powers.¹

The senate and the people are held in a connection not less intimate, which compels them mutually to respect each other. The people alone can inflict the most tremendous of all punishments. They can diminish the collective honours of the senate; they can abridge the fortunes of its members; and the *veto* of a single tribune, who is naturally the creature and the organ of the people, can stop all proceedings in

¹ Polybius, l. vi. c. xv. p. 486, & seq.

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the senate, and even prevent the assembling of that council. But the people, in return, must respect the will of the senators, both collectively and individually; for the senators are their employers, paymasters, and judges. In every part of Italy there are innumerable works, consisting in buildings and repairs; the culture of lands and gardens; the management of mines, rivers, and harbours, all which objects are let to farm by the censors, and undertaken by the people. There is scarcely a single Roman who is not involved in these contracts; some farming under the censors at a certain price; others being partners with the farmers; a third class being sureties for them; and a fourth, in support of these sureties, pledging their own fortunes to the state. But in enforcing or modifying all such bargains, the power of the senate is supreme. This council can extend the time limited for performance; can lighten the conditions of the contract; and when any inseparable obstacle occurs, altogether release the contractors. Besides this, in most other civil causes of magnitude, judges are selected from the senate. The people at large, therefore, will be careful how they provoke a body, from whose members they have so much to hope, as well as so much to fear^m. Nor is there reason to apprehend that they should wantonly thwart the inclinations of the consuls, to whose authority all the citizens both collectively and individually

^m Polybius, l. vi. c. xvi. & xvii. p. 432, & seq.

are

BOOK are amenable in the field. From this skilful
 { **VIII.** adaptation and intimate dependence of the
 parts, that harmony of action results by which
 the political machine is impelled regularly and
 rapidly towards its proposed goal^a; resisting all
 attacks, surmounting every enemy, and conti-
 nually extending the dominion of the republic.
 When the terrors of danger are exchanged for
 the joys of victory, -and the minds of men

^a There is a difference between mechanical and moral powers obscurely hinted at by Polybius. The former, acting necessarily and invariably, will, when equal and contrary, destroy each other. But in politics two contrary powers may exist simultaneously; and the movement of government, instead of being weakened or stopped, may be sometimes thereby strengthened and accelerated. In the Roman constitution, besides the *Comitia Curiata*, which was chiefly useful in arming military commanders with the sanctions and authority of religion, there existed in Rome, from the time of the Publilian law enacted in the 414th year of the city, two legislative powers, the *Comitia Tributa* and the *Comitia Centuriata*; the former founded on the balance of numbers; and the latter on the balance of property. A dictator might be legally named by the consuls, neither controlable in his exercise of power, nor accountable for his administration in office; which, though limited to the space of six months, afforded time sufficient for the subversion of a government. The power of the dictator was occasional and extraordinary; but at all times the veto of a tribune was alike formidable. He might stop all measures and all deliberations; and, as the tribunes were the creatures of the multitude from which they derived their authority, they would often be inclined through interest and vanity, to flatter popular passions, and to blow up every gust of discontent into a storm of sedition. Yet notwithstanding these seeming incongruities, the body politic was held together by the charms of victory and glory, and the necessity of acting continually against innumerable enemies*, in defence of a country in which the great enjoyed pre-eminences and honours, and the people at large more freedom and more advantages than any other nation in the ancient world. Such was the state of Rome until that combination of circumstances was produced, which, Polybius suspected, the commonwealth would be unable to surmount.

* *Externus metus, maximum concordie vinculum.* Tit. Liv.

might

might be elated and intoxicated through excess of prosperity, the benefit of a government of reciprocal control is eminently conspicuous; since those branches of the state that would tower too high, and expand too widely, are checked in their movements, and even anticipated in their tendencies, by the continual pressure of the powers to which they are obnoxious.^o

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This is a glorious panegyric of the republic, as then constituted, and then circumstanced. But Polybius reluctantly acknowledges that the compliment would soon cease to be applicable; for the component parts of the state would be kept in their proper places through reciprocal counteraction and control, only while the minds of men were neither inflamed by the lust of power, nor loosened from the restraint of principle; and while the commonwealth, continuing in a progressive state of prosperity, could discharge in its colonizations and conquests those noxious humours which, unless drained by such outlets, must prove destructive to its vitals. But as the measure of national prosperity was filled up^p, the objects of individual ambition would be expanded and magnified; and while the assailing temptations augmented beyond bounds, the virtues to resist them would continually

^o Polybius, l. vi. c. xviii. p. 492.

^p ἡς ὑπεροχὴ καὶ δυναμίαν ἀδύνατος ἀφικέται, p. 576. I have paraphrased this passage of Polybius by comparing it with what Aristotle predicts concerning the destiny of Carthage. We learn from the Roman historians in general, that the complete colonization of Italy had the effect ascribed to it in the text.

diminish.

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diminish. The extortion of rapacity would keep pace with the profusion of vanity; and the unworthy proceedings of the Great would finally terminate in their own ruin, and that of the republic; for the people, provoked by the ambition and avarice of one party, and intoxicated by the perfidious adulation of another, would begin to despise law, to spurn authority; and, subjecting the concerns of their country to their own furious passions, would establish under the specious names of liberty and equality, the worst and cruellest of all tyrannies. This political prophecy began to be verified a few years after it was made, in the seditions of the Gracchi; and was completely accomplished in the subsequent misfortunes of the republic. But it is worthy of remark, that Polybius concludes his discourse, after he has shipwrecked the Romans on democracy; leaving them to infer from his general theory of political revolutions, that this tyrannical democracy must necessarily terminate in the exaltation of a single despot.^a

The

^a According to Aristotle's principles, the republic of Rome enjoyed one advantage in common with the great republic of modern growth; viz. its greatness: for the parties which necessarily prevail in all popular governments rendering them peculiarly liable to the pernicious interference of foreign powers, the stability of a great republic considered in relation to external causes of destruction, whether by force or fraud, must be much firmer than that of a small one. But the modern commonwealth is destitute of two advantages which had a tendency to preserve the ancient. First, a permanent senate, which gave the state continuity of existence, and transmitted from one generation to another the same plans and purposes; and secondly, the dictatorial and tribunical powers, which, however liable to abuse, seem indispensably necessary in every populous community

The want of constitutional firmness in the best regulated states of antiquity, produced a very general opinion, that nations, as well as individuals, had their youth and old age; their maturity, decline, and consequent dissolution. This opinion is warmly patronized by Plato^r; it is maintained likewise by Polybius; it was first refuted by Aristotle; and it is also rejected by Cicero^s. But it remained for modern times to shew, how the vigour of monarchy, acting by responsible instruments only, could retain the component parts of a state unalterably in their proper spheres; and how the merely executive part of government, though clearly distinct from the sovereignty, might be armed with sufficient power to uphold law, but without either the power or the will to subvert liberty. Had this political arrangement been established in the free states of antiquity, they would not have been liable to those perpetual abuses of power, which, as Polybius says, are by a *natural necessity*^t, subversive of aristocracies and democra-

munity governed on the republican plan, for seasonably suspending the adverse exertion of exasperated factions; and thereby preventing contraries of interest from continually degenerating into sources of sedition.

^r Plato de Republic. l. viii. p. 712. & seq. edit. Ficini.

^s Debit enim constituta sic esse civitas ut æterna sit. Itaque nullus interitus est reipublicæ naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persæpe. Fragment. de Republic. l. iii.

^t The natural necessity of political revolutions is maintained by Machiavel, History of Florence, l. i. sub initio; whose opinions on the subject, and even turn of expression, are copied by Hume. History of England, vol. ii. p. 441. edit. 1767.

cies ; nor would there have been room for that unbounded ambition, which, in all great and prosperous states, tends, by a *necessity equally inevitable*, to the destruction of mixed governments, how nicely soever in other respects their texture may be combined, and their elements may be balanced. Enterprising demagogues and fortunate generals would not merely have been resisted in their exertions by the counteraction of equals and rivals, until the bloody conflict ended in the ruin of public liberty ; but they would have been repressed in their tendencies, and overawed in their hopes, by a power far mightier to save than they were to destroy ; but a power, whose strength would be changed into weakness, whenever it attempted to violate liberty, and infringe the laws."

" Is it necessary to observe as a corollary to this discourse, that a neighbouring nation, if she consulted her supposed interest and the safety of her republican government, would instantly relinquish the career of ambition, and disband her armies more eagerly and more cheerfully than ever she collected them ? The stability of her democratical constitution can result only from giving to her national guards or militia a decided superiority over soldiers by profession. But how many stubborn difficulties will present themselves in attempting to realise this project ! Should many of the requisition men be desirous to return to their families, and should the numerous bodies of foreigners in the service be discharged without danger, and without tumult, yet who will be able to persuade the French veterans to forsake their arms, their generals, and their military habits of life ; and prevail on the greater part of them to mix with the peaceful mass of citizens, while the remainder is dispersed over an extensive frontier ? Yet unless this is done, it is morally impossible that France should long enjoy even the name or appearance of a republic. — I leave this note as it was printed in 1797 : the conclusion is now justified by as relentless a military despotism as ever was established.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Of republics of husbandmen — Of manufacturers and merchants. — Imperfections of democracy. — Oligarchy. — Military and naval force. — Branches of executive magistracy. — Magistrates for protecting commerce and contracts. — Of police — Of revenue. — Courts of record. — Controllers of public accounts. — Different orders of priests. — Superintendants of education and morals.

IN former books, we analysed and examined the complex structure of government, and explained the nature and the differences of the deliberative, the judicial, and the executive, powers. The deliberative power properly constitutes the sovereignty, since the proper office of magistrates and judges consists in obeying its will, and in executing its orders*. We shewed also, what are the political arrangements, which in the appointment of magistrates, and in the constitution of councils and tribunals, are best adapted to each form of government; and described what are the active powers by which every political fabric may be shaken and subverted, as well as what are the resisting forces by which it may be upheld and perpetuated.

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Chap. I.

Of the elements of governments, and their different combinations.

* Πολιτικῆ καὶ κυριῶ. Compare above, p. 319. & seq.

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But as governments, included under the same specific name, differ from each other, in consequence of the different materials of which they are composed, and of the various modes in which these materials are arranged, it is necessary further ⁷ to examine these materials and that arrangement; to consider whether, for instance, a democracy or an oligarchy contains all the constituent elements, which are commonly deemed essential to democracies or oligarchies; or whether they contain only a certain proportion of them mixed with others of a different kind ⁸; what is the effect of this composition on good government in general, and what combinations are best adapted to each country or nation in particular. We begin by treating of democracy.⁹

Chap. 1.

Of the nature and end of democracy.

Liberty is the foundation and scope of democracy; and it is not unusual to hear that in this government alone, the charms of liberty are displayed. Liberty itself is allowed to be founded on justice; but the justice of democracies, being measured by arithmetical^b equality, requires that

⁷ Aristotle having stated the contents of the preceding Books, goes on to consider the different kinds of governments distinguished by the same specific name, ἀμα τε περιεκυρωσεν τε λοιπον, "and at the same time to examine any remaining particulars which bear a reference to the subject of his present work:" which is sufficient to shew that this Book, as I have observed in the Introduction, is chiefly supplemental.

⁸ Aristotle says that the result of the συνδυασμοι, "the conjunctions of elements," was not sufficiently attended to in his own times.

⁹ I omit some parts of this chapter, because the observations contained in them are afterwards more clearly expressed.

^b See vol. i. b. v. c. 4. p. 372.

each

each individual citizen should enjoy the same political advantages with every other citizen, and that the will as well as the interest of the greater number should always be preferred to the will and the interest of the lesser. It is the nature, therefore, of democracy, that offices of executive magistracy should be held by rotation; and that in the deliberative assembly, the poor should always prevail over the rich, because the class of the poor is every where the more numerous. This last circumstance is considered as the best proof, or most evident sign of liberty; and the second is, that each individual may live as he lists; for to live agreeably to the will of another is, according to the maxim of democrats, to be a slave. On the basis, therefore, of these principles, the following democratical laws may be erected. That every citizen should be capable of holding offices; and where election prevails, that every citizen should be an elector. That the general will should govern each individual; but that each individual, in his turn, should be appointed to declare and execute this will. That offices should be distributed by lot, if not all offices, at least all such as do not require the peculiar advantages of skill and experience. That a qualification in point of fortune be not requisite for holding any employment; at least, that this qualification be exceedingly small. That the same office (military offices excepted) be not held twice successively by the same person; and that all offices should be of as short duration as circumstances will admit. That all the citizens be

Laws
therefrom
resulting.

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The evils
resulting
from the
form of a
simple
democracy,
prove that
form to be
imperfect.

capable of being appointed judges of the law as well as of the fact in all sorts of causes, and respecting all sorts of persons; or, if this be thought too general, in all important causes, and respecting all distinguished persons; for example, in all political questions, in impeachments, and even in private contracts, where the object is considerable. That the sovereignty reside in the national assembly, and be as sparingly imparted as possible to particular magistrates. Of all magistracies, that least repugnant to the genius of democracy is the senate; but when salaries and fees are granted for the discharge of public duties, the authority even of the senate must soon vanish; for the rapacity of the people will speedily bring all public business before the national assembly, and draw all lawsuits and trials before their own tribunals^c. Salaries and fees, therefore, are essential to the completion of democracy; magistrates, whose uninterrupted functions require that they should meet together^d, must live at the public expence; and should occasional meetings pass unrewarded,

^c Aristotle subjoins, that this had been observed in the preceding Book; an observation which might have led his editors to a better arrangement of his treatise of politics, than that hitherto given.

^d Aristotle here enumerates *τας αρχας και τα δικαστηρια και βυλην*; that is, magistrates respectively entrusted with executive, judiciary, and deliberative powers; who, as well as the citizens at large convened in the *εκακληροισται κυριαι*, or stated assemblies, ought, according to the principles of simple democracy to be paid for political labours. But if the public revenues cannot suffice for this profusion of expence, then those magistrates at least must be remunerated, whose uninterrupted functions require that they should meet together; and with them it appears from B. vi. c. xiii. that he means to class, as to this particular, the citizens convened in the stated and periodical assemblies.

yet

yet the people at large must be paid for attending those stated and periodical assemblies, the returns of which are regulated by law for the necessary discharge of public business. Birth, wealth, education, morals, are the elements of aristocracies; the elements of democracies, therefore, must be of a contrary kind; baseness of extraction, gross ignorance, poverty, and profligacy^c. No hereditary, no perpetual magistracy can exist under such a government; and if any thing of that nature had formerly found place in the country, the power of such a magistrate must be abolished; or if his title be allowed to remain, the honour of bearing it must not be conferred by election, but committed to the blind decision of chance. Such are the common properties resulting from the form of a simple democracy, and deducible from the definitions given by the partisans of that government of justice, equality, and liberty.

The imperfection of these definitions appears in the mischief of their consequences^f. Yet the number of inhabitants, or populousness, is, doubtless, the first element in the composition of

Chap. 3.

How the
right of the
majority is
to be re-

^c The word *Casavoria* denotes mean sordid labour; but Aristotle, by saying that the elements of democracy are directly the reverse of those which constitute aristocracy, shews that he here intends the manners and morals resulting from that degrading species of labour; and what these manners and morals are, he explains below in chapter iv. of this Book.

^f I have here inserted this observation, which occurs below, for the sake of perspicuity. The same inducement has made me transpose some other sentences, and also expand the author's brevity by using the same words which he himself employs on other occasions when treating similar subjects.

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conciled
with the
due in-
fluence of
property.

states; and to the interest of the people at large, due regard, therefore, ought to be had in the distribution of advantages and honours. But populoufness, though the first and principal, is not the only element essential to the end and purpose of every political association; the well-being, comfort, or happiness of the associated members. Towards the producing and securing of this comfortable subsistence of the community, other powers must co-operate; property, education, morals; without which it is impossible that any civil partnership or commonwealth can answer the purpose of the partners^s. How then are we to combine the other elements or causes of political advantage with mere numbers? How, for instance, is the regard due to property, a thing essential to the existence of states, to be reconciled with the interest of the people at large, and the rights of the majority. Shall we divide the state into the two classes of the rich and poor, and reckon the votes of five hundred of the former, equal to the votes of a thousand of the latter? Or retaining this division, shall an equal number of deputies be chosen from the class of the poor and from the class of the rich; and shall these deputies, united in one assembly, appoint by the majority of voices,

^s Cicero frequently borrows and adorns this sentiment. *Respublica est res populi. Populus autem non omnes cœtus multitudinis, sed cœtus juris consensu, et utilitatis communione, sociatus.* "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people; but the people are not a mere collection or multitude of human beings; but a multitude associated according to the principles of justice, and for the sake of utility." *Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.*

the

the magistrates and judges? According to the partisans of democracy, the political scales ought to be balanced by the mere weight of numbers; according to the partisans of oligarchy, the greatest weight of property ought always to prevail. How can those contrarieties be harmonised into system, but by considering wealth and numbers as elements of equal importance, or mere units, of which the greater number of fractional parts^a must always prevail over the lesser? Suppose, for instance, twenty poor and ten rich, and that fifteen of the poor and four of the rich are of the same opinion: it is plain, that in this case there is a greater accession of wealth to the side of numbers, than of numbers to the side of wealth. Numbers, therefore, must prevail; but the contrary would happen if the six rich, exceeding half the representation of wealth, had been joined by ten of the poor, which is half the representative of numbers. When the opposite sides are equally balanced, it will be necessary to cast lots, or to have recourse to the expedients employed in doubtful cases by tribunals and assemblies. Difficult as it certainly is, nicely to adjust contrarieties, and to discover the true theory of political arrangements, it is far more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper places, and to restrain the injustice of domineering factions. The inferior party are great sticklers

^a The Greeks, it is known, employed proportion for answering the purpose of fractions; but in explaining Aristotle's sense, I have preferred a language familiar to the modern reader.

for

B O O K for justice ; but those that are uppermost set its
VIII. maxims at defiance.¹

Chap. 4.

Of the different kinds of democracies, and of that which is the best.

Of the character of men subsisting chiefly by agriculture.

We have shewn that there are different kinds of democracies, necessarily resulting from the variety of materials of which they are composed, and the various distribution of those materials in the political structure. Every democracy is a government of the majority ; but this government may be more or less tempered in proportion as wealth, birth, morals, and other circumstances, besides the mere strength of numbers, are respected by the fundamental laws of the constitution, and preferred in the distribution of offices and honours. The principal differences of democracies result, however, from the different qualities of the people that enter into their composition ; and communities are thus marked with characteristic distinctions by their various modes of procuring the necessaries of life ; or, according to the various occupations of agriculture, pasturage, manufactures, and commerce. Agreeably to this division, the best kind of democracy, and likewise the most ancient on record, is that in which the people subsist by agriculture ; because the best class of working people are those employed in the rural

¹ This lamentation is often made by the historians of Rome, even during the ages most distinguished for political moderation. "*Sed alter semper ordo gravis alterius modestiæ erat.*" The reason is subjoined. "*Adeo moderatio tuendæ libertatis, dum æquari velle simulando ita se quisque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili est: cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro se efficiunt: et injuriam a nobis repulsam, tanquam aut facere aut pati necesse sit, injungimus aliis.*" Tit. Liv. l. iii. c. lkv. In the introduction to this book, I have endeavoured to point out the means by which the evil may be cured.

labours

labours of agriculture and pasturage, especially the former ; and the manners and habits of husbandmen are also the best adapted to counteract the evil tendency of democratic institutions. From their poverty mixed with simplicity, those classes of men are less inclined than any others, to assemble frequently or tumultuously ; and summoned to daily labour by the voice of Nature herself, they learn to prefer the certain profits of industry to the precarious acquisitions of rapine. When allowed to retain their own, they covet not the property of others. To them it is a more agreeable task, to cultivate their fields, than to compose laws ; and they do not much care to attend the national assembly, unless they be well rewarded for their political labours. The greater part of mankind are, in fact, more desirous of gain, than ambitious of honour. As a proof of this observation, we may allege the husbandmen or peasants of old, who patiently brooked absolute monarchy ; and also the peasants of our own times, who quietly endure oligarchy, provided they are not stripped of their property, nor disturbed in their labours ; by which some of them acquire opulence, and all of them avoid indigence. The alteration of the government will not alter their propensities and habits, which they will carry with them into democracy itself ; where those of them who have any seeds of ambition, will find themselves sufficiently gratified by the right of electing their magistrates, and of exacting an account of their administration. In some democracies, the people

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ple at large are seldom convened in the deliberative or elective assemblies. At Mantinæa, the usual magistrates were named by deputies previously appointed, and the nation continued well satisfied with this arrangement; because each individual might become a deputy in his turn, and thus enjoy the advantage of deciding the public resolutions, and of appointing, approving, and judging those invested with executive power. This form of democracy prevailed among the shepherds and husbandmen of Arcadia. But it is usual, and highly useful, in the best sort of democracies, though they intrust to the people at large the election and judgment of magistrates, to enact, however, that the principal offices of government should be held by men of a certain census, or without specifying any fixed census, to enjoin that such great offices should be conferred on those rich enough to discharge them disinterestedly and honourably. Such a constitution is well regulated, for power will be administered by the fittest persons, whose talents are the objects of public approbation; and whose honours, not bringing with them any profit, will not be the objects of popular envy. The superior ranks of men will be contented with an arrangement which liberates them from the hard condition of being occasionally governed by their inferiors; and they will themselves govern uprightly, because they are responsible to the people at large for their behaviour in office: magistrates not responsible are incompatible with any

kind of good government, since power uncontrolled suits not the frailty of human nature.

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This then is the best kind of democracy, because resulting from the best quality of the people, the best daily occupations, and the best consequent habits. An important question, therefore, arises, how are we to mould the people into this most useful form? The answer will be found in the legislation of ancient and most flourishing states, whose institutions encouraged agriculture in preference to all other employments. In some countries it was a law, that no individual should possess above a certain measure of ground; in others, this regulation was confined to lands within a limited distance from the capital. Some commonwealths have enacted that no family should be allowed to part with its original lot of land, or ancient inheritance; and a law of Oxylyus^k forbids any man to mortgage beyond a certain proportion of his estate. The Aphytaei^l are a populous community with a diminutive territory, yet are all of them cultivators of the ground; because, though a qualification in land is necessary for holding offices and honours, yet is this qualification so small in value or extent, that even the poorest inhabitants may easily acquire it. It is impossible to mistake the spirit of such

How agriculture is to be encouraged, and the best kind of democracy to be established.

^k King of the Elians. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. & v.

^l In some editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch. in Lyfand. p. 444. calls them Aphygæi. They inhabited the peninsula Pallæ. See in the region of Chalcis on the coast of Thrace or Macedonia. See History of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xv. p. 196. & see Strabo Excerpt. l. viii. p. 330.

regu-

B O O K regulations, which, while they prevent one class
VIII. of men from occupying more lands than they
 can themselves cultivate, call forth the industry
 of the other class by assigning to them lands of
 their own, and thereby giving them a subject on
 which that industry is always most cheerfully
 exercised.

Of democ-
 cracies of
 shepherds,
 manufac-
 turers,
 sailors, and
 merchants.

Why the
 latter democ-
 racies
 are greatly
 inferior to
 the former.

Next to a community of husbandmen, a nation
 subsisting by pasturage is the fittest for being
 formed into a democracy. There is much simi-
 larity in those two modes of life ; and as a pre-
 parative for war, the daily occupations and con-
 sequent habits of the shepherd are admirably cal-
 culated. He is accustomed to sleep in the open
 air, to march regularly, to encamp cautiously ;
 while his body is hardened by exercise, his
 mind is sharpened by vigilance. All other de-
 mocracies are of a far inferior stamp ; for their
 materials are not capable of receiving any ele-
 gant or lasting impression. They are composed
 of wretched labourers and mean mechanics, of
 manufacturers condemned to unwholesome air
 and distorting postures, of rapacious sailors and
 greedy merchants, who navigate and trade for
 no other purpose than that of gain ; a purpose
 mean in itself, and meanly or wickedly attained,
 sometimes by fraud, and sometimes by rapine.
 Men subsisting by continual deceit and mutual
 depredation, must live together in crowds,
 tumbling over each other in populous cities, and
 ready at the beck of every seditious demagogue
 to assemble tumultuously, and to act outrage-
 ously. But in a commonwealth of husbandmen,
 families

families are scattered at due distances by the necessity of their daily labours. The citizens jostle not with each other; and their circumstances neither require nor admit the frequency of popular conventions. It is for this reason that a country of great extent, and which easily afforded room for the continual diffusion of colonies at wide distances from the capital, might be improved, fortified, and embellished by agriculture alone and its subservient arts, and might enjoy, under nearly a simple democratic form, the benefits resulting from mixed policy.^m

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The properties and habits of husbandmen, as distinguished from mercenary labourers on the one hand, and from manufacturers, merchants, and tradesman on the other, are so eminently conspicuous and so incomparably better adapted to the peaceful enjoyment of every species of freedomⁿ, that even in countries where a great proportion of the inhabitants subsists by arts and commerce, the city tribes ought never to assemble separately; every convention, to be lawful, ought to be attended by deputies from the country; so that the noxious humours engendered in market-places and courts of justice, may be

That the city tribes ought not to assemble separately from those of the country.

^m Aristotle says, that such people may establish an useful democracy, and a *πολιτεία*; which he has before explained to be a mixed government, and the best form of republicanism. But the spirit of his observation would evaporate in a literal version.

ⁿ How much does a great modern democracy mistake its fundamental interest, when it is inflamed by the desire and stimulated by the jealousy of trade, and is ready to begin or carry on war in order to attain commercial superiority, or even commercial equality!

sweet-

BOOK sweetened and purified by a due mixture of
VIII. more wholesome materials.*

How the
 inferior
 kinds of
 democracy
 are to be
 established.

Such then is the constitution of the best kind of democracy. The other kinds are more or less praiseworthy, in proportion as every species of venality is more or less completely extirpated ; for public functions, gratuitously discharged, are neither the objects of jealousy nor the sources of faction ; they are not scrambled for by unprincipled indigence as instruments of profit or pleasure : they are not received as a gift, but undertaken as a task by men of property and integrity, who are covetous of nothing but public gratitude. The last and worst species of democracy, by its political arrangements, admits, and, by the allurements of fees and salaries, attracts and entices all conditions of men to the exercise of every department of executive as well as deliberative authority. It is not every city or commonwealth that is at all susceptible of such a constitution ; and to render it permanent in any country, salutary laws and habitual discipline must counteract and control the vicious principle of the government. In order to introduce this form of policy, demagogues think they can never too much strengthen the popular party. Bastards, children descended from the intermarriages of citizens and strangers, all sorts of materials, howsoever impure and corrupt,

* How wonderfully are our author's remarks illustrated by a history which he could not know, I mean the Roman ! See Livy, b. ix. c. xlv.

are

are considered as proper aliment for such a constitution. Yet it is certain that this progression in degeneracy has its limit. For when the promiscuous rabble too much overpower the rich and noble, these latter classes of men resume courage from despair, and, as happened at Cyrené^p, destroy their oppressors. The regulations once adopted by that African republic, and afterwards employed by Clisthenes at Athens, are useful in establishing democracies. Ancient distinctions are to be done away; ancient associations, civil and sacred, are to be abolished; new tribes are to be created; new and common solemnities to be instituted; and every expedient to be employed that may have a tendency to stamp the people with one uniform character, and reduce them all to the same level. Democracy may also borrow useful hints from tyranny. The unbridled licence of women, boys, and slaves is conformable to the nature and principle of democracies and tyrannies. Above all, demagogues must never cease to convince the people that under their favourite democracy, they will be at liberty to live as they list; this will procure for them the assistance of the majority; for the greater part of mankind will always be better pleased to live licentiously, than to submit to the restraints of salutary discipline.

^p This country flourished as a kingdom or aristocracy, and decayed as a democracy. See History of the World from Alexander to Augustus, chapter iii. p. 266 & seqq.

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VIII.

Chap. 5.

How they
are to be
preserved.

It is, therefore, an easy matter to establish a democracy; but the difficulty lies in rendering it permanent. Laws, therefore, of every kind, written and unwritten, must continually be shaped and fitted to those ends and purposes, which, when attained, give stability to the popular constitution; and of laws, those are to be reckoned the best and the most democratical, which tend to uphold the power, not those which flatter the passions of the majority. It is usual with the demagogues of the present age to gratify the rapacity of the multitude by unjust impeachments and corrupt judgments. But men sincerely attached to popular government, ought to counteract those dangerous and disgraceful measures by getting it established as a law, that confiscated property shall not be divided among the people, but consecrated to the gods; a law by which private peculation might be punished without provoking public rapacity, since the multitude would no longer accuse wantonly, or wickedly condemn, those of whose forfeitures they would not expect to reap the spoils. All groundless impeachments ought also to be repressed by severe penalties; and every method employed to convince the rich and noble, that those invested with power are not their enemies.

How they
are to be
rendered
more moderate and
less expensive

Democracies of the last and worst kind are sometimes so populous, that the public revenues are insufficient to defray the ordinary expences of government, without the dangerous aid of

fines

fines and confiscations. When this happens to be the case, no unnecessary assemblies ought ever to be held; and business must be dispatched in the courts of justice with all possible expedition. In consequence of these arrangements, the expences of government will be less oppressive to men of property; and although the attendance only of the poorer classes be rewarded by fees, yet the higher ranks also will for the most part attend both the assembly and the tribunals, because short and unfrequent absences from their private affairs will not prove ruinous to their fortunes; and under the control of the best citizens, deliberations will be more moderate, and decisions more equitable. When revenues, on the other hand, superabound, it is now usual with demagogues to divide the surplus among the poor; but this is pouring water into a sieve. A good statesman, instead of being contented with occasionally relieving the wants of the poor, will continually strive to better their condition; and when he gives them property, will use the best means for rendering that property permanent and productive. The public savings ought not to be squandered away in temporary and fruitless donatives, but accumulated to such an amount, that when distributed to the industrious and deserving poor, they may enable them to purchase and cultivate a few acres of land of their own, (which is incomparably the best use of public bounty,) or to acquire the materials and instruments necessary for

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carrying on manufactures and commerce. When the national savings are too scanty to admit of useful distribution to individuals, they must then be divided among the most deserving districts; and the rich, who defray the necessary expences of government, must be liberated from the burden of useless entertainments and frivolous but expensive exhibitions. By such political arrangements, the Carthaginian nobles acquired the affection of the people, whose industry they encouraged in cultivating the circumjacent territory. It belongs, surely, to the good sense as well as to the liberality of the higher ranks of men, to excite, by every means in their power, the productive labour of their inferiors. The example of the wealthy Tarentines is worthy of imitation; who, by communicating many uses of their estates to the people at large, obtained universal good-will, and greatly improved their possessions. At Tarentum, indeed, the populace were farther soothed by the law which enacted that some public offices should be distributed by lot, while others were conferred by suffrage. When the same magistracy consists of several members, this institution may be usefully varied by appointing some members by lot, and others by suffrage. Such are the arrangements which ought to prevail in democracies.

Chap. 6.

Of the different
 kinds of oligarchies:

As to oligarchies, it is plain that they must be constituted on principles totally different; since the highest intension of oligarchy is diametrically

metrically opposite to the highest intension of democracy. In proportion as oligarchies and democracies recede from their highest intension, that is, from the worst constitution of each, a tumultuary populace on one hand, and a tyrannical cabal on the other, the distance between them is gradually diminished; each preserving, however, its distinctive character, till by continual approximations, they finally run into each other, and blend harmoniously in a well-constituted republic. In that species of oligarchy which we call the first and best, because it most resembles a mixed government, retaining nothing of oligarchy but its undue preference of wealth to other political elements, there ought to be a double census, or two sorts of qualifications, of which the lowest ought to entitle those possessed of it to hold all the inferior magistracies. By this means, the best portion of the citizens would have a direct and personal interest in supporting the authority of government, and in defending the honours of that privileged order, which, by enjoying the highest census would be exclusively entitled to form the supreme council, and to administer the great offices of state. Between this species of oligarchy and that which is the last and worst, there are several intermediate kinds; each requiring additional props to preserve it in proportion to the narrowness of its base. The last and worst kind of all is the most difficultly upheld, requiring the utmost delicacy of management. Bodies well constituted, and hardily disciplined, resist and sur-

BOOK VIII.
how they are to be established and preserved.

BOOK mount the vicissitudes and shocks of life : a ship
VIII. well constructed, and well manned, defies the
 affailing tempest ; but a puny habit and a leaky
 vessel are exposed to the danger of sinking
 under the least adverse accident. A narrow
 oligarchy, therefore, can only be supported by
 the political wisdom of its magistrates, counter-
 acting by moderation and good discipline that
 tumult of passion and interest which is always
 ready to assail its security.

Chap. 7. Forms of government, we have said, are rela-
 tive to local circumstances, by which they are
 often modified, upheld, or subverted. For local
 circumstances powerfully influence the compo-
 sition of armies, and the composition of armies
 often decides the nature of the constitution.
 As communities are composed chiefly of four
 classes of men, husbandmen, manufacturers,
 merchants, and mechanics¹, so there are chiefly
 four elements that compose national strength ; ca-
 valry, heavy-armed infantry, light infantry, and
 seamen. A champaign country, by its fitness
 for rearing and maintaining cavalry, is the best
 adapted for the establishing and supporting an
 oligarchy, because men of wealth only are ca-
 pable of rearing and maintaining any consider-
 able number of horses. The next kind of oli-
 garchy may be defended by heavy-armed troops,
 since to purchase and keep in repair complete
 and well-tempered armour, only falls within the
 reach of persons possessed of no mean share of

That forms
 of govern-
 ment de-
 pend on
 the compo-
 sition of
 the military
 and naval
 force, and
 that this
 depends on
 local cir-
 cum-
 stances.

¹ *to thirteenth*, including journeymen or day-labourers, and slaves.
 opulence.

opulence. But light infantry and seamen are, on the contrary, instruments entirely adapted to the establishment or support of democracy; and where the national strength is chiefly composed of such elements, it will be difficult for an oligarchy to subsist.

The best expedient which can, in that case, be employed for propping an edifice always ready to fall in pieces, is to imitate the conduct of good generals, who, by mixing a due proportion of light troops with the heavy-armed men and the cavalry, often supply by arrangement the defect of numbers. This proportion of light troops must be raised from the youth of most honourable descent, and especially the sons of the magistrates, carefully selected and diligently exercised, whose zeal and merit will render them the fittest champions of the oligarchy. But the disease of such a constitution is too dangerous to admit of hope from the application of one single remedy. It will be prudent, therefore, gradually to impart a share of the government to persons chosen from the people at large, either, as before-mentioned, to those who have acquired a certain census; or, as was established at Thebes, to those who have ceased cultivating for a certain number of years all mean and mercenary employments; or thirdly, in imitation of Marseilles, we may associate to government abilities and virtues, in whatever class of citizens they shall be found. For the safety of oligarchies, it is necessary that the great offices of state should be burdensome.

How oligarchies are to be upheld under unfavourable local circumstances.

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VIII.

The people at large will be inclined to tolerate exclusive honours that are dearly purchased, and to pardon generous ambition, that is rewarded by nothing but an expensive pre-eminence. At entering upon office, oligarchic magistrates ought to be sumptuous in their entertainments, and magnificent in their presents. Architectural embellishments of the city, costly dedications in the temples, ought to display and perpetuate their patriotic munificence. But instead of following these salutary maxims, which can alone give permanence to their order, the nobles of the present day are equally covetous of wealth and ambitious of honour; and uniting insolent pride with greedy rapacity, the oligarchies, in which they bear sway, are nothing better than little democracies.

Chap 8.

Of the divisions of the executive power, and the different kinds of magistrates.

Having thus examined the general distribution of the powers of government, relatively to the principal elements of which communities are essentially composed, it remains to consider the necessary divisions of the executive authority, and to explain how many and what kinds of magistrates ought to be established in every well-regulated commonwealth. In small states, it is plain, there cannot be so many persons spared from employments of productive industry, for exercising useful but unproductive offices, as in states that are larger and more populous. Yet every commonwealth, that completely answers the end of its institution, must contain nearly the same varieties of executive magistracy; since, without some offices, a community could

could not subsist at all; and without others, it could not subsist happily. It is necessary therefore, to know what are those offices that admit of accumulation, and what are those that require partition; what are those offices that may be easily and safely exercised by the same person, and what are those that cannot prudently be intrusted to the same hands. The solution of this question must be derived from considering the number and nature of those offices that result from the great purposes of political society; the subsistence, accommodation, security, and comfort of its constituent members.

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The general end of the political partnership is the well-being of the partners. Men associate together and unite their efforts, that the operations of the whole community may terminate as nearly as possible in the happiness of each individual citizen. But in order to attain, by continual approximations, to this most desirable end, it is necessary that the citizens should enjoy easy and regular means of communicating mutual assistance, and supplying mutual wants^r. That species of exchange, therefore, which is directed to the purposes of accommodation and comfort, not to the senseless, because insatiable pursuit of accumulation or gain, is the most direct and immediate result of political society; and the first and most useful magistrates are those appointed to protect internal commerce, and to

Magistrates
for protect-
ing com-
merce and
contracts;

^r See Ethics, b. v. c. vi. p. 377, & seq.

see

B O O K see that it be carried on freely, regularly, and
VIII. honestly.

for main-
 taining po-
 lice both in
 the city and
 country ;

Another concern analogous to the former, and which requires the immediate attention of every state, is to take care that boundaries be accurately adjusted ; and that streets and buildings, whether private or public, be regularly disposed and solidly constructed ; so as neither to incommode nor endanger the inhabitants ; and that roads be well straightened, and kept in constant repair. These and such objects are comprehended under the name of police, which in large states is divided into a variety of branches, entrusted to particular magistrates, who are, some of them, inspectors of the harbours, others of the fountains, and others of the fortifications ; and when their offices bear a reference to the country, they are called keepers of the forests, and superintendents of districts.

for collect-
 ing and
 managing
 the reve-
 nues.

Men in their corporate capacity have occasion to effectuate public purposes, and therefore must possess a common fund. Revenues and contributions thus become necessary ; and there must of course be treasurers to receive and take charge of these contributions and revenues, and to distribute them through the various channels of the public expenditure.

Courts of
 record.

How regularly soever matters may originally be adjusted, disorders must soon take place, unless there be in every country courts of record. Contracts and judicial decisions, as well as actions, suits, and accusations, must all of them, when

when liable to be misrepresented or disputed, be committed to the faithful registry of writing; and this duty of perpetuating the memory of civil acts is plainly the function of one and the same magistracy, though the business is often divided among notaries, recorders, remembrancers, and other functionaries; whose names have, all of them, a relation to the same important concern.

Next to this is a function of government of all the most necessary, and also the most troublesome. The sentences of courts are nugatory, unless they be regularly carried into execution. A magistrate, therefore, must be appointed for exacting fines, for inflicting punishments, and for taking charge of those answerable to the laws in their bodies or estates. It is not easy to find men well qualified, and at the same time willing, to discharge this most important function; for the odium attending it makes prudence and humanity decline it, and it cannot be safely intrusted to insensibility or knavery. Knaves or fools require to be continually watched themselves, instead of being appointed to watch and take charge of others. Much attention is necessary in regulating this department of office, which will be best constituted when divided among a variety of persons called to exercise it by rotation, or to the different companies of young men employed to guard the city*. The odium attending their employment will thus be

BOOK
VIII.

Magistrates
for super-
intending
the execu-
tion of the
sentence of
courts of
justice.

* See History of Ancient Greece, v. iii. c. xxvii. p. 253, & seq.

diminish-

B O O K diminished; and the less is the odium that attends
VIII. those appointed to execute the laws, the more
 easily and the more completely will the laws be
 executed. If the same set of men were perpetually employed in conducting all matters of this kind, these men, how proper soever might be their behaviour, would soon come to be regarded as public enemies. The Athenians, therefore, wisely separated the functions of superintending the custody, and superintending the execution, of persons condemned by public justice; and the magistrates of one court may very properly be intrusted with carrying into effect the sentences pronounced by another.

Command
of the na-
tional
force.

Most of the offices hitherto enumerated and explained, may be fitly discharged without any other requisites than those of common sense and common honesty. But there are other employments requiring more than ordinary skill and more than ordinary integrity. To be the general or admiral of the commonwealth; to have the charge of equipping the fleet and marshalling the army; and to be intrusted, either in peace or war, with troops, garrisons, ships, and harbours; all these are branches of one and the same function, the command of the national force; an office that cannot be safely committed except to men of pre-eminent skill and distinguished fidelity.

Comptrol-
lers of pub-
lic ac-
counts.

Almost all magistrates and officers, civil as well as military, must be perpetually or occasionally intrusted with the receipt and expenditure of public money. In every well-regulated
 state

state there ought, therefore, to be a particular board for the specific purpose of examining and controlling the public accounts; and this board consisting of men who never handle money themselves, but who have a right to be satisfied in the name of the public, as to the precise amount of the revenues that are raised, and the exact manner in which they are employed.

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The most dignified of all magistracies is that with which important national concerns begin and terminate; which assembles the people; proposes matters for their deliberation; and, by its respected authority, either confirms or annuls their decrees. This magistracy, in which the wisdom and majesty of the state are concentrated, is called in aristocracies the college of censors¹; in oligarchies, the council of pre-advisers²; in democracies, the senate.

Religious concerns require also their proper magistrates to take charge of the temples, sacred treasures, and sacrifices; of which some are performed by priests of particular districts, the ministers of particular divinities; and others by those called kings or archons on behalf of the public at large, and in honour of the guardian gods of the commonwealth.

Different
orders of
priests.

In well-regulated and flourishing states, there are also many offices (all departments of the same function) which have for their objects the education of youth, as well as the morals of

Superintendants of
education,
morals, and
public
shows.

¹ νομοφύλακες, guardians of the laws.

² Resembling the lords of articles in the old Scottish constitution.

every

BOOK every age and of either sex, together with the
VIII decency and splendour of dramatic entertain-
 ments, and other shows and solemnities. In
 democracies, there is not any room for several
 of those magistrates. Inspectors of education
 and of morals would be altogether useless under
 such governments; where the wives and chil-
 dren of those dignified with the name of citi-
 zens are often, through poverty, employed by
 them as slaves². Such is the general sketch of
 the necessary branches of executive govern-
 ment.³

² See above, b. iv. c. xv. p. 357.

³ In some parts of this Chapter, the order of the sentences is
 changed for the sake of perspicuity; and some imperfect sentences
 are omitted, the observations contained in them being repetitions of
 what is said in Book VI.

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J. O. M.

Finished Oct. 27, 1870

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